





















Based on eleven months of field work (2009-2011), this book analyzes the situation of youth in urban Gulu, Northern Uganda, in the a ermath of the war between the Lord’s Resistance 
Army and the Ugandan Government (1986-2006). Specifically, it focuses on the generation that 
was born and grew up during the 20-year war: How do members of this generation perceive and 
evaluate socio-cultural changes which occurred in Acholi society throughout the war years? 
How do they imagine their future society? And how do they react to the expectations directed at 
them by their elders? In order to answer these questions, the book draws on rich ethnographic 
material. It provides an in-depth analysis of how imaginations of the post-war society are 
contested and negotiated between di erent groups of social actors – youth and elders, men 
and women as well as local, national and international actors. While some try to re-establish 
former cultural practices and conventions and call for a ‘retraditionalization’ of Acholi society, 
others lobby for ‘modernization’ and attempt to establish ‘new’ social structures, values and 
norms which are strongly influenced by local understandings of ‘the Western culture’. The book 
presents numerous examples of the multiple and complex ways young people strategically 
position themselves in these debates and make use of the various discourses on culture, 
tradition and modernity in their negotiations of generational, gender, family, and peer-to-peer 
relations. 
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Introduction1. 
This study is based on eleven months of field research carried out in Gulu Munici-
pality, Northern Uganda, between August 2009 and February 2011. Since 2006, 
Northern Uganda has been recovering from a 20-year war. In the current post-war 
phase, different social actors are trying to ‘rebuild’1 Acholi society and ‘normal-
ize’ societal relations, which they believe have been heavily disrupted through the 
war and particularly the war-related, large-scale displacement of Acholi people into 
refugee camps. Imaginations of a post-war society are contested and negotiated – 
between youth and elders, men and women as well as local and international actors. 
While some try to re-establish former practices and conventions, others attempt 
to establish new social structures, values and norms. Discourses and debates on 
1 Throughout this book, I use quotation marks for a number of different reasons. I use double 
quotation marks to quote a) technical or analytical terms as well as longer passages of text from 
the literature and b) terms and expressions from the emic discourse. I use single quotation marks 
to denote so-called scare quotes, i.e. to emphazise that I use a word or expression in an unusual, 
non-standard way or to imply skepticism or disagreement with the quoted terminology.
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retraditionalization versus modernization and “Westernization”2 are widespread, 
and, depending on the issue discussed, the context, and the power constellations 
involved, speakers switch between different positions.
My research project studies these ongoing negotiations and discourses from the 
perspectives of urban youth. I analyze how members of the generation that was born 
and grew up during the years of the war perceive and evaluate the socio-cultural 
changes Acholi society is seen to be undergoing, how they imagine their future so-
ciety and how they picture their role in this future society. By discussing aspirations 
and agency, predicaments and problems of the young people in Gulu, my study 
contributes to the growing field of youth research in Africa.
In this introduction, I will outline my key research questions and explain my 
approach to studying youth and discourses on socio-cultural change. In order to 
contextualize my research, I give some background information on the war and 
post-war situation in Northern Uganda and the state of the art of youth research in 
anthropology with particular focus on contemporary debates on youth and socio-
cultural change in Africa. I explain how my research contributes to these fields of 
study. Finally, I discuss my analytical framework and present an overview of the 
chapters which make up this book. First, however, I would like to introduce the 
reader to my ‘field’ and my topic of research by presenting a short anecdote from 
my field notes. 
Prolog: Barbra’s Dream
I will start by telling you a dream. It is not my dream, but the dream of Barbra, a 
13-year old Acholi girl, the daughter of a friend of mine. We, that is Lioba, Flor-
ence, her four children Barbra, Eunice, Solomon and Elizabeth3 and me, are sitting 
at our favorite pork-eating place, locally referred to as “pork joint”, at the outskirts 
of Gulu town centre. It is the first day of the long school holidays and we have de-
cided to treat the children to a pork dinner. It is already dark. The moon and the 
faded lights from the pork grill are shining over to where we are sitting, on an open 
2 Throughout this book, I use terms like “Westernization”, “Western” and “the West” in the way 
they are commonly applied in Uganda. “The West” usually refers to (Northern) America and 
(Western/Central) Europe. More important than the spatial references, however, are the ideologi-
cal implications of the terms. “Western” is often used as analogous to modern, and as antonym 
to traditional. As Ferguson (2006: 6) argues for the concept of “Africa”, the “West” marks both 
a location in space and a rank in a system of hierarchical social categories. I have put “Western” 
(etc.) in quotation marks only in those cases where I quote a particular expression from the emic 
discourse or the literature (double quotation marks) or to emphasize that the application of the 
term should be treated with caution (single quotation marks). 
3 I have listed and provided some background information on my most important interlocutors in 
the appendix.
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meadow, surrounded by trees, in wooden chairs. Some few other guests are scat-
tered across the place.
Pork joints are widespread throughout Gulu town. They are not only popular 
eating places, but important urban spaces for social gatherings. In pork joints, peo-
ple from all segments of urban Acholi society come together: men and women, local 
elites and underpaid workers, students and out-of-school youth. They are especially 
popular among the younger generation. Most of the pork joints in the town centre 
have TV screens, where videos, usually Western action films or Nigerian movies 
and sometimes also music clips, are shown from morning to night. One often finds 
customers seated in rows in front of the TVs, watching videos while eating pieces of 
roasted pork and fried cassava with chopped raw cabbage and slices of tomato.
Throughout my stay in Gulu, I spend many hours hanging out in local pork 
joints – to meet friends for food or drinks, to visit youthful interlocutors who work 
there, or simply to observe the town life. Nearly every time I make valuable discov-
eries for my research, learn important aspects about social life in Gulu, and experi-
ence thought-provoking conversations and debates. It is in the informal setting of 
pork joints that people tell me about their life stories and family biographies, about 
the time of the war, and about the challenges they face today. It is where I learn 
about Acholi names and their meanings, about rituals and proverbs and fables and 
songs; where I try to converse in the local language; where I discuss hip hop, record 
studios and the local music scene; and where I am confronted with local peoples’ 
perceptions of munu (colloquial Acholi term for white people)4, who are working in 
Gulu as ‘development experts’ or researchers.
Our local pork joint in Pece, the quarter of town where I live, does not have a 
TV screen. Lioba, Florence and I often meet here in the evenings since we all live 
close by. If the children are not at school, they always come along. Meat is not part 
of the boarding school diet and thus always appreciated as a special treat. Tonight, 
while we are waiting for the food to arrive, we talk about the dreams we had last 
night. It is Barbra’s turn. She is a good and confident story teller. After a small intro, 
she starts recounting her dream:
“I dreamt I was at school. All the students in my class had just finished their exams 
and we were enjoying some free time on the school premises. Suddenly I see 
Alfred, the shortest boy in our class. He is running around the schoolyard, wearing 
a miniskirt. I am surprised and a little bit shocked. I walk up to him and shout: 
‘Alfred, are you crazy? What do you think you are doing putting on that miniskirt?’ 
But instead of being intimidated or ashamed Alfred just answers matter-of-factly: 
‘We are now living in a globalized world and so I can wear miniskirts just as I like!’” 
(field notes 04.12.2010; my interpretation of exact wording).
4 A list of the Acholi terms used throughout this book and their English translation is provided in 
the appendix.
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This anecdote of Barbra’s dream captures many of the themes I will discuss in 
this book. I will talk about perceptions of socio-cultural change, about images of 
tradition and modernity, about generational and gendered conflicts, about various 
interpretations of Western influences, and about negotiations in the (urban) post-
war Acholi society with regard to the future and the ideal society. I believe that the 
miniskirt as reflected in Barbra’s dream is an emblem for change in Gulu – as I 
will show later in my text it is referred to in many different contexts. The miniskirt 
represents not only a modern way of dressing. Depending on the speaker it can 
stand for the emancipation of girls and young women, the loss of elder’s control over 
young people, a symbol of Western influences in Uganda, a sexual icon and sign of 
moral degeneration and indecency. Above all, it stands for the loss of “traditional 
Acholi culture”5. This discourse on cultural loss and the various perceptions and 
interpretations of socio-cultural change among the Acholi will be the main focus of 
my analysis in the following chapters.
Barbra’s dream is also relevant to my theoretical reflections on discourse, power 
and agency. In the dream, Alfred, the shortest and therefore probably one of the 
less powerful boys in his class, draws upon the discourse of a “globalized world” to 
emphasize his right to wear a miniskirt. Discourses, while reflecting existing power 
structures, can also be a means to challenge them. Drawing on a particular discourse 
can be a source of agency. According to both Foucault (1990 [1976], 2002b) and 
Ortner (1997, 2001, 2006), whose theories I outline in more detail below, social 
power relations are neither fixed nor all-encompassing, and agency can be exercised 
even by the seemingly least powerful. Alfred, who in the dream might represent a 
subordinate student, implicitly uses his knowledge of discourses on globalization, 
personal freedoms and human rights, to challenge established gender ideologies and 
dress conventions. In this sense, Barbra’s dream illustrates, in a very peculiar way, 
a point that I argue in the following: that global und local influences as well as 
changing norms and practices are negotiated at all levels of society, and that dis-
courses, power and agency are central concepts which help us to understand pro-
cesses and perceptions of socio-cultural change in contemporary Acholi society (and 
elsewhere).
The research for this study took place between 2009 and 2011 in Gulu Mu-
nicipality, Northern Uganda. Gulu Municpality is the biggest town in Northern 
Uganda. It was the main site of my field research, which lasted a total of eleven 
months. I first came to Gulu for a preparatory study in August/September 2009. 
From March 2010 until January 2011, I lived in Gulu for a period of ten months in 
which I collected the main data for my research.
5 Throughout this book, I speak of (“traditional”) Acholi culture in the emic sense, i.e. in the way 
it is imagined and referred to in local discourses. I outline in great detail in chapter 4 what the 
term entails and what people mean when they talk about Acholi culture. In chapter 4, I also refer 
to anthropological debates on the concept of culture and delineate what I understand by the term 
culture. 
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Northern Uganda has been affected by severe armed conflict since 1986 and only 
the beginning of peace talks in 2006 has brought about a lasting end of the fight-
ing. The 20-year insurgency has caused massive ruptures in the cultural and social 
life of the Acholi, the majority population in the Northern districts6, who were 
worst affected by the conflict. Continuous insecurity and forced resettlement are 
seen to have caused changes in norms, values and social practices, and have led to 
a perceived breakdown of Acholi culture. In the faltering post-war phase, different 
social actors try to ‘rebuild’ society by either re-establishing former practices and 
conventions, or by attempting to establish what is referred to as a “modern” lifestyle. 
In this book, I analyze different perceptions and interpretations of socio-cultural 
change in Northern Uganda, which manifest themselves, among other things, in 
gender and generational conflicts. I particularly focus on the perspectives of young 
people and analyze how they position themselves between conflicting notions of 
retraditionalization and modernization when imaging their future – as individuals 
and with regard to Acholi society as a whole. I also analyze the different roles attrib-
uted to Acholi youth in discourses on socio-cultural change. On the one hand, they 
are seen as bearers of hope for the future and preservers of “traditional culture“, on 
the other hand they are blamed for “losing Acholi culture” and for “westernizing” 
Acholiland. In this sense, I argue that Acholi youth are being discursively placed at 
a crossroads: between past and future, tradition and modernity, Acholi culture and 
Western culture.
Before I further elucidate my key research interests, I consider it important to 
give a brief summary of the war and the recent post-war situation in Northern 
Uganda in order to contextualize the contemporary discourses on socio-cultural 
change. After my synopsis of the recent history, I will discuss how it impacted on 
the life of Acholi youth, who grew up during the war and who were the prime focus 
of my research.
The War in Northern Uganda:  1.1. 
Insecurity, Displacement & ‘Cultural Breakdown’
Between 1986 and 2006 Northern Uganda was affected by one of the longest 
and most convoluted armed conflicts in Africa. Different rebel groups, parts of 
which later united to become the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), fought against 
the Ugandan army (National Resistance Army (NRA), later renamed to Ugandan 
Peoples Defence Force (UPDF)). The complex causes of the war and the many 
different actors involved (on the local, national and international level) have been 
controversially discussed by many authors and I analyze this literature in detail in 
chapter 3.
6 As of 2011, the Acholi sub-region, sometimes referred to as “Acholiland”, was comprised of seven 
districts: Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Amuru, Nwoya, Lamwo and Agago (see appendix, figure 1). 
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In the course of the war both the rebels and the Ugandan army committed se-
vere human rights abuses and the local population bore the brunt of the suffering. 
Thousands of people lost their lives, either through violence, starvation or war-
related diseases and epidemics. The LRA abducted tens of thousands of children 
and young adults, looted food and other belongings from the Acholi population, 
burned down their huts and massacred local people suspected of supporting the 
NRA/UPDF. Until 2006, the fighting between the LRA and the UPDF contin-
ued, sometimes with longer intervals in which no attacks were launched. Several 
peace initiatives failed. In August 2006, a first peace agreement was signed between 
the LRA and the Ugandan government, followed by further peace agreements in 
April and June 2007 and February 2008 which brought about a tentative end to the 
fighting. The peace talks, held in Juba, Southern Sudan, did not however lead to a 
final resolution of the conflict as leading commanders of the LRA refused to sign 
the final peace deal. Since 2006, Northern Uganda has experienced relative peace 
while the LRA is continuing its attacks in the DR Congo and the Central African 
Republic (ICG, 2010; 2011).
From 1996, the government started forcibly displacing the people of Northern 
Uganda into so-called “protected villages”, also commonly known as IDP7 camps. 
Over the next ten years, up to 1.8 million people (IDMC, 2010)8 – the great major-
ity of the Acholi population – were forced by the NRA/UPDF to leave their local 
villages and resettle in camps which were established around local trading centers, 
allegedly to protect the people from the LRA attacks in the villages. The living 
conditions in the camps, however, were extremely poor, leading prominent social 
scientists to accuse the Ugandan government of “social torture” (Dolan, 2009) and 
of “displacing human rights” (Branch, 2011). Several thousand Acholi people are 
said to have died as a result of the encampment due to lack of food, low health, sani-
tation and housing conditions, physical and psychological disorders and violence. 
In local perception, camp life is furthermore seen to have caused a breakdown of 
Acholi culture, i.e. formerly established economic practices, political orders, social 
relations, norms and values. This perceived loss of Acholi culture and the various 
contemporary attempts to reconstruct it will be discussed in depth in chapter 4.
Most of the people who did not stay in the camps, usually those who had better 
financial means and/or relatives in town, moved to urban centers. Gulu Municipal-
ity, the biggest town in the North, grew from around 40,000 people in the early 
1990s to approximately 130,000 people in 2002 (Branch, 2008: 1)9. In town, many 
of the new settlers experienced living in a large-scale monetary economy and gained 
7 Internally Displaced Person
8 Estimates vary between one million and 1.8 million displaced people (Branch, 2011; RLP, 2004: 
21ff.; OCHA, 2006; IDMC, 2010).
9 According to estimates attributed to the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (2012), the population of 
Gulu has developed as follows: 18,170 inhabitants in 1969; 14,958 inhabitants in 1980; 38,297 
inhabitants in 1991; 119,430 inhabitants in 2002, and 154,000 inhabitants in 2011 (cf. appendix, 
figure 4). 
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access to new technologies such as mobile phones, national and international media, 
and popular culture through TV and internet for the first time. They also lived in a 
‘multi-cultural’ setting, in which they interacted with people from other countries 
and other ethnic groups on a daily basis (ibid.: 7ff.). While people enjoyed greater 
freedom and safer living conditions in town, they also suffered from economic hard-
ships. Since no food aid was given out in town people had to struggle to provide 
for their families. And although there was an increase in the number of jobs and 
income opportunities due to the presence of humanitarian organizations (especially 
from 2000 onwards), many people were un- or underemployed and salaries were 
exceedingly low (ibid.: 5ff.).
Due to forced displacement and the subsequent change of social, cultural and 
economic practices and routines, Acholi – particularly those in the camps, but also 
those in town – increasingly perceived the war situation as a situation of ‘cultur-
al breakdown’. According to common perception, displacement implied a radical 
change in lifestyle: in camps and in town people were confronted with new norms, 
values and morals. Discourses on the rights of children and women promoted by 
many humanitarian NGOs, for instance, were seen to thoroughly challenge former 
Acholi social hierarchies (Branch, 2008: 7ff.). Images and behaviors (particularly 
those regarding dressing styles and sexual practices) exposed in Western films, which 
were (and still are) widely shown in video halls in the camps and in town, were seen 
to clash with Acholi ideas of morality and decency. To this day, a frequently voiced 
claim is that Acholi culture has been lost due to the war and its social consequences, 
and that Acholi society is experiencing a profound “moral degeneration”.
While this discourse can be found among all segments of Acholi society, it is par-
ticularly pronounced among the older generations. Elders often blame young peo-
ple for abandoning “their culture” and engaging in a lifestyle copied from the West 
instead. In the current post-war situation the benefits and detriments of “tradition”, 
and the extent to which former cultural practices should be ‘revived’ and reinstated, 
are matters of fierce debate. Urban youth, while appreciating the value of “tradi-
tion”, are frequently attracted to a more global, “Western” (youth) culture. Inspired 
by the media which conveys images of a glossy modern future, young people dream 
of a prosperous life in urban Uganda or abroad, and do not want to return to a life of 
rural farming as practiced by previous generations before the war. At the same time, 
they yearn for the communality and stability of “traditional life”, which they know 
from romanticized narratives about the past. In this sense, they are caught between 
conflicting notions of retraditionalization and modernization.
Growing up in Times of War: Acholi Youth1.2. 
The historical events I described above had a great impact on the life of my inter-
locutors. Most people I worked with during my research were born shortly before 
or during the early years of the war (i.e. roughly between the mid-80s and early 
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1990s). They had spent their childhood and early youth in a time and place that was 
characterized by great insecurity, confusion and despair. Members of this “war gen-
eration”, as I argue in more detail in chapter 5, experienced the instability caused 
by the war and the post-war situation in a specific way, which was different from 
members of older (pre-war) or younger (post-war) generations. During the war, they 
faced a particular situation of insecurity, for instance because young people of their 
age group were a prime target of LRA abductions (cf. Spitzer and Twikirize, 2012: 
70ff.). Nearly all of my interlocutors had friends, siblings or class mates who had 
been forcefully recruited by the LRA, and some of them had also been abducted 
themselves. War-related displacement also affected members of the war generation 
in specific ways. Unlike their parents and grandparents, most of them had not or 
only very briefly experienced pre-war village life and the social, cultural, economic 
and political practices related to it, which shaped older people’s imagination of a 
‘normal’, i.e. stable and regulated social life and provided them with a source of 
stability and orientation. I gained the impression that young people’s lack of a sense 
of normality had in some ways made it easier for them to adapt to the new circum-
stances in the camps or in town than for members of the older generation.
Most of my interlocutors had come to Gulu during the years of the war, either 
with their families or to stay with relatives in town. As described above, urban life 
differed significantly from life in the camps. Children and youth in town had better 
access to education and other services (e.g. health and counseling, leisure activities, 
media) which were provided or supported by international development organiza-
tions, particularly during the last years of the war. Although the overall humani-
tarian intervention, particularly the distribution of food aid, concentrated on the 
people in the camps, urban children and youth were an important target group of 
aid agencies and thus became very exposed to Western development discourses and 
practices (cf. Verma, 2012).
During the time of my research, I gained the impression that my young inter-
locutors had not only experienced the time of the war quite differently from mem-
bers of older generations, but were also confronted with specific challenges in the 
contemporary post-war period. Some of these directly resulted from the war context 
(for instance being exposed to an extremely high rate of HIV, having to cope with 
traumas resulting from abduction, displacement and violence, or being orphaned10). 
Other factors such as the lack of quality education, unemployment, political and 
economic marginalization, were challenges faced by other young people in urban 
Africa and beyond.
Acholi youth in Gulu also gained new opportunities and means to exercise 
agency compared to older generations. In some regards these were related to recent 
developments in Gulu which was in the process of becoming a rapidly growing11 
10 Spitzer & Twikirize (2012: 72) give estimates according to which 22 percent of the children in 
Northern Uganda are orphaned.
11 Gulu now ranks third in the list of most-populated towns in Uganda (cf. appendix, figure 4).
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and globalized economic center with promising business opportunities due to its re-
established and newly emerging national and international trade connections. With 
the opening of Gulu University in 2003, Gulu had also become a centre for higher 
education and attracted students from all over the country. Although many of my 
interlocutors did not immediately profit from Gulu’s economic or educational prog-
ress, they welcomed the increased access and exposure to international media and 
material culture (particularly music and films, clothing and phones) and often used 
this access in creative ways.
It is crucial to point out that there were important differences among youth 
living in Gulu, particularly regarding class and educational background, family situ-
ation and gender, which affected the ways they experienced the war and post-war 
situation. I will discuss these differences in greater detail in chapter 5. The informa-
tion provided so far suffices to describe the setting of my research and to contextu-
alize the key research questions, objectives and hypotheses which I outline in the 
following.
Key Research Questions, Objectives & Hypotheses1.3. 
Branch (2008: 7) states that
“[a]lthough there [are great] controversies over what Acholi society was like 
before displacement, the actual changes that have occurred are, especially 
now, twenty-one years since the beginning of the war, of minor importance 
relative to the perceived changes that have occurred in the eyes of the dis-
placed population itself. The differences between different perceptions of 
pre-war, pre-displacement Acholi culture and of its current changes are all-
important, for these different perceptions will guide and legitimate the dif-
ferent projects put into place after the end of displacement.”
This statement only hints at the pervasiveness of current discourses on socio-cultur-
al change in Northern Uganda and at the importance the contestations of a ‘true’ 
Acholi culture might have for the restoration and renovation of post-war society. 
Branch rightly remarks that in this context it is less relevant to try to reconstruct 
actual changes which have occurred in Acholi society. Rather, one should take seri-
ously people’s perceptions of what has changed because these perceptions fundamen-
tally shape, and thus have very real consequences for, future developments. During 
my stay in Gulu, I was confronted with discourses on socio-cultural change daily. 
Everywhere I went and whomever I talked to, at some point the topic of “cultural 
change”12 and the differences between pre-war and post-war Acholi society came 
12 My English-speaking interlocutors in Gulu used the term “cultural change” rather than socio-
cultural change to refer to the changes they perceived in Acholi cultural, social, economic and 
political life. I have opted to use the term socio-cultural change as a more encompassing term to 
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up: in the local market when talking to vendors or tailors, in restaurants selling 
Acholi food, in family contexts when visiting people at home, and at the university, 
when chatting with colleagues or students13.
Originally, my main focus of research was only on perceptions of changes in 
gender relations. However, during the course of my fieldwork I learned that gender 
relations were only one of the many topics discussed in the context of analyzing 
and interpreting socio-cultural change. I further learned that an important refer-
ence in discourses of change was not only the imagined ‘authentic’ pre-war Acholi 
society; just as relevant were imaginations of a ‘prototypical’ Western society, which 
people encountered in films, in development discourses, and by observing and/or 
interacting with expatriates currently living in Northern Uganda. I will elaborate the 
discourse on Westernization in more detail in chapter 6.
At this point it is enough to declare that discourses on socio-cultural change are 
highly complex matters. They are comprised of and interlinked in multiple ways 
with local, national and global discourses, political, economic and moral discourses 
as well as colonial and post-colonial discourses. As stated above, discourses reflect 
and at the same time challenge existing power structures. They reveal different po-
sitionalities individual actors have in Ugandan society. They enable and constrain 
agency. In my analysis, I have thus chosen a discourse-analytical approach to study 
the ways people perceive and talk about socio-cultural change in post-war Acholi 
society. My research is guided by two main questions and their respective sub-ques-
tions:
On a general level, I look at discourses on socio-cultural change and the various 
imaginations of post-war Acholi society conveyed in these discourses:
How do different social actors define, perceive and interpret socio-cultural  →
change? What are their future aspirations both individually and for their society 
as a whole?
How are values, norms and cultural practices negotiated in a society which •	
has experienced severe disruption due to war?
What are matters of debate and conflict?•	
I specifically focus on the perspectives of urban members of the generation that was 
born and grew up during the years of the war:
talk about the perceived changes in these various but closely interconnected fields of Acholi life. 
In my analysis, I am less interested in the ‘real’ changes which occurred in recent history (in fact, 
when speaking from a Foucauldian standpoint, the ‘real’ cannot be separated from the discourse 
and as such is always already an effect of power). Instead, I focus on the perceived changes and the 
way these are represented and discussed in local discourses. 
13 During the second half of my stay (August 2010 to January 2011) I worked as a part-time lecturer 
at the Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies (IPSS) of Gulu University (cf. Chap. 2). 
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How do they perceive changes in Acholi society and (how) do they position  →
themselves as agents or ‘victims’ of these socio-cultural changes?
How have their life experiences influenced their understanding of Acholi cul-•	
ture and values?
How do they picture their individual futures and the future of Acholi soci-•	
ety?
How do they react to the expectations directed at them by older members of •	
Acholi society?
These research questions are discussed with regard to three key sets of relations: 1) 
generational relations, 2) gender relations, and 3) local-global relations, especially 
between Acholiland (respectively Uganda and Africa) and the West as they are 
imagined in local discourses. All three themes are closely interconnected. They are 
of crucial relevance for my analysis not only because they recur throughout my data, 
but because all three areas are especially dense fields and transfer points of power 
relations and thus interesting and suitable to study by means of a Foucauldian 
discourse-analytical approach (see below). Throughout my analysis I will show that 
generational relations, gender relations, and (imagined) relations between Uganda 
and the West are currently major fields in which power relations are established, 
maintained and contested. It is in these fields that all the different types of discours-
es I mentioned above – local, national and global, political, economic and moral, as 
well as colonial and postcolonial discourses – become closely intertwined.
Throughout my study, I place Acholi youth, specifically those who grew up dur-
ing the time of the war, in the centre of my analysis. My key argument is that 
members of this war generation are faced with a particular situation of uncertainty14 
and ambivalence. This is linked, on the one hand, to their experience of protracted 
war and the profound changes people attribute to the war. On the other hand, it 
is related to the expectations and hopes placed on Acholi youth as the “pillars” of 
the future15 and the preservers of Acholi culture. I argue that the war generation 
occupies a specific in-between position. It is seen as the link between the war-torn 
past and a prospective peaceful future, but also between tradition and modernity, 
Uganda and the West. As ‘beacons of hope’ for Acholi future, members of this gen-
eration face an enormous amount of societal pressure. Figuratively speaking, they 
are placed at a crossroads at which they feel that they have to choose whether they 
14 In my understanding of uncertainty, I loosely draw on Reiter (2010: 8), who defines the concept 
of “biographical uncertainty”, which has been applied in different sociological studies, as “the 
weakening of [the] linkage of experience, expectation and projecting due to an erosion of inter-
subjectively shared certainty in a special social situation”. According to this definition, uncer-
tainty is linked to the difficulty to establish a coherent link between past experiences and future 
actions.
15 According to Cheney (2007: 3) the Ugandan national youth anthem even refers to young people 
as “the pillars of Uganda’s tomorrow”.
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want to be ‘breakers with’ or ‘re-makers of ’ the past. It is their burden but also their 
chance to decide whether these seemingly conflicting notions can be reconciled or 
whether they are, as often suggested, mutually exclusive.
My study seeks to make a contribution to the growing field of youth research 
and generational change in Africa. I assume that in societies which recently expe-
rienced prolonged war, such as in Northern Uganda, the dynamics of and debates 
on change are even more pronounced than in other contemporary African societies. 
I thus believe that my research can provide specific insights into the complex ways 
change is negotiated by youth and between youth and elders, men and women, local 
and international actors.
The origins of youth research in anthropology go back to the early years of the 
discipline, but approaches to studying youth have rapidly changed over time. There-
fore, it is necessary to first give a brief overview of the historical development of the 
anthropology of youth before I discuss recent developments in this field with par-
ticular regional focus on Africa. Subsequently, I will elaborate my standpoint, and 
propose how my research contributes to current debates.
State of the Art: Past & Contemporary Debates  1.4. 
in the Anthropology of Youth
In the last 20 years, youth and youth culture have (again) become popular fields of 
research in anthropology. Studies of childhood and adolescence, both in Western 
and non-Western societies, have a long history in anthropology, but their focus has 
greatly changed over the years (for a good overview, see Bucholtz, 2002; Dracklé, 
1996a; Hodkinson, 2007; Luig & Seebode, 2003b; Wulff, 1995).
History of Youth Research in Anthropology1.4.1. 
A foundational work in the field of youth research, which subsequently inspired 
many studies in anthropology, was Stanley Hall’s Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its 
Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education, 
first published in 1904. Hall analyzes adolescence as a process of becoming, a tran-
sitory life stage marked and to some extent determined by physiological changes. 
Due to the bodily changes during puberty, Hall regards adolescence as a universal 
period of uncertainty, existent in all societies. Adolescent sexuality and delinquency 
are two of the topics discussed at length by Hall, and, as I will show in the follow-
ing, have been taken up by sociologists and anthropologists as key themes of youth 
research until today (Hall, 1911; cf. Dracklé, 1996a: 19ff.).
In the 1920s and 1930s, anthropologists became interested in studying ado-
lescence in cross-cultural perspective (Benedict, 2008 [1938]; Malinowski, 2001 
[1927]; Mead, 1949 [1928]). Margaret Mead’s Coming of Age in Samoa is one of 
the pioneering books of early cultural anthropology and an essential reference in 
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its emerging Culture and Personality School. In her study among adolescent girls 
in Ta’ū, Mead analyzes the passage from childhood to adulthood in Samoan soci-
ety by looking at family, gender and sexual relations and related social norms, and 
compares them to adolescence in the U.S.A. (Mead, 1949 [1928]). Her findings, 
although later disputed by Freeman (1983), challenge Hall’s assumption of a uni-
versal and biologically determined phase of adolescence, and instead emphasize the 
culturally-determined particularities of growing up in different societies.
For a long time after these early works, anthropologists continued to study ado-
lescence as a phase of transition, as passages from childhood to adulthood. Ado-
lescents were regarded as no longer children but not yet adults. They were thus 
seen as ‘incomplete’ and studied from an adult perspective, rather than taken as 
self-determining and mature social actors. A prominent, albeit very narrow focus 
of the anthropology of adolescence were rites de passage and initiation rituals (e.g. 
Richards, 1956; Turner, 1967), which were seen as the most crucial transition points 
from childhood to adulthood (for an overview and critical analysis of these studies 
see Dracklé, 1996a; Lauser & Bräunlein, 1996: 152ff.; Müller, 1992; Schlegel & 
Barry, 1980; 1979).
A separate strand of research on youth and adolescents was situated at the cross-
roads between anthropology, sociology and cultural studies, and was largely focused 
on urban youth and youth (sub)cultures16 in Western societies. Starting in the 
1920s, the Chicago School produced some famous monographs which particularly 
focused on (criminal) urban youth gangs (e.g. A. Cohen, 1967 [1955]; Whyte, 1955 
[1943]). The deviant behavior of youth, often second generation immigrants, was 
discussed in relation to racial segregation and economic destitution in the USA, and 
can be seen as important antecedents to more recent works on social marginalization 
in inner-city America, most prominently those by Bourgois (2003; with Schonberg, 
2009). The Chicago School also greatly influenced the foundation of youth cultural 
studies, particularly in Birmingham (Bucholtz, 2002: 536).
In the 1960s, the Birmingham Centre of Contemporary Cultural Studies 
(CCCS) started to analyze youth “subcultures” in Great Britain. The studies by dif-
ferent researchers mainly concentrated on male (for an exception see McRobbie & 
Garber, 1991 [1975]), white, urban, working class youth. They applied a Marxist 
framework to discuss the perpetuation of class dynamics across generations, and 
were particularly concerned with “cultural style” as a basis for class identity, and with 
resistance against hegemonic, mainstream culture (Hebdige, 1988 [1979]; Hall & 
Jefferson, 1991 [1975]). With the prominent exception of Willis’ study of working 
class “lads” (1977), the CCCS researchers did not base their studies on participant 
observation, but rather on textual and semiotic analysis. Nevertheless, their stud-
ies greatly influenced later youth research in anthropology and beyond. A good 
example is Stanley Cohen’s concept of moral panics (Cohen, 2002 [1972]), which 
is still frequently cited and referred to (cf. Buchholtz, 2002: 536ff.; Valentine et al., 
16 The term youth culture was first introduced by Talcott Parsons in 1964 (Wulff, 1995: 3). 
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1998: 10–19). Furthermore, many contemporary studies which focus youth’s resis-
tance to and contestations of race-, class-, gender- or ethnicity-based discrimination, 
often in the context of globalization, build on the works of the Birmingham School 
(Cole & Durham, 2008b: 4; Bucholtz, 2002: 540f.).
During the 1980s and early 1990s, research on youth and youth culture lost 
some of its former popularity in anthropology (and sociology). But in the past two 
decades, a new focus on youth has emerged (Luig & Seebode, 2003b: 9). Although 
topics discussed throughout its early stages – like sexuality, deviancy, crisis etc. – are 
still important today, youth research has undergone a significant shift. Newer ap-
proaches to the subject have regional foci and theoretical premises which largely 
differ from older approaches.
For a long time, youth were mainly studied in the context of Western, industrial-
ized societies (Wulff, 1995: 2). Anthropologists did study adolescents in non-Western 
societies, but, as outlined above, with the aim of comparing adolescence in Western- 
and non-Western societies, and/or with an often exoticizing focus on initiations. 
Nowadays, social scientists study youth in the context of globalization and analyze 
the interplay between local and global youth cultures, prominently in the fields 
of music, film, clothing and recently also computer-based social networking (Fur-
long & Cartmel, 1997; Hodkinson & Deike, 2007; Skelton & Valentine, 1998). 
In anthropology, youth research relates to a range of broader popular themes (e.g. 
post-modernism, media, consumerism, ethnicity, gender, sexuality) and analytical 
concepts (e.g. agency, space, resistance, identity, performance) which are related to 
contemporary process of socio-cultural change across the globe (e.g. the volumes 
by Amit-Talai & Wulff, 1995; Cole & Durham, 2007a; 2008a; Luig & Seebode, 
2003a). As Wulff (1995: 1) states in her often-cited introduction: “The analysis of 
youth cultural production raises questions which are at the very heart of contempo-
rary debates in anthropology”. She further argues that “[w]hen it comes to globaliza-
tion or transnational connections youth cultures are in the forefront of theoretical 
interest; youth, their ideas and commodities move easily across national borders, 
shaping and being shaped by all kinds of structures and meanings” (ibid.: 10).
Defining Youth: Conceptual Challenges & Debates1.4.2. 
The broader, global focus in studying young people has exposed some conceptual 
problems in defining youth. In their introduction to a volume on globalization and 
the temporalities of children and youth, Cole and Durham (2008b: 5) claim that 
“[c]hildhood and youth are notoriously difficult categories to define”. The chal-
lenge arises not only from the fact that conceptions of life stages differ vastly across 
cultures and societies, but also because, very broadly speaking, rapid changes in all 
societies across the globe, particularly throughout the second half of the 20th cen-
tury and until today, have called into question formerly established assumptions of 
‘normal’ life courses and have led to a disjuncture of biological age and the expected 
correlating life stage.
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For a long time in anthropological writings, concepts of childhood, adolescents, 
youth, or adulthood were based on Euro-American understandings of the life cycle 
as a “developmental teleology” (Cole & Durham, 2008b: 5) and clearly separable, 
successive stages, based primarily on biological age. As stated above, more recent 
works fundamentally challenge these assumptions (Baller, 2010: 25ff.). Cole and 
Durham (2008b: 6ff.), for instance, point out that adolescence as a distinct life stage 
only came to be recognized in Europe and the USA in the course of the 19th and 
20th century and was particularly shaped by the introduction of capitalism. Condon 
(1990) argues that among the Canadian Inuit he studied population changes, in-
creased economic security, and increased exposure to “southern” value systems led 
to the recognition of adolescence as a prolonged life stage – albeit substantially later 
than in Western societies – which was non-existent in the pre-contact period. Thus, 
definitions of social categories like youth or adulthood, are always determined by 
social circumstances rather than being biologically determined. What exactly it 
means to be a child, a youth, or an adult, and whether these are relevant categories 
at all, changes over time and greatly varies across cultures and genders.
In recent decades, however, social categories, their boundaries and definitions 
have undergone significant and somewhat paradoxical shifts across the globe. On 
the one hand, there has been a global move towards standardized definitions, usu-
ally based on biological age, for statistical reasons, legal purposes and social plan-
ning. This trend must be seen in connection with the global establishment of the 
nation state (cf. Scott, 1998). In international or regional conventions such as the 
Convention of the Right of the Child (1989) or the African Youth Charter (2006), 
definitions of “child” or “youth” have even been homogenized beyond the level of 
the nation state. On the other hand, locally established, i.e. emic markers of social 
categories and their boundaries have become obscured for various reasons. Initia-
tions, for instance, which formerly served to mark the transition from childhood 
to youth in many societies, are no longer experienced collectively by all or even 
the majority of boys and/or girls in these societies – because young people are in 
boarding schools or their families have moved to towns, or because initiation rituals 
have been discontinued due to the introduction of Christianity. Similarly, ‘status 
symbols’ like marriage and the establishment of an independent household, which 
formerly marked the transition from youth to adulthood in many cultures, are no 
longer attainable for a large number of young people for a number of reasons: young 
men cannot find employment and lack the resources to pay the brideprice; young 
women therefore cannot find a husband in their age group and often turn to older 
men or simply remain unmarried. Furthermore, due to processes of urbanization 
and neoliberalization new conventions and social relations are emerging which dif-
fer considerably from existing patterns and norms (Hansen, 2005: 14; Honwana, 
2012: 89ff.).
In any case, the discrepancy between ideal type and reality poses an analytical 
challenge. For how can social scientists still operate with the term “youth” if in 
fact a considerable proportion of young people remain “youth forever” (Hansen, 
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2005: 5)? And even beyond the analytical level, the emergence of new social actors 
who fit neither the standardized, formal categories nor the emic ones, constitutes a 
very real concern. A prominent example are ‘child soldiers’, a category of social ac-
tors, which challenges definitions of child, youth, and adult, and deeply confounds 
behavioral expectations, social roles and hierarchies associated with these social cat-
egories (Baines, 2009).
Anthropological studies have increasingly become confronted with a gap between 
ideal life stages and lived realities and the uncertainties and confusion which result 
from this incongruity (Cole, 2011: 82). Honwana (2012: 19ff.), in her comparative 
analysis of African youth, uses the concept of “waithood” to analyze this phenom-
enon and states that “[f ]or many, being young in Africa today is synonymous with 
living in involuntary waithood” (ibid.: 6). The problem of conceptualizing youth 
has become a central concern and issue of debate in anthropology in the last two de-
cades. In the following, I will briefly sketch some of the most important ‘solutions’ 
anthropologists have found to deal with the problem of conceptualizing youth, and 
outline some of the ongoing debates carried out concerning this matter.
Adolescence
As already stated above, in its earlier stages, the majority of anthropological re-
search on ‘young people’ was highly influenced by Western psychology and its 
postulations on adolescence. Adolescence was seen as a universal process and life 
stage, throughout which physical and social transitions occurred, and which was 
thus experienced by the individual as a period of uncertainty and crisis. Although 
some anthropologists working with the concept of adolescence acknowledged that 
‘context’ had different effects on the way individuals in different cultural settings 
experienced adolescence, the concept as such was not generally questioned. The 
definition of adolescence was based largely on biological age and biological mea-
sures, i.e. the years of puberty, and therefore did not constitute a major analytical 
concern (Bucholtz, 2002: 528ff.).
Conceptually and etymologically, the word adolescence, derived from the Latin 
word adolescere, to grow, implies a sense of incompleteness, a state of becoming, 
and thus of not yet being a full social actor (Bucholtz, 2002: 532). Accordingly, 
anthropologists have tended to view adolescents “as not to be taken very seriously” 
and many studies depicted them “as objects of adult activity” (Wulff, 1995: 1). 
Adolescents in anthropological studies were often represented by others – by adults 
in their community or the anthropologist speaking about and for them rather than 
with them – often with an educational intent. These studies were thus often more 
about the way adults guide and socialize young people to become full members of 
the society and not about the many informal ways young people socialize them-
selves. Due to their often comparative design, many studies on adolescents were 
shaped by the anthropologists’ own assumptions about adolescence in their coun-
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tries of origin, and this bias was rarely openly reflected upon (Bucholtz, 2002: 529; 
Dracklé, 1996a).
Bucholtz (2002), Dracklé (1996a) and Wulff (1995) thus all call for a different 
approach to the study of young people, one which discards the concept of adoles-
cence and the premises associated with its study, and which instead focuses on youth 
as cultural agents.
Youth as Cultural Agents
As an alternative to the “anthropology of adolescence”, Bucholtz advocates an actor-
centered approach, the “anthropology of youth”, which she believes can help to 
overcome some of the shortcomings she associates with the former. She delineates 
this approach as follows:
“More recently, (…) an anthropology of youth has begun to take shape, 
sparked by the stimuli of modernity and globalization and the ambivalent 
engagement of youth in local contexts. This broad and interdisciplinary ap-
proach revisits questions first raised in earlier sociological and anthropo-
logical frameworks, while introducing new issues that arise under current 
economic, political, and cultural conditions. The anthropology of youth is 
characterized by its attention to the agency of young people, its concern to doc-
ument not just highly visible youth cultures but the entirety of youth cultural 
practice, and its interest in how identities emerge in new cultural formations 
that creatively combine elements of global capitalism, transnationalism, and lo-
cal culture” (Bucholtz, 2002: 525; my emphasis).
In contrast to the concept of adolescence, which is based on “age as biological fact”, 
Bucholtz then sees the concept of youth as based on “age as identity”, and empha-
sizes that “the selection of either term is itself a theoretical choice”, which leads to 
very different research approaches and outcomes (Bucholtz, 2002: 532). Bucholtz 
does not in fact provide a definition of youth, but is rather concerned with broader 
conceptual issues related to studying youth. Essential to her approach are the con-
cepts of agency and identity. She stresses the necessity to focus on youth’s own 
cultural agency which can be somewhat independent from that of adults. Youth 
are not only being formed by their elders, but also rebel against them and are often 
initiators of socio-cultural change. They are full cultural, social and political actors, 
who take conscious choices and are influenced by their peer groups just as much or 
even more than by adult members of their communities.
Bucholtz’s approach has been criticized by Durham (2008) and Cole (2011), 
both prominent anthropologists of youth in Africa. They claim that Bucholtz’s focus 
on agency is too much centered on individual actors and often aligned with a very 
rationalist subjectivity, which reflects the ideal of Western individualism. They ar-
gue that agency as a positively connoted concept celebrates the opposition between 
subjects and existing structures, but often tempts the researcher to overlook the fact 
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that many individuals, particularly in non-Western contexts, aspire to become part 
of and subordinate themselves to a collectivity. In this sense, Cole claims that Bu-
choltz’s approach is not very suitable for African contexts where youth seek to “be 
recruited into particular kinds of subject positions” (Cole, 2011: 72) which can be 
tied to the reproduction of patron-client relationships. She asserts that “youth seek 
adulthood by subjecting themselves even more intensively to the networks and so-
cial relations that provide economic and social opportunities. Theirs is not a story of 
standing outside existing structures of power: It is a story trying to get inside them” 
(Cole, 2011: 73).
Durham also criticizes that agency has become a rather arbitrary and ubiquitous 
concept in anthropology, which requires further specification if it is to be of any 
analytical value. She wonders whether youth have the same kind of agency as other 
people and suggests that “[w]e must ask what kind of agency they might have, how 
they come by it and exercise it, and how their agency relates them to others and 
to their society” (Durham, 2008: 153). She questions whether youth are really the 
initiators of socio-cultural change often envisioned in the West, and criticizes the 
“romance of youth agency” frequently portrayed in anthropological writings (ibid.: 
164ff.; 175f.). Thus, rather than conceptualizing youth as cultural actors, Durham 
(2004) suggests that they are “social shifters”.
Youth as Social Shifters
Durham develops her concept of youth as “social shifters” with reference to her 
own ethnographic research in Botswana. Drawing on linguistic concepts, Durham 
suggests that “youth is socially deictic or, more boldly, a social shifter” (2004: 589). 
Who is considered youth can only be understood with reference to temporal, spatial 
and social context, and it is situationally created or defined. Youth is thus a rela-
tional concept, and who is considered youth is contested and changes depending on 
the situation. In Durham’s words:
“If one accepts that youth (or other age categories) is culturally contingent, 
that is relational, and that there may be more than one set of age-related 
frameworks available in any society, then one must explore that pragmatic 
dimensions through which age is invoked, the political aspect of calling 
someone ‘youth’ (or not)” (2004: 592).
In this sense, the act of labeling oneself or someone else as youth can be considered 
a political act (ibid.). It reflects struggles within society about defining, represent-
ing and positioning (age) groups: “To call someone a youth is to position him or 
her in terms of a variety of social attributes, including not only age but also inde-
pendence–dependence, authority, rights, abilities, knowledge, responsibilities, and 
so on” (Durham, 2004: 593). The contested, dynamic and relational meanings of 
youth in any given society need to be taken into account by anthropologists. Rather 
than assuming that all youth are cultural agents, researchers need to understand 
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what it means in a given society to be a ‘youthful cultural agent’, in which situations 
it may be desirable or undesirable to be labeled as such, and how young people are 
positioned and position themselves in the category of youth (cf. Christiansen et al., 
2006b: 9ff.).
Generation
A different but related approach to studying young people, i.e. analyzing generations 
and generational dynamics, has recently experienced a new popularity, particularly 
among scholars studying African youth (e.g. Alber et al., 2008; Alber & Häberlein, 
2010; Bundy, 1987; Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999; Kagwanja, 2005). The concept 
of generation, just as the concept of social shifter, is a relational one. Specifically, it 
designates relations in time. It does not a priori define a social category in terms of 
youth or adulthood, but acknowledges the relational nature of such categories. In 
the literature on Africa one can identify three different conceptions of generation 
(Whyte et al., 2008: 3ff.): a) generation as a genealogical relation of kinship; b) gen-
eration as a principle for structuring society (as in the classical example of age sets 
among East African pastoralists); and c) generation as historical generation or co-
hort, as outlined by Karl Mannheim in his classic text The Problem of Generations, 
first published in German in 1928. Most of the recent studies by anthropologists 
draw on this last conception, which I will therefore briefly summarize17.
According to Mannheim, a central characteristic of a generation is “the similar-
ity of location of a number of individuals in the social whole” (1972: 290)18. He 
postulates that a “historical generation” reaches maturity in a similar cultural and 
historical “location”, which its members are conscious of, and which offers its mem-
bers a limited range of potential experiences. If, during their young ages, people 
of a similar age range experience major historical shifts and socio-cultural changes 
together, they can develop a “generational consciousness” (1972: 288ff.). However, 
whether a generation does in fact develop such a distinctive consciousness depends 
on the “tempo” of change. As Mannheim states, “not every generation location – 
not even every age group – creates new collective impulses and formative principles 
original to itself and adequate to its particular situation” (1972: 309). This depends 
on the “realization of potentialities” inherent in the social location, and it is closely 
connected to the speed of socio-cultural change (ibid.). Furthermore, the percep-
tion of one’s generation as a distinct group, i.e. as a “generation in actuality”, only 
develops when a concrete bond exists between its members due to their exposure to 
similar social and intellectual modes of thought. These may differ between people of 
different classes and social backgrounds (e.g. urban vs. rural) and their subsequent 
17 For a re-interpretation of Mannheim’s theory in view of current sociological theory see Fietze, 
2009. 
18 In this book, I draw on the English translation of Mannheim’s text by Paul Kecskemeti (cf. 
Mannheim, 1972) in order to be able to use direct quotes without having to translate them from 
the German original.
36 Julia Vorhölter: Youth at the Crossroads
capacity to participate actively in social transformation, which results from these 
different positionalities in society (1972: 302ff.). The most concrete group within 
an “actual generation” is the “generation unit”, which is not only exposed to similar 
modes of thought, but shares a similar ideology or “identity of responses” (ibid.: 
306), i.e. shares a similar conviction how to respond to a particular historical situa-
tion. Mannheim gives the example of liberal and conservative groups in 19th century 
Germany, which he sees as polar forms of generation units within an “actual genera-
tion” (1972: 304).
An important concept in Mannheim’s theory which is often taken up in re-
cent writings (e.g. Cole, 2004) is the concept of “fresh contact” (Mannheim, 1972: 
293f.). Mannheim attempts to explain processes of socio-cultural change by arguing 
that every new generation establishes “fresh contact” with the already existing social 
and cultural heritage but with a different attitude than former generations. Thus 
every generation assimilates accumulated heritages differently and selects different 
cultural elements to be kept and others to be forgotten (cf. Cole & Durham, 2007b: 
16ff., who use a similar concept which they call “regeneration”).
Defining Youth in Northern Uganda1.5. 
My own conception of youth is largely based on and combines the more recent 
approaches just outlined. I provide more detailed information on my regular inter-
locutors, interviewees and respondents in the course of my analysis and in the ap-
pendix. Here, I only want to explicate my conceptual approach and delineate who 
I mean when I speak of youth or the young generation.
As a label for the target group of my research in a narrower sense, I have coined 
the term “war generation”. Thereby, I have used Mannheim’s concept of “histori-
cal generation”. I speak of the war generation when I want to refer to a particular 
‘subgroup’ of Acholi youth, namely the generation which was born and grew up 
during the years of the war, i.e. those born shortly before or in the early years of the 
war (roughly between the mid-80s and early 1990s). The group thus defined can be 
well-described as a historical generation in a Mannheimian sense: members of this 
generation reached maturity in a similar location, experienced a major historical 
shift, i.e. the war, throughout their childhood and adolescence, and thus – one has 
reason to believe19 – developed a form of “generational consciousness”. Throughout 
my field research I mainly worked with urban members of this war generation in 
Gulu Municipality who had spent most of their life in town (i.e. they never or only 
briefly experienced village life and did not spent extended periods of time in the 
19 The question whether the “war generation” had developed a generational consciousness in the 
Mannheimian sense is, in fact, an empricial one. Although I did not gather systematic data with 
regard to this question, I assume that members of the war generation did possess a form of genera-
tional consciousness because in several discursive contexts they referred to themselves and were 
referred to by others as a distinct generation. 
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IDP camps). I chose to place them in the center of my analysis, because they expe-
rienced war-related changes in Acholi society in a very particular way as I will argue 
in more detail in chapter 5, where I describe the specific characteristics of the urban 
war generation and also point out important differences between its members.
When speaking about Acholi youth in a broader, more general sense, I draw on 
Bucholtz’s concept of youth as cultural agents. Like Bucholtz, I believe that youth 
represent a distinct group of social actors, which can exercise cultural agency and 
initiate or influence socio-cultural changes relatively independent of or even in op-
position to other societal groups, namely adults and elders. This assumption also 
seemed to be in line with the conceptions of youth I encountered in Gulu because, 
as stated above, my interlocutors often spoke about youth and elders as distinct cat-
egories, endowed with different characteristics and different potentials for agency. 
In my research I am interested to find out under which conditions young people 
perceive themselves as agents and actively try to influence change processes, and in 
which situations they perceive themselves as subordinated members of society who 
cannot or do not want to question the status quo. Following Bucholtz, I do not a 
priori want to categorize youth as agents or victims, equals or subordinated as is 
often been done by adult members of society and by external researchers. Rather, 
I focus not only on youth’s perspectives on social developments, but also on their 
perceptions of themselves.
Based on my empirical experience, I acknowledge that youth in Northern Ugan-
da, just as Durham has argued, is very much and maybe increasingly becoming a 
relational category. Who is categorized as youth varies from situation to situation 
and according to speaker and context. I can give many examples from my fieldwork, 
where in one situation a person was labeled youth, and in another was addressed 
as an adult or even an elder. One extreme case happened in the context of a group 
discussion in Bobbi, a rural area some 30 kilometers outside of Gulu. My research 
assistant had organized the interview with the help of a young woman, Alice, who 
was living and working in Bobbi. When telling me about her, my assistant always 
referred to her as “youth”. He knew her because she sometimes helped the Youth 
Centre in Gulu where he was working to organize outreach programs in Bobbi. 
Alice was 25 years of age and married with one child. When we arrived at the day of 
the interview she had organized a number of young people between the ages of 16 
and 20. She had also tried to find elders, as the interview was planned as a group dis-
cussion between youth and elders. Unfortunately, she had only managed to find two 
elderly men. Thus, in the course of the interview, my research assistant started to ad-
dress her as a female elder. He, for instance, asked her to give her opinion on today’s 
young generation and to judge them from her adult/elder point of view. Thus, in the 
brief context of the interview, Alice social position shifted to that of an elder – not 
because she really fulfilled the criteria for being an elder, but because relative to the 
other young people present, she came closest to these criteria, i.e. being married, 
having a child and being (relatively) older (cf. field notes 06.10.2010).
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This is a very extreme case. However, in all the interviews I conducted with mixed 
groups of elders and youth there was always significant variation as to who was 
considered youth, and who would fall in the category of elder. Sometimes youth 
were school children in their teenage years; sometimes they were married men and 
women in their late 20s. Similarly, elders were sometimes in their 50s and 60s, and 
at other times they were people in their 40s and 30s. In these mixed group contexts, 
the relationality of categories such as youth and elder became very obvious to me.
Before I close my conceptual reflections on youth, I will briefly touch upon emic 
conceptions of youth among the Acholi as well as official Ugandan definitions. The 
Acholi word for youth is bulu. According to my interlocutors there were and are 
no specific initiation rituals which mark the transition from childhood to youth. 
Rather, a person passes the threshold from child to youth when he or she obtains a 
separate hut in the father’s compound. Children usually sleep in their parent’s hut 
and later in the kitchen until they are old enough to inhabit a separate hut. The in-
formation people gave me on the age of the child when he or she moves to a separate 
hut varied considerable. Some claimed a boy could be as young as ten, others said 
it was only at a later age. Whether girls also obtained a separate hut was a matter 
of considerable debate. The issue of having a separate hut was the most commonly 
mentioned single indicator of child to youth transition I encountered. Rather than 
referring to this Acholi conceptualization of youth, however, most of the people I 
talked to referred to official definitions of particular institutions or the Ugandan 
state when asked to define youth. These definitions were all based on age-spans, and 
normally ranged somewhere between 9 and 35, with sizeable differences at both 
ends20. The official Ugandan National Youth Policy defines youth as “all young per-
sons (…) aged 12 to 30 years”, claiming that “[t]his is a period of great emotional, 
physical and psychological change that requires societal support for a safe passage 
from adolescents to adulthood” (Republic of Uganda, 2001: 9). Similar arguments, 
which reflect an understanding of youth as a period of change and an in-between 
status, were also put forth by my interlocutors.
To sum up, one can state that youth both as analytical category and emic con-
cept is a highly blurred one which is nevertheless relevant and frequently used in 
academic writing as well as in quotidian conversations. What is clear is that terms 
like youth and elders are always relative to some degree. Abstractly, they can be 
used to refer to distinct groups, but who is included in this group is highly context-
specific. In order to define my target group in a narrower sense, I have therefore used 
the Mannheimian concept of “historical generation”, which allows for the definition 
of distinctive groups in relation to a particular event in history, in my case the war. 
However, throughout this book I also often (and interchangeably) use comparative 
20 In interviews I conducted with members of CBOs and NGOs working in the field of youth, the 
following different age spans were named by my interlocutors: 18–35 (INT Rocki, 16.03.2010); 
12–35 (INT Ojara,17.03.2010); 9–24 (INT Faith, 18.03.2010); 15–30 (INT Zipparoh, 
23.03.2010); 12–24 or 12–35 (INT Henry & Bangi, 27.04.2010). 
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terms like youth and elders, the young(er) and old(er) generation or young(er) and 
old(er) people. By doing so, I do not imply that these categories are fixed or homog-
enous. Rather, I consider them to be relative categories and use them to emphasize 
different tendencies between these ‘groups’, for instance with regard to a particular 
topic of debate. Unless otherwise stated, I use these comparative terms in the way 
they were also used by my interlocutors in the context or situation I refer to.
The question of conceptualizing of youth, and thereby taking into account etic, 
emic as well as situational understandings, remains a central concern in all contem-
porary studies of youth. In the following, however, I want to turn from general re-
flections to the field of youth research which is specifically relevant for my research: 
current studies on youth with a regional focus on Africa.
State of the Art: Contemporary Debates  1.6. 
on Youth & Socio-Cultural Change in Africa
Studying youth and socio-cultural changes has emerged as one of the major pre-
occupations of Africanist scholars as the following quotes by leading researchers 
reveal. Diouf (2003: 2), for instance, states that
“[t]oday, young people are emerging as one of the central concerns of Afri-
can studies. (…). Undoubtedly, the centrality of this subject is connected to 
the extraordinary turnaround over the last three decades in the way African 
societies see themselves.”
Durham (2000: 113) argues that
“[y]outh are an increasingly compelling subject for study in Africa (…). To 
pay attention to youth is to pay close attention to the topology of the so-
cial landscape – to power and agency; public, national and domestic spaces 
and identities, and their articulation and disjunctures; memory, history and 
senses of change; globalization and governance; gender and class.”
Similarly, and more recently, Honwana (2012: 3) in her book The Time of Youth – 
Work, Social Change and Politics in Africa has emphasized that
“[y]outh are a critical indicator of the state of the nation, of its politics, econ-
omy, and social and cultural life. Studying youth involves not only studying 
the lives of young people themselves, in all their diversity, but also under-
standing the social, political, economic, and cultural concerns of adults. The 
two generations are entangled in complex processes of construction and re-
construction, the making and remaking of society.”
And Abbink (2005: 3) proposes that “there is a need to integrate the youth factor 
as a necessary element in any social analysis of African societies” (my emphasis). 
Anthropologists, in particular, have discovered youth and generation as central 
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concepts to analyze contemporary African societies and to understand the rapid 
socio-cultural changes these societies have experienced in the past decades.21 There 
are several reasons for this increased interest.
The first is that young people make up such a large proportion of contempo-
rary African societies. The World Population Data Sheet for 2011 indicates that 43 
percent of the population in Sub-Sahara Africa is below 15 years of age. Only three 
percent are above 65. All top-ten countries listed in the World Population Report 
as those with the youngest population worldwide are in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
contrast, with the exception of Japan, all of the top-ten countries with the oldest 
population are in Europe. Here, only 16 percent of the population is below 15, the 
same percentage as those above 65 (Population Reference Bureau, 2011). Therefore, 
as the majority of the population in most African countries falls under the category 
‘young people’, it seems plausible that they are widely represented in current studies 
of African societies.
Second, youth and generation have become such prominent concepts in Af-
rican studies because they can be well combined with other currently fashionably 
concepts and research interests in anthropology such as agency, identity, globaliza-
tion, modernization etc. as the above quotations suggest. The perceived rapidness of 
social, cultural, economic and political change in postcolonial Africa over the past 
decades and, related, the changing context in which youth grow up (due to urban-
ization, economic liberalization, HIV/AIDS, access to education and global media, 
to name but a few factors), has inspired much of the recent research. Debates about 
tradition and modernity – in the literature but even more so among Africans them-
selves – have inspired reflections about how young people engage and come into 
“fresh contact” (Mannheim, 1972: 293f.) with the so-called “traditional” cultural 
heritage of their societies, and how they are on the other hand increasingly drawn to 
adopt and appropriate foreign cultural elements transmitted through global markets 
and the global media (e.g. Adogame et al. 2008a; Appadurai 1996; Loimeier et al. 
2005a; Ferguson, 2008; Geschiere et al., 2008a; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2005; cf. 
Diouf, 2003: 2). Burgess (2005: xi) has claimed that in many African contexts of 
generational change “youth came to possess conflicted associations with modernity 
and all of its attendant blessings and ills”. As these points illustrate, youth, directly 
or indirectly, have been placed at the heart of current debates on socio-cultural 
change, both in Africa and within the scientific discourse.
A third reason for the increased interest in youth and generational relations is 
that conflicts – which for a long time have been a major research concern among 
Africanists – increasingly occur along generational lines. As Jean and John Coma-
roff, speaking about South Africa, state: “[R]ather than the more familiar axes of 
social division – class, race, gender, ethnicity – the dominant line of cleavage here 
21 See, for instance, Honwana, 2012; the volumes edited by Abbink & van Kessel, 2005; Alber 
et al., 2008; Honwana & De Boeck, 2005; Christiansen et al., 2006a; and the special issues in 
Anthropological Quarterly Vol. 73, No. 3 (Part I & II), cf. Durham, 2000.
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has become generation” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999: 284). The same might be 
said about other African societies. Generational conflicts are not only a popular 
concern of researchers but are experienced and frequently discussed by young and 
old Africans in their everyday lives (as I will subsequently show in my case study 
of Northern Uganda). The closely interwoven family ties and social networks often 
associated with African societies have recently experienced fundamental ruptures 
along generational lines. Conflicts between children, parents and grandparents often 
revolve around issues like education22 (Cheney, 2007; Sharp, 2002), morals and val-
ues (Boden, 2008; Roth, 2008), lifestyle and consumerism (Ringsted, 2008), care-
relations and responsibilities in extended family networks (Alber, 2004; Nyambedha 
et al., 2003; Nyambedha, 2008; Whyte et al., 2004; Whyte & Whyte, 2004), access 
to leadership positions (Le Meur, 2008; Mwangola, 2007), and other aspects which 
are closely related to the socio-cultural changes pointed to above.
For these and other reasons, research projects concerned with African youth 
have mushroomed over the past decade, particularly in anthropology, and a number 
of key debates have emerged. I will briefly summarize the debates which are of par-
ticular relevance to my research in the following.
Victims or Agents? Makers or Breakers?1.6.1. 
There are currently two important, far-reaching, and closely-related debates in 
contemporary studies of Africa’s young generation. The first concerns the question 
whether African youth are victims or agents of change. The second explicitly focuses 
on youth as agents and revolves around the question whether African youth are to 
be considered vanguards and makers, i.e. positive agents of change, or rather vandals 
and breakers, destructive forces that pose a danger to their societies (cf. Honwana & 
De Boeck, 2005; Abbink & van Kessel, 2005).
The debates, of course, are more nuanced than these two questions would sug-
gest. On a very general level, one can differentiate between pessimists, who delineate 
African youth as precarious or “lost generation” (Cruise O’Brian, 1996), and more 
optimistic voices, which emphasize and celebrate the creativity of African youth. 
The former include those who see young Africans largely as victims of their crisis-
ridden environments. In these writings, rather than looking at the agency of youth, 
the focus is on structural conditions and constraints which they face such as poverty, 
unemployment, bleak education opportunities, violent environments, HIV/AIDS, 
22 Young people, inspired by NGO campaigns, see access to schooling as their right. Parents often 
struggle to acquire the necessary means to send their children to school, others cannot or do not 
want to let their children be away from home for a prolonged period every day, because they need 
their assistance on the fields or at home, or because they fear their children will be exposed to 
unwanted influences. The large-scale spread of ‘Western’ school education by governments and 
international organizations has furthermore led to an ‘education gap’ between children and their 
parents and grandparents as the former sometimes feel their knowledge to be superior to that of 
their elders (Cheney, 2007; Sharp, 2002).
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forced marriages and forced recruitment into armed forces. The discourse on Afri-
can youth as victims is very prominent in development discourses (e.g. World Bank, 
2008; IRIN, 2007; UNDP, 2006: 19f.; 26f.), which often imply that African youth 
need the help of external development actors. To a lesser extent this discourse also 
resonates in the anthropological literature, which is less paternalistic but does not 
generally question the fact that African youth grow up in a situation of profound 
crisis (e.g. De Boeck & Honwana, 2005: 1f.; Abbink, 2005: 1; Cruise O’Brien, 
1996; Boothby et al., 2006; cf. Cole, 2011: 61).
On the other end of the pessimistic spectrum are those authors who do not see 
youths as victims but actually blame them, at least partly, for the current crisis in 
many African states, and who construct them as “threats” (cf. Diouf, 2003: 3). This 
discourse is more pronounced in popular science and media representations of Af-
rica (cf. Kaplan, 1994 as a prominent example) than in academic writing. But it can 
also be identified in texts by social scientists, who point to the destructive nature of 
youthful rebels in armed conflicts, or violent, criminal youth gangs in African cities. 
They see youth as agents, albeit as destructive ones, whose actions are detrimental 
to their communities and to positive developments on the African continent as a 
whole (e.g. Abdullah, 1998, 2005; Bangura, 1997; Barker & Ricardo, 2005: 24ff.; 
Simonse, 2005; cf. UNDP, 2006: 21f.).
Most anthropologists take a more nuanced approach to the subject by looking 
both at the structural constraints faced by many African youth as well as their agen-
cy in dealing with these constraints, which can be very destructive. A prominent ex-
ample is the debate on children and youth in armed forces, so-called “child soldiers”, 
who are at the same time victims and agents of violent conflict (Baines, 2009). 
Faced by bleak future opportunities – unemployment, lack of access to schooling, 
inability to marry, start a family and gain a respectable status in their communi-
ties – young people may resort to violence, or are more vulnerable to be recruited 
into fighting forces. This ‘grievance-approach’ to explaining violent behavior among 
youth has been supported by many anthropologists working in war zones, in which 
fighting forces included a large number of children and youth, e.g. in Sierra Leone 
(Richards, 1996; Richards & Krijn, 1998), Liberia (Utas, 2005), Northern Uganda 
(Finnström, 2003; 2006b; 2010), Angola and Mozambique (Honwana, 2005), Su-
dan (Jok, 2005) and more generally (McEvoy-Levy, 2006; Boyden & Berry, 2004).
The ‘grievance-approach’ can also be found in the literature on youth revolts, i.e. 
situations in which youths have protested, sometimes violently, against their politi-
cal marginalization in African politics and for more democratic and equal political 
systems (e.g. Kagwanja, 2005; Mwangola, 2007). Prominent examples here are the 
youth uprisings in South Africa during the years of apartheid (Bundy, 1987; John-
son, 1988), or, more recently, the ‘revolutions’ in Northern Africa and the Middle 
East (INAMO, 2011; Honwana, 2013).
Among the more ‘optimistic’ scholars are those who give illustrative example of 
positive, non-violent youth agency. A UNDP report alerts its readers to the fact that 
the focus on violent reactions to crisis in much of the literature on African youth 
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should not “lead us to argue that involvement in violent conflict is the only – or even 
the main – response to a youth crisis” and that “[r]esponses to such a youth crisis 
are not necessarily violent” (UNDP, 2006: 27). The report, somewhat superficially, 
mentions urbanization, South-North migration and involvement in religious move-
ments as the main non-violent strategies of African youth to deal with or escape 
inauspicious environments (UNDP, 2006: 27–29). In a similar vein anthropologists 
often emphasize and celebrate the creativity and ‘robustness’ of African youth and 
their inventive ways of dealing with situations of crisis and marginality in order to 
avoid the Afro-pessimism and escape the victim narratives so widespread in the lit-
erature (Chabal, 2009; Ferguson, 2005: 172ff.). Different researchers have analyzed 
forms of resistance and social critique found in popular arts, especially hip hop 
(Stroeken, 2008; 2005; Ntarangwi, 2009; Weiss, 2005), films (Larkin, 1997) and 
popular drama (Lange, 2001), or in sport (Baller, 2010). Others have looked at the 
creative ways youth participate in and adapt Western consumer culture, for example 
with regard to clothing and style (Hansen, 1999; Hendrickson, 1996; Friedman, 
1994). And again others have studied more ambivalent forms of ‘sexual liberation’ 
such as “transactional sex”, whereby mostly young girls have sex with older and/
or richer men in exchange for money and consumer goods (mostly phones and 
clothes), which offer new (economic) opportunities, particularly for young women, 
but at the same time expose them to new risks and constraints (Cole 2004; Honwa-
na, 2012: 89ff.; Hunter 2002: 100f.; Mills & Ssewakiryanga, 2005). As pointed out 
above, agency figures as a pivotal concept in these debates, and its proponents stress 
that even youth in the most marginalized positions can exert agency to a certain 
degree and are thus not only passive victims. In one way or another, all these dif-
ferent studies show how African youth engage with global, mostly Western cultural 
and economic trends, which they criticize and ridicule at the same time as admiring 
and wanting to imitate them (Ferguson, 2006). However, ‘creative chaos’, ‘cultural 
hybridity’ and ‘alternative modernities’ resulting from youth’s desire to participate 
in what they refer to as global modernity are not always just aspects to celebrate. As 
Ferguson (2005: 179f.) warns:
“[A]nthropologists have lately tended to focus on (…) happy stor[ies] about 
plurality and nonranked cultural differences – to the neglect of (…) relatively 
fixed global statuses and a detemporalized world socioeconomic hierarchy. In 
this way, the application of a language of alternative modernities to the most 
impoverished regions of the globe has become a way of not talking about the 
non-serialized, detemporalized political economic statuses of our time – in-
deed a way of turning away from the question of a radically worsening global 
inequality and its consequences”.
Thus, studies of youth agency should not overlook the fact that many young people 
grow up in situations of inequality and marginalization – within their societies, but 
also in relation to ‘global society’. Different researchers have turned to analyze how 
youth in Africa deal with and react to their real and perceived relative marginal-
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ization. One particular focus in these studies has been the way young people give 
meaning to concepts like tradition and modernity and thereby position themselves 
in relation to spatial and social categories like Africa and the West.
Tradition & Modernity, Africa & the West1.6.2. 
Afro-pessimism, i.e. seeing Africa mainly as a place of crisis, is not only prevalent 
outside Africa. It is in fact a very real sentiment among many African youth, who 
experience their countries as being behind the rest of the world and distinctively 
non-modern (Ferguson, 2005: 174; Honwana, 2012: 90). The idealized images of 
the West young people gain from TV, internet and films, and by witnessing the 
luxurious lifestyle of expatriates and tourists staying in their countries, sometimes 
leads them to question their own societies and cultural identities. Subsequently, 
many dream of leaving their countries and migrating to the West – for educational 
purposes, to find (lucrative) employment, or to escape poverty in their home com-
munities (cf. Ferguson, 2006: 151f.).
On the other hand, and as a reaction to what many consider the detrimental 
aspects of a Western, capitalist lifestyle such as inequality, individualism, and vora-
cious consumption, an increasing number of youths seems to seek solutions to con-
temporary problems by drawing on ‘local traditions’ or an “invented” form thereof 
(cf. Hobsbawm, 1983). Instead of idealizing the West, they demonize its ‘modern’ 
influences, and propagate a return to ‘African traditions’ and an ‘unspoilt’ pre-colo-
nial past. Particularly in the literature on HIV/AIDS ‘retraditionalization discourses’ 
are commonly described (for an imposing example, cf. Geissler & Prince, 2010 and 
Prince, 2008 & 2009; cf. also Reis, 2008). AIDS is regarded as a modern disease and 
often blamed on young people’s ‘immoral’ behavior, which is associated with living a 
Western lifestyle and disregarding ‘cultural’ rules and conventions (cf. Dilger, 2003, 
2005). Subsequently, reviving these rules is proposed – both by elders and youth – 
as a solution to mitigate the adverse effects of AIDS and ‘modernity’ as a whole. 
What is desired in these discourses, then, is a return to an often idealized past.
One particular contested and well-researched field in which discourses on tra-
dition and modernity, Africa and the West play a prominent role are gender and 
sexual relations (for a good overview see Arnfred, 2004a; Baerends, 1998; Corn-
wall, 2005; Tamale, 2011a). Different authors have critically noted how Western 
interventions and related discourses on African gender and sexual relations have 
historically shaped and continue to influence gender- and sex-related practices and 
perceptions among Africans (cf. Arnfred, 2004b; Mamdami, 2004: 91ff., 121ff.; 
Tamale, 2011b: 14ff.; Lewis, 2005). Both in popular discourses and in the academic 
literature, one still commonly finds the assumption that a) there are significant dif-
ferences between ‘African’ and ‘Western’ gender, kinship and sexual relations and b) 
‘African’ gender and kinship system have undergone drastic changes over the past 
100–150 years, which have caused fundamental disruptions and redefinitions and 
have been significantly influenced by the West (cf. Appiah, 2008: 88). These changes 
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have been linked to, among other things, Christian proselytism and colonial policies 
(e.g. Bennett, 2011: 80f.; Silberschmidt, 2001: 660ff.; cf. also texts of African classic 
literature such as Ngugi Wa Thiongo’o, 1965 and Okot p’Bitek, 1989), colonial and 
post-colonial labor migration and urbanization (Ferguson, 1999: 170ff.; Mamdani, 
2004: 218–285), structural adjustment policies following the economic and debt 
crisis of many African states in the 1980s and subsequent socio-economic changes 
(e.g. Silberschmidt, 2004; O’Laughlin, 1997; Cleaver, 2002: 3f.), as well as Western 
development discourses (e.g. Cornwall et al., 2004; Cornwall & White, 2000; Pala, 
2005).
In recent years, studies focused on African gender, kinship and sexual relations 
have paid increasing attention to the influences of the mass media, global capital-
ism and consumer culture, especially among youth. Following Appadurai (1991: 
197), these studies argue that (gender) images and ideologies conveyed through 
the mass media have influenced the dreams and expectations of people around the 
world, and represent “a peculiar new force to the imagination in social life today” 
(ibid.). Films and TV series, which convey “images of modernity” (Hunter, 2002: 
115) related to fashion, beauty, romantic love and consumer goods, are regarded as 
very influential in transforming conceptions of gender and sexual relationships in 
Africa, particularly among the younger generation (cf. for instance Larkin, 1997 and 
Masquelier, 2009). Many recent case studies show that sexual behavior and images 
of relationships and love among youth have changed profoundly as a result of media 
influences (e.g. Bochow, 2008; Cole, 2004, 2008, 2010). Others have studied how, 
in different African societies, alterations of what are considered ‘traditional’ gender 
and sexual norms and practices have become a major cause of intergenerational 
conflict and debate (e.g. Silberschmidt & Rasch 2001; Ringsted, 2008). Ideas of 
‘traditional African’ and ‘modern Western’ forms of gender relations and sexuality 
are often linked, in complex and sometimes contradictory ways, to moral notions of 
right and wrong (cf. Vorhölter, 2012). What is considered traditional and whether 
tradition is seen as something outdated and harmful or as something desirable and 
appropriate can vary significantly between speakers and according to context. The 
differences between ‘African’ and ‘Western’ gender, sexual and kinship relations that 
have been historically constructed in various popular and academic discourses will 
be analyzed in greater detail in chapter 6, where I relate them to contemporary de-
bates in Ugandan society.
In the literature on youth in Africa, notions of modernity and tradition, African 
and Western culture found in local discourses are frequently dissected and linked 
to broader debates in postcolonial studies on contemporary African identities (for 
an overview see Eriksson Baaz, 2001; Appiah, 2008; Mbembe, 2008; Werbner & 
Ranger, 1996). It is interesting to note that although many authors emphasize the 
interdependence and relational construction of these categories, in local discourses 
they are still perceived as dualistic, even antagonist categories.
Drawing on my own experience in Uganda, debates on tradition and modernity 
are ever present in discourses on socio-cultural change, and revolve around com-
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plex and profound questions of identity and cultural authenticity. As I will show 
throughout this book, positionalities in these discourses vary greatly among youth 
and are often dependent on context. Most young Ugandans I encountered switched 
between celebrating ‘African traditions’ in one situation and longing for ‘Western 
modernity’ in others. Hereby, the majority expressed difficulties in reconciling the 
two sides, and thus experienced being ‘caught in between’ as a burden rather than 
as a chance.
To summarize, the challenge of writing about African youth is to pay attention 
to the creativity and the crisis, the agencies and the structural constraints, as well as 
to the dualisms and eclecticisms inherent in discourses on modernity and tradition, 
African and Western identities. In short, one has to take into account the ambiva-
lent and heterogeneous experiences of African youth and the dialectics of genera-
tional change “as characterized by the conjuncture between young people of coming 
of age, on the one hand, and existing social, cultural and economic arrangements on 
the other” (Cole, 2011: 64).
Specific Contribution of my Research1.7. 
My research contributes to the above-outlined debates by providing a differentiated 
analysis of intergenerational negotiations of socio-cultural change and the multi-
layered positions which youth take on in these negotiations and related discourses. 
Rather than labeling them as makers or breakers, agents or victims, modernizers 
or traditionalists – categories which fail to address the complexity and diversity of 
social relations/positions and which often reflect an outsider and/or adult perspec-
tive of youth – I focus on young people’s perceptions of themselves in processes 
of socio-cultural change, specifically those which are seen to have taken place in 
Acholi society since the beginning of the war in the mid-1980s: How have Acholi 
youth experienced these processes of change? Do they believe they can effectively 
shape these processes? How do they see themselves in relation to older and younger 
members of society? How do they use and relate to discourses about Acholi youth? 
I will address these questions by adopting a specific theoretical approach in which I 
identify youth’s perceptions of agency and victimhood in local discourses. My theo-
retical approach, which I elaborate below, also enables me to analyze the diversity 
and complexity of intergenerational debates about socio-cultural change by study-
ing the discourses and power relations which shape these debates.
Furthermore, and as outlined above, the regional focus on Northern Uganda 
distinguishes my analysis from other recent studies of African youth in the context 
of socio-cultural change. This is due to the specific post-war setting: in addition 
to the introduction of mass schooling23, increased media exposure and HIV/AIDS 
– factors, which are discussed in many recent studies on youth and socio-cultural 
23 Universal Primary Education (UPE) was introduced in Uganda in 1997. 
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change in Africa – young people in Northern Uganda have experienced 20 years of 
war and thus a situation of extreme instability and ‘disorder’. As stated above, the 
combined effects of war, displacement and “internal crisis” (Branch, 2011: 61ff.) 
have placed Acholi youth in a special situation of cultural uncertainty and have led 
to the fact that discourses on socio-cultural changes are particularly relevant and 
wide-ranging in the current post-war situation24.
The war in Northern Uganda has recently become a major focus in different so-
cial science disciplines dealing with war, displacement and its effects on society (cf. 
Chap. 3). Many of these studies touch upon the situation of youth as well as the dis-
courses on socio-cultural change, which are the focus of my study. Especially in the 
literature dealing with the situation in the IDP Camps, the reintegration of former 
‘child soldiers’, and recent peace-building measures, the issue of ‘cultural revival’ and 
restoration of cultural practices is extensively discussed. These studies provide im-
portant background information to my analysis. However, they are largely based on 
research that was conducted while the war was still ongoing, and their predications 
for post-war society are largely speculative. Furthermore, the reports produced or 
commissioned by NGOs in particular are often written from a positivist standpoint. 
They neglect the constructed nature of culture, take historical narratives about the 
past as given facts, and overemphasize the homogeneity within societal ‘subgroups’ 
such as youth, women, or male elders. Some of these reports as well as the more 
populist writings (and films) on the war (e.g. Eichstaedt, 2009; Green, 2009; In-
visible Children, 2006; 2012a,b; McDonnell & Akallo, 2007) reproduce colonial 
discourses about Africa as the ‘dark, dangerous and uncivilized’ continent – for 
example by depicting the LRA rebels, and especially their leader Joseph Kony, as 
irrational barbarians (cf. Chap. 3). In a different vein, some of the reports produced 
by or for development organizations invoke colonial discourses by postulating that 
“in some parts of the world [e.g. in Uganda] the most important, authentic identi-
ties are cultural identities, particularly traditional, customary, or tribal identities”, 
which are patriarchal and “illiberal”, as has been critically noted by Branch (2011: 
154). Particularly NGOs working in the fields of gender and children’s rights often 
24 This, once again, became obvious to me when I presented some preliminary findings of my re-
search at a colloquium at Gulu University shortly before I finished my fieldwork. The audience 
was made up of students as well as staff from the university. There were also some visiting anthro-
pologists from Denmark and the U.S.A. In the discussion, comments by the external researchers 
addressed conceptual problems in my research outline. They also suggested further analytical 
tools for my data analysis and referred to texts which might be interesting for me to read. The 
Ugandan students, on the other hand, focused largely on the content of my presentation. They 
affirmed that the loss of Acholi culture was a major societal problem and thus a topic of great 
concern to them. Some of the older students (many were already in their late 30s or early 40s 
and were studying part-time while working) started to explain to me how the young generation 
was responsible for the loss of values and morals; one student particularly blamed youth for their 
“project of modernity”. Another student asked me whether I had any practical suggestions as to 
what could be done to stop this loss of culture. To me, these statements indicated how all-encom-
passing the discourse on socio-cultural change and loss of culture was (field notes 01.12.2010).
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implicitly or explicitly suggest that ‘vulnerable groups’, i.e. women, children and 
youth, need to be protected against ‘harmful cultural practices’ because ‘traditional’ 
Acholi gender roles and child rearing practices are not in line with Western dis-
courses on women’s and children’s rights.
My analysis contributes to the growing number of studies that deconstruct such 
conceptions of Acholi culture and people. I apply a discourse-analytical approach to 
point out the fuzziness and complexity of concepts like “Acholi culture” and “West-
ern culture” and to analyze how such labels are strategically used and filled with 
meaning in local discourses. I am interested in the ways various social actors engage 
with international discourses on women’s and children’s rights, post-conflict peace-
building and “traditional culture” in their negotiations of socio-cultural change. I 
explicitly focus on power relations, both within Acholi society, specifically those 
based on age and gender, and between the local and the global level, specifically 
between Uganda and the West. In summary, my research makes a contribution both 
to the recent debates in the study of African youth as well as to the vast and growing 
literature on the war in Northern Uganda and in particular the immediate post-war 
situation. A specific feature of the study is its analytical approach, which I outline 
in the following.
Analytical Framework1.8. 
As already stated, my study follows a discourse-analytical approach which is largely 
based on the works of Foucault25. In this section, I first give an overview of dis-
course analysis as it is currently applied in anthropological theory and two of its 
major concepts – discourse and power – as understood by Foucault. I explicate how 
I make use of these concepts and outline different elements, which I refer to in my 
analysis of discourses on socio-cultural change, specifically binary oppositions and 
agency.
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis1.8.1. 
Over the past three decades, discourse analysis has gained widespread prominence 
in anthropology (Dracklé, 1996b: 24). Among German anthropologists, however, 
it is still regarded quite ambivalently in some institutes today26 (the same applies to 
25 In chapter 3, I also draw on the discourse theory of Reiner Keller (2008; 2007; 2006; 2005; 
1997), who has adopted some aspects of Foucault’s theory and integrated them into the frame-
work set by Berger and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge.
26 During my time as a student at the Institute of Social Anthropology in Hamburg (2003-2008) 
I was once told by a professor that “some anthropologists today believe that discourse analysis 
could be applied in anthropological research” but that “at this institute we do not consider dis-
course analysis as anthropology”. Haller (2012: 326f.) notes that in recent years German anthro-
pology has (again) turned towards studying “social reality” rather than its discursive production, 
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postcolonial theory, cf. Castro Varela & Dhawan, 2005: 8f.). This is somewhat sur-
prising because discourse analysis has much to offer for anthropology (cf. Birkhan, 
2012). It can address the complex relationship between individual and society, 
agency and structure, and can thus capture the dynamics inherent in studying 
socio-cultural change. Hence, it can also contribute to the development of theoreti-
cal concepts in anthropology (Dracklé, 1996b: 24ff.). Essentially, discourse analysis 
is an instrument for studying power relations as reflected in societal practices and 
speech. It aims to discern what is said, how, by whom and under which effects of 
power (Dracklé, 1996b: 28).
Foucault has not provided a singular and finite definition of discourse. Rather, 
he has tried to explain in different texts and speeches how discourses are structured 
and produced and how they can be identified and analyzed. An often cited ‘defini-
tion’ of discourse is taken from The Archeology of Knowledge, first published in 1969, 
in which Foucault states that “[w]e shall call discourse a group of statements in so 
far as they belong to the same discursive formation” (Foucault, 2002a: 131). Ac-
cording to Foucault, one can speak of a discursive formation “[w]henever one can 
describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever, 
between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define 
a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations)” 
(ibid.: 41). In The Order of Discourse, Foucault’s inaugural lecture at the Collége of 
France given in 1970, he outlines how discourses are “controlled, selected, organized 
and redistributed” (Foucault, 1981b: 52) through procedures of exclusion, internal 
procedures and a “rarefaction (…) of the speaking subjects” (ibid.: 61). He proposes 
to analyze discourses either from a critical perspective, i.e. by focusing on procedures 
of exclusion, limitation and appropriation, or from a genealogical perspective, i.e. 
by looking at the historical formation and changes of discourses (ibid.: 70ff.). Hall 
(1992: 295) summarizes Foucault’s concept of discourse as follows:
“Discourses are ways of talking, thinking or representing a particular sub-
ject or topic. They produce meaningful knowledge about that subject. This 
knowledge influences social practices, and so has real consequences and ef-
fects. Discourses (…) operate in relation to power – they are part of the way 
power circulates and is contested. The question of whether a discourse is true 
or false is less important than the question whether it is effective in practice. 
When it is effective – organizing and regulating relations of power (…) – it 
is called a ‘regime of truth’”.
Thus, rather than focusing only on language and text as is common in linguis-
tic approaches27, discourse analysis rooted in a Foucauldian tradition also looks at 
and quotes Preisendörfer (2008) who states that “Die (postmodernen) Diskursgletscher ziehen 
sich zurück, und die (soziale) Wirklichkeit kommt wieder zum Vorschein” (quoted in Haller, 
2012: 326f.). 
27 For a discussion of linguistic versus intertextual analysis within different approaches to discourse 
analysis, cf. Fairclough (1992).
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non-language practices. According to Foucault (2002a), all social practices entail 
meaning and thus also have a discursive effect. Discourses can thus bridge the di-
vide between what is spoken and what is done, i.e. between language and practice 
(Hall, 2001: 72). Discourse analysis allows for the interpretation of text material 
(documents as well as interview-transcripts) with regard to the societal context in 
which they were produced (Fairclough, 2001: 18ff.). In applying an anthropological 
approach of participant observation in addition to pure linguistic procedures one 
can analyze how discourses develop and how they operate and become manifest in 
concrete situations. As Dracklé states:
“Through participant observation over a longer period in one place (…) suf-
ficient situations arise in which discourse, its process of coming into being, 
and its effects can be pursued.” (…) “Against the background of empirical 
work and the participant observation of non-discursive practices, discourse 
theory offers the pivotal point for an anthropology of ‘truth production’” 
(1996b: 33; 36).
In Foucault’s theory, the way “truths” are “produced” is closely connected to his 
concept of power-knowledge, which I outline below. According to Foucault, dis-
courses link power, knowledge and truth and legitimate power relations. Based on 
this assumption, he formulates four rules for the analysis of discourse. First, there 
is no exteriority between the technologies of knowledge and the strategies of power. 
Second, there is a continual shift in power-knowledge relations. Third, a “rule of 
double conditioning” exists between strategies and tactics of power. Fourth, there 
is no uniform function of a discourse (Foucault, 1990: 98ff.). The last point is spe-
cifically important: Discourse is not subservient to power; it can produce but also 
undermine it.
Power-Knowledge1.8.2. 
The relationship between power, knowledge, discourse and truth is essential to Fou-
cault’s theories. Unlike in Enlightenment epistemology according to which power 
distorts truth but truth can be unraveled through knowledge, Foucault argues that 
power and knowledge are not oppositional but mutually constitutive and that there 
is no such thing as absolute truth because our perception of the world is only a re-
flection of a particular set of social relations in a historical context (Foucault, 1990: 
97ff.; cf. Haugaard, 2002: 181ff.). What follows from this is that each historical 
epoch has its own specific relationship between knowledge and power, which is 
both, constantly reproduced and constantly challenged. Power in a given society 
is also always related to historically-specific types of discourses, which define what 
is considered relevant knowledge in a given time and place. For example, in con-
temporary Northern Uganda discourses on post-conflict peacebuilding sustain the 
power of international ‘development experts’, because they are seen to possess a 
certain type of knowledge which is discursively established as relevant.
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In Discipline and Punish, first published in 1975, Foucault argues that since the 19th 
century a new form of power has developed in Europe, which is no longer based 
on obedience to the law or a sovereign but on knowledge and the knowledge-based 
disciplining of individuals. Knowledge, for example how to behave according to the 
current social rules, can be used to individualize power, as is done in the Panopti-
con. In this prison, designed by Jeremy Bentham in 1791, power does not have to be 
enacted in the form of (physical) punishment. As the inmate feels that he is being 
constantly exposed to (potential) observation he automatically behaves the way it is 
expected of him. Foucault (2002b: 197) speaks of a “fictitious” power relationship, 
which is based on subjection. Thus, rather than being a “property”, power becomes 
a “strategy” (ibid.: 191), a whole set of mechanisms and technologies, which can be 
used to regulate the behavior of individuals. What is important is that power is not 
marked by repression but by positive technologies of power. This means that power 
is productive, it produces social realities and must therefore always be seen in a 
spatial and historical context (Foucault, 2002b: 191–203).
In the History of Sexuality, first published in 1976, Foucault further outlines this 
understanding of power as a “complex strategical situation in a particular society” 
(Foucault, 1990: 93). He argues that power is decentral and omnipresent and that 
it consists of a multiplicity of force relations which constitute an overall strategy or 
system of power. Decentral means that power evolves from below. At the bottom 
level it is intentional but because of the multiplicity of force relations the overall 
strategy has an unintentional outcome. Hence, it is not possible to calculate the con-
sequences of power and it becomes nonsubjective. Omnipresent denotes that there 
is power in every unequal relation. Foucault understands power as strictly relational 
in character. Thus, inherent in every power relation is the possibility of resistance. 
Just as there are multiple generators of power there is also a multiplicity of points of 
resistance. Just as there cannot be a society without power relations, there cannot be 
a societal power regime in which no resistance is possible (Foucault, 1990: 92ff.).
In the History of Sexuality, Foucault argues that since the late 17th century, sexu-
ality has, in various ways, become an important transfer point for power relations. 
He notes that
“Sexuality (…) appears rather as an especially dense transfer point for rela-
tions of power: between men and women, young people and old people, par-
ents and offspring, teachers and students, priests and laity an administration 
and the population. Sexuality is not the most intractable element in power 
relations, but rather one of those endowed with the greatest instrumental-
ity: useful for the greatest number of manoeuvres and capable of serving as 
a point of support, as a linchpin, for the most varied strategies” (Foucault, 
1990: 103).
According to Foucault, the reason why sexuality comprises such a dense node of 
power relations relates to it being an intersecting point between the individual body 
and the population as a whole. It is thus a target point for a disciplinary “bio-
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power”, “whose task [it] is to take charge of life [and which] needs continuous regu-
latory and corrective mechanisms” (Foucault, 1990: 144). According to Foucault 
(ibid.: 146), technologies of sex combine “in varying proportions the objective of 
disciplining the body and that of regulating populations.” I relate to this argument 
throughout my analysis, and particularly in chapter 6, by revealing how in con-
temporary Acholiland and Uganda, discourses on sexuality have become a way to 
discuss a whole range of societal developments, which are seen to be problematic 
and in need of regulation.
In Scientia Sexualis, the third part of his book on the History on Sexuality, Fou-
cault (1990: 53ff.) further elaborates his argument that sexuality has become a focal 
point of societal discourses and power relations. He describes how from the 19th 
century onwards a confessional science of sex was created by bringing together con-
fession and scientific discourse. Sex started to be regarded as a “cause of any and 
everything” (ibid.: 65), as an explanation of all sorts of different behaviors, and thus, 
indirectly, also for many societal developments and problems. Due to the “interplay 
between sex and truth” (ibid.: 57), talking about sexuality came to be discovered as 
a way of revealing certain truths which had less to do with sex itself than with the 
discourses around it. In this sense, Foucault suggests that
“in this ‘question’ of sex (…), two processes emerge, the one always condi-
tioning the other: we demand that sex speak the truth (…), and we demand 
that it tell us our truth. Or rather, the deeply buried truth of that truth about 
ourselves which we think we possess in our immediate consciousness. We tell 
it its truth by deciphering what it tells us about that truth; it tells us our own 
by delivering up that part of it that escaped us. (…). [T]he project of a science 
of the subject has gravitated, in ever narrowing circles, around the question 
of sex. (…) Not, however, by reason of some natural property inherent in 
sex itself, but by virtue of the tactics of power immanent in this discourse” 
(Foucault, 1990: 69f.).
The different ways sexuality is used in Ugandan discourses to establish certain 
“truths”, for instance about tradition or the West, and the power dynamics which 
surround these discourses offer an interesting perspective for my analysis and I will 
take up this point in my discussion of my findings in the concluding chapter.
Discourse & Power as Analytical Concepts1.8.3. 
In this book, I apply a discourse-analytical approach to study the power dynamics 
inherent in discourses on socio-cultural change in Northern Uganda. I examine the 
linkages between competing normative orders and states of knowledge. Following 
Foucault, my approach is based on three assumptions: 1) Discourses serve to estab-
lish certain interpretations of reality as truths; 2) Discourses reflect positionalities 
and power differences within society; 3) Discourses can be resources for and expres-
sions of agency and resistance.
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These assumptions are based on the premise that power, knowledge and truth are 
intimately linked. Truths, such as the idea of an ‘authentic’ pre-war Acholi culture, 
are constructed through discourses, whereby the production of such truths must 
follow certain rules which are determined by the discourse (cf. Foucault, 2002a: 
34ff.; Mills, 1997: 51ff.). One always has to keep in mind that discourses must be 
seen in their historical and cultural context – in my case the immediate post-war 
setting in Northern Uganda. Different discourses will arise in different times and in 
different historical settings and thus produce new truths on socio-cultural change 
(Hall, 2001: 74). Furthermore, discourses are never singular but multiple. Thus, one 
must also pay attention to contradictions within discourses as well as to interdiscur-
sive effects (Dracklé, 1996b: 38).
In my analysis of discourses on socio-cultural change in Northern Uganda, I 
refer to the following elements28 (cf. Hall, 2001: 73f.; Dracklé, 1996b: 37f.):
Statements,•	  for example about past, present and future, or about different 
groups/clusters of people such as youth, white people (munu) etc.
(Implicit) rules •	 which define who is allowed or not allowed to say what on the 
topic of culture in a given situation – in a mixed group of elders and youth, 
for instance, only elders would have the authority to speak about “traditional 
Acholi culture”.
Subjects •	 who personify the discourse and possess certain characteristics typical 
for the discourse – for example the prostitute, who sells her body in order to 
be able to afford consumer goods and accessories required for a ‘modern’ town 
life; the sugar daddy, who stands for the corruptive nature of modern life; the 
lazy and disrespectful youth as opposed to the respected and knowledgeable 
elder; or the muno (white person).
Authorities •	 who people refer to if they want to manifest specific opinions on 
culture and socio-cultural change such as elders, religious leaders, or in some 
cases Western development workers.
Practices within institutions,•	  for instance those involved in ‘post-conflict 
peace-building’, who initiate certain ideas of culture – for instance by ‘invent-
ing’ certain rituals for the reintegration of former LRA soldiers (cf. Verma, 
2012: 443ff.), or by postulating simplistic ideas about “traditional reconcilia-
tion and justice” (cf. Branch, 2011: 154ff.).
Continually repeated terms•	  – in my case for example Westernization or cul-
ture.
Myths•	  – for example why women were or are prohibited to do certain things 
according to “traditional Acholi culture”.
28 I have used these elements as a guide in my analysis, but I have not dissected each of them in 
greater detail, which is also due to the fact that they are often overlapping.
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Symbols•	  – for instance the miniskirt, which symbolizes negative Western 
influences, or video halls, which stand for the ‘downfall’ of the young genera-
tion of Acholi.
I have placed particular emphasis on studying binary oppositions and (expressions 
of) agency in local discourses and will thus discuss these elements more compre-
hensively.
Binary Oppositions in Local Discourses
Binary oppositions are a consistent feature of discourses on socio-cultural change in 
Northern Uganda (and elsewhere), and thus a very relevant aspect to analyze. The 
study of binary oppositions in language goes back to the French linguist Ferdinand 
de Saussure. Saussure argued that making difference is essential to the produc-
tion of meaning. Signs have meaning not because they refer to real objects, but 
because of their oppositions to other signs. Binary oppositions are the simplest and 
most radical way of constructing difference29. Hereby, meaning is never fixed but 
always produced in context. Saussure’s approach was later heavily criticized by post-
structuralist scholars and in the context of postcolonial theory. They argued that 
there are many other, less simplistic and less dualistic ways of establishing differ-
ence, which cannot be captured by focusing merely on binarisms30. They further 
criticized that Saussure’s concept neglected the fact that there are always “violent 
hierarchies” implied in binary thinking on which imperialist thinking is based and 
perpetuated (Hall, 1997a: 30ff.; 1997b: 258; Ashcroft et al., 1998: 23).
These criticisms are very valid and my analysis should thus not be mistaken as 
an application of Saussure’s theory. Rather, I am interested to find out how, when 
and for what purpose binary oppositions are used within local discourses. Thereby, 
I concur with Baumann (2004: 31) who argues that grammars, i.e. classificatory 
structures like binary oppositions, can be “argumentative tools” which “provide a 
repertoire of structures through which to put forward arguments about self and oth-
er”. He stresses that “all grammars are always at the disposal of all social actors, and 
it is precisely the constantly shifting invocations and revocations of each grammar 
that matter in the social processes of selfing and othering as we can observe them 
emprirically” (Baumann, 2004: 31). Furthermore, he points out (and convincingly 
demonstrates by giving various concrete examples) that each binary grammar always 
implies a ternary grammar (ibid.: 37ff.). I found numerous examples of such ternary 
29 However, as Baumann and Gingrich (2004), among others, have comprehensively demonstrated, 
there are further, more complex ways to create and ‘order’ difference. In their edited volume 
Grammars of Identity/Alterity, they identify three major “classificatory structures or schemata” 
(ibid.: x) which are used in processes of selfing and othering, namely orientalization, segmenta-
tion and encompassment. 
30 Even structuralists themselves, for instance Levi-Strauss, acknowledged that binarisms cannot 
capture the richness and sophistication of social actors’ taxonomies and engaged in debates about 
what Baumann calls the “ternary challenge” (Baumann, 2004: 35ff.). 
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implications in statements that were framed in binary terms by my interlocutors, 
although they did not constitute an explicit focus of my analysis.
The most common examples of binary oppositions in discourses on socio-cul-
tural change in Northern Uganda revolved around distinctions between Africa and 
the West, modern and traditional as well as local and global. The high prevalence of 
such binary oppositions or “cultural dualisms” (Ferguson, 1999) in speaking about 
social change is not specific to Northern Uganda, but has been observed in other 
studies of perception of socio-cultural change. James Ferguson, for example, con-
ducted research on perceptions of modernization and decline and related associa-
tions with “the urban” and “the rural” among mineworkers on the Zambian Cop-
perbelt. He observes:
“A pervasive and familiar dualism structured the way that most Copper-
belt dwellers spoke about such matters. Contrasting styles of urban dress 
and comportment, workers said, reflected a fundamental difference between 
‘town ways’ and ‘village ways’. But what they described in one breath as a 
difference between urban and rural might in the next become a contrast 
between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’, ‘European’ versus ‘African’, or even ‘edu-
cated’ versus ‘uneducated’” (Ferguson, 1999: 83).
He further reflects:
“The puzzle in all this (…) is that my fieldwork with Zambian minework-
ers in Kitwe revealed (…) a cultural bifurcation remarkable similar to those 
that Wilson (1941), Epstein (1958, 1981) and Mitchell (1956a, 1987) had 
described for an earlier era. We might well reject the terms in which these 
authors described this duality (primitive/civilized [Wilson]; tribal/urban 
[Epstein]; low urban commitment/high urban commitment [Mitchell]), but 
the ethnographic fact of a certain cultural duality remains to be explained” (Fer-
guson, 1999: 91, my emphasis).
Like Ferguson31, I will treat binary oppositions in local discourses as “ethnographic 
facts”, which shape people’s experiences and interpretations of their lives, and thus 
have real effects not only on everyday thinking but on social life more generally. I 
will show how binary opposition in local discourses in Northern Uganda both re-
produce and invert colonial discourses32. In particular, I will focus on the discourse 
on Westernization and its inherent representations of African/Ugandan/Acholi 
culture as opposed to Western culture. As I will show, this discourse is central 
to analysing and deciphering discourses on socio-cultural change in (Northern) 
Uganda.
31 I will further draw on Ferguson’s concept of cultural styles, which I outline in Chap. 5.
32 Binary Opposition were and are a crucial component of colonial discourses and racialized regimes 
of representation (cf. Hall, 1997b: 243ff.; Hall, 1992).
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Perceptions of Agency in Local Discourses
A further aspect that I focus on in my analysis of discourses is agency. In my under-
standing of agency, I loosely draw on the works of Sherry Ortner (1997, 2001, 2006). 
Ortner’s concept of agency is concerned with the mediation between conscious in-
tentions and actions of the individual and the structures he or she is embedded in, 
and which influence these actions and intentions (Ortner, 2001: 77). Ortner argues 
that there are two inseparable meanings of agency – “agency of intentions” which 
she relates to Geertz’s interpretative approach of studying the meaning of human 
activities, and “agency as power”, which she relates to post-structuralist approaches 
of studying power and domination (1997: 136ff.). According to her
“[i]n one field of meaning ‘agency’ is about intentionality and the pursuit of 
(culturally defined) projects. In the other field of meaning agency is about 
power, about acting within relations of social inequality, asymmetry, and 
force… [Hereby] power itself is double-edged, operating from above as dom-
ination and from below as resistance” (Ortner, 2006: 139).
Ortner explains the difference between these two meanings as follows:
“In the contexts of questions of power, agency is that which is made or de-
nied, expanded or contracted, in the exercise of power. It is the (sense of) 
authority to act, or of lack of authority and lack of empowerment. It is that 
dimension of power that is located in the actor’s subjective sense of authori-
zation, control, effectiveness in the world. (…) [O]n the other hand, agency 
represents the pressures of desires and understandings and intentions on cul-
tural constructions. Much of the meaning uncovered in a cultural interpreta-
tion assumes, explicitly or implicitly, an actor engaged in a project, a game, 
a drama, an actor with not just a ‘point of view’ but a more active projection 
of the self toward some desired end. In the first context, agency (…) is both 
a source and an effect of power, in the second (…), it is both a source and an 
effect of ‘culture’” (Ortner, 1997: 146).
To summarize her idea, one can say that “agency as power” refers more to the con-
ventional meaning of agency: agency as a form of power, which can be used by the 
powerful, but also by the seemingly powerless in order to keep up the status quo 
or to invoke changes33. It is a form of reactionary agency as it is directed against 
another individual or societal group, i.e. it can be used to influence actions and 
events, but it also entails the capacity to control one’s own life (Ortner, 2006: 143f.). 
According to Ortner, the “agency of power” is defined to a great extent by people 
33 I am aware that Ortner, whose work is positioned in the realms of practice theory, has a different 
conception of power and understanding of the subject or individual actor than those commonly 
applied in discourse-analytical approaches based on Foucault. Nevertheless, I regard certain as-
pects of her approach to agency as useful for my analysis.
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in positions of power. In her 1997 article Thick Resistance: Death and the Cultural 
Construction of Agency in Himalayan Mountaineering, she gives the example of in-
ternational, mostly Western mountaineers in Nepal who – due to their privileged 
(economic and world-political) position – can impose their terms and conditions 
on the local Sherpa people who they employ as climbing assistants. However, she 
convincingly shows that the Sherpa are not only dominated by the mountaineers, 
but use local constructions of agency and power to give meaning to their actions 
and to integrate their (religious) beliefs into the mountaineering operations.
Ortner refers to this later form of agency as “agency of intentions”. It designates 
the ability to imagine, plan and exert one’s own projects by drawing on personal 
and cultural resources. Ortner claims that it is important to study this form of 
agency by applying a Geertzian interpretative framework in order to better grasp 
and understand local assumptions about what counts as agency in a given cultural 
and historical context. In this way, one can identify how social actors give meaning 
to their actions within existing relations/systems of power and how they formulate 
and pursue their plans, goals and desires.
In order to clarify the relevance of these elements for my analysis I will give some 
examples. On the one hand, I look at agency in the context of unequal power rela-
tions – agency as a “source and effect of power”. I analyze implicit or explicit state-
ments about power relations and social structures, and the ways individuals position 
themselves within these power relations, e.g. as agents or ‘victims’, as members of 
the dominant or of the inferior group. I also observe, how power relations manifest 
themselves in daily practices, for instance in the family setting. I specifically focus on 
three different forms of power relations which I frequently encountered throughout 
my research: relations between youth and elders, between men and women and 
between Uganda and the West.
On the other hand, I use the meaning of “agency as projects” to focus on percep-
tions of agency in (youth’s) discursive practices. Thereby, I place special emphasis 
on the analysis of my interlocutor’s future aspirations. Do they have visions for the 
future or “projects” at all? If yes, where do ideas and inspirations for these projects 
come from? What meaning do they give to their actions and (how) do they try to 
establish their systems of meaning in a larger social context? How do they perceive 
their social situation and their chances to act within this situation? These questions 
will be particularly interesting because there are many young people in Northern 
Uganda who perceive themselves to be confronted by very bleak future opportuni-
ties.
I will further elaborate some of the concepts mentioned here in the chapters 
where they become relevant for my analysis. I will conclude my introduction by 
outlining the structure of this book.
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Structure of the Book1.9. 
This book is divided into seven chapters: the introduction, a field chapter, four ana-
lytical chapters and a concluding chapter. I introduce each of the chapters (with the 
exception of chapter 334) with an extract from my field notes in order to convey a 
better feeling and understanding for my research setting in Northern Uganda. The 
lengthy extracts intend to illustrate some of the general points I talk about in the 
respective chapter.
I begin the following second chapter with an extract from my field notes in 
which I outline my impressions of ‘field’ and ‘fieldwork’ when I travelled to Gulu 
for the very first time in August 2009. Subsequently, I discuss the progress of my 
research, the various methods I applied and the ‘biases’ entailed in my research ap-
proach. I also introduce the reader to some of my field sites and groups of interlocu-
tors in Gulu, which I will refer to throughout this book.
Chapter 3 and 4 comprise a historical analysis of discourses on the war in North-
ern Uganda and of discourses on Acholi culture. The background information pro-
vided in these chapters is necessary to contextualize my analysis of contemporary 
discourses on socio-cultural change in the two following chapters.
The third chapter takes a discourse-analytical approach to studying Ugandan 
history. I trace different narratives and interpretations of events in Ugandan history, 
which entail different analyses of the root causes of the war in Northern Uganda. 
I demonstrate that there are different versions of history, which are contested among 
Ugandans and social scientists alike. I point out how certain interpretations of his-
torical events have become established as “truths” (in a Foucauldian sense) and show 
how these “truths” have had a profound effect on subsequent historical develop-
ments, in particular the war in Northern Uganda, and their interpretations. Chapter 
3 is intended to help the reader to grasp the complexity of the war in Northern 
Uganda and the scientific and popular debates that have been fought about it. This 
is necessary to understand my discussion of discourses on (war-related) socio-cultur-
al change in the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 4 serves to expound the contemporary, hegemonic discourse on Acholi 
culture, propagated by both local and international actors, who proclaim that “tra-
ditional Acholi culture” as it was in “those days” has been lost through war and dis-
placement. Thereby, I refer to the literature as well as to my ethnographic material. 
In order to give the reader an impression of contemporary representations of Acholi 
culture, I begin the chapter with an extract from my field notes in which I describe 
the “Miss Acholi Contest”. I then delineate elements of Acholi culture that are 
commonly associated with pre-colonial and/or pre-war times. I try to reconstruct 
the image of this proclaimed ideal and ‘authentic’ Acholi society by linking com-
34 Chapter 3 comprises a discourse-analysis of the literature on the war and is not based on my 
ethnographic data.
Introduction 59
mon expressions by my interlocutors to older and newer ethnographic accounts of 
the Acholi. By doing so, I reconstruct how contemporary notions of an ‘authentic’ 
Acholi culture have been and are being discursively produced. In the subsequent 
part of the chapter, I focus on the widespread contemporary impression that Acholi 
culture is “getting lost”. In local discourses this loss of Acholi culture is blamed on 
the war, particularly the displacement of the majority of the Acholi population to 
IDP camps, and the effects of war-related foreign influences. In the final part of the 
chapter, I briefly discuss contemporary attempts to reconstruct ‘traditional’, ‘au-
thentic’ Acholi culture, which are pursued in different ways by rural communities, 
urban elites and international development actors.
Based on the general analyses of the discourse on Acholi culture and its pro-
claimed loss in chapter 4, I then turn to analyze more specifically how the young 
people I worked with in Gulu position themselves in this discourse and how they 
evaluate ongoing processes of socio-cultural change. I argue that due to the specific 
situation they have been confronted with in the past, and the specific challenges and 
opportunities they face both with regard to the present and the future, their position 
is somewhat different from that of the adult/elder population.
In chapter 5, I discuss youth practices and discourses against the backdrop of 
shifting social expectations, different power influences as well as local and global 
discourses. The chapter focuses on the ways members of the “war generation” expe-
rience and evaluate the changes Acholi society is seen to be undergoing, and on the 
strategies they adopt in dealing with the post-war situation of perceived cultural flux 
and uncertainty. I first provide an ethnographic insight into contemporary youth 
culture in Gulu and give a general description of the generation of urban young 
people, who were born and raised during the war years and who live in Gulu Mu-
nicipality today. In the subsequent part of the chapter, I discuss youth practices and 
behaviors with regard to Ferguson’s (1999) concept of “cultural styles”. Thereafter, 
I focus on discourses on socio-cultural change and future visions of Acholi society 
and delineate four ‘prototypical’ positions young people adopt regarding this sub-
ject: a desire to retraditionalize Acholi society, a desire to modernize Acholi society, 
ambivalence and creativity. Chapter 5 intends to illustrate how youth in Gulu stra-
tegically react and contribute to contemporary discourses in post-war Acholi society 
in very different ways depending on their individual characteristics, the situational 
context and changing power constellations.
Chapter 6 deals with notions of Westernization and neocolonialism in Ugan-
dan discourses on socio-cultural change, particularly those concerned with gender, 
kinship and sexuality. It is based on my observation, derived from my analysis of 
statements by my interlocutors and in the Ugandan media, that the West consti-
tutes an important, spatial and symbolic reference point in contemporary discours-
es. Westernization is generally regarded as a major source of the ongoing changes 
in Acholiland (and beyond), and its implication and desirability were strongly de-
bated among my interlocutors. In my analysis I aim to understand why the West 
is such a frequent point of reference and comparison and why and in which con-
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texts Ugandan actors respectively establish positive or negative associations with the 
West. I argue that one can differentiate between two different types of discourses: 
“neocolonialism discourses” which mainly reflect negative perceptions of ‘Western-
influenced’ change and are used to blame the West for interference in Ugandan 
internal affairs, and “Westernization discourses”, which echo more ambiguous views 
of Western influences and are concerned with Ugandan society itself. In the first 
part of the analysis, I examine general discourses on Westernization which are re-
lated to aid dependency, NGO intervention and generational change, all of which 
are much-debated topics in contemporary (Northern) Uganda. In the second part 
of the analysis, I place special emphasis on representations of the West in contem-
porary debates on gender, kinship and sexuality, where binary oppositions between 
local and global, modern and traditional and African and Western are particularly 
widespread and contested. In the third part of the analysis, I contrast the formerly-
outlined discourses on Westernization with a neocolonialism discourse – the cur-
rent national debate on homosexuality – and show that the motives, arguments and 
strategies behind it are very different from the discourses on Westernization. Finally, 
I draw attention to the highly sexualized dimension of discourses on socio-cultural 
change in Acholiland and Uganda generally and analyze the way these discourses 
are closely interwoven with power dynamics at the local, national and international 
level.
The concluding chapter summarizes the major themes and insights discussed in 
the previous chapters with regard to the question how perceptions of socio-cultural 
change and imaginations of post-war Acholi society are contested and negotiated 
in the context of generational, gendered and globalized power dynamics. It takes 
up my hypothesis that, in these negotiations, members of the war generation are 
placed in a specific in-between position – between past and future, tradition and 
modernity, Acholi culture and Western culture – which they perceive as a cause of 
uncertainty, but also as a source of agency. The concluding chapter furthermore 
serves to link my findings from Northern Uganda to broader debates on youth and 
socio-cultural change in Africa.
‘My Field’2.  – Changing Perceptions of Research 
in a Post-War Setting
This chapter serves to introduce and reflect my research approach and fieldwork 
experience, including my research setting in Gulu, the various research methods 
I applied, the course and evolution of my research and the biases entailed in my 
research approach. I introduce the reader to some of my ‘field sites’ and interlocu-
tors in Gulu, which I will refer to throughout this book35. Drawing on the work of 
Gupta and Ferguson (1997a,b,c), I briefly dissect the problematic notion of ‘field’ 
and expound how I conceptualize ‘my field’ beyond the conventional sense of the 
term. I begin my reflections by describing the feelings and expectations I had about 
my research when I first travelled to Uganda for a four-week exploratory study in 
August and September 2009. In the following, I discuss how my perceptions of my 
research and my ‘field’ changed over time and how my change of perceptions af-
fected my research approach.
35 A complete list and description of all of my major interlocutors can be found in the appendix. 
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Entering ‘The Field’2.1. 
In August 2009, I left Germany for a one-month preparatory trip to Northern 
Uganda. I had studied the literature on Northern Uganda which was largely fo-
cused on the 20-year conflict which had come to a tentative end in 2006. I had 
talked to people on the ground, mainly foreign researchers and development work-
ers, who assured me that the situation was stable and safe. I had read many books 
focusing on gender and conflict – which was my original ‘theoretical frame’ for 
my research. With regard to methodology, I had contemplated about the nature of 
ethnographic fieldwork, about self-reflectivity of the anthropologist, about trying 
to learn from the people on the ground, about having a ‘blank mind’ and entering 
the ‘field’ as un-biased as possible.
But despite all my ‘scientific engagements’ with region, theory and methodology 
and my critical reflections, in retrospective I must admit that my mind was full of 
stereotypes: stereotypes about war-stricken and dangerous Northern Uganda, about 
victimized and marginalized women and youth and their patriarchal counterparts. 
I also had a rather inadequate vision of ‘doing ethnography’ which corresponded 
largely to the “Malinowskian archetype” (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997a: 11) of getting 
settled in a bounded ‘field’ and to provide a comprehensive ethnography of ‘modern 
Acholi’ and the changes which had taken place and affected Acholi culture, particu-
larly gender relations, as a result of the war. Resulting from all the contradictory and 
confusing images in my mind and the high expectations I had of me as an ethnogra-
pher, my predominant feelings when I entered the plane to Uganda were doubt, fear 
and uncertainty. I had many doubts about my ‘dangerous field’, feared the post-war 
traumas I might be confronted with, and felt uncertain about the methodological 
and personal challenges of fieldwork.
After spending a few preparatory days in Kampala, the Ugandan capital, I felt 
it was time to explore my ‘field-to-be’. I took the bus to Gulu, the biggest town in 
the North, which would become my main base for a longer stay in 2010/2011. In 
the bus, I was lucky to sit next to a friendly young man. The conversation with him 
helped me to temporarily forget some of my fears and doubts about my research 
endeavor. His name was Komakech and it turned out that he was an Acholi from 
Gulu, a student, pursuing his secondary education in Kampala, going for a home 
visit during the school holidays. I was naively excited to have the opportunity to 
speak to a ‘representative’ of my envisioned target group – Acholi youth – even 
before having entered ‘the field’. This is what I wrote about the encounter in my 
field notes:
“We exchange some introductory words. Proudly, he shows me his student ID 
card and tells me that he is currently doing his A-level, the last two years in 
the Ugandan school system, which will enable those who graduate to study at 
university. We talk about school and this and that. Then, I start to ‘interview’ 
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him about the present situation in Northern Uganda and about the reason why 
he had decided to study in Kampala. I ask him whether his family is still in Gulu 
and whether he will be visiting them now during the holidays. He becomes quiet, 
his face expression changes and all of a sudden he looks very serious. He tells 
me that he will be seeing his sister and brother who are still in Gulu. His mum, 
he says, has also moved to Kampala. After a pause he tells me that his father is 
dead. I don’t know what to say and feel stupid at having asked such an insensitive 
question. There is silence between us. I imagine how his father died in the war, 
how Komakech and his mother fled to Kampala, how the family is trying to cope 
now. And for the first time I feel what it can mean to do research in a former war 
zone” (field notes 22.08.2009).
In the situation described above, I never considered that Komakech’s father could 
have died of cancer, AIDS, old age or in a car-accident; that his mum might have 
had a well-paid job in Kampala which enabled her to provide a good education for 
her son; that his brother and sister might have decided to stay in Gulu to run a fam-
ily business. My image of Northern Uganda as a war-zone blinded my interpreta-
tion, or, to quote the brilliant speech by the Nigerian novelist Chimamanda Adichie 
(July 2009)36, I only had a “single story” of Northern Uganda in my mind. Most of 
the things I had read about Northern Uganda had been about the war, the victims, 
‘child soldiers’, the rebels. And despite my intended theoretical focus on the agency 
of the people in a post-war setting, my mind was full of victim narratives. In the 
first days of my stay (and even later, during my second stay), I often saw daily life in 
Gulu only through the ‘war lens’. When I saw a teenage girl carrying a baby child 
I thought that she must have been raped by the rebels; when I saw young people 
hanging out in the streets I often wondered whether they had been abducted and 
were former ‘child soldiers’. I expected everyone, everywhere to be always thinking 
and talking about the war.
What I actually found in Gulu, however, was very different and much more mul-
tifaceted. Most people in town seemed to be living in the present rather than in a 
‘traumatic’ past. Men and women were working hard on their fields or in small busi-
nesses, struggling to provide for their families. Young people were going to school 
or hanging out with their friends. Boys and girls were supporting their families at 
home, helping with household chores or taking care of their younger siblings. Gulu 
Municipality was a vibrant place, one of the fastest growing towns in Uganda, and 
one in which people seemed to have a vision for their future. Construction work was 
going on everywhere, the local markets were full of stalls selling all types of products, 
and the streets were bustling with life. If I had not known that only three years ago 
Gulu, and more particularly its surrounding areas, had been a war zone, I could not 
have guessed it. Only the numerous signs pointing to the headquarters of humani-
36 Adichie, Chimamanda. 2009. The Danger of a Single Story. TED, July 2009: http://www.ted.
com/talks/chimamanda_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_story.html (accessed 10.10.2013).
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tarian NGOs, which had ‘flooded’ Gulu mainly in the last phase of the conflict, still 
provided some evidence of the conflict-ridden past. Daily reality in Gulu hardly 
conformed to my expectation of a dark and dangerous field site.
Of course, upon closer inspection, there were also problems and impediments: 
many people were still suffering from the consequences of war and did not profit 
from the ‘development boom’. Children were out-of-school because their parents 
lacked the means to pay school fees, unemployment was widespread and poverty 
remained a big challenge, especially for youth. In the rural areas, new conflicts about 
land were erupting as people returned from internal displacement camps. And of 
course, when discussing these issues, the war sometimes came up as a topic of con-
versation and especially older people lamented that in the past everything had been 
better. However, the war did no longer occupy such a central position in the daily 
lives of the people as I had expected.
There was only one group of people who were still primarily focused on the war: 
the foreign researchers. And they were many. Although I had known beforehand 
that Gulu had become a major ‘hub’ for conflict researchers from various disci-
plines, especially since the war had ended, I had not expected the researcher com-
munity to be so large – and so well-known. Whenever I told local people in Gulu 
about the purpose of my stay – research – they seemed to have a very precise idea 
of what exactly I was planning to do and sometimes they smiled at me knowingly. 
I often felt awkward and I sensed (and sometimes my interlocutors explicitly stated) 
that they were wondering why all these foreigners came to do so much research, 
and why all research topics seemed to focus on the same thing, namely the war 
in Northern Uganda. I sometimes encountered situations where people seemingly 
randomly came up to me and, after confirming that I was a researcher, offered to 
be interviewed by me. In other situations, I was told that my topic of research had 
already been covered, but that nevertheless it would be no problem to find volun-
teers for a group discussion. “Mobilizing” people for focus groups, taking people 
to “the field” (usually a rural area outside Gulu Municipality), and being “research 
assistants” were tasks and positions actively sought by some of the Gulu locals. Just 
as I had my stereotypical expectation of a post-war community, this very same com-
munity had a very clear (and also stereotypical) understanding of what it meant to 
do research or be a researcher.
To most people I encountered in Gulu, research meant that white people (usu-
ally young, often university students, and mostly female) from the US or from Eu-
rope would stay in Gulu for some weeks or months. They would look for former 
LRA rebels or victims – preferably ‘child soldiers’ – and conduct interviews or ‘visit’ 
the camps for internally displaced persons (locally known as IDP camps), which 
had already been closed by the time I settled in Gulu. In common perception, re-
search was understood to be applied research, aimed to provide ‘solutions’ to current 
‘problems’, which could then be taken up by the NGOs working in Gulu. In this 
sense and understandably, most people expected some short- or mid-term (personal 
and communal) benefits to come out of all the research, and, as a result, were happy 
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to (re)produce and reinforce the victim narratives and the images of Gulu as a war 
zone, which the foreign researchers wanted to hear and see (cf. Verma, 2012; for a 
similar situation in West Nile cf. Bogner & Rosenthal, 2012: 124ff.). This is not to 
say that people intentionally lied about their situation or exaggerated their problems 
(although this sometimes also happened), but that they presented only “a single 
story” of their lives as war victims, which left large parts of their daily routines un-
noticed and served to manifest the dominant discourse on Northern Uganda as a 
crisis zone.
I often felt awkward being confronted with the stereotypical image of the foreign 
researcher, probably because it was in many ways quite an accurate representation 
of the situation on the ground37. Reluctantly, I had to admit to myself that I not 
only was a part of the researcher community, but was actually not as different from 
the stereotype as I pretended and would have liked to be. During my second stay in 
Gulu (March 2010 – January 2011), and over time, I became more confident in my 
role as a researcher, especially after I started working as a part-time lecturer at the 
local university. The people I worked with for my research also became more accus-
tomed to my research style which was less focused on formal interviews and rather 
based on establishing relationships and having informal conversations (see the dis-
cussion of my research methods below). They eventually believed that I would stay 
longer than many of the student short term researchers and that I was interested 
in getting to know the different facets of their lives and their opinions on a whole 
range of matters, including but by no means limited to the war experience. Over 
time, my own perception of the situation in Gulu also changed dramatically from 
my first impressions.
Today, after having spent nearly a year in Northern Uganda, I sometimes look 
back to that first bus ride to Gulu to remind myself of my changing perceptions 
which now offer me an important guideline for my interpretations. As I changed, 
my ‘field’ changed – not as a physical “space”, but as a “place”38. The way I will come 
to represent it in the following chapters are strongly related to the personal changes 
I underwent during my time in this ‘field’ and the way I came to understand it as a 
“political location” rather than a “spatial site of difference” (cf. Gupta & Ferguson, 
37 Together with my colleagues from IPSS, I often wondered about the influx of foreign researchers 
and “well-intentioned Western teenagers” (cf. Perrot, 2010: 190), some of whom had very super-
ficial observations and assumptions about Northern Uganda. We met and talked to quite a few 
of the international students and researchers, because they came to IPSS to collect information 
on the war and post-war setting and were sometimes quite surprised and shocked by the naïve, 
unreflected and paternalistic approach to studying and ‘helping’ the people in Northern Uganda 
some of them proposed (cf. field notes e.g. 23.03.2010; 29.03.2010; 15.04.2010; 18.11.2010).
38 “Space” refers to a physical, geo-political and seemingly natural unit whereby “place” refers to 
something which has acquired an identity and social meaning. Gupta and Ferguson (1997c: 36) 
claim that “by always foregrounding the spatial distribution of hierarchical power relations, we 
can better understand the processes whereby a space achieves a distinctive identity as place.” For 
anthropological debates on space and place cf. also Low & Lawrence-Zúñiga (2003) and Cole-
man & Collins (2006).
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1997a: 5; 35ff.). I will briefly reflect on the changes my notion of field underwent 
throughout my research.
Reflecting the Notion of ‘Field’2.2. 
At the start of my research, I still had a rather classical notion of fieldwork and the 
‘field’ – being far away from ‘home’, generating a specific form of ethnographic 
knowledge, and following a rite of passage which turns the anthropological student 
into a “real anthropologist” (cf. Gupta & Ferguson, 1997a: 12–18). This perception 
changed when I came to realize not only the differences but the similarities between 
‘field’ and ‘home’, when I came to understand both the ordinary and the extraordi-
nary aspects of life in the ‘field’, when I discovered my role not only as a knowledge 
seeker and generator but as an ignorant and naïve learner and visitor, and through 
these realizations gained a somewhat different, much more fuzzy notion of what it 
means to be a “real anthropologist”.
The representation of my field which I present in this book takes into account 
the critique of Gupta and Ferguson (1997a,b,c)39, who in their often-cited essays 
called into question anthropology’s long-established and uncritical understandings 
of field and fieldwork40. Following their appeals, I address the interrelationship be-
tween “culture, power and place” (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997b) and dissect how un-
derstandings of community, locality and region have been formed and how they 
are now lived. In chapters 3 and 4, in particular, I analyze the ways different groups 
of people, both insiders and outsiders, have historically and politically constructed 
the places (e.g. “Acholiland”), peoples (e.g. “the Acholi”) and events (e.g. the “LRA 
war”) which I discuss as part of my research, and thereby try to uncover the unequal 
power relations and various forms of knowledge inherent in these constructions.
In their chapter on Discipline and Practice: ‘The Field’ as Site, Method and Lo-
cation in Anthropology (1997a), Gupta and Ferguson summarize their vision of a 
reformed and relevant ethnography as follows:
“Instead of a royal road to holistic knowledge of ‘another society’, ethnogra-
phy is beginning to become recognizable as a flexible and opportunistic strat-
egy for diversifying and making more complex our understanding of various 
places, people and predicaments through an attentiveness to the different 
forms of knowledge available from different social and political locations” 
(Gupta & Ferguson, 1997a: 37).
I hope that the insights I present throughout this book can live up to this vision.
39 I exemplary draw on the essays by Gupta and Ferguson, but am aware that similar ideas have been 
put forth by many other anthropologists, who reflect on the changing nature and assumptions of 
anthropological fieldwork since Malinowski.
40 Having pointed out the problematic implications as well as my understanding of the term ‘field’, 
I will use it without quotation marks in the following text.
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Fieldwork in Gulu:  2.3. 
Basic Overview of Research Methods
As I already stated above, my findings are based on a one-month preliminary study 
in 2009 and ten months of fieldwork between March 2010 and January 2011 in 
Gulu Municipality. The main part of the research consisted of participant obser-
vation and regular conversations with urban youth, their families and friends. It 
involved visiting and participating in training sessions of different youth groups 
(e.g. hip hop, break-dance, “traditional dance” or sports), participating in discus-
sions with and about youth at Gulu Youth Centre and watching competitions such 
as song contests, dance competitions or debate tournaments in which young people 
performed. I interacted with youths from very different backgrounds (regarding 
their family situation, educational level, economic situation etc.) and with very dif-
ferent life experiences (cf. Chap. 5). I developed closer relationships and met with 
some of them outside of the institutional settings described above. I visited their 
homes, got to know their families and ‘hung out’ with them in their free time – in 
dance clubs, movie halls, record studios and several other places. The majority of 
my interlocutors belonged to what I would call the ‘ordinary’, i.e. non-elite popula-
tion. Most had a basic level of education and were able to speak English, but only a 
few had finished high-school or gone to university. My regular informal encounters 
and conversations, which I recorded daily in my field notes, constitute the most 
important basis of my data.
In addition to my participant observations, I also conducted a number of semi-
structured interviews with male and female urban youth (20), staff from NGOs, 
CBOs and the local government (9), an Acholi elder (1), and mixed groups of youth 
and elders in selected rural areas (6)41. The interviews were based on a set of broad 
and very loosely structured questions, and focused on perceptions of the socio-cul-
tural changes which had occurred in Northern Uganda over the past 25 years. All 
interviews were conducted in English with the exception of the group interviews in 
the rural areas, which were carried out in Acholi with the help of three research as-
sistants42: John Omara, Ruth Lagen and Kenneth Oyet Odong43.
41 A list of all the interviews including date, location and biographical information on the respon-
dents is provided in the appendix.
42 I did not have a fixed research assistant at any point of my research, but relied on the help of vari-
ous people in various contexts. I tried to reward their help by inviting them for food and drinks, 
or by equally assisting them in material and non-material ways in situations where they could use 
it (for instance in interactions with organizations and institutions or when they needed volun-
teers for projects and activities organized by them). The only situations in which I worked with 
research assistants in the conventional sense of the term, i.e. as paid ‘employees’, were the group 
interviews I conducted in the rural areas in the Acholi language. 
43 I met John and Ruth through my work at Gulu Youth Centre, where they both worked as youth 
counselors. Kenneth was a Master student at the Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies (IPSS), 
where I worked as a part-time lecturer.
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In some instances of my fieldwork, I worked with a “bio-ethnographic approach” 
(Roberts, 2005), in which ethnographic and biographical methods overlapped. I 
carried out participant observation with a strong biographical focus and asked the 
young people about their life stories in the semi-structured interviews I conducted. 
I spent significant time hanging out with my interlocutors and, after a while, a situ-
ation of trust and normality emerged between us. I was no longer seen primarily as 
a foreign researcher but as a member of the group – albeit a special one. The young 
people started sharing information about their lives with me which they had never 
mentioned during the interviews. Furthermore, by observing the behavior of my in-
terlocutors in different settings I got a more complex picture of their lives and could 
relativize the self-images people had presented of themselves in the interviews. The 
interviews provided an important complementary source of information. Here, my 
interlocutors could reflect on and explain why they behaved in certain ways. They 
could also clarify aspects which might have been misleading for me when only 
observing their behavior. In one instance, for example, I was observing a session of 
the hip hop project, in which the participants were asked to write a hip hop verse 
talking about their life story. One of the participants wrote a verse about his life 
on the streets. He rapped about living without his parents and how he had to cope 
on his own. I later interviewed the young man and asked him about his lyrics. He 
laughed and then clarified:
“My song portrays my life, but it is not a true life. I wrote it just to shame 
my father, because one time he annoyed me, so I wrote it to shame him. 
He didn’t want me to do the music project, so I wrote the song to shame 
him. That’s why I put so much interest on my parent’s life” (INT Nura, 
21.04.2010).
In addition to resolving such misinterpretations, the combination of interviewing 
and observing exposed how youth strategically conjured different facets of identity 
depending on the setting they were in. This was especially evident when comparing 
how youth presented themselves among fellow youth in town (and also in the inter-
view) as opposed to their behavior at home or when visiting relatives in the village.
After the first five months of my stay, and based on an intermediary data analysis 
of my field notes and interview transcripts, I developed a short questionnaire and 
distributed this to youth in Gulu Municipality in order to get a broader picture on 
some of the topics I had discussed with my interlocutors in the interviews and daily 
conversations. The questionnaire was distributed by two of my research assistants to 
youth at Gulu Youth Centre and in cultural groups. The target group was approxi-
mately 100 youth between the ages of 16 and 26. I received a total of 94 response 
forms. The average age of the respondents was 19 (age range: 13–33) and the sex 
ratio was 36 percent female and 64 percent male youth. The selection of respondents 
was based on a convenience sample (Bernard, 2006: 191f.) and is thus statistically 
not representative for any larger part of the population of urban youth beyond the 
sample. Nevertheless, the findings provide some interesting additional insights and 
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represent a larger number of youth than those which I interviewed personally and in 
more depth. I present some findings from the questionnaire throughout my analy-
sis, especially in chapter 544.
Throughout my stay, I collected newspaper articles and other documents which 
focused on discourses of socio-cultural change in Northern Uganda and Uganda 
more broadly. I regularly perused the two main Ugandan daily newspapers: the Daily 
Monitor which is the leading independent and government-critical newspaper, and 
the New Vision which is largely government-owned and sympathetic to the NRM 
regime. Furthermore, I read and collected several issues of Straight Talk, a newspaper 
which discusses “issues raised by adolescents” and aims to carry out comprehensive 
sex education and which was distributed to youth at Gulu Youth Centre45. These ad-
ditional data helped me to better contextualize my own experiences and perceptions 
and relate them to wider discourses. I will draw on the various newspaper articles I 
assembled throughout my stay particularly in chapter 6, where I discuss notions of 
Westernization and neocolonialism in local and national discourses.
In my research and data analysis I combined elements of ethnography and 
grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 2005 [1967]46). Charmaz and Mitchell (2001) 
have described the benefit of such a mixed approach as follows: “Grounded theory 
methods preserve an open-ended approach to studying the empirical world yet add 
rigor to ethnographic research by building systematic checks into both data col-
lection and analysis” (ibid.: 162). In their article, they outline how the strengths 
of ethnography (i.e. thick description of and an open-minded frame of mind to-
wards everyday life) and grounded theory (i.e. flexible but none the less systematic 
approach to theory development) can be combined, and develop an approach to 
grounded theory, which “builds upon a symbolic interactions theoretical perspec-
tive and constructivist methods that assume the existence of multiple realities, the 
mutual creation of knowledge by researchers and research participants, and aims to 
provide interpretative understanding of the studied world” (ibid.: 160).
Throughout my research, I approached my topic from various angles and ob-
served and participated in very different aspects of Gulu everyday life. After some 
weeks of relatively unstructured ethnography, I started to preliminary code and 
analyze the data I had hitherto collected and thus to follow a more systematic ap-
proach to data collection and analysis as envisioned by grounded theory. I began to 
approach my field more systematically and – by engaging in a cumulative cycle of 
collecting and coding data – tried to work out core themes and thus increase the 
focus and depth of my research.
Shortly after I returned from the field, I started a second round of coding my 
data in which I confirmed and refined already existing codes and identified new 
44 All original response forms can be consulted upon request to the author.
45 Straight Talk is published by the Straight Talk Foundation, a Ugandan, internationally funded 
NGO that specializes in communication for adolescent health (cf. www.straighttalkfoundation.
org/, accessed 14.01.2013).
46 For a critical discussion and summary of grounded theory cf. Denscombe (2003).
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themes (“open coding”). I then categorized and compared all of my codes (“axi-
al coding”) and selected the most important themes (“selective coding”; cf. Den-
scombe, 2003: 119ff.; Charmaz & Mitchell, 2001: 165ff.). Based on this analysis, I 
developed a basic outline of my book and defined the broad topic of each chapter. I 
then carried out a further, more detailed and pronounced data analysis with regard 
to the topics of the respective chapters. In most stages, writing and analysis phases 
overlapped or were deeply intertwined. In the written account that emerged, I again 
combined elements of ethnography and (grounded) theory by mixing narrative ac-
counts and detailed description with conceptual analysis (cf. Charmaz & Mitchell, 
2001: 169ff.).
In the following, I will briefly reflect on the process and different stages of my 
research in order to elucidate how I practically applied the different methods and 
concepts I outlined in this section and also to give a reflexive account of the ways I 
experienced fieldwork.
Progress of Fieldwork2.4. 
Chaudhary (2006: 24f.) writes that “the main emphasis of reflection lies in clarify-
ing the transfer process of the fieldwork experience into an anthropological text, the 
idea being that the fieldwork experience offers information on the background and 
the individuality of the researcher as a very important determinant of anthropo-
logical knowledge.” In a similar vein, Hastrup (1992: 117) argues that “[f]ieldwork 
is situated between autobiography and anthropology” and that this “connection 
itself is of generative impact upon the reality of anthropology”. Thus, as part of my 
reflexive account, and in line with an interpretative epistemology, I believe that it 
is imperative to discuss not only the methodological but also some of the personal 
implications of the fieldwork process. I will do so in the following by sketching dif-
ferent stages I underwent during fieldwork.
Based on a review of fieldwork literature, personal exchanges with colleagues 
over a 40-year period and his experiences as a director of field schools in cultural 
anthropology and linguistics, Bernard (2006: 378–384) has developed a typology 
of seven different stages of participant observation: 1) “Initial Contact”, 2) “Cul-
ture Shock”, 3) “Discovering the Obvious”, 4) “The Break”, 5) “Focusing”, 6) “Ex-
haustion, Second Break and Frantic Activity”, and 7) “Leaving the Field”. I found 
Bernard’s typology very helpful to reflect on the course of my fieldwork, both on 
a personal and a methodological level, and will loosely relate to it in the following 
description of the different fieldwork phases I experienced.
March–July 2010: Initial Contact, Culture Shock & Discovering the Obvious
During the first four months of my fieldwork, I was concerned with getting settled 
in Gulu (on the personal level) and setting out my field (on the professional level). 
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Although this phase was very challenging and exhausting as I struggled with alter-
nating feelings of euphoria and shock, understanding and ignorance, frustration 
and optimism, I did not experience any profound set-backs. In the first weeks in 
Gulu, I tried to talk to as many people as I could about my research topic. I spent a 
lot of time at the Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies (IPSS) of Gulu University, 
where I had already established some contacts during my first visit to Gulu. I also 
made interview appointments with people who were working for NGOs and CBOs 
involved in youth work and used the interviews to get a general overview of my 
research field and my envisioned target group. At the same time, I started to visit 
different youth groups, which were involved in music, sports or “cultural activities” 
and which I had heard about. Soon, I decided to work with two of these groups 
more closely. The decision was based on two aspects: first, both groups were very 
open towards me as a researcher. Secondly, I believed they were situated in very dif-
ferent fields of youth culture, one being a group of so-called “traditional dancers” 
and the other being a group of hip hop performers.
The first group called themselves the “Gulu Theatre Artists” (GUTA). They were 
a “cultural group”, consisting of male and female children and youth between the 
ages of roughly ten to thirty who met regularly to practice and perform “traditional 
Acholi dances”. Throughout my stay in Gulu, I visited their dance practices and 
their performances in public venues and at dance competitions on a regular basis. I 
also conducted interviews with a number of the GUTA’s members and some became 
regular and important interlocutors.
The second group I got involved with was engaged in a hip hop project called 
“Gulu Talking Straight”, which was loosely connected to Gulu Youth Centre and 
coordinated by an international volunteer and an Acholi (self-proclaimed) music 
artist and producer. Approximately 20 young people (in their late teens and early 
twenties), among them only one young woman, had qualified to participate in the 
project. They had been promised that they would be taught in creative writing and 
other basic music skills and would be able to record a song in a record studio after 
their training. The predefined style of music was hip hop and the predefined topic 
of the songs was “my life story”. Apart from these basic specifications, the project 
turned out to be very unstructured and unorganized. The bi-weekly training ses-
sions were held during school hours, which forced the in-school participants to 
decide between their ‘hip hop career’ and their education. Sometimes, one or both 
of the coordinators who also took the role of the trainers did not show up, came 
late or unprepared. The long waiting hours before and in-between sessions enabled 
me to establish closer contacts to the group and after some weeks I also used these 
‘breaks’ to conduct interviews with many of the participants. Two of them, Akello 
and Simon, became very important interlocutors and ‘field guides’ and Akello be-
came one of my closest friends in Gulu. In the first months of my research, I spent a 
lot of time with the people from the project and even after the project had officially 
ended I maintained sporadic contact with many of the young hip hoppers.
72 Julia Vorhölter: Youth at the Crossroads
Towards the end of the start-off phase, I started to ‘experiment’ with my methods 
and conducted a group interview with youth and elders in Kapedopong, a settle-
ment on the outskirts of Gulu, with the help of a research assistant and translator. 
I also started a preliminary reflection and analysis of the field notes and interview 
transcripts I had produced during the first four months and wrote a paper for a con-
ference presentation in mid-July (see below). I felt I had become well-settled in my 
field and that my research was progressing well. At the same time I felt exhausted 
and was happy to take a break from field work.
July–August 2010: The Break
In July, I travelled to Sweden for the World Congress of Sociology in Gothenburg 
(11. –17.07.2010), where I presented some of my preliminary findings (cf. Vorhölter, 
2010a). Afterwards, I returned to Uganda with my parents. I invited them to Gulu 
and introduced them to some of my friends before travelling through the country 
with them for twelve days. I only got back to my field in the beginning of August.
August–September 2010: Focusing
When I returned to Gulu, I was eager to follow-up on my research and catch up 
with the people I had not seen for a month. I intensified my participant observa-
tion and for a couple of weeks got very involved in the Gulu hip hop scene. I spent 
a lot of time hanging out in record studies, talking to music and video producers 
and even ended up participating as a ‘guest rapper’ in two songs myself. In addi-
tion, I also spent time at Gulu Youth Centre where in the meanwhile I had become 
well-known as a researcher and occasional volunteer. I helped to chair the youth 
talks and continued (as I had done before) to come along on outreach trips for VCT 
(Voluntary (HIV-)Testing and Counseling) to the rural areas. Based on my prelim-
inary data analysis, I developed a questionnaire and, with the help of two research 
assistants, distributed this to youth in Gulu (see above). By this time, I felt that the 
relationships I had developed in the first months of my research were intensifying. 
I spent the greater parts of many days (and some nights) out with my interlocutors 
and friends and thus gained insight into many new aspects of Gulu life.
September–December 2010: Frantic Activity47
In September, I started my position as a part-time lecturer in the Post-Graduate-
Diploma Program at IPSS48. Every Saturday, I taught the course Ethnic Identity 
47 Bernard has labeled this phase “Exhaustion, Second Break and Frantic Activity”, but for me it was 
mainly a period of “frantic activity”.
48 Because there was a lack of teaching staff and because I was an affiliate to the institute, the direc-
tor of IPSS had offered me to teach a course in the program.
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and Conflict Transformation. This made me feel even more at home in Gulu and I 
thoroughly enjoyed the teaching experience. I sometimes used the seminar sessions 
to discuss issues which were also relevant to my research and I asked my students 
about their opinion on some of the topics I was working on. On December 1st, 
I presented my research at the IPSS colloquium, which was attended by several 
Post-Graduate and Master students as well as a number of foreign anthropologists 
and gave me the chance to receive a critical feedback on my work.
In addition to my regular participant observation activities during this period, 
I also had the chance to observe and take part in some important festivities such as 
Independence Day (on October 9th), Christmas and New Year’s Eve, which I spent 
with friends and their families in Gulu. The last months of the year also marked 
the start of the pre-election campaign (elections took place in February 2011) and 
I watched the rallies by President Museveni and FDC49 opposition candidate Kizza 
Besige, which provided me with some new, interesting insights into political life in 
Uganda.
Throughout the month of October, with the support of two research assistants 
and translators, I carried out five group interviews with youth and elders in selected 
rural areas outside of Gulu.
Between September and December, I also undertook some short trips to other 
parts of Uganda in order to visit the home regions, friends and families of people 
I had met in Gulu: to Arua in the West Nile Region, to Busia in Eastern Uganda, 
and to Palabek in Lamwo District (cf. figure 2 in the appendix). These trips not only 
gave me short breaks from “frantic fieldwork”, but helped me to establish even closer 
contacts to my interlocutors and also gave me the opportunity to compare life in 
Gulu with other places in Uganda.
January 2011: Leaving the Field
Although my return flight to Germany was only on the 31st of January, I already 
left Gulu in early January in order to participate in an evaluation of a ZFD50-Proj-
ect (“Promotion of Peaceful Co-existence between the Iteso and the Karimojong”) 
in Teso and Karamoja, Eastern Uganda, with three colleagues from IPSS. Before 
I left, I visited all of my regular interlocutors to say farewell and to thank them for 
their support. I exchanged contact details with those who had become close friends 
and to this day I am still in touch with some of them. Bernard (2006: 383) writes 
that “[t]he ritual of leaving a place in a culturally appropriate way will make it pos-
sible for you to go back and even to send others” and I tried as best as I could to live 
up to this statement.
49 Forum for Democratic Change
50 Ziviler Friedensdienst. The ZFD supports projects which aim for the peaceful resolution of con-
flicts (cf. http://www.ziviler-friedensdienst.org/de, accessed 30.01.2013).
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Biases Inherent in my Research Approach2.5. 
It seems unnecessary to say that despite the relatively long time I spent in the field 
and the different research approaches I applied, I only gained a temporal insight 
into some aspects of youth life in Gulu. The accounts I present in the following 
chapters of experiences and life situations youth face in Gulu are based on my im-
pressions and the information which was reported to me by my interlocutors. Thus, 
they are selective and subjective and only hint at the manifoldness and complexity 
with which youth – collectively and as individuals – deal with and interpret socio-
cultural change in contemporary Acholiland.
My ‘personal attributes’ as a relatively young, white, educated woman from Ger-
many affected the way people in Gulu interacted with me in multiple ways. On the 
one hand, these characteristics made it easy for me to gain access to various places 
and people: firstly, because they granted me a privileged position in the local social 
order, and secondly (and related to the first point), because people were generally 
enthusiastic about interacting with munu, albeit for different reasons. Many were 
simply interested in exchanging and discussing ideas with someone from a differ-
ent social and cultural context, others thought that “having a white friend” was a 
symbol of status, and some expected financial or social benefits from encounters 
with whites. On the other hand, being young, white and female sometimes also had 
some rather annoying ‘side-effects’ such as having to deal with offensive approaches 
by men on quite a regular basis, being ‘harassed’ by children in the street and having 
to explain and justify my behavior in many situations, especially when it collided 
with local gender ideologies.
Apart from the biases resulting from my ‘personal attributes’, language had a 
restricting impact on the kind of people I interacted with. Due to my very limited 
understanding of Acholi, I mostly interacted with people who could speak Eng-
lish, i.e. those with at least a basic level of education. In urban Gulu, this was the 
great majority of the population, at least among the young generation and among 
male elders, and most spoke a fairly high level of conversational English. However, 
although English was widely used51, it was only the second language for my inter-
locutors and this probably had an effect on the conversations and interviews. In the 
rural areas or when talking to non-English-speakers in Gulu, I was usually aided by 
research assistants or friends who translated for me. In everyday situations, for in-
stance in the local market, I usually managed to have very simple ‘conversations’ in 
Acholi, and my language skills did improve to some extent throughout my stay.
Lastly, my data has a slight male gender bias, particularly with regard to the 
interviews I conducted with youth, but also with regard to the unplanned personal 
51 English is the official national language in Uganda. The only other national language is Swahili, 
which was not spoken by the majority of my interlocutors and is, generally, not commonly used 
in the Acholi sub-region.
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exchanges and daily encounters, which make up a significant part of my field notes. 
This bias can be attributed to a number of reasons: (young) men were more forth-
coming and actively sought contact with me. I was often approached by (young) 
men in the street and used this as a chance to talk to them and ‘informally interview’ 
them on topics I was interested in. Among my close friends and the people I inter-
acted with regularly, the number of men and women was relatively equal (see list of 
most important interlocutors in the appendix). The insights I gained from the regu-
lar encounters with these close interlocutors produced some of my most important 
data and reflect both male and female perspectives.
The male bias is most obvious in the individual interviews I conducted with 
male and female youth. Throughout my research, it proved to be extremely difficult 
to interview young women and to get them to talk in front of a voice recorder. 
It seemed, maybe due to established gender roles, that girls were not used to and 
thus very shy to figure as ‘experts’ and express their opinion in a formal (interview) 
setting. Even girls like Akello, who I interacted with regularly, seemed to feel very 
uncomfortable in the interview situation (cf. field notes 26.11.2010). In the end, 
I decided to conduct the interviews with female youth in a more informal man-
ner and without recording, for instance by deliberately discussing and asking their 
opinions on certain issues in seemingly ‘ordinary’ conversations. Interestingly, in the 
group interviews with youth and elders, I observed that elderly women were usually 
the most outspoken and often took the lead in the discussion. This illuminates that 
it is not gender as such, which produces certain socially-accepted speaker positions 
and subsequent ‘research biases’, but a combination of gender, age, social status 
and, possibly, other factors – both on the side of the researcher and the research 
participants.
In this ‘field chapter’, I have outlined and reflected my research approach and 
have thus provided some guidance to the reader as to what he or she can expect in 
this book. The following chapters are based on an analysis of both the literature 
and my ethnographic material, which I have gathered by applying the above-cited 
research methods.

The War in Northern Uganda3.  –  
Conflicting Interpretations
This chapter takes a discourse-analytical approach52 to studying events in Ugandan 
history which are important in order to understand the war in Northern Uganda 
and its root causes. I point out how certain interpretations of historical events have 
become established as “truths” (in a Foucauldian sense, cf. introduction) and how 
these “truths” have had a profound effect on subsequent historical developments 
as well as their interpretations. This chapter provides important context and back-
ground information, which is needed to grasp the complexity of the war in North-
ern Uganda and the scientific and popular debates that have been fought about 
it. This information is relevant to understanding my discussion of discourses on 
52 Originally, the chapter was intended only as a historical excursus. However, upon closer inspec-
tion of the literature, I found that many aspects of Ugandan history and the war in Northern 
Uganda were so contested that I opted for a discourse-analytical approach.
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(war-related) socio-cultural change in the rest of the book53. My analysis is based 
mainly on an extensive review of the literature and not on my own ethnographic 
data, which is less concerned with the history of the war as such.
Different Accounts of Ugandan History  3.1. 
from the Perspective of the Sociology of Knowledge
The war in Northern Uganda cannot be understood without giving at least a gen-
eral overview of the political developments Uganda underwent during colonialism 
and after independence. This is not an easy endeavour as historical accounts, just 
like social reality in more general terms, are collectively negotiated and constructed, 
and different versions or orders of knowledge may be contested among different so-
cietal groups (cf. Bogner & Rosenthal, 2012: 120ff.). As Keller (2006: 121) states:
“Gesellschaftliche oder gruppenspezifische Wissensvorräte und symbolische 
Ordnungen stehen untereinander mitunter in Konkurrenzbeziehungen. Sie 
bilden keine harmonische Gesamtordnung. Treten solche Sinnwelten zue-
inander in Konkurrenz, entscheiden Interessen konkreter Personengruppen 
bzw. Machtverhältnisse über ihre relative Geltung.“54
A typical Acholi perspective on Ugandan history often differs quite substantially 
from the ‘mainstream version’, which dominates public and to a lesser extent aca-
demic discourses. Since colonial times – and for reasons I will explicate later – the 
Acholi have been viewed as an uncivilized, dangerous, martial tribe and this view 
still persists among many Ugandans today. Misrepresentations of the Acholi and 
their involvement in the political past continue in the daily newspapers, in aca-
demic writings and in popular discourses (cf. Finnström, 2008: 74f.; 78ff.; Leopold, 
1999). As Finnström (2006a: 204) states, “[i]t is still common today for people in 
Central Uganda to regard people from Northern Uganda as backward, primitive 
and warlike“.
The young Acholi I met in Gulu, some of whom had gone to school in other 
parts of the country during the war, often told me about their experience of be-
ing called “Kony”55 and being feared by their non-Acholi classmates. The following 
statement by a university student, who had gone to high school in Western Uganda, 
is a typical example:
53 Readers who are sufficiently familiar with the debates on the war might only want to skim over 
my analysis.
54 “Societal or group-specific pools of knowledge and symbolic orders can occasionally compete 
with each other. They do not constitute harmonious total orders. In the case that such symbolic 
worlds compete, the interests of concrete groups of persons or power relations respectively decide 
over their relative standing and validity” (Translation J.V.). 
55 Joseph Kony is the name of the notorious LRA leader. 
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“The first two weeks I had a lot of problems, in fact people, the whole school 
feared me, the only word they call you is Kony, they relate you to the real 
rebel leader (…), everywhere you go ‘Kony, Kony, Kony. See that Kony?’ 
They thought everybody from here is too rough and too tough (…). Some-
times, in those places like Central Uganda, Kampala (…) people still call 
you a Mukoko, which means animal in their language. They call us from the 
North an animal…” (INT Ojok, 31.03.2010).
The image of the Acholi as barbarous and irrational people has been reinforced and 
intensified through statements by the Ugandan government and media reporting 
on the LRA rebels and particularly their leader Joseph Kony. Thus, in conversations 
with non-Acholi Ugandans, I often found that they blamed the Acholi for much 
of the postcolonial violence in Uganda generally, and the war in Northern Uganda 
in particular. Among the Acholi, on the other side, I often experienced that people 
tried to teach me the ‘real’ history of Uganda according to which the Acholi were 
largely the victims of the colonial and postcolonial state. Sometimes people encour-
aged me to tell other Ugandans about my positive experiences among the Acholi, 
and asserted that my research would surely contribute to rectifying the negative 
image of the Acholi (personal conversations in Gulu; cf. RLP, 2004: 23; Kuster & 
Santchi, 2006: 158ff.).
Different versions of the war and Ugandan history more generally are not only 
found in people’s minds and reflected in daily conversations. They are also repro-
duced in the social science literature, albeit to a lesser extent (cf. Bogner & Rosenthal, 
2012: 137). While the major historical occurrences are not disputed, the devil is in 
the details. Only after returning from the field and rereading some of my writings 
on Ugandan history I had produced before entering the field – which were mainly 
drawn from social scientists, who had not carried out extensive research in Northern 
Uganda – did I notice how they differed not only from popular Acholi perceptions 
of Ugandan history (cf. Dolan, 2009: Chap. 3), but also from articles on Ugandan 
history by Acholi social scientists (see for example the texts in the Accord volume 
edited by Lucima, 2002) and by ethnographers of contemporary Acholiland (see 
below). The difficulty of reconstructing Ugandan history based on oral and written 
sources is captured in the following statement by Vincent (1999: 123):
“I have referred several times to the difficulty of finding or trusting either 
written or oral sources relating to war in postcolonial Uganda. Experience 
has taught the people of Uganda that the powerholders of today may be 
overthrown by the powerholders of yesteryear, and, without the dangerous 
courage of an ideological commitment to speak out, journalists and those 
interviewed carefully and deliberately fashion their words, I would suggest, 
with double tongues. One may read what one will into their messages”.
With regard to the war in Northern Uganda more specifically, different authors 
have recognized the various framings of the armed conflict and its root causes – by 
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the conflict parties as well as by the media and other outside analysts – not only as 
a ‘scientific challenge’ but also as a practical problem to ending the war (Leopold, 
1999; Westbrook, 2000: 7). A report by the Refugee Law Project (RLP, 2004: 7) 
states:
“The absence of a consensus on the core causes of the war partly explains why 
there is no consensus on how to end the war. (…) [C]ompeting analyses [of 
the root causes] paralyze conflict resolution efforts, as key actors lack a firm 
consensus on which issues to address in resolving the conflict.”
Thus, when trying to summarize the major historical events which led to the 
armed conflict in Northern Uganda, I have tried to highlight relevant discrepan-
cies I found in the literature between different versions of Ugandan history. I have 
taken a sociology-of-knowledge approach to discourse analysis (“wissenssoziolo-
gische Diskursanalyse”, cf. Keller, 1997; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008). According to 
Keller (2006: 115), “wissenssoziologische Diskursanalyse” implies reconstructing 
the processes of social construction, objectivation, transmission and legitimation 
of structures of interpretation and action at the level of institutions, organizations 
and social actors, and, secondly, discerning the societal effects of these processes. 
This can include analyzing the emergence of specific discourses (including their 
power-knowledge constellations), their changes over time, the topics and audiences 
they address, the latent and manifest contents and convictions they convey, as well 
as the relationships between different, competing discourses (Keller, 1997: 318f.). 
Sociologists of knowledge, like Keller, understand discourse as
“Formen der Wissenskonstruktion und Vermittlung (…), die sich von der 
Ebene konkreter situativer Konstruktions- und Aushandlungsprozesse basa-
len Allerweltwissens unterscheiden. D.h. es geht um die Wissensproduktion 
in wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen bzw. in unterscheidbaren institutionellen 
Feldern der Gesellschaft: etwa im Recht, in der Politik, in der massenme-
dialen Öffentlichkeit. (…) Diskurse sind abgrenzbare übersituative Zusam-
menhänge von Äußerungsformen (Praktiken der Artikulation) und Inhalten 
(Bedeutungen), die mehr oder weniger stark institutionalisiert sind” (Keller, 
2006: 130f.).56
This understanding is based on the ideas of Foucault but also includes everyday 
usages of the term. Keller adopts some aspects of Foucault’s theory and integrates 
them into the framework set by Berger and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge 
(Keller, 2005: 5; cf. Berger & Luckmann, 2011 [1966]). I have chosen to work with 
56 “Forms of knowledge construction and transmission (…), which differ from the level of concrete 
situational processes of construction and negotiation of basal everyday knowledge. I.e. it is about 
the production of knowledge in scientific disciplines or respectively in discernible institutional 
fields of society: for instance in law, in politics, in the mass media (…). Discourses are definable 
meta-situational combinations of forms of articulation (practices of articulation) and contents 
(meanings), which are more or less institutionalized” (Translation J.V.). 
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Keller’s approach in this chapter, because, more than Foucault, he acknowledges 
the role of actors in the social production and circulation of knowledge and offers a 
theory, which is specifically situated to study the “historical and collective dimen-
sions of knowledge and knowledge-making practices” as well as “social regimes and 
politics of knowledge” (Keller, 2005: 4).
As a conceptual approach, Keller (2005: 9f.; 2007: 10ff.) has suggested four 
categories for the analysis of societal knowledge relations and politics of knowl-
edge: interpretative schemes (“Deutungsmuster”); classifications (“Klassifikationen”); 
phenomenal structures (“Phänomenstrukturen”), and narrative structures (“Narrative 
Strukturen”). In the following chapter, I will analyse the discourses on the war in 
Northern Uganda based on the conceptual approach suggested by Keller, which I 
will briefly outline.
Interpretative schemes emerge over time and are interactively produced. They 
are the result of the social construction of reality. They help social actors to inter-
pret worldly phenomena, and provide practical orientation in daily life – to solve 
problems, in interactions with others, or in understanding and reacting to social 
processes, happenings and events. Interpretative schemes are transmitted through 
socialization processes, but also, for instance, through the media. In discourses, dif-
ferent interpretative schemes of social phenomena are combined in specific ways. 
In my example of the war in Northern Uganda, I will show how certain events in 
Ugandan colonial and postcolonial history have gained high symbolic relevance, 
and how hegemonic interpretative schemes of these events have emerged. These not 
only serve to produce a dominant narrative of Ugandan history, but have in fact 
heavily influenced the actions and practices of social actors and thus fundamentally 
shaped and continue to shape historical developments in Uganda.
Classifications, according to Keller (2007: 12f.), not only structure reality, but 
help social actors to experience reality in the first place. Classifications in this sense 
have a performative effect. Keller names the common example of ethnic categoriz-
ing, which can fundamentally shape self-perception as well as the perception by and 
of others. In my example, I will outline how classifications of the war in Northern 
Uganda are heavily contested between different, competing discourses, and how 
different classifications, for instance of the war’s root causes or its major conflict 
parties, have had profound effects on suggested interventions and solutions to end 
the war.
Phenomenal structures establish causal connections between different elements of 
a discourse. They are necessary to convincingly construct an issue as a problem or 
concern and to place it on the public agenda. Different argumentative, dramatizing 
or evaluating statements can serve to define a topic in a particular way, establish 
certain interpretations of cause and effect, ascribe responsibilities and subject posi-
tions, and suggest possible courses of action. In my analysis, I discern two major 
and competing discourses on the war – what Finnström (2008: Chap. 3) and Dolan 
(2009) have called the “official narrative” and the “counter narrative”. I will pres-
ent a detailed analysis of the phenomenal structure of these two major discourses, 
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and demonstrate that they frame their responses to key analytical dimensions (for 
instance origin of the war, possible solutions, positioning of key actors, value attri-
butions etc.) very differently when interpreting the war.
Lastly, narrative structures serve to establish a coherent story line of a discourse 
over a longer time span. Keller (2007: 16) states that narrative structures are those 
structuring moments of statements and discourses, which are related to each oth-
er in specific ways through patterns of interaction, classification and phenomenal 
structures. In making use of narrative structures, discourses become stories with a 
coherent plot, which can be convincingly communicated to a broader audience. 
Keller argues that collective actors (for instance social scientists, journalists, NGOs) 
may form a coalition to raise public awareness of a problem by using a common ba-
sic story line. In my analysis of discourses on the war in Northern Uganda, I outline 
different narrative structures used by proponents of competing discourses. I further 
show how the discourses and their story lines have developed and been altered over 
time due to shifts in power structures and interpretation hegemonies, and in order 
to accommodate recent events.
For my analysis, I selected the most relevant, i.e. the most commonly cited texts, 
most of which were written by social scientists (commonly cited popular texts, 
books and films were also included, albeit to a minor extent)57. Social scientists 
and academic institutions, among many other social actors, produce knowledge, 
which – depending on the economic and political constellations – may be accepted 
as truths. According to Foucault (cited in Keller, 2006: 126f.), knowledge is always 
a form and effect of power, a power to establish one version of reality or truth, while 
excluding others. In my analysis, I was interested to find out not only how different 
narratives and types of interpretation of the war varied, but also how hegemonies of 
interpretation changed over time (“dispositive analysis”, cf. Keller, 2007: 25ff.).
In the following, I will first reconstruct the elements of Ugandan history which 
are necessary to understand the war in Northern Uganda. Thereby, I will present 
the hegemonic version, i.e. relatively uncontested historical facts, but also point out 
those aspects, which are highly disputed58. I will start my analysis by tracing the 
(proclaimed) origins of the war to the times of British colonial rule in Uganda59, 
and end by looking at the most recent debates, which directly concern the armed 
conflict and its impacts on Northern Uganda.
57 In recent years, there has been an explosive increase in research and literature dealing with the 
war in Northern Uganda, not all of which could be sighted for the analysis.
58 The analysis of all the contested elements would be enough material for a study of its own. As my 
main focus lies elsewhere, I will concentrate on the major points of debate, which are relevant to 
understanding interpretations of the war in Northern Uganda.
59 At this stage I will not focus on the precolonial era – for a summary of precolonial developments 
in Northern Uganda see Finnström, 2003: 87ff. and Girling, 1960: 135ff.; cf. also Chap. 4.
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Colonial Times: Dominant Interpretative Schemes3.2. 
1884 marked the beginning of the British Protectorate in Uganda. It is generally 
undisputed that the colonial rule by the British laid the foundation for many of 
the subsequent conflicts in postcolonial Uganda – particularly along ethnic and 
regional lines. Branch (2011: 45) states that “ethnicity and the state have been in a 
dynamic, mutually dependent relationship ever since the establishment of indirect 
rule in the early twentieth century”. Similarly, Ndikumana and Nannyonjo (2007: 
17) remark that postcolonial antagonisms “were the outcomes of a colonial system 
of political control that transformed ethnicity from a latent factor into a primordial 
determinant of access to power and economic advancement”.
In the literature on Northern Uganda, the origins of the contemporary conflicts 
are often traced back to colonial times. The dominant interpretative scheme sug-
gests that from the beginning, the British privileged the Southern ethnic groups. 
In colonial discourses, ethnic groups in Northern Uganda like the Acholi were 
seen as inferior to the ethnic groups in Southern and Central Uganda, particularly 
the Baganda. This was largely due to their different form of political organization 
(Finnström, 2006a: 203f.). While the Baganda and other ethnic groups in the South 
like the Bunyoro, Batoro, Ankole and Busoga (cf. Tripp, 2010: 42) were organized 
as centralized kingdoms – which thoroughly impressed the British (Vincent, 1999: 
111) – many groups in the North had only very loose and decentralized forms of po-
litical organization beyond the level of the lineage, and some did not even perceive 
themselves as members of one ethnic group at all. Under British colonial rule the 
Buganda Kingdom was given a privileged role in governing the country – Vincent 
(1999: 109) even goes as far as to say that “colonial sovereignty rested on Baganda 
sub-imperialism” – which has led to a complicated role of Buganda in the postcolo-
nial state until today. As Tripp (2010: 42) asserts, this legacy of privileged treatment 
under and collaboration with the British during colonialism has made Buganda 
“a thorn in the side of every post-independence Ugandan government”.60
According to the dominant interpretative scheme, the decentralized political sys-
tems of the Acholi and other Northern groups were not as easily adoptable to the 
colonial system of indirect rule as the more centralized kingdoms. Therefore, instead 
of relying on lineage heads and local chiefs (in Acholi: sg.: rwot, pl.: rwodi ), the 
British installed their own ‘government chiefs’ who were responsible for collecting 
taxes and organizing communal labour in Acholiland on a central level, i.e. beyond 
the lineage. A common interpretation is that this policy eventually led to a disin-
tegration of the different subgroups throughout Acholiland, and the importance 
of organizing in lineages decreased. At the same time, the central administration 
of Acholiland and the decreasing importance of the individual subgroups resulted 
60 On the special role of Buganda during colonialism and subsequent Ugandan politics see for in-
stance Low & Pratt (1960), Apter (1967) and Karlström (1996; 2004).
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in the emergence of an “Acholi consciousness” (Girling, 1960: 201), which has led 
some authors to conclude that the Acholi as an ethnic group were only created by 
the colonial administration. I will discuss this point in more detail below.
A further, commonly emphasized aspect in the literature is that the colonial ad-
ministration effectuated massive changes in the local economic organization, mainly 
through the monetization of the economy and the introduction of cotton as a cash 
crop. The Acholi population, which formerly relied on subsistence farming, was 
forced to cultivate cotton in order to be able to pay taxes. For the same reason, the 
colonial state encouraged labour migration of Northerners to the South, where the 
main economic developments were centred. According to Branch (2011: 50), many 
Acholi were also recruited to become civil servants, and an educated Acholi elite 
started to emerge – a factor that is often neglected in the literature (see discussion 
below). After some initial hesitation the Acholi were also recruited in large numbers 
for the King’s African Rifles (particularly with the onset of WWI) and semi-military 
services of the police and prison department (Finnström, 2006a: 204). This fact is 
always mentioned (and sometimes overemphasized) in the literature dealing with 
the war in Northern Uganda. In a typical vein, a report by the International Crisis 
Group notes that “[t]he Acholi in particular had been told by their colonial masters 
that they were born warriors, effectively transforming them into a military ethnoc-
racy” (ICG, 2004: 2).
Some authors point out that after the Second World War, when the anti-colonial 
struggle started to emerge mainly in the South of Uganda, soldiers from the North 
including many Acholi were also deployed by the British to fight anti-colonial re-
volts (Tripp, 2010: 133). Mamdani (1983: 10) writes that “[t]he colonial view that 
northerners were ‘martial’ peoples was simply racist hogwash; the simple truth was 
that northern peasants were put in uniform to crush the resistance of the southern 
peasantry.”
In any case, the North-South divide of the country installed under the colonial 
administration (and the narrative, which constantly reemphasizes this fact) has had 
long-lasting consequences for the political history of Uganda and still plays a major 
role in the conflicts (and their interpretations) of the country today (Mamdani, 
1976: 133; Ndikumana & Nannyonjo, 2007: 16ff.). Similarly, ethnic classifications 
and ascriptions given to certain ethnic groups – such as claims that the Acholi are 
a militant ethnic group – have their origins in colonial ideologies, but have since 
profoundly shaped social relations in Uganda. As Vincent (1999: 109) states:
“Imperial times bred colonial places and the hegemonic moment reified lan-
guages and cultures, tribes and bounded districts, and codified them. In 
Uganda, this lasted for the first sixty years of the twentieth century. Not pre-
colonial animosities but modern state formation bred ethnic and regional 
conflict.”
In most points, the accounts of Ugandan colonial history converge. The domi-
nant interpretative scheme acknowledges the devastating effects of colonialism and 
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the basis it provided for subsequent ethnic tensions and conflicts. Ndikumana and 
Nannyonjo (2007: 16) summarize the three main channels through which the Brit-
ish colonial administration “sowed the seeds of ethnic antagonism”: first, the divi-
sion of Uganda into several ethnically demarcated areas and the privileged status 
given to the Baganda as collaborators in the administration of the country; second, 
the promotion of racial theories according to which some ethnic groups (i.e. the 
Baganda) were taken to be superior to other ethnic groups; and third, the concen-
tration of economic and educational development in the South and the military 
power in the North of Uganda.
Critical Debates on Colonial History3.3. 
In this section, I will point out debated matters and incongruities in the academic 
literature (and popular accounts) of Ugandan colonial history, which are relevant 
to understanding different analyses of the war in Northern Uganda. The first mat-
ter of debate concerns the origins of an ‘ethnic consciousness’ among the Acholi, 
the second concerns the origins and the extent of Acholi marginalization in the 
colonial (and later the postcolonial) state. Both ethnicity as well as the regionally 
uneven development in Uganda are often singled out as root causes of the war in 
Northern Uganda, which originated in colonial times. Evidently, both factors have 
shaped conflict realities and processes, and the way they are dealt with. However, 
as Vincent (1999: 110ff.) has pointed out in her analysis of the Teso war (in the 
Eastern part of Northern Uganda), one must always carefully dissect how these 
explanations have been constructed and culturally produced in academic as well as 
in public discourses (cf. Keller, 2006; 2007).
The first point of contestation concerns the question, whether the Acholi existed 
as an ethnic group before colonial times at all. This point is important because 
contemporary imaginations and interpretative schemes of a ‘typical Acholi society’ 
and of ‘traditional Acholi culture’ are frequently related to a pre-colonial past, and 
instrumentalized in national political debates (e.g. on cultural institutions) and in 
peace-building discourses, where ‘cultural revival’ is seen by some humanitarian 
organizations as a means to recreate social stability by reconstructing ‘traditional 
cultural practices’ (cf. for instance Pain, 1997 and Liu Institute for Global Issues, 
2005). I will further discuss this point in chapter 4.
Historians and anthropologists working in Northern Uganda have long debated 
whether the Acholi existed as a distinct ethnic group before colonial times. Some 
researchers (e.g. Allen, 2006: 26; Behrend, 1993: 23; Schäfer, 2008: 332; Vincent, 
1999: 109) argue that the Acholi as an ethnic group were only created or reified 
by the colonial administration. Others, notably Atkinson (1994, 1999) as well as 
Dwyer (1972: 12) and authors in the Onyango-Odongo and Webster edition 1976 
(the two latter both cited in Finnström, 2008: 52), trace the origins of the Acholi to 
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precolonial times and claim that Acholi collective belonging is not (just) a colonial 
intervention.
The debate is partly about classifications and collective terms (e.g. when the eth-
nonym Acholi was first used and by whom), and about the related question, when 
a collective Acholi self-consciousness first began to emerge. Girling (1960: Chap. 9) 
claims that before colonial times, lineages and domains were the most relevant cat-
egories of social organization. With the arrival of the first missionaries and the onset 
of colonial rule, these bonds started to dissolve, while the individual household 
became the most important formation. At the same time, he argues, something like 
an overall “Acholi consciousness” was born (ibid.: 201f.). Finnström (2003: 63f.) 
explains the missionaries’ role in creating this Acholi consciousness:
“The missionaries encouraged the production of various vernacular texts deal-
ing with Acholi history and culture, in which Acholi writers played an im-
portant part along with the missionaries. (…) [A] variety of localized Acholi 
myths and histories were systemized, standardized, printed and distributed 
widely, with the potentiality of promoting a higher degree of cultural coher-
ence throughout Acholiland.”
It is not possible and also not necessary to come to a final conclusion as regard-
ing the ‘true’ origins of the Acholi. What is important is to acknowledge, on the 
one hand, that today a (however-defined) collective Acholi identity exists and has 
powerful effects (cf. Chap. 4). Allen (1994: 115) expresses a similar thought when 
he argues that “in spite of their limitations as analytical devices, these old [ethnic] 
labels have the advantage of being categories used by actors themselves”. On the 
other hand, one always needs to bear in mind that ethnic classifications like “the 
Acholi” imply static, primordial identities and disguise the fact, that these labels 
were – at least to some extent – reified as distinct categories only by the colonial 
administration (Allen, 1994: 113ff.; cf. Lentz, 2006). Particularly, when using eth-
nicity as an explanatory variable to explain the roots and processes of armed con-
flicts, differentiated analyses which go beyond emic conceptualizations are crucial 
(cf. Schlee, 2006; Turton, 2002; Nielsen, 2008). As I will later discuss, different 
discourses on the war in Northern Uganda attribute different relevance to ethnicity 
as a root cause of the conflict. While the official discourse reinforces the dominant 
interpretative scheme and primordial classification of the Acholi, the counter dis-
course is concerned to deconstruct and contextualize Acholi ethnicity, and opposes 
classifications of the war as an “ethnic conflict”61.
A second point of incongruity in the literature on colonial history, which to date 
has not gained much recognition, concerns the role of the Acholi in the colonial 
61 The official discourse largely reflects the NRM perspective and blames the war primarily on the 
LRA, while the counter discourse takes as more nuanced and critical stance and sees the war as 
the outcome of a complex political crisis (for a further differentiation of the two discourses, see 
Table 1 and discussion below).
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state. According to the dominant interpretative scheme, the Acholi were marginal-
ized by the colonial administration and used only as cheap labour and as soldiers for 
the army (see for instance Finnström, 2008: 101f.; Schäfer, 2008: 331; Mamdani, 
1983: 10; Doom & Vlassenroot, 1999: 7f.). The resultant and still continuing eco-
nomic and political marginalization of the North is commonly mentioned as a root 
cause of the conflict(s) in Northern Uganda (Vincent, 1999: 110ff.).
Branch (2011: 50), however, drawing on the works of Leys (1967), Sathyamur-
thy (1986) and Kasfir (1976), contends that the Acholi were not marginalized by 
the colonial state as has frequently been asserted. Instead, he argues that they were in 
fact overly included in the state, particularly in the civil service, and that it was thus 
their privileged position which led to the problems they faced later in postcolonial 
history. According to Branch (2011: 50),
“[t]he Acholi ended up being overrepresented in both [i.e. in the civil service 
and the military/police], because of a British policy of recruiting northerners 
to put down southern rebellions and of the lack of profitable unskilled em-
ployment opportunities in Acholiland. This situation thus belies the often-
heard narrative that describes the Acholi as having been marginalized under 
colonialism, with their role restricted to providing military recruits; although 
the Acholi were indeed found in the security services, more important was 
their incorporation into the civil services and access to state resources. Mar-
ginalization cannot explain the roots of the conflicts in northern Uganda: 
instead, it is necessary to consider the particular way the Acholi were in-
cluded in the state all the way until the purges undertaken by Idi Amin. For 
this reason, the exclusion of the Acholi in recent decades has to be seen in 
the context of the degree of privilege that they formerly enjoyed” (emphasis 
in original).
Branch’s point is rarely taken into account in most analyses of the war. The domi-
nant interpretative scheme – used both by social scientists (e.g. Shaw & Mbabazi, 
2008) and the Acholi population – reinforces the picture that Northern Uganda, 
and Acholiland in particular, have been marginalized since colonial times, and 
thus lag behind other regions of the country today (with regard to economic de-
velopment, political representation in national politics, quality of school education 
etc.). The common contemporary classification of a war-torn and underdeveloped 
Northern Uganda and a prosperous, peaceful Southern Uganda has fundamentally 
shaped the perceptions of the Acholi people, and has (further) alienated them from 
the Museveni government62. The narrative of Acholi marginalization has also been 
62 There are certainly many indicators, which suggest that economic developments and political 
representation have been and still are distributed very unevenly across Uganda. The IDP politics 
of the NRM government during the war, rumors of subsequent land grabbing by politicians from 
Kampala, which had been enabled through IDP policy, as well as the de-stocking of cattle by the 
army and the Karimojong in the 1980s and early 1990s have further reinforced this perception 
(van Acker, 2004: 344).
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taken up by the LRA, which argues that the political and economic exclusion of the 
North has been one reason for its insurgency.
The hegemonic interpretation of Uganda’s postcolonial history as an ongoing 
North-South conflict is a good example of a narrative, which has fundamentally 
structured Ugandan realities and which has caused tangible societal effects. Van 
Acker (2004: 342f.) brings this idea to the point, when he writes that “[t]he fact 
that the pattern of economic differentiation is more complex than a straightforward 
north-south antagonism does not deny its perceived existence”. He further argues 
that
“Acholi perceptions of marginalization evidently present a picture of differ-
entiation in Uganda that is not necessarily complete or accurate. (…) Rather 
than debating the accuracy of various arguments, however, what matters 
are the insights they offer into people’s perceptions and the type of latent 
mobilizing power they convey for an entire generation spoon-fed on them” 
(ibid.: 344).
Ethnicity and marginalization along regional and ethnic lines are two themes which 
also dominate the narrative accounts of and have shaped Ugandan postcolonial his-
tory. I will turn to these in the following section. Again, I will present the dominant 
interpretative scheme, which is reflected in the literature I cited. Afterwards, I dis-
sect how different discourses follow different argumentative schemes and narrative 
structures when analyzing postcolonial developments in the context of the war in 
Northern Uganda, and how different story lines emerge in the interpretation of the 
events, particularly after the fall of Amin.
Postcolonial Developments:  3.4. 
Dominant Interpretative Schemes & Critical Debates
In 1962, British colonial rule ended and Uganda became an independent African 
state. However, independence did not bring stability to the country. On the con-
trary, ethnic (and religious) antagonisms, widely agreed to have been created by 
the colonial rulers, manifested themselves in post-independence politics and di-
vided the country (Branch, 2011: Chap.2; ICG, 2004: 2; Rubongoya, 2007: 19ff.; 
Ogenga Otunnu, 2002: 11f.). According to the dominant interpretative scheme, 
“ethnification”63 was a central component of the political developments in Uganda 
between 1962 and 1986 (and until today). However, one has to bear in mind that 
63 Finnström (2003: 98) defines ethnification as “the process of fragmentation, especially at play in 
situations of social unrest, social inequality and political turmoil, in which expressions of collec-
tive belonging are limited to a dominant discourse of more or less fixed stereotypes. Ideological 
constructions are institutionally reproduced, and ethnic categories unavoidably become politi-
cised categories.”
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ethnification alone cannot explain the complexities of the actual political processes 
in post-independence Uganda64 (Finnström, 2003: 98; 101f.). Some authors ac-
knowledge that there were in fact many attempts by postcolonial Ugandan govern-
ments to prevent anti-sectarian politics, which, however, largely failed in practice 
and are thus not always acknowledged in public and academic discourses (Tripp; 
2010: 43ff.; Mamdani, 2004: 200–217; Vincent, 1999: 111, and Van Acker, 2004: 
341f.).
Upon independence, Milton Obote, a Langi from the North, became the first 
prime minister of Uganda and in 1963 the King of Buganda, Edward Mutesa II, 
became the first president of the state, demonstrating the privileged political status 
the Baganda had gained under the colonial administration. His rule, however, only 
lasted until 1966 when Obote abolished all kingdoms and Uganda became a one 
party state under the rule of Obote and his Ugandan People’s Congress (UPC). 
Obote’s break with Buganda is commonly interpreted as an attempt to weaken the 
power of Baganda and install a government and army dominated by Northerners. 
Ndikumana & Nannyonjo (2007: 19), for instance, argue that Obote discriminated 
against the Buganda region “as a means of shifting the balance of power to the 
North”, and thus perpetuated the ethnic tensions and the political divide between 
Northern and Southern Uganda, which had existed during colonial times. Tripp 
(2010: 43ff.) and Rubongoya (2007: 33ff), however, demonstrate that the reasons 
and courses of action behind the 1966 crisis were much more complicated than 
explanations based on simple ethnic or regional sectarianism would suggest (cf. also 
Branch, 2011: 53ff.). Among other things, both point to and offer a differentiated 
analysis of Ugandan party politics as a reason for the crisis.
In 1971, Obote’s regime was overthrown by Idi Amin, an army officer of Kak-
wa origin from the West Nile Region. According to the dominant interpretative 
scheme65, Amin was initially welcomed by the majority of the population due to 
the increasing dissatisfaction with the Obote regime. However, he soon began to 
systematically oppress the Buganda as well as the Langi and Acholi who had made 
up the largest percentage of Obote’s army. He also expelled the prosperous Asian 
business community (and all other Asians) from the country and institutionalized 
an economic system in which access to commodities depended on the religious and 
ethnic background of a person (Rubongoya, 2007: 51). The rapidly evolving cor-
ruption and nepotism, and the random killings of political opponents and people 
64 Mamdani (1976). for instance, offers a Marxist analysis of class formation in Uganda and its 
influence on the political developments. 
65 The widespread interpretative scheme of Amin’s regime – in Ugandan but even more in interna-
tional (scholarly and popular) discourses – is often shaped by sensationalist accounts of his grue-
some dealings with political opponents, his fanatical personality, and his devastating political 
decisions. Mamdani criticizes that the picture is more complex than these accounts would sug-
gest. He writes: “[Their] sensational twist hides the ideological content. The trick is quite simple: 
a book on the Amin regime becomes a book simply on Amin, and instead of political analysis, we 
get an anecdotal biography” (Mamdani, 1983: 1).
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not belonging to Amin’s ethnic group or not adhering to his religious beliefs (Amin 
was a Nubi Muslim) led to a fundamental breakdown of the Ugandan political, eco-
nomic and social system. According to some estimates, up to 500,000 people died 
during his eight-year regime and several thousand fled the country (Schäfer, 2008: 
333f.; Rubongoya, 2007: 45ff.). The literature on the war on Northern Uganda 
commonly mentions that the Acholi specifically suffered from a series of ethnic 
purges by Amin’s troops. Branch (2011: 57) estimates that tens of thousands of 
Acholi (and Langi) civilians were killed during the time of the Amin regime, and 
that several members of the Acholi political elite fled into exile.
In April 1979, Amin was driven from office by the Tanzanian army supported 
by the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA), which had been formed by ex-
iled Ugandans who opposed the Amin regime. After short interim-governments by 
Yusuf Lule, Godfrey Binaisa and Paulo Muwanga (Tripp, 2010: 43), Milton Obote 
returned to power, claiming to have won the parliamentary elections in 1980. From 
the beginning, there was massive opposition against his regime as he was accused of 
having manipulated the elections, a claim which is widely accepted in most histori-
cal accounts. According to the dominant interpretative scheme, Obote then estab-
lished patronage networks based primarily on Langi and Acholi loyalties, which had 
already served as an important cornerstone of his first regime. But in the 1980s, as 
there were less state resources to be distributed to loyal supporters, these clientalist 
structures were considerably weaker. Due to the resultant instability right from the 
beginning of his regime, the military became of foremost importance to Obote’s 
hold on power. According to widespread perception, Langi and Acholi troops be-
came overrepresented in the UNLA66 (cf. e.g. Tripp, 2010: 134). Branch (2011: 58) 
reflects on the role of the Acholi in the newly formed government:
“Although certain prominent Acholi were incorporated into the new, Obote 
II, government, there was no return to the massive patronage machine of the 
Obote I regime, and there was no wide-scale political revival of the Acholi 
middle class. Indeed, given the years of economic ruin under Amin, the 
destruction wrought by the Tanzanian invasion, and the newly imposed In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IWF) austerity measures, there was much less 
to distribute. Instead, Acholi were brought into the state principally through 
the military, and the UNLA officer corps again became heavily weighted 
toward the Acholi and Langi.”
In 1981, Yoweri Museveni founded the National Resistance Army (NRA) and 
started to wage a guerrilla war against the Obote Government. The bulk of the 
fighting was carried out in the Luwero Triangle in Central Uganda. Museveni, a 
Munyankole from South-Western Uganda, sought the support of the local popula-
tion. It is often stated that, throughout the course of the fighting, more and more 
66 Again, as in other accounts of postcolonial Ugandan history, one finds that ethnicity is singled 
out as the decisive factor in the analysis of army recruitment patterns.
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people willingly joined the NRA, and Museveni managed to build an alliance 
between Baganda and Banyarwanda migrant workers, indigenous peasants from 
other ethnic groups and refugees of Rwandan origins (Mamdani, 2004: 200ff.; 
Branch, 2011: 58f.). Some authors, for instance Mamdani (2004), classify Musev-
eni’s strategy as an effort to mobilize support for the NRA without appealing to 
ethnic identities, and thus as an attempt to overcome sectarian politics in Uganda. 
Others contest this interpretation. Branch (2011: 59f.), for instance, argues that 
the NRA framed its mission as a struggle against Northern ethnic power in the 
national state. According to Branch (ibid.: 60),
“the rebels also built support in Luwero by putting forth, not tribal ethnic 
commonality, but common ethnic regional identity, as Bantu southerners 
united against Nilotic northerners. The rebellion became the crucible in 
which the north-south divide took a central place in national politics.”
The fighting in Luwero Triangle lasted until 1985. According to the dominant in-
terpretative scheme, an estimated number of 250,000 to 300,000 people were killed 
by the UNLA, the national army under the command of Obote, and severe human 
rights abuses were committed including rape and torture (Schäfer, 2008: 335). It is 
commonly cited that the profound humiliations against the local population and 
NRA soldiers committed by Obote’s army, believed to be largely consisted of Acholi 
and Langi, further deepened the antagonisms between Northern and Southern eth-
nic groups. Several authors therefore argue that the Luwero conflict and the ethnic 
hatred it conjured among Southerners particularly against the Acholi laid the cor-
nerstone for the war in the North. In the words of Doom and Vlassenroot (1999: 
9), “Luwero is the ghost that haunts the Acholi”.
The accusations of having killed and raped thousands of innocent civilians dur-
ing the Luwero fighting are heavily contested among the Acholi until today. In 
2010, Olara Otunnu, an Acholi and the president (and later presidential candidate) 
of the UPC (Uganda People’s Congress) party, caused an uproar in the media, when 
he demanded an independent inquiry into the killings in Luwero and thus called 
into question the taken-for-granted culpability of the Acholi (and Langi) from the 
North67. In a similar vein, critical social scientists like Ogenga Otunnu (2002: 12) 
have remarked that “[a]lthough the UNLA was a national and multi-ethnic army, 
the NRM/A held the Acholi exclusively responsible for the atrocities committed, 
and this disputed perception was to shape subsequent attitudes toward the con-
flict”.
The events during the Luwero war, but also the repeated reporting of the 
proclaimed Acholi responsibility for the war crimes and the constant framing of 
the war as an ethno-political conflict, have profoundly influenced post-1986 social 
relations and politics in Uganda. As a report by the International Crisis Group states, 
“[t]he effects of massacres on the psyche of all protagonists are central to the failure 
67 See for instance: Khisa & Nalugo (2010), Ngabirano (2010) and N.N. (2010b).
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to overcome the cycle of ethnic retaliation after the NRA came to power” (ICG, 
2004: 2). The discourse on Luwero is thus an example of how profoundly discourses 
and the dominant interpretative scheme they propose can shape reality.68
Critical Debates on the Lead-up to the War3.5. 
In 1985, a split occurred within the UNLA when high-ranking Acholi generals 
initiated a military coup. It is generally uncontested that the Acholi accused Obote 
of favouring the Langi within the army. Rubongoya (2007: 55) writes that Obote 
“sought to purge the army of the Acholi elements while elevating his fellow Langis 
(…) Obote’s commanders disproportionately deployed the Acholis to the frontline 
to face a strengthened guerilla force in the name of the National Resistance Army 
(NRA).” This eventually led to the coup commanded by Brigadier Bazilio Okello 
and General Tito Okello. In 1985, they took over Kampala and Tito Okello be-
came the first Acholi president – however, only for a very brief period of time.
The events following Okello’s rise to presidential power are heavily debated both, 
in the literature and in public discourses. Some authors, especially those with a pro-
Acholi stance, claim that the Okello regime tried to unite different fighting factions 
and political parties and engaged in protracted peace negotiations with the NRM/A. 
They blame the NRA for the failed implementation of the peace agreement, which 
was signed between all fighting factions in Nairobi in December 1985, and accuse 
Museveni of having used the peace talks only as a means to prepare his own take-
over of Kampala (Ogenga Otunnu, 2002: 12; Kiplagat, 2002; Allen & Vlassenroot, 
2010b: 9). As Ngoga (1998: 104) concedes, “the NRA had little interest in peace 
negotiations for anything but tactical purposes, when it was in any event on the 
brink of victory.” To this day, the Acholi blame Museveni for having betrayed the 
peace agreement and for having unlawfully taken power from Okello who remains 
the only ever Acholi president69 (cf. van Acker, 2004: 340).
Other authors describe the situation prevailing in 1985/6 very differently. 
They claim that Okello was unable to control his troops, had no clear political 
program, and was thus driven from office by Museveni and his NRA in January 
1986 (Ndikumana & Nannyonjo, 2007: 21; Rubongoya, 2007: 53ff.; Schäfer, 
2008: 336f.). Contrary to classifying Museveni as the spoiler of the peace talks, these 
authors celebrate him as the ‘savior’ of a war-torn country. Schäfer (2008: 337), for 
instance, argues:
68 This is also reflected in public discourses. In one discussion I had with two students from Gulu 
University, for instance, my interlocutors claimed that Museveni and his supporters had rewritten 
Ugandan history to make it sound that Obote committed “so many” crimes in Luwero Triangle 
(field notes, 10.03.2010).
69 This topic often came up in personal conversations about politics and the (illegitimate) rule of 
the current NRM government with my interlocutors in Gulu, who blamed Museveni for having 
taken power from the Acholi.
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“General Tito Okello hatte nur kurzfristig die Macht im Lande inne, 
denn bereits Ende Januar 1986 eroberte die NRA Kampala und Museveni 
übernahm offiziell die politische Führung. Die Acholi Soldaten gingen u.a. 
gegen Langi und Männer aus dem West Nil Gebiet vor, marodierende Truppen 
zogen durch Kampala (…) Okello konnte nicht einmal die in Kampala 
stationierten Streitkräfte unter seine Kontrolle bringen. Museveni wollte 
seine Visionen von neuen ökonomischen und politischen Entwicklungen 
in Uganda verwirklichen, wozu neben ehrgeizigen Wirtschaftsreformen, 
die politische Konsolidierung und Stabilisierung sowie die Befriedung und 
Demokratisierung zählten.”70
Similarly, the media and the international community lauded Museveni’s ascent 
to power, and for many years celebrated him as a new type of African leader, who 
respected human rights and followed Western development imperatives (Hansen & 
Twaddle, 1991: 1). Omara-Otunnu (1992: 446) reflects on the different perceptions 
of the post-Obote phase:
“The reaction of the population to the defeat of Okello’s junta varied accord-
ing to geographical regions, thereby reflecting in large measure the main 
structural imbalances in the country. However, the occasion was widely 
hailed as marking the dawn of a new era by the intelligentsia and the media: 
they announced that Museveni would usher in genuine democracy and the 
enjoyment of human rights for the majority of Ugandans, and it was their 
views that certainly helped to shape international opinion about the charac-
ter and purpose of the new regime.”
While it is generally accepted that Museveni’s rule brought an end to the fight-
ing in Central and Southern Uganda, one also has to acknowledge that it marked 
the beginning of the long lasting armed conflict in Acholiland, as well as in other 
‘peripheral’ regions of Uganda such as West Nile, Karamoja, Teso and Western 
Uganda71, which is often ignored in uncritical accounts of the Museveni regime. 
The events surrounding Museveni’s ascent to power (and their interpretations) are 
of crucial importance in order to understand and analyze the conflicts arising in 
70 “General Tito held power only for a short while, because already at the end of January 1986 
the NRA seized Kampala and Museveni officially took over the political leadership. The Acholi 
soldiers attacked Langi and men from the West Nile Region, among others, marauding troops 
moved through Kampala (…) Okello was not even able to control the troops stationed in Kampa-
la. Museveni wanted to realize his vision of new economic and political developments in Uganda, 
including ambitious economic reforms, political consolidation and stabilization as well as pacifi-
cation and democratization.” (Translation: J.V.) 
71 For more details about these other armed conflicts see for instance Finnström (2003: 105f.), 
Schäfer (2008: 352 ff.), Bogner & Rosenthal (2012: 118ff.), Behrend (2007), Knighton (2003), 
Leopold (2005), Beyond Juba Project (2008).
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Northern Uganda in the mid-1980s and the subsequent 20-year war in the North, 
which I will turn to in the following.
In my analysis, I will first outline the historical developments since 1985, and 
briefly point out those ‘facts’, which are debated in the literature. In a second step, I 
will then introduce the two major, competing discourses which exist on the war in 
Northern Uganda in greater detail.
The War in Northern Uganda3.6. 
For people in the North, the time after Museveni’s National Resistance Movement/
Army (NRM/A) took over the government in 1986 “was a strange time of holding 
one’s breath while preparing for the worst” (Dolan, 2009: 43). While some of the 
former UNLA soldiers demobilized and resettled in their homes, others refused to 
disarm and accept the new Museveni government and started to regroup. The latter 
withdrew to Southern Sudan where they formed the Ugandan Peoples Democratic 
Movement /Army (UPDM/A). In the course of 1986, fighting resumed in North-
ern Uganda between the NRA and the UPDA. This marked the beginning of the 
subsequent war, which was to last more than 20 years.
Again, the events following Museveni’s ousting of Okello and the withdraw-
al of the Acholi from Kampala are disputed in the literature. Some authors claim 
that many of the Acholi soldiers who had served in the previous government forces 
found it difficult to adjust to a peaceful life back in their villages and felt alienated 
towards their former communities. Due to the long and brutal fighting in Luwero 
these soldiers had become “internal strangers” (Behrend, 1993: 23f.), or as Schäfer 
(2008: 339) puts it more drastically, had become “brutalized”. Due to their unwill-
ingness and inability to reintegrate themselves into their communities and start a life 
as farmers, many of these soldiers joined the UPDA. Schäfer (2008: 338) depicts the 
situation of the returnees as follows:
“[I]hre Verrohung durch die von ihnen verübten Gewaltakte und die Per-
spektivlosigkeit trieb zahlreiche Demobilisierte in die Hände der Uganda 
Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA), die geflohene Acholi-Soldaten im Süd-
Sudan kurz vorher gegründet hatten. Mit Gewaltexzessen versetzte die 
UPDA die Bevölkerung Nordugandas bald in Angst und Schrecken.”72
72 “Their bestialization through the violent crimes they had committed and their lack of future 
prospects drove many of the demobilized soldiers to join the Uganda Peoples Democratic Army 
(UPDA), which had been newly founded in Southern Sudan by Acholi soldiers, who had fled 
Northern Uganda. The UPDA soon began to terrorize the population in Northern Uganda with 
acts of excessive violence” (Translation: J.V.).
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The brutal behavior Schäfer (and also Behrend) attribute to the newly formed 
UPDA is not confirmed in other accounts which claim that the UPDA was well 
respected and generally supported by the local population (e.g. RLP, 2004: 5).73
Instead, some authors paint a very different picture of the situation which un-
folded in Northern Uganda in 1986. Ogenga Otunnu (2002: 13), for instance, 
claims that the majority of Acholi soldiers “heeded the appeal by the government 
to hand over their arms and demobilize”. He and others blame the escalation of the 
situation in Northern Uganda on Museveni’s troops, who followed the withdrawing 
Acholi soldiers to the North – officially to counter the burgeoning insurgencies and 
pacify the country. Ogenga Otunnu (2002: 13) writes that
“anxieties escalated when the NRA began to commit human rights abuses in 
the name of crushing a nascent rebellion. Over time NRA soldiers plundered 
the area and committed atrocities, including rape, abductions, confiscations 
of livestock, killing of unarmed civilians, and the destruction of granaries, 
schools, hospitals and boreholes escalated. These atrocities were justified by 
some as revenge for the ‘skulls of Luwero.’”
It is widely accepted that the conduct of the NRA which had been a relatively 
well-disciplined army during its guerilla war in Luwero deteriorated severely when 
its soldiers reached Northern Uganda and were confronted with their former en-
emies74. Revenge killings, also against non-combatants, and cattle looting occurred 
on a large scale and created mistrust of the new government and its troops among 
the local population (ICG, 2004: 3). Some authors (e.g. Finnström, 2003: 104ff.; 
2005: 100) claim that it was the misbehavior of the NRA that actually led the 
Acholi people to support and thus strengthen the UPDA and other emerging rebel 
groups (see below). A report by Human Rights Watch quotes an eye witness of the 
happenings by the name of Nyeko as follows:
“‘National Resistance Army soldiers would do all they could to make things 
difficult here [in Gulu and Kitgum]. They would defecate in water supplies, 
and in the mouths of slaughtered animals. They would tie people’s hands 
behind their backs so tightly that people would be left paralyzed. They went 
into villages, and took guns by force. They looted Acholi cattle, and did 
nothing to prevent [cattle raiders from the Karamajong district] from steal-
ing the rest. Over three million head of cattle were soon lost, and it made the 
people embittered’” (cited in HuRiWa, 1997: 32).
73 In personal conversations I had with my interlocutors (esp. with Florence and Lioba), I was often 
told that the UPDA is generally remembered by the Acholi as a well-behaved army which warned 
the civilian population before it launched its attacks on the NRA.
74 This claim is frequently voiced particularly with regard to soldiers belonging to the FEDEMU 
unit, a former anti-Obote insurgency comprising many Baganda from the Luwero triangle, which 
committed severe human rights abuses including massacres of the civilian population (Doom & 
Vlassenroot, 1999: 14ff.; Gersony, 1997: 23ff.).
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Nyeko further explains how many ex-soldiers feared ethnic purges similar to those 
carried out by Idi Amin:
“One further event sparked the beginnings of the Acholi rebellion: the Na-
tional Resistance Army high command issued a directive over Radio Uganda, 
calling on Acholi ex-soldiers to report to Mbuya army headquarters within 
ten days. Nyeko observes that to many Acholi, this order was frighteningly 
reminiscent of the radio order that presaged one of Idi Amin’s massacres of 
Acholi soldiers, and it inspired many additional Acholi ex-soldiers to leave 
Uganda to join their comrades who had fled to Sudan: ‘The order was just 
like in Amin’s days,’ says Nyeko. ‘The Acholi boys said to each other, ‘This 
time we are not going to die like chickens. Let us go to Sudan and join our 
brothers, and fight to save the Acholi’’” (ibid.).
Whatever happened exactly and whoever is to blame, what one can unanimously 
derive from the above accounts is that the period particularly between August 1986 
and May 1988 was one of great turmoil in Northern Uganda (cf. Dolan, 2009: 41). 
This was also due to the emergence of different rebel groups which managed to 
mobilize popular support by combining political aspirations with spiritual motiva-
tions.
In August 1986, a religious movement – the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) – 
had been founded by Alice Auma, the spirit medium of the ghost Lakwena75. There 
are various accounts of the HSMF, ranging from meticulous academic analyses to 
sensationalist media depictions, which I will not present in detail here. The follow-
ing is just a summary of the most essential and relatively uncontested ‘facts’ as main-
tained by the dominant interpretative scheme. According to this scheme, the HSMF 
were opposed not only to the NRA/M but also to the proceedings of the UPDA. 
Their original aim was to overthrow the government of Museveni and establish a 
new moral order in Uganda. Apparently founded as an egalitarian, non-ethnic and 
gender-equal movement, which combined Christian doctrines with local beliefs, the 
HSMF managed to attract many followers. Up to 10,000 people – men and also 
some women from different ethnic and social backgrounds – are said to have joined 
the “March on Kampala” (Behrend, 1993: Chap. 6) where the government was to 
be taken over. Before reaching Kampala, however, the HSMF were defeated by the 
NRA in Jinja in November 1987. During the march, thousands of the HSMF fight-
ers lost their lives. After the defeat of the HSMF, Alice Auma’s father Severino Lu-
koya set up a rebel movement based on the ideas of the HSMF but never attracted as 
many followers (Behrend, 1993; Finnström, 2003: 109ff.; Schäfer, 2008: 339ff.).
It appears that around the same time, Joseph Kony, a former UPDA fighter, 
founded another spiritual military movement which was later to become the Lord’s 
75 The HSMF, and especially the spiritual beliefs and the role of ghosts within the movement, have 
been thoroughly analyzed by Behrend (1991; 1993; 1998; 1999) and will not be further elucidated 
in this book.
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Resistance Army (LRA). There is some debate regarding the overlapping of the dif-
ferent rebel movements and the extent of commonalities they had. What is relatively 
uncontested is that in 1988, the UPDA signed a peace agreement with the NRA, 
so that Kony’s movement eventually remained as the main opposition force to the 
NRA. Some of the former UPDA rebels who refused to abide by the peace agree-
ment joined Kony (Dunn, 2004: 140). Different narratives exist about the events 
that took place after the 1988 peace agreement, which I analyze in detail below. The 
smallest common denominator of these narratives on the developments from 1988 
until today might be summarized as follows.
Over time, Kony’s LRA resorted to tactics more and more atrocious and which 
were no longer solely directed at the NRA but also affected the local population. The 
LRA forcefully recruited children, youth and adults, looted food and other belong-
ings from the Acholi population, and massacred local people suspected of support-
ing the NRA. The NRA/UPDF76, on the other side, also committed severe human 
rights abuse, among other things by forcibly displacing the people of Northern 
Uganda into so-called “protected villages” (see below). Over the next two decades, 
the Acholi population suffered from a protracted war situation in which periods of 
physical violence alternated with periods of relative calm77. Different peace initia-
tives failed (for a detailed description, cf. ICG, 2004, 2010; Finnström, 2003: 124f.; 
Rodriguez Soto, 2009; Lamwaka, 2002; O’Kadameri, 2002; Obita, 2002; Otto, 
2002; Allen, 2010; Brubacher, 2010; Atkinson, 2010).
In August 2006, a first peace agreement was signed between the LRA and the 
Ugandan government, followed by further peace agreements in April and June 2007 
and February 2008, which effectuated a tentative end to the fighting. The peace 
talks, held in Juba, Southern Sudan, did not however lead to a final success as lead-
ing commanders of the LRA refused to sign the ultimate peace deal (Allen & Vlas-
senroot, 2010b: 17ff.). Especially the involvement of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), which was called upon by Museveni in 2003 to “investigate the situ-
ation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army” (press release ICC, 29.01.2004 cited 
in Allen, 2006: 1), was taken by many to have had a negative effect on the peace 
talks (e.g. Mamdani, 2012: 20). Somewhat contrary to the former policy of the 
Ugandan government to grant amnesty to LRA returnees if they agreed to cease all 
insurgencies, the ICC had issued arrest warrants against Joseph Kony and four other 
high-ranking LRA officers in 2005 (for an in-depth discussion on the debates sur-
rounding the involvement of the ICC in Uganda see Allen, 2006).
Since 2006, Northern Uganda has experienced relative peace while the LRA is 
continuing its attacks in the DR Congo and the Central African Republic (ICG, 
2010; 2011). The 20 years of war have had devastating effects on the Acholi popula-
76 With the introduction of the 1995 Constitution, the NRA was renamed to Uganda Peoples’ 
Defense Forces (UPDF). 
77 Dolan (2009: 41ff.) distinguishes between seven distinct phases of the war between 1986 and 
2006 involving an overall gradual intensification of violence with periods of relative calm in 
between.
98 Julia Vorhölter: Youth at the Crossroads
tion and the region of Northern Uganda as a whole. Thousands of people have been 
killed, several thousand abducted and well over a million displaced78. The economy 
has been ruined and health, education and other social services have broken down. 
However, it is generally acknowledged that due to the heavy presence of national 
and international development organizations, post-war rehabilitation in Northern 
Uganda has proceeded quite rapidly, at least in the urban centers of Gulu and Kit-
gum. The IDP camps have officially been closed and many of the people who had 
been forced to settle there have returned to their original villages (IDMC, 2010: 
74)79. Although generally the situation is quite calm and people are relieved that the 
security situation has improved, there are also several challenges which could lead to 
a large scale eruption of new conflicts in the medium-term (Allen et al., 2010). The 
most pressing issues currently affecting Northern Uganda are land wrangles among 
the returning population, the continuing (perceived) economic, social and political 
marginalization of the North compared to the rest of Uganda, which was intensified 
through the long period of war, and the growing, nationwide political tensions and 
dissatisfaction with the regime of Museveni throughout Uganda (ICG, 2012).
Critical Debates on the War:  3.7. 
Official Discourse versus Counter Discourse
In the preceding pages, I have summarized important dates and events in Ugandan 
political history from colonial times until today. I have pointed out both relatively 
uncontested interpretative schemes as well as disputed matters, which are relevant 
to understanding the war in Northern Uganda and its various interpretations. I will 
now look more closely at these various interpretations. Following Finnström (2008: 
Chap. 3) and Dolan (2009), I differentiate between two different meta-narratives80 
about the war in Northern Uganda81: The official discourse is propagated by hu-
78 It is impossible to provide exact figures. Estimates vary heavily depending on the discourse and 
the speaker. 
79 Some have also decided to stay near the trading centers, i.e. the former camps, because they have 
better access to services there. Others did not, in fact, have the option to return to their villages, 
especially elderly people, who lost their family and thus have no one to take care of them and no 
place to return to in the villages. 
80 Finnström and Dolan both use the term “narrative” to refer to the two conflicting interpreta-
tions of the war in Northern Uganda. In my analysis, however, I have decided to use the term 
“discourse” instead as it better captures the complexity and scope of the two positions. Both, the 
official and the counter discourse are made up of several sub-discourses, which I reconstruct in 
my analysis to show how they come to form a larger discourse. 
81 In doing so, one needs to acknowledge that different positions taken by different authors concern-
ing the analysis of the conflict do not always neatly map out onto coherent discourses. There are 
several sub-discourses, and not all authors can clearly be assigned to one of the two discourses 
on the war at all.
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manitarian organizations, the Ugandan NRM government as well as large parts 
of the Ugandan population outside of Northern Uganda, and for a long time has 
also featured prominently in academic publications. Typical examples of the official 
discourse are the texts by Schäfer (2008), Eichstaedt (2009); McDonnell & Akallo 
(2007), De Temmerman (2001), Green (2009) and the films by Invisible Children 
(esp. Rough Cut (2006) and Kony 2012 (2012)). In a modest version, the official 
discourse is also reproduced by Gesony (1997) and Shaw & Mbabzi (2008).
The counter discourse, on the other side, has recently gained acknowledgement 
through the voices of Acholi politicians and intellectuals as well as through several 
recent publications by critical scholars who have carried out extensive field research 
in Northern Uganda. The most prominent academic representatives of the counter 
discourse are Sverker Finnström, Chris Dolan, Adam Branch and most of the au-
thors in the edition by Allen & Vlassenroot (2010a). Some aspects of the counter 
discourse are supported by Westbrook (2000) and Van Acker (2004). After having 
studied the literature on the war in great detail, I regard the latter discourse as more 
substantiated and convincing. As this is reflected in my analysis of the two discours-
es, the reader should be aware of my own standpoint and take it into account.
Following Keller (2007: 14ff.), I have analyzed the phenomenal structures of the 
two competing discourses. Thereby, I have differentiated between central analytical 
dimensions or categories which come up in both discourses, and their contents, i.e. 
the perspective the respective discourse represents and the arguments it puts forth. 
The results of my analysis are summarized in the following table and discussed more 
extensively in the following text.
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Table 1: Contrasting Perspectives on the War in Northern Uganda
Dimensions
Contents: Conflict Analysis
Official Discourse Counter Discourse




Spiritual / religious beliefs -
Political and economic griev- -
ances
Complex historical develop- -
ments
Who is to blame?2. Mainly the LRA - Multiple actors on the local,  -
national and international level
Need for Action? 3. 
Solutions?
Military solution, i.e. defeat of  -
LRA
Humanitarian intervention to  -
help the Acholi ‘victims’
Political solution, i.e. peace  -
talks and peace agreement
Sustainable changes in Ugan- -





Conflict as a humanitarian crisis -
Analytical approach -
Conflict as a political crisis -
Major repre-5. 
sentatives / pro-
ponents of the 
discourses?
NRM / UPDF -
US Government -
Aid industry -
Large parts of the Ugandan  -
population outside of Northern 
Uganda
Critical scholars -
Acholi intellectuals and politi- -




Positioning  6. 
of key actors:
Museveni  a) 
(as head of NRM 
Government & Chief 
Commander of UPDF)
‘Savior’ of war-torn Uganda -
‘Developer’ -
Ally in the “war on terror” -
Spoiler (of peace talks) -
Profiteer of the war – political  -
and economic incentives to 
continue fighting
LRA b) 
(Motives / Ideology? 
Extent of popular 
support? Extent of 
child abductions?)
‘Irrational barbarians’ -
Army of ‘child soldiers’ -
No political agenda -
No support by Acholi popula- -
tion 
Complex political, religious and  -
spiritual motives
Army of abductees and volun- -
teers; fewer ‘child soldiers’ than 
commonly assumed
Political agenda, which reflects,  -
to some extent, the grievances 
of many Acholi
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The official discourse labels the war as a result of ethnic conflict in Uganda since co-
lonial times as well as a result of ‘irrational, brutal, spiritual rebels’, which emerged 
in Northern Uganda in the 1980s (cf. Finnström, 2006a: 202f.; 2008: 68; Leopold, 
1999: 221f.). In Finnström’s words, “the typical depiction has been a one-sided and 
sometimes eroticizing focus on the various Holy Spirit rebel movements, and thus 
on the religious, even pseudocultural, aspects of the war” (2008: 63). By overem-
phasizing factors such as ethnicity and spiritualism, and by blaming the war pri-
marily on the LRA, it is de-politicized and the ‘real grievances’ by the Acholi popu-
lation are ignored. The official discourse furthermore conveys a highly moralized 
image of the conflict, which concurs with more general, international perceptions 
of Africa as a continent of crisis, war and human suffering. According to Branch 
(2011: 45/2012), this has led to equally moralized interventions by the international 
aid regime with largely harmful consequences. Proponents of the official discourse 
favour a military solution to end the war. They encourage the attempts by the US 
government and army to support the UPDF in their fight against the LRA (cf. 
Atkinson et al., 2012). Unlike most proponents of the counter discourse, they still 
regard Museveni as a trustworthy partner and an ally of the West in development 
initiatives and the “war on terror”, and not as one of the prime conflict actors. In 
sum, the official discourse pinpoints the roots of the conflict in ethnic divisions, 
depicts the crisis as humanitarian rather than political, views the Acholi populace 
as helpless victims rather than political agents and citizens, and looks mainly at the 
LRA and to a lesser extent the Ugandan government and army as conflict actors, 
thereby failing to ignore the broader complexities of the war.
In contrast, the counter discourse argues that the war in the North is highly 
complex, essentially politically motivated, and must be historically contextualized. 
It cannot be reduced to an ethnic conflict, or to a rebel insurgency led by a mad 
and barbarous leader. Rather, one needs to look at a range of different conflict ac-
tors with very different (and sometimes changing) motives. In order to understand 
the length and complexity of the war, one has to consider not only the local and 
national, but also the regional and international dimension of the conflict. Relevant 
aspects include the role of the Sudanese government in supporting the LRA and, 
more generally, the proxy wars fought between Uganda, Sudan and Congo; the 
global “war on terror” and the labeling of the LRA as a terrorist organization by 
the USA and the Ugandan government, which legitimated the extensive (military) 
support the US government provided to the Ugandan government army in their 
fight against the LRA; and the internationalization of the conflict resolution and the 
subsequent involvement of the UN, Western states, and international humanitar-
ian and development organizations82. In this spirit, the counter discourse frames 
the LRA as a political (rather than irrational, spiritual) actor, and blames the war in 
82 For a more detailed analysis of the regional and international dimension of the conflict see Pru-
nier, 2004; ICG, 2004: 24ff.; ICG, 2010; Dunn, 2004; Mwenda, 2010; Perrot, 2010; Branch, 
2011; Finnström, 2008: 112ff..
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the North not only on LRA violence, but also on the irresponsible and intentional 
warfare by the Ugandan government and its uncritical support by the international 
community (cf. Branch, 2011; 2012). Rather than lamenting the humanitarian cri-
sis and lauding the efforts by humanitarian organizations to stop it, the counter 
discourse takes a critical stance on the complex and politically-intended reasons for 
the massive human suffering, which Chris Dolan (2009) has labeled “social torture”. 
He summarizes his idea of “social torture as counter narrative” as follows:
“Social Torture is a counter-narrative which embraces complexity and rejects 
oversimplification. The range of local, national and international actors in-
volved, the intersection of multiple economic and political motivations with 
psychological needs arising from cycles of oppression and subordination, and 
the transnational nature of justificatory public discourses and value systems, 
cannot be easily accommodated in the depoliticizing binary oppositions 
(such as ‘internal-external’, ‘greed-grievance’ and ‘rational-irrational’) which 
underpin the mainstream discourse of internal war” (Dolan, 2009: 252).
The counter discourse favors a political solution to end the war. It argues that only 
sustainable changes in Uganda’s political landscape will prevent further violence in 
the long run.
The official discourse and the counter discourse are exemplary for the many 
controversies on and conflicting interpretations of the war in Northern Uganda, 
not all of which can be neatly assigned to one of the two discourses. In the growing 
amounts of literature on the war, debates have become increasingly blurred. The 
most contested issue is the role and image of the LRA/LRM83. As Dolan (2009: 74) 
states,
“[a]nyone attempting to assess the role of the LRA in northern Uganda is 
faced with a number of ambiguities, particularly concerning its composition 
and the extent of civilian support and link with the LRM. They are also 
faced with a media which fuels rather than resolves these ambiguities.”
I will turn to this matter in more detail in the following section.
The Role of the LRA3.7.1. 
Different accounts of the role of the LRA reflect different understandings of the 
war, its root causes and the reasons for its continuation. Therefore, I want to discuss 
this matter in more detail. When assessing matters such as the political or spiritual 
motivation of the LRA, the magnitude of its child abductions, the extent of local 
civilian support, and the (in)sanity of its leader, diverse images of the rebel organi-
83 Some authors, notably representatives of the counter discourse, who want to stress the political 
character of the LRA, refer to the organization as LRM – Lord’s Resistance Movement – which 
is the self-designated name of the political wing of the LRA.
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zation emerge. In the following, I will summarize the major debates surrounding 
these matters and thereby give an overview of the different positions taken by dif-
ferent authors on the war.
The first matter of debate concerns the proclaimed motives of the LRA for its in-
surgency in Northern Uganda. Some authors (for a typical example see Eichstaedt, 
2009), especially the local and international media as well as some human rights 
organizations have portrayed the LRA as an irrational and absurd rebel organiza-
tion led by a mad leader, which is fighting for no comprehensible goal at all (cf. van 
Acker, 2004: 336). This image is also conveyed in films, most prominently those by 
the US-American organization Invisible Children (see below). Others claim that the 
LRA is a Christian fundamentalist organization which wants to rule Uganda on the 
basis of the Ten Commandments (cf. Finnström, 2008: 108ff.; HuRiWa, 1997: 31). 
Sensationalist portrayals of the LRA also like to point to its spiritual elements, which 
can be traced back to its origins or more correctly other spiritual movements such 
as the HSMF, and which still serve as a signboard for the LRA. In this regard, un-
critical analysts often do not differentiate between the different rebel groups which 
existed in Northern Uganda in the first phase of the war, and the diverse motives 
and tactics they each pursued. In recent years, several critical scholars have argued 
convincingly that the LRA is by no means an irrational and mad movement (see for 
instance Titeca, 2010). As a report by the Refugee Law Project maintains,
“[a]lthough the LRA is often portrayed as a band of criminals, such a charac-
terisation is clearly inaccurate for a group that has wreaked havoc in northern 
Uganda for the past 17 years. Not only are its tactics appallingly effective, 
but the LRA also has significant military ability” (RLP, 2004: 21).
Sophisticated historical analyses of the insurgencies point to the differences be-
tween the spiritual and political movements (Finnström, 2006a) which responded 
to two different crisis faced by Acholi – an internal crisis (cf. Behrend, 1993: 36ff.) 
and a national crisis (Branch, 2010: 25). They also differentiate between the extents 
to which the different rebellions were supported by the local population (Behrend, 
1993; 1999; Omara-Otunnu, 1992: 455ff.). In this regard, the UPDA and HSMF 
rebellions are clearly distinguished from the LRA and seen as having been sup-
ported by the majority of Acholi as they addressed their grievances and fears. This 
is also stated in a report by the Refugee Law Project which argues that
“[i]n retrospect, both the UPDA and HSM were similar in that they tried 
to mobilise popular grievances in a struggle against the new government. 
Although the former was more about capturing political power and the lat-
ter more about rejuvenating Acholi society, they both articulated reasons 
for rebellion that most Acholi sympathised with at the time. These popular 
causes can be summarised as follows: they feared reprisals for what many 
perceived to be Acholi led massacres in the Luwero Triangle during the early 
1980s; they were upset at their loss of political and economic power as a 
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result of Museveni’s breaking of a 1985 power-sharing agreement and de-
structive cattle raids that they believed were sponsored by the NRM; they 
were afraid the new government – believed to be controlled exclusively by 
Western Ugandans – would marginalise them after their dominance in the 
national army; they were defending themselves against atrocities committed 
by certain battalions of NRA troops in 1986–7; and they saw violence as the 
only means to address these grievances after witnessing Uganda’s successive 
violent power struggles since independence. Since they were trying to gain 
popular support, neither the UPDA nor the HSM committed significant 
atrocities against its own civilians” (RLP, 2004: 5).
The existence and scope of a political ideology within the LRA is one of the greatest 
controversies in portrayals of the LRA, and arguably a very complex matter (RLP, 
2004: 15). As stated above, many analysts simply refuse or fail to grasp even the pos-
sibility that the LRA could be motivated by a political agenda. The violent tactics 
the LRA has adopted, which have caused inexplicable suffering among the civilian 
Acholi population, have led many to refuse to try to understand possible reasons 
behind it. This dominant attitude is captured very well in the following statement 
by the International Crisis Group (2004: 5): “The LRA is not motivated by any 
identifiable political agenda, and its military strategy and tactics reflect this”.
In fact, it is not easy to pin down the motives behind the LRA’s fight84 (Doom 
& Vlassenroot, 1999: 20). However, different authors have recently tried to unravel 
the “myth” behind the LRA (Allen & Vlassenroot, 2010a), and take seriously the 
political aspects of the war, which reflect real grievances and concerns by the Acholi 
population and which have been addressed – however defectively and untranspar-
ently – by the LRA. Social scientists such as Sverker Finnström, Chris Dolan, Adam 
Branch, and Tim Allen have convincingly demonstrated that it is important to ac-
knowledge that, besides its spiritual and religious agenda, which have been overrep-
resented in the official discourse, the LRA also pursued a political agenda (Dolan, 
2009: 90ff.). Against the common claim that, even given the existence of a politi-
cal program, the LRA has been unable or unwilling to communicate it (Doom & 
Vlassenroot, 1999: 26), these authors have described various attempts by the LRA 
to disseminate their political program, for instance via radio messages and village 
meetings (Branch, 2010: 41). Dolan (2009: 85) writes that “[t]hese broadcasts belie 
the claim that the LRA lacked any political position and had no interest in commu-
nicating with the civilian population – clearly they wished to, but were suppressed 
at the first sign of success.”
Finnström (2001; 2003: Chap. 4; 2008: Chap. 3; 2006a; 2006b; 2010; cf. also 
Allen, 2006: 43) has gone even further and claimed the existence of “political mani-
festos”, which according to him had been distributed among the Acholi population, 
84 This is even more the case since the LRA has left Northern Uganda and is continuing its random 
and brutal attacks on civilians in the DR Congo and the Central African Republic. 
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and which reflect the political issues the rebels wanted to address. He repeatedly 
refers to the frustration communicated to him by his interlocutors about the fact 
that the issues, which were of real concern to the people, have been left without 
commentary in the public arena (Finnström, 2008: 99; 2006b: 207). In an article, 
Finnström (2001: 247f.) summarizes the main points communicated in the mani-
festos:
“The Acholi of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts in northern Uganda seem 
to share a mistrust – created by this uneven development – with the LRM/A 
rebels. The criticism is outlined in a recent manifesto distributed by the rebels. 
(…)The manifesto takes a critical stance against ‘the New World Order’, as 
it is described by the globalization sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (1998: 55–
76). Furthermore, the LRM/A claims to be fighting for multi-party politics, 
a key issue in contemporary Ugandan politics. Most government officials 
dismiss this and previous rebel manifestos as diaspora creations disconnected 
from Ugandan realities. However, regardless of the origin of the manifestos, 
it must be noted that the LRM/A rebels pinpoint the issues relevant to most 
people in northern Uganda.”
It is frequently claimed, by scholars and political actors alike, that the political 
manifestos of the LRA are mere diaspora creations, which have little to do with 
the motivations of those fighting on the ground. The Lord’s Resistance Movement 
(LRM), allegedly the political wing of the LRA, is seen by many skeptics to be 
largely a group of London-based Acholi in the diaspora, who are extremely critical 
of the Museveni government and its role in the war, but who are not as close to 
Kony and his leading commanders as they claim to be (Dolan, 2009: 76f.).
The debate about the political aspirations of the LRA is still ongoing. However, 
since the LRA has concentrated its attacks on the civilian population in the DR 
Congo and Central African Republic, skepticism of the sincerity of their political 
motivations is even more widespread than before.
The extent to which the local population supported the LRA is another matter of 
considerable debate (Dolan, 2009: 75). The majority of analysts postulate that only 
a very small minority of the civilian Acholi population supported the LRA. They 
argue that due to the excessive violence committed by the LRA, the movement 
lost all the support it might have enjoyed in the initial years of fighting (Behrend, 
1998: 117; Gersony, 1997: 68; Westbrook, 2000: 3, van Acker, 2004: 352; Hu-
RiWa, 1997: 36). This and the fact that Acholi elders accused the LRA of having 
broken ‘traditional’ conventions and rules of Acholi warfare soon diminished the 
local support for the LRA.
Finnström, most prominently, opposes this general opinion and claims that the 
LRA has enjoyed more support among the local population than is widely acknowl-
edged. He writes:
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“[Y]oung informants were often careful when they expressed their views on 
the public arena, and it took quite some time for me to gain their confidence 
so that they could freely share their feelings, views, and ideological stand-
points. Again without being able to provide any proper or final statistics, I 
want to question the conclusion by Gersony (1997: 59) that of the Acholi 
people ‘more than 90 % do not respect, welcome, encourage, support or 
voluntarily assist the LRA’” (Finnström, 2008: 105).
In a similar vein, a report by the International Crisis Group argues that
“Although few are willing to say that the LRA is fighting to rectify histori-
cal Acholi grievances, these grievances do exist, and many see the LRA, for 
all its faults, as the only group that is effectively confronting Museveni. This 
feeling is likely to be strongest amongst the Acholi diaspora, which is not 
directly affected by either the LRA’s actions or by any positive deeds of the 
government” (ICG, 2004: 9).
The issue has still not been resolved and debates on the extent of LRA support con-
tinue. However, since the LRA has not been active in Uganda since 2006, and the 
aims they supposedly fought for have been taken up and made public by politicians 
from the North such as the charismatic DP presidential candidate Norbert Mao or 
UPC president Olara Otunnu, this question is no longer such a pressing issue.
The debate on the extent of support is closely intertwined with the question 
about the extent of (child) abductions and violence actually committed by the LRA. 
International human rights organizations, the media as well as other proponents 
of the official discourse on the LRA have frequently portrayed the LRA as an army 
of ‘child soldiers’. They derive their main motivation for intervention on the moral 
ground that the abducted children need to be rescued. In discourses on military sup-
port for the Ugandan army as well as in debates on humanitarian interventions the 
issue of ‘child soldiers’ always figures high on the list of arguments which legitimate 
intervention (for an extreme example see the recently released film “Kony 2012” 
by Invisible Children (2012), which I discuss in more detail below). Several figures 
exist on the supposed numbers of child abductees, most are based on the number of 
returnees which have gone through reception centers. High estimates suggest that 
over 30,000 children were abducted by the LRA (World Vision, 2005: 4)85. Shaw 
& Mbabazi (2008: 230) state that “the LRA reportedly consists of more than 80 
percent abducted children”. Testimonies of children who returned from the bush 
are often used to underline the general perception of the LRA as barbarous and 
irrational (e.g. HuRiWa, 1997)86. As Dolan (2009: 75) writes, “The vision of an 
organization built on abduction of children was linked to notions of its irrationality 
and lack of education.”
85 Cf. Invisible Children, http://www.invisiblechildren.com/history.html (accessed 28.03.2012).
86 For a critical discussion of these processes of “story-making” see Verma (2012). 
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Dolan (2009) and others (e.g. USAID & UNICEF. 2006: vi), however, have ques-
tioned the assumption that the majority of fighters in the LRA have been abducted 
children. Based on extensive interviews and long term research in Northern Ugan-
da, Dolan (2009: 75) summarizes his fieldworkers’ accounts. They suggest “that 
more than half of the abductees were adults, and thus did not confirm the image of 
an organization which focused primarily on abducting children.”
Blattman and Annan (2010, cf. also Annan et al. 2006 & 2008) have conducted 
an in-depth investigation of the magnitude, incidence, and nature of the violence 
of LRA abductions. Based on an extensive survey of hundreds of former abductees 
they try to present a more balanced and accurate picture of the subject than gener-
ally presented in the often sensationalist accounts. They state:
“The phenomenon of abduction is (…) poorly understood. While we know 
that many youths met terrible fates – whether killed, forced to commit un-
speakable acts or taken as slaves for combat or sex – we have little sense of 
what experiences are exceptional and which are the rule. (…) In the absence 
of a public face and (until very recently) an active political arm, the LRA’s 
activities, motives and structure have been defined by external actors, most 
of all journalists, human rights groups and the Ugandan military and gov-
ernment. One thus worries that the most sensationalist rather than the most 
common experiences have found their way into discourse” (Blattman & An-
nan, 2010: 132).
Based on their data, they come to the conclusion that
“the LRA appears to be a much more strategic and conventional military 
organization than often supposed, however terrible its violence. (…) On the 
one hand, abduction is seemingly more widespread, more focused on ado-
lescents and (on average) less grotesquely violent than often imagined. On 
the other hand, what is more common and broad based than previously sup-
posed is the emphasis on political ideology in the group, as well as the level 
of cooperation and allegiance to the rebel cause reported by abductees…” 
(Blattman & Annan, 2010: 132f.).
These and other controversies about the LRA have only recently been openly de-
bated in the literature on the war in Northern Uganda. The fact that the motives, 
practices and tactics of the LRA are more complicated than is generally portrayed 
by the official discourse should not belie their brutal abductions, killings, mutila-
tions and the suffering they have caused in Northern Uganda for a period of 20 
years. However, one needs to keep in mind that just as the position of the LRA has 
been more complex than assumed, the role of the Ugandan army and government 
also needs to be critically re-examined.
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The Role of Museveni, the NRM Government & the UPDF3.7.2. 
Different evaluations regarding the inability or unwillingness of the government to 
end the war, and its potential motivations to continue it, can lead to various conclu-
sions about the nature of the conflict. Many authors are surprisingly uncritical of 
Museveni’s politics in Northern Uganda and the fact that his government and army 
have been unable – for more than 20 years – to defeat an army of ‘insane rebels’ 
and ‘child soldiers’ (for instance Hansen & Twaddle, 1991; Schäfer, 2008: 337; 
343ff.; 358; Eichstaedt, 2009: 13; Ndikumana & Nannyonjo, 2007; Mamdani, 
2004; Gersony, 1997). Museveni’s labeling of the armed conflict as a military rather 
than a political struggle, his long-lasting refusal to engage in peace talks and his 
IDP politics have led critical scholars (e.g. Omara-Otunnu, 1992) to question his 
motives and his willingness to end the war. As a report by the International Crisis 
Group analyses,
“[t]he war has been a disaster for Uganda but it has allowed him [Museveni] 
to maintain an unreformed and corrupt army as a key pillar of the regime. It 
stands in the way of thorough security sector reform and gives him the argu-
ments with which to resist mounting international pressure to reduce defense 
spending drastically. It also gives him pretexts to maintain the political sta-
tus quo by denying the opposition a power base and curtailing freedom of 
expression and association in the name of ‘the war against terrorism’” (ICG, 
2004: 10).
Besides these political motivations to continue the war, there have also been eco-
nomic incentives for the UPDF, especially its top commanders (Ogenga Otunnu, 
2002: 13). Van Acker (2004: 353f.) mentions large scale cattle theft, different forms 
of corruption, as well as the use of “ghost soldiers” as means by some people in the 
army to enrich themselves (cf. RLP, 2004: 27ff.). Only in very rare cases were these 
forms of misbehaviour by UPDF soldiers recorded and punished (Dolan, 2009: 
148f.). Proponents of the counter discourse have often criticized that legal measures 
to punish war crimes committed during the armed conflict in Northern Uganda 
have only been directed against the LRA and that the UPDF, despite its known 
gross human rights violations, has never been indicted. In this regard, the most 
frequently cited example is the investigation by the International Criminal Court, 
which charged the top LRA commanders with crimes against humanity while re-
fusing to investigate the crimes committed by the government forces (Mamdani, 
2012; Kalinaki, 2012).
To summarize the complex debates on the LRA and the Ugandan government, 
I will quote Chris Dolan, who, in his chapter Reconsidering the LRA-Government 
Dynamic concludes his analysis with the following words:
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“The LRA was more motivated and organized than it was made out, and the 
GoU [Government of Uganda] less committed to finding a solution than 
concepts of wars as something you fight to win would have us believe. In-
deed, for the GoU winning seemed to lie in keeping the opponent alive for 
as long as possible, in particular by using humiliation tactics to provoke him 
into reacting whenever the situation became calm for too long. In this inter-
pretation the Government’s behaviors, whether in military or non-military 
interventions, were not driven by political immaturity, but rather aimed to 
achieve the opposite of what was stated – namely to bring the situation back 
to the broil rather than to find a solution” (Dolan, 2009: 102).
Concluding Remarks –  3.8. 
Changing Hegemonies of Interpretation
In this chapter, I have demonstrated how different historical realities are construct-
ed in different discourses on Ugandan history. At different times, different social 
actors have had different degrees of influence to establish their version of history as 
the dominant interpretative scheme in public and/or academic discourse (cf. Keller, 
2006: 121, 124). I have further shown how, once established, dominant interpreta-
tive schemes of key events in Ugandan history and their consolidation in coherent 
story lines (cf. Keller, 2006: 133f.) have had a profound effect on subsequent histori-
cal developments and their interpretations.
My aim, more specifically, was to analyze different narratives of the war in 
Northern Uganda and the way they were based, at least partly, on different ver-
sions of Ugandan history. On a macro level, two major opposing discourses can 
be singled out: one official discourse, which takes a very moralizing approach in its 
conflict analysis, blames the war primarily on the LRA and its ethnic and spiritual 
fanaticism, and favors a military solution to the war; and a counter discourse, which 
acknowledges the LRA as a political actor, points to the devastating effects not only 
of LRA violence but also of the government policies on the war and the complicity 
of the international community, and calls for a long-term political solution to over-
come the root causes of the conflict. Each of the two discourses interprets historical 
events before and during the war in different ways, and builds different story lines 
to legitimate its interpretation of the war.
Since the beginning of the war, discourses and interpretations of the war have 
been repeatedly altered due to the necessity to accommodate recent events. Hege-
monies of interpretations have also changed due to changes in discourse coalitions 
and societal power structures and relations. In the beginning of the war, and for 
quite a long time thereafter, the official discourse was the only one which resonated 
in national, international and even in academic discourses. This was due to the 
widespread image of Museveni as the ‘savior’ of Uganda after the troubled years un-
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der Amin and Obote, which made his rhetorics on the war in the North sound cred-
ible. It was further affected by chaotic events in Northern Uganda in the mid-1980s, 
which were hard to comprehend for outside observers, and the gruesome reporting 
of the crimes, which the LRA began to commit particularly after the failure of the 
1994 peace talks.
In recent years, the counter discourse has gained more influence, and has be-
gun to challenge the dominant interpretative schemes set by the official discourse. 
This, among other reasons, is due to the fact that prominent and influential Acholi 
politicians like Olara Otunnu (President of the UPC) and Norbert Mao (President 
of the DP) have started to change the image of Northern Uganda and the Acholi 
in national discourses. Furthermore, Gulu is increasingly becoming an important 
economic centre and is no longer seen as the capital of a war region. Another im-
portant aspect is that the general political atmosphere in Uganda and also attitudes 
among the international donor community have become very critical towards the 
Museveni Government (cf. ICG 2012). In academic circles, the counter discourse 
has, in fact, become the hegemonic line of interpretation. Today, there is hardly a 
serious scholar working on Northern Uganda, who does not cite the major works by 
Finnström, Dolan and others, and takes a more critical look at the government and 
international involvement in the war.
In Uganda (with the exception of Acholiland), the official discourse long domi-
nated public perceptions of the conflict. In line with established colonial and post-
colonial classifications, it was blamed on the ‘barbarous’ and ‘martial’ Acholi people, 
while the accountability of the NRM government was rarely taken into account. 
Over the years, however, and especially since the end of the war, critical press reports 
(especially in the Daily Monitor ) and the voices of prominent intellectuals and in-
fluential Acholi politicians have managed to establish a more differentiated picture 
of the conflict in Ugandan public discourses. With rising criticism of the Museveni 
government in all parts of the country, especially since the elections in 2011 (ICG, 
2012), and the recent outrage over the Kony 2012 video (cf. for instance Mamdani, 
2012; Kalyegira, 2012; Tabaire, 2012; Kalinaki, 2012; see discussion below), many 
aspects of the counter discourse have in fact become hegemonic.
In international media and political circles, however, the official discourse is still 
widely recited. For many years, the war was largely ignored, and was famously de-
scribed in 2003 by Jan Egeland, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative 
on Humanitarian Affairs, as the world’s worst neglected humanitarian crisis (Dolan, 
2009: 55f.). Afterwards, relief efforts rapidly expanded, and reportings of child ab-
ductions and ‘child soldiering’ by the LRA as well as the plight of thousands of night 
commuters, children who fled their villages at night to sleep in protected areas in 
town for fear of attacks, spread through the international media. In the U.S.A., the 
films by Invisible Children reached ten thousands of (predominantly) young people, 
and convinced them that Northern Uganda needed to be rescued from the ‘evil and 
mad’ Joseph Kony with the help of the U.S.A. (cf. Finnegan, 2013). This ‘propa-
ganda’ culminated in the documentary “Kony 2012”, which was spread via Face-
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book und YouTube and was watched by millions of people worldwide within days 
after it was first uploaded87. Kony 2012 represents the bluntest version of the official 
discourse; it distorts historical facts88, and is based on the most sensationalist and 
moralizing images. In an article about the video, Finnström (2012: 127) notes:
“The global success of the film KONY 2012 by Invisible Children, Inc., man-
ifests far greater magical powers than those of Joseph Kony and his ruthless 
Lord’s Resistance Army, which it portrays. The most prominent feature of the 
Invisible Children lobby is the making and constant remaking of a master 
narrative that depoliticizes and dehistoricizes a murky reality of globalized 
war into an essentialized black-and-white story. The magic of such a digest-
ible storyline, with Ugandan rebel leader Joseph Kony as a global poster boy 
for evil personified, not only plays into the hands of the oppressive Ugandan 
government but has also become handy for the US armed forces as they seek 
to increase their presence on the African continent.”
Even the Ugandan Government, generally a stern promoter of the official discourse, 
has criticized the video for its misrepresentation of historical facts and its patron-
izing attitude. A press release states:
“[W]e note with concern the gross misrepresentation created by the docu-
mentary. The documentary is in essence, an erroneous attempt to rewrite the 
history of Uganda regarding the conflict in the Northern part of the country. 
(…) The documentary is also patronizing in as far as it portrays Uganda as 
helpless in the face of the conflict and cuts out Ugandans as people incapable 
of solving their own problems” (Okurut, 2012: 28).
Internationally, there have been mixed reactions to the video. While the extreme 
emotional and patronizing measures the film adopts to convey its message, and the 
motives behind the film and the organization Invisible Children have been widely 
criticized, few of the uninformed viewers of the film are capable or willing to chal-
lenge the story behind it. As is well-known from other examples (e.g. Schomerus, 
2010), there is a general reluctance by the international media and its consumers to 
accept less sensationalist accounts of the war and its main actors as the presentation 
87 On March 5th, 2012, Invisible Children released the film as part of a campaign to call atten-
tion to the LRA and its leader Joseph Kony and to lobby for a large-scale military intervention 
to capture Kony. In the 30-minute film, American Jason Russel, founding member of Invisible 
Children and director of the film, talks to his five-year old son Gavin about the war in Northern 
Uganda and the “bad guy” Joseph Kony. Using very emotional language and images, the film 
contrasts Gavin’s life as a child growing up in the U.S.A. with the life of Jacob, a Ugandan friend 
of Russel, who grew up in Northern Uganda during the war and experienced terrible suffering 
due to Kony and the LRA. Russel states that his motivation for the campaign is that children 
across the globe should grow up in a better world and calls upon the international internet com-
munity to support his mission.
88 The most drastic distortion, which has been pointed out by several critiques, is that the video 
gives the impression that the war is still ongoing in Northern Uganda. 
112 Julia Vorhölter: Youth at the Crossroads
in the video fits too well the common notion of Africa as the dark, dangerous and 
irrational continent. As a columnist in the Daily Monitor writes:
“International media has long perfected the reductive art of trying to explain 
a complex, foreign story to an uninterested domestic audience in the tradi-
tional 90 seconds or three minutes of a television news clip. (…) The biggest 
concern shouldn’t be the inaccuracies or the lack of context in the video 
– that is to be expected – but that there are few, if any, alternative realities to 
correct them. We are simply not telling enough of our own stories. Mzungus 
[common Swahili term for white people] have written most of the books 
I have read on the LRA war. (…). Fifty years after independence, one can 
count less than that number of good, insightful books written by Ugandans 
telling the story of our nation and the men (and women) who built it” (Ka-
linaki, 2012: 11).
Thus, while Kony 2012 has certainly achieved to put the conflict in Northern 
Uganda (back) on the international agenda89, at least for a brief period of time, the 
notion it conveys of the war, its root causes and its main actors, is one-sided if not 
completely wrong. The video is therefore a manifestation of the official discourse on 
the international level, and it remains to be seen whether critical commentators will 
be able to correct the interpretative scheme it has established90.
The debates about the Kony 2012 video are an extremely telling example of 
the fights about defining history, and the power inherent in the capability to do so, 
which I have referred to in this chapter. I will end this chapter with a quote from 
another Daily Monitor columnist, who captures this idea very well when he writes:
“But, finally, here we are – in the twenty-first century. Africa is pushing 
back in real time on (somewhat) equal platform. Everyone is free to define 
and redefine Africa in his or her own image. That definition, however, shall 
no longer go un-interrogated. Swiftly and robustly. The fight is fully joined” 
(Tabaire, 2012).
89 As a reaction to the video, the African Union now plans to deploy 5,000 soldiers to the countries 
in Central Africa currently affected by the LRA attacks to defeat Kony and his rebel army (Ta-
gesschau, 2012).
90 Some weeks after the release of the first video, Invisible Children published a second video “Kony 
2012 – Part II. Beyond Famous” (2012b), in which they try to react to some of the criticisms 
voiced against the first film. They make clear that Northern Uganda is no longer a war zone and 
focus more on the actions of the LRA in the DR Congo and the Central African Republic. Gener-
ally, however, the film is just as patronizing as the first.
“Our Culture is getting lost!”4.  –  
Pre- & Post-War Representations  
of Acholi Culture
This chapter represents the starting point of my main analysis and consists of a 
mix between literature review and a discussion of my ethnographic material. The 
chapter serves to expound the contemporary, hegemonic discourse on Acholi cul-
ture, propagated by both local and international actors, which proclaims that “tra-
ditional Acholi culture” as it was in “those days” has been lost through war and 
displacement. I will introduce the reader to contemporary representations of Acholi 
culture by presenting a lengthy extract from my field notes which describes the 
“Miss Acholi Contest”. Afterwards, I will turn to a detailed analysis of the ways 
Acholi culture has been historically and discursively produced and how it is under-
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stood today91. The proclaimed loss of Acholi culture is one of the main features of 
contemporary discourses on socio-cultural change and thus of great relevance for 
my analysis. The way different people – elders and youth, men and women, local 
and international actors – talk about and give meaning to it reveals the complex role 
of culture in linking and understanding past and future of Acholi society. In order 
to give the reader an impression of the contemporary discourse, I have decided to 
present numerous and sometimes lengthy quotes throughout this chapter.
Acholi Culture 2.04.1. 92
I first learned about the Miss Acholi Contest in August from Simon. Simon was one 
of my regular interlocutors. I got to know him in the first month of my research as 
a participant of the “Gulu Talking Straight” Hip Hop Project (cf. Chap. 2), but we 
stayed in touch even after the project was finished. In August, Simon was working 
for Kwach Academy (http://www.kwachacademy.net/, accessed 29.05.2012), the 
CBO, which was responsible for the organization of the Miss Acholi Contest, and 
whenever we met he would tell me about the event. When I first heard the name 
“Miss Acholi” I had to think of a beauty competition or a fashion show, but Simon 
explained to me that the Miss Acholi Contest was by no means a conventional 
“modern” fashion show, but that the event was “all about tradition” (cf. field notes 
09.08.2010). On the official website, the Miss Acholi event is described as follows:
“The Miss Acholi Cultural Festival is not the normal conventional beauty 
pageant. This is very much to celebrate the rich culture and traditions of the 
Acholi people. This is a platform where we become students and learn some-
thing new. The event is a family event for both children and adults to learn. 
This year the events will consist [among other things] of the following:
Miss Acholi – showcase of the beauty of the Acholi women (…) each •	
will have to demonstrate knowledge of the Acholi Cultures and current 
affairs.
Cultural Dances (…)•	
91 When I use the term Acholi culture without further specification I refer to this contemporary 
understanding. 
92 Acholi Culture 2.0 alludes to the term “Web 2.0.”, which has been used to designate new de-
velopments in the World Wide Web since the late 1990s. Web 2.0 is a concept that stresses the 
interactivity and interoperability of the internet, in which users no longer only passively consume 
web contents, but become actively involved in shaping and creating web contents, for instance 
through social network and blogs. I have appropriated the term to designate not only the inven-
tiveness and creativity in current discourses on Acholi culture but also the multiplicity of different 
actors, who are involved in the ‘creation’ of Acholi culture as it is understood today. 
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Panelist [sic] – which consists of cultural leaders, academics and •	
teachers to talk about Acholi culture and traditions. There will be a 
question and answer time from the audience.
A Showcase of forgotten Acholi, e.g. food, fruits, craft – you name it, •	
and we will have it!”
(Miss Acholi, cf. http://missacholi.com/aboutus.php, accessed 14.05.2012).
According to the website, the main purposes of the event are “cultural revival” and 
“empowerment through culture”. It states: “The Miss Acholi Cultural show acts as 
a platform for cultural revival after the 23 years of war which ravaged the region 
and caused devastating impact on the community and families in the area” (Miss 
Acholi, cf. http://missacholi.com/faq.php, accessed 14.05.2012).
Ever since I first heard about Miss Acholi, I waited for this event, hoping that 
it would provide me with a new perspective on contemporary representations and 
negotiations of Acholi culture. In a very peculiar way, the event did indeed provide 
me with a new perspective on Acholi Culture 2.0. And it reinforced my perception 
of the ubiquitousness of static and highly flexible elements commonly associated by 
Acholi people in Gulu with Acholi culture.
In the following chapter, I will first present an extract of my field notes on the 
Miss Acholi Event to give the reader an impression of the hybrid93, multiple and 
sometimes contradictory contemporary images of Acholi culture. I will use this eth-
nographic example to address a question which is of central concern to my research: 
What is Acholi culture? Or, more concretely: What do people mean when they 
speak of Acholi culture? The answer to this question is by no means straightforward 
and critical anthropologists, including myself, would probably answer that Acholi 
culture as a monolithic whole does not exist at all. Nevertheless, there does seem 
to be a ‘prototypical’ understanding of the term. People remember the “real Acholi 
culture of those days”, elders lament the “loss of Acholi culture”, and cultural leaders 
and foreign organizations aim for the “revival of Acholi culture”. Expressions like 
these suggest that to some degree there is a shared notion of Acholi culture, and in 
the following chapter I will try to dissect this notion.
Before I do so, however, I will briefly elaborate my own understanding of and 
approach to the term culture which has been controversially debated ever since the 
beginnings of anthropology and, more especially, since the first anthropologists 
started “writing against culture” (Abu-Lughod, 1991) in the 1980s. In recent times, 
culture has become a buzzword not only in anthropological but also in public de-
bates – as the Acholi case prominently shows – and this has sparked further contro-
versies. Trouillot (2003: 98), for example, argues:
93 For a discussion of the concept of cultural hybridity see Weißköppel (2005) and Ashcroft et al. 
(1998: 118ff.).
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“As the explanatory power of culture increases, many anthropologists react 
negatively to what they see as an abuse of one of their favorite categories by 
the general public, journalists and especially colleagues. (…) Occasional and 
acute irritation aside, most academic anthropologists have a limited aware-
ness of both the extent of this abuse and the extent to which it now serves 
politically conservative causes. (…) The narrative and the solutions sketched 
here are valid only to the extent that we have both a conceptual problem and 
a public – therefore political – problem, that these problems are intertwined 
and urgent, and that the massive exportation of essentialized and racialized 
views of culture(s) (…) increases both their theoretical and political urgency. 
(…) Culture is out there, but anthropologists have no control of its deploy-
ment” (emphasis in original).
I share Trouillot’s criticism of the “essentialized and racialized views of culture(s)” 
one finds in popular discourses today. Equally, I perceive the diffuse usage of cul-
ture as an analytical concept in anthropological writings as highly problematic. 
However, I would not go as far as to call for the complete abandonment of the term 
culture as Trouillot and others have done. I believe that in a time where everyone 
talks about culture, anthropologists cannot simply abandon the word or the con-
cept behind it and ignore how and why it has become so common in popular de-
bates. Rather than engaging in endless debates about essentialist vs. constructivist 
concepts of culture, plural or singular understandings of culture, and the benefits 
and detriments of abandoning culture (for a good overview of these debates see 
Lentz, 2009 and Sahlins, 1999), however, I suggest that it is more relevant to en-
gage with and analyze the different contemporary emic understandings of the term 
culture as used by the people who are studied by anthropologists. Anthropologists 
need to shift their focus from abstract conceptual debates to ethnographic analysis 
and understand (discourses on) culture as an ethnographic fact94. As Sahlins (1999: 
403) has pointed out, emic conceptions of culture are by no means stable but in 
fact highly negotiable, manipulable and instrumental. Taking up his argument and 
drawing on Foucault’s analytics of power and discourse (cf. introduction), I argue 
that what is considered as culture in a given society is always related to time-and-
place-specific types of discourses which derive from a complex interplay of knowl-
edge and power relations. Culture is discourse in the sense that it is a way of creating 
order which subjects social actors and disciplines them to behave and believe in 
certain ways. Culture as discourse operates in relation to power – it is constantly 
reproduced as it serves to manifest societal power relations and to maintain social 
order, but it can also be resisted and challenged.
In this chapter I concentrate on hegemonic representations of Acholi culture 
and the multiple voices and authorities involved in its construction. I analyze how 
a shared meaning of Acholi culture has historically evolved and how it is constantly 
94 The same applies to debates on tradition and modernity which will be discussed in Chapter 5.
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reproduced without ignoring, however, the ways this shared meaning is also un-
dermined, altered and contested. My aim, in this and the following chapters, is to 
gain a deeper understanding of how the hegemonic discourse on Acholi culture and 
the various reactions to it shape past, present and future imaginations of Acholi 
society.
The contemporary hegemonic discourse on Acholi culture, propagated by both 
local and international actors, proclaims that “traditional Acholi culture” as it was 
in “those days” has been lost through war and displacement. I argue that this dis-
course is hegemonic for two reasons. Firstly, it reflects the perspective one most 
frequently encounters if one asks people in Gulu (and presumably also other areas 
of Acholiland) about Acholi culture today. Secondly, and related to the first point, it 
captures the perspective on Acholi culture that is most commonly depicted in con-
temporary writings on Northern Uganda. However, as I will show more explicitly 
in the following two chapters, the discourses on and conceptions of Acholi culture 
are more contested and complex than it may seem initially95.
In the first part of my analysis, I will delineate elements of Acholi culture which 
are commonly associated with pre-colonial and/or pre-war times. In different ways, 
both the pre-colonial and pre-war period (in common discourse often referred to, 
without distinction, as “those days”) are seen as the time when Acholi society was 
still intact and ‘authentic’. I will try to reconstruct the image of this ideal Acholi 
society not only by giving examples of common expressions by my interlocutors, 
but also by referring to frequently cited ethnographic accounts of the Acholi. I have 
decided to adopt this dual approach because both, the older and the more recent 
ethnographies written by social scientists and local ethnographers influence contem-
porary discourses in multiple ways. To this day, they are cited as authentic accounts 
of the past – in school education on ‘traditional culture’, by local organizations and 
NGOs involved in ‘cultural revival’, and by academics working on Acholiland – and 
thus shape contemporary imaginations of the past. Girling (1960: 202f.) further-
more argues that Acholi ethnographies in fact contributed to the emergence of an 
overall Acholi consciousness in the middle of the twentieth century. Both, contem-
porary discourses and older ethnographies adhere to a largely essentialist notion 
of culture as a social system. In their characterization of Acholi culture they both 
depict similar elements (political, social, economic organization, local beliefs etc.). 
Due to the pervasiveness of these categories, I have decided to follow their pattern in 
my analysis despite criticisms of such fixed representations of ‘cultures’ in contem-
porary anthropological debates.
In the second part of my analysis in this chapter, I will focus on the widespread 
contemporary impression that Acholi culture is “getting lost”. In local discourses 
95 In chapter 5, I show how, among the young generation, very different understandings of Acholi 
culture and its role in future Acholi society exist. In chapter 6, I further analyze how imaginations 
of Acholi culture are contrasted to a “westernized lifestyle” and demonstrate that the proclaimed 
loss of Acholi culture is attributed not only to the war but also to Western influences, which can 
be regarded both positively and negatively depending on the context and the speaker.
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this loss of Acholi culture is blamed on the war, particularly the displacement of 
the majority of the Acholi population to IDP camps, and the effects of war-related 
foreign influences. Again, I will link findings in the literature on Acholiland with 
expressions from my interlocutors in Gulu.
In the final part of my analysis, I will briefly look at contemporary attempts to 
reconstruct ‘traditional’, ‘authentic’ Acholi culture, which are pursued in different 
ways by rural communities, urban elites and international development actors.
With this chapter, I intend to show continuities and discontinuities, differences 
and similarities in discourses on Acholi culture. The eclecticism inherent in con-
temporary understandings of Acholi culture is best exemplified by the Miss Acholi 
Contest. In the following, I will present an extract from my field notes to charac-
terize this event, and use this example to introduce my analysis of contemporary 
understandings and representations of Acholi culture.
The Miss Acholi Contest – Extracts from my Field Notes4.2. 
18th December, 2010, Saturday night, Acholi Inn, Gulu. It is 6 pm and I am sitting with 
a group of friends at the Acholi Inn, one of the oldest, most well-known and expensive 
hotels in Gulu. Tonight the infamous “Miss Acholi Contest” will take place, which I have 
been hearing about for months.
We are a mixed group of people: both locals and foreigners, and of different ages 
and occupational backgrounds. We have bought our tickets at the entrance and are now 
awaiting the show, which is supposed to start at 5.30 pm. But apart from us no other 
guests have arrived yet.
I sit with Akello, a good friend and one of my closest research interlocutors96. While 
waiting, we chat and observe the preparations for the show going on around us. We greet 
Simon who is busy running around organizing. As usual, he looks like a ‘gangsta rapper’ 
– he is wearing sun glasses, a big cap and baggy pants. He greets us enthusiastically in 
his usual ‘hip hop style’ – a casual hand shake and a fist bump. Besides being a rapper 
Simon is also a passionate supporter and performer of “traditional dance”, and I always 
wonder how he manages to combine these two facets of his identity. For him, there does 
not seem to be a contradiction – even on an event like today, which he is attending as 
a representative of the organizing team, he does not consider it necessary to drop his 
‘gangsta habitus’. (…)
I look around as the crowd keeps gathering. There are families with small children, 
elderly men and women, youths – really all segments of society (but predominantly 
those, who are a little bit better off and who can afford the entrance fee of 10,000 
UGX, approximately 3.2 Euro97). Most of the young people are members of the cultural 
96 For more information on my most important interlocutors cf. appendix. 
97 According to a statistical survey by Pham & Vinck (2010, cf. figure 3 in the appendix), the aver-
age weekly income in Gulu District in 2010 was 23.157 UGX (approx. 7 Euro). Presumably, the 
“Our Culture is getting lost!” – Pre- & Post-War Representations of Acholi Culture   119
groups which will perform in the dance competition. A DJ has started to play music. 
The very adventurous mix includes “traditional Acholi music” (locally also referred to 
as “Suk style”), Ugandan and Western hip hop tunes, as well as international Christmas 
songs. One hip hop song consists nearly exclusively of the word “motherfucker” – I find 
it quite out of place in this event which explicitly aims to “revive traditional culture”, and 
I think many people in the audience, especially the older, more conservative ones, think 
likewise, but no one complains.
At 10 pm the show finally starts. The presenter, a radio MC from the local radio 
station Choice FM, welcomes the audience and introduces the event. He says that Miss 
Acholi is an annual event which aims to preserve Acholi culture. “Today”, he continues, 
“the young children should see and learn about Acholi culture”. He remarks that the 
Miss Acholi contest is not so much about beauty, but about knowledge of Acholi culture, 
and that the eight contestants will have to prove their knowledge of Acholi culture by 
answering questions raised by the jury. The winner of the contest, he announces, will 
receive a scholarship for Gulu University.
The presenter also introduces the rest of the program. There will be more than ten 
cultural groups from all over the Acholi region which will be performing “traditional 
dances” and competing against each other98. The winner, who is selected by the jury, will 
receive a prize money. In addition to the two contests, there will be other entertainment 
and music acts.
The presenter apologizes that the expected chief guest, the Acholi Paramount Chief 
Rwot David Onen Acana II, will not be able to attend the event. Ker Kwaro99 has sent 
his secretary as a representative instead. (To me it seems that Ker Kwaro does not take 
the event very seriously despite the fact that “cultural revival” and “cultural education” 
are two of its primary concerns). The second guest of honor is the speaker of the local 
government who is welcomed briefly. Then the presenter introduces the jury which is 
made up of three older men. Akello explains to me that all of them are well-known 
average income in Gulu Municipality was slightly higher. In order to put the above figure in a 
broader (national) perspective, one could look at the average income for teachers in Uganda. Ac-
cording to a New Vision article (N.N., 2011a), the average monthly salaries for primary teachers 
at the time was 260.000 UGX (approx. 78 Euro) and 450.000 UGX for secondary teacher (ap-
prox. 135 Euro). 
98 “Traditional dance” competitions, which I discuss in more details below, are very popular in 
Acholiland and throughout my research I witnessed several of these competitions. The perform-
ing groups are often comprised of children and youth who meet regularly to practice. Some 
groups also have adult members. The most common dances performed in the competitions in-
clude courtship dances like Larakaraka or Ajere, the “royal dance” Bwola, as well as age- and 
gender-specific dances (such as Dingi Dingi for young girls, and Apiti for older women). The 
performances are judged by a jury and the winners usually win various amounts of prize money 
(and sometimes other prizes). “Traditional dance” is the established emic term and as such I will 
use it without quotation marks in the following. (However, I am aware of the problematic notion 
of the term “traditional”).
99 Ker Kwaro is the official (but controversial) Cultural Institution of the Acholi (cf. Paine, 2011), 
which I will further discuss in the course of this chapter.
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experts of Acholi music and traditional dance who regularly judge music and dance 
competitions.
After all the announcements the program finally begins. First, the Ker Kwaro cultural 
group is called on stage to sing the “Hymn of the Acholi”, which praises the rwot, i.e. the 
Paramount Chief. I have never heard of this hymn before, and when I ask Akello about 
it, she says she has not heard of it either. I wonder whether it might be a very recent 
invention.
Next, the eight women, who will be competing to become Miss Acholi briefly present 
themselves to the audience by walking and dancing across the stage. Afterwards, the 
cultural group of the hosting organization Kwach Academy presents Bwola Dance100. (…)
The dance competition starts. Each group has nine minutes performance time. As 
in other traditional dance contests I have observed, most of the groups have powerful 
costumes and perform with great passion and professionalism. The boys and young 
men are bare-chested and often only wear something like feather skirts to cover their 
private parts. Most of the ladies and girls wear short skirts and something to cover their 
breasts, sometimes just conventional bras. Akello and some of the other young people 
in the audience find the costumes very amusing and there is some laughter. These young 
people are probably not the only ones who wonder why in the name of tradition so much 
bare skin can be shown, while in other contexts it is condemned as something Western 
and morally disgraceful. One performance, in particular, by a dance group made up 
only of elderly and very corpulent women, who are all wearing black bras, causes some 
uproar in the audience. (…)
Akello really enjoys watching the dances and is intrigued by their swiftness and 
powerfulness. She tells me that she once used to perform traditional dances when she 
was still at school, but that unfortunately she does not know the great majority. She is 
happy that today, at least, she is seeing and learning some new dances, which are part 
of her culture101.
In between the dance performances, the Miss Acholi Contest continues. One by one, 
the eight contestants are called on stage. I guess that most of the women are in their 
twenties. They enter the stage by dancing to a ‘traditional tune’. When the music stops 
they step before the jury to introduce themselves. The women are asked to state their 
names, their region of origin and the names and origins of their parents – probably to 
establish that they are ‘real’ Acholi. Every time, the people in the crowd, who are from the 
100 Bwola is the “royal dance“ of the Acholi. According to custom, it was performed during the 
crowning or the burial of a chief, or to welcome and entertain respected elders on festive occa-
sions. Today it is one of the most popular dances performed by youth cultural groups in dance 
competitions and other public events (cf. Nzita, 1997: 94; Acholi Heart Beat, cf. http://ugta.org/
acholi_heart_beat.php, accessed 29.05.2012).
101 I often encounter similar expressions by young people, who regret that they do not know the 
dances and other traditions of their forefathers and mothers. In this sense, events which aim to 
promote cultural education like Miss Acholi are something very much welcomed by the younger 
generation, despite the fact that they do not agree or accept all aspects of “traditional culture” as 
I will further discuss below.
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same area as the contestant, cheer and clap. The conversation between the contestants 
and the jury is only in Acholi so that I do not understand much. But in many ways it 
seems awkward to me: some of the women are very loud and their answers do not seem 
to please the jury. I ask Akello about it, and she thinks that some of the women might 
be drunk. (…)
After a further round of dances, the Miss Acholi contestants appear on stage for 
the second round. This time they wear some kind of ‘traditional clothing’, usually a skirt 
and something to cover their breasts. The jury asks them to tell the audience about the 
cultural meanings of the clothes and accessories they are wearing. Some of the ladies 
give lengthy and very sophisticated answers (according to Christopher, another Acholi 
friend of mine, who is sitting close by). Others seem to know nothing and embarrass 
themselves.
The evening continues, with dance competition and Miss Acholi contest alternating. 
It is already long past midnight, but there is still so much program to come. As it is very 
cold, many of the spectators begin to leave, and if it were not for research purposes, 
I would probably leave as well.
All of a sudden, the presenter announces a hip hop act, and Simon appears on stage. 
He performs a hip hop song with Acholi lyrics. He later tells me that he has written the 
song just for the Miss Acholi event. Together with him, many young guys, all in baggy 
pants, and also some girls, dressed in casual clothes, come on stage and dance. Some 
young people from the audience come up and put money in Simon’s pockets to show 
that they are enjoying his music. To me, the performance seems very much out of place 
when compared to the preceding program. (…) Later in the show, more rappers perform, 
who seem similarly out of place when compared to the rest of the ‘cultural program’. I 
look at the audience. The young people enjoy the hip hop performance, while the older 
people seem relatively indifferent. Some also seem annoyed, but I think mainly because 
it is getting so late and they want the contests to move on. I really wonder about the 
eclectic conception of this event. Is this Acholi Culture 2.0? (…)
It is already past 3am and of our group only Akello, Lioba, Christopher and me are 
left. Christopher, an Acholi man in his 40s and a stern supporter of ‘Acholi traditions’, is 
the one who is making us stay as he wants to see who wins the Miss Acholi Contest. But 
there is always some other program mixed into the contest so that it is getting later and 
later. Alpha Otim, a well-known local artist for popular Acholi music, comes on stage to 
perform one of his “Suk style” songs. All of a sudden the stage is full of people – young 
and old, traditional dancers and rappers, men and women – who are all dancing to Alpha 
Otim’s tune. It is a crazy sight, seeing elderly ladies in bras dancing together with rappers 
in beanies and baggy pants. Despite the coldness and the late hour, I have to smile and 
feel somehow happy that we stayed this far. Nevertheless, Akello and I decide to leave 
shortly after the performance, since it is already 3.30 am and it will probably take some 
more hours until the contest will be over (field notes 18.12.2010).
The Miss Acholi Contest raises several questions about the notion of Acholi culture 
and the way it is currently being promoted. Acholi culture, on the one hand, seems 
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to imply something bounded and fixed, something which can be grasped by inter-
rogating contestants about ‘cultural facts’ or by judging the authenticity and cor-
rectness of a dance performance. On the other hand, Acholi culture blends in with 
other elements – in case of the Miss Acholi Contest international popular music, 
fashion and dance – and thus seems to be an inherently hybrid concept. In this 
chapter, I will concentrate largely on the first aspect, the official discourse on Acholi 
culture, and will turn to the more dynamic and hybrid aspects of Acholi culture in 
the following chapters.
Pre-war Ethnographies: Representations of the Ideal 4.3. 
Acholi Society
In this section of the chapter, I analyze widespread imaginations of pre-war Acho-
li society. I give a systematic account of different elements, which are regarded 
as fundamental parts of Acholi culture. Many of these elements are reflected in 
early ethnographic studies of the Acholi such as those by Crazzolara (1950; 1951; 
1954), Girling (1960) and Onyango-Odongo & Webster (1976) as well as the later 
publications by Atkinson (1989; 1994; 1999), Ocholla-Ayayo (1980), Nzita (1997), 
Behrend (1993) and Finnström (2003)102. These ethnographies not only reflect con-
temporary notions of Acholi culture, but have in fact contributed to their produc-
tion and construction by inscribing and thus consolidating ethnographic data as 
‘historical facts’. I focus on those facets of Acholi culture, described in these ethno-
graphic accounts, which I also encountered in contemporary popular imaginations 
of “traditional Acholi culture”. I will summarize the insights provided by the differ-
ent ethnographers on commonly discussed aspects such as origin, social, political, 
economic and religious/spiritual life of the Acholi, and relate them to expressions 
by my interlocutors in Gulu. Reconstructing the way Acholi culture has been dis-
cursively produced and is seen to have evolved is important in order to understand 
contemporary discourses on socio-cultural change.
The Origin(s) of the Acholi4.3.1. 
Different ethnographic studies claim that the Acholi are part of the Luo103 and 
originally stem from Southern Sudan, from where they started to migrate into the 
102 Other prominent examples of Acholi ethnography, which I did not cite for this section because I 
did not have access to the texts, include Dwyer, 1972 as well as the local ethnographies by Reuben 
Anywar, Alipago Latigo, Noah Ochora, Laito Okech und R.M.Nono (cf. Behrend, 1993: 14). 
103 Luo is a Western Nilotic Language spoken by different peoples in Southern Sudan, Uganda and 
Tanzania and the umbrella term under which the Acholi dialect is subsumed (Atkinson, 1994: 3; 
1999: 62; Crazzolara, 1938).
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area now referred to as Acholiland104 sometime between the 15th and 17th century 
due to several calamities such as diseases, conflict and overpopulation (Behrend, 
1993: 23f.; Nzita, 1997: 87; for a more nuanced analysis cf. Crazzolara, 1950; 1951; 
Atkinson, 1999: 61ff.; Onyango-Odongo & Webster, 1976: 25ff.). According to 
Nzita (1997: 88), they moved into different areas in Uganda where they intermar-
ried with the local people. The Acholi as we know them today “are said to have been 
the offspring of the intermarriages between the local people and the Luo arrivals” 
(ibid.: 88).
When talking about the origins of the Acholi with my interlocutors in Gulu, 
both older and younger people frequently referred to the founding myth according 
to which two brothers split up over a bead and one went to West Nile and became 
the founder of the Alur and the other became the father of all Acholi (personal con-
versation cf. field notes 31.03.2010; INT Faith, 18.03.2010; cf. Finnström, 2008: 
47f.; Crazzolara, 1950: 62ff.; Girling, 1960: 158; Onyango-Odongo & Webster, 
1976: 106f.). In conversations, the issue of origin sometimes came up when dis-
cussing the differences and similarities between the Acholi and their neighbouring 
ethnic groups. Some interlocutors emphasized the differences that had existed (and 
still exist) between different Acholi clans or between Acholi from different regions in 
Northern Uganda. A common claim, for instance, was that there is a fundamental 
difference between Acholi from the Gulu and Acholi from the Kitgum region (e.g. 
INT Okello, 26.09.2010; personal conversation cf. field notes 06.09.2010)105.
Nevertheless, the existence of a collective, overall Acholi (ethnic) identity was 
never disputed. When I asked my interlocutors what being Acholi meant to them, 
most of them answered that it was an unchangeable part of their identity. The fol-
lowing statement by one of my interviewees is typical: “I just found myself born 
in it – they call us Acholi, so there is no way I can run away from it. I prefer some 
people’s culture to mine, but there is nothing you can do, I have to love my culture 
and my tribe” (INT Martin, 21.04.2010).
When I further inquired, what being Acholi meant in practice, many of my in-
terlocutors stated that it implied living according to Acholi traditions and following 
‘typical’ cultural practices related to social, political, spiritual and economic life. The 
popular descriptions of the different spheres and aspects of Acholi life correlate in 
many ways with ethnographic accounts I found in the literature. Behrend suggests 
that these correlations may not be coincidental and argues that contemporary rep-
104 The geographical area of Acholiland (approx. 28,400 square kilometres, cf. Atkinson, 1999: 46) 
consists of a series of huge terraces rising from West to East with some isolated mountains. Roll-
ing grass plains, small bushes and scarcely scattered trees (Ficus, Albizzia, Shea-Butter-Nut Trees 
etc.; nowadays also fruit trees such as Mango and Citrus) comprise the main features of the 
vegetation (Girling, 1960: 13f.). A map showing the districts which make up Acholiland today is 
included in the appendix (figure 1). 
105 The (historically grown) regional differentiation between different Acholi groups has also been 
discussed at length in the literature, cf. Atkinson (1999), Onyango-Odongo & Webster (1976) 
and Crazzolara (1950, 1951, 1954), but will not be further discussed here.
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resentations of Acholi culture have in fact been influenced by ethnographic studies. 
She writes:
“Als ich mit einigen Acholi-Ältesten im Norden Ugandas Gespräche führte, 
musste ich feststellen, dass meine Gesprächspartner Bücher und Artikel, die 
von Missionaren, Ethnologen und Historikern über ihre Kultur und Ges-
chichte geschrieben worden waren, bereits gelesen hatten und mir daraus 
berichteten. In ihren Antworten begegnete ich also nicht so sehr einem au-
thentischen Wissen, als vielmehr meinen eigenen Kollegen, in gewisser Weise 
also mir selbst. Auch fand ich heraus, dass es bereits eine Anzahl lokaler Eth-
nographien und Historiographien gab, die von Acholi wie Reuben Anywar, 
Alipago Latigo, Noah Ochora, Laito Okech und R.M.Nono, um nur einige 
zu nennen, geschrieben worden waren. In diese indigenen Texte sind auch 
die Texte von Europäern eingegangen, vor allem die von Missionaren der 
Comboni-Mission, die von Crazzolara über die Geschichte der Lwo (1937) 
und von Pelligrini über die Geschichte und ‚Tradition‘ der Acholi (1949)” 
(Behrend, 1993: 14)106.
During my research I encountered similar situations and responses. When I ques-
tioned my interlocutors about Acholi culture, they sometimes referred to books 
which had already been written on this subject. One interlocutor even showed me 
the book Living with Bad Surroundings by Sverker Finnström (2003) which he was 
reading because he was planning to make a movie based on two chapters in the 
book (field notes 14.04.2010).
In the following, I will draw on both sources – popular and ethnographic ac-
counts of Acholi culture – and will summarize those aspects of Acholi political, eco-
nomic, social and religious/spiritual life which both sources consider important.
Socio-political Organization4.3.2. 
In ethnographic descriptions of the Acholi, different levels of their socio-political 
organization have been identified107. Girling (1960) differentiates between four 
levels: the household, the hamlet, the lineage/village and the domain. Crazzolara 
106 “When I talked to some Acholi elders in Northern Uganda, I noticed that my interlocutors 
had already read and recited to me books and articles, which had been written by missionar-
ies, anthropologists and historians about their culture and history. Thus, their statements did 
not primarily reflect an authentic knowledge; rather, I encountered my own colleagues, and in 
some ways myself. I also discovered that there were a number of local ethnographies and his-
toriographies, which had been written by Acholi like Reuben Anyway, Alipago Latigo, Noah 
Ochora, Laito Okech and R.M.Nono – to name just a new. These indigenous texts also reflect 
the accounts of Europeans, especially those by the Comboni missionaries, by Crazzolara on the 
history of the Lwo (1937) and by Pelligrini about the history and ‘tradition’ of the Acholi (1949)” 
(Translation J.V.). 
107 The inclusion in the political and administrative system of the British colonial state heavily im-
pacted on the Acholi socio-political organization and will be further discussed below.
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(1954: 325ff.; 1938: ix f.) also mentions three segments above the household, which 
he refers to as clan group, tribal group and rwotship group. However, this typology 
is not maintained in all descriptions of the Acholi. More recent publications discern 
only three segments: the household, the localized lineage and the chiefdom (e.g. 
Atkinson, 1994: 5; Behrend, 1993; for a detailed account of the development of 
Acholi chiefdoms, cf. Atkinson, 1999).
According to the ethnographic literature, the lineage constituted the most fun-
damental socio-political unit in Acholi (Atkinson, 1994: 5). It was comprised of 
different households headed by agnatic kinsmen, who lived in the same area (i.e. 
what Girling refers to as “village”). The lineage members believed in the idea of a 
common ancestor and shared common traditions, taboos and totemic observances. 
Members of the same lineage were thus considered (distant) relatives and forbidden 
to marry one another (exogamy rule). A lineage collectively owned agricultural land 
and hunting grounds. Ritual authority was exerted by a lineage elder (ladit), whose 
main functions involved the supervision of moral rules and the regulation of the 
internal and external relations of the lineage (Girling, 1960: Chap. 5).
According to the literature, the chiefdom (or “domain”, cf. Girling, 1960: 8) 
constituted the next higher social unit above the lineage. Atkinson (1999) dates the 
emergence of the first Acholi chiefdoms to the late 17th century. According to Girling 
(1960: Chap. 6), a “domain” was made up of aristocratic lineages whose members 
were kinsmen of the ruler, and commoners who were unrelated to the ruler. It was 
ruled by a chief (rwot) who organized the agricultural production of the domain 
and was responsible for rain-making. The rwot was the ritual and political authority. 
However, his political power was rather limited, especially when compared to those 
of the kings among the more centralized and stratified groups in Southern Ugan-
da. He did not possess a “coercive machinery for enforcing his decisions” (Girling, 
1960: 100). Rather, his main task was to mediate between potentially antagonistic 
individuals, households and villages in order to achieve internal cohesion of the 
chiefdom. It is often mentioned that some rwodi of the larger domains did acquire 
substantial political influence, such as the rwot of Payira, however the nature and 
extent of their influence is highly contested108.
108 The proclaimed “paramount role” of the Payira rwot is especially debated, both in the literature 
and in popular accounts. Some authors and members of the Payira clan claim that he hailed from 
an ancient royal hierarchy and originally fulfilled the role of a paramount chief from the 18th 
century onwards (cf. Atkinson, 1999: 121ff.; 234ff.). They use this argument to legitimate why to 
date the ‘re-invented’ post of the Paramount Chief has always been held by a Payira rwot (cf. Liu 
Institute for Global Issues, 2005: 30). Others (e.g. Girling, 1960: 156; 201; Allen, 2006: 149ff.) 
say that the Acholi never used to have a Paramount Chief and that this post was only invented 
by the colonial administration. Crazzolara (1954: 481) states that “Payiira (…) was perhaps the 
largest Rwootship of old Acooliland; its superiority however, was merely numerical. (…) It is, 
therefore, a plain deception to attribute to any of the former Payiira Rwoots the position of para-
mount chief in the Acooli country.” 
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The main purpose of the domain, according to Girling (1960: 97ff.), concerned the 
common organization of defense, of agriculture and of some rituals and ceremo-
nies. Sometimes war was declared on another domain in order to loot women and 
cattle. Generally, however, the chiefdom constituted a relatively unstable political 
structure whose unity was continuously threatened by internal conflicts. It was not 
uncommon for a household or even a whole lineage to leave the domain and join 
another (Crazzolara, 1954: 327).
When comparing older ethnographic accounts with contemporary popular rep-
resentations of the socio-political organization of the Acholi, it seems that the terms 
used to refer to different segments have changed. In conversations (in the English 
language) I had with people in Gulu, I never encountered the use of terms like “lin-
eage”, “chiefdom” or “domain”. The only common term people used when referring 
to the socio-political organization of the Acholi beyond the level of the individual 
household was “clan”. I had the impression that people mainly used the term “clan” 
to refer to lineage in the anthropological sense. According to Ker Kwaro (2010b: 2) 
“Kaka”, the Acholi word for clan, “is an extended family unit comprising of a gen-
erational line including grandfather father’s son (sic) and immediate next of kin”. 
In this sense, kaka would be closer to the meaning of lineage than to the meaning 
of chiefdom/domain. Girling (1960: 196) writes that kaka “are social formations, 
which I have termed village-lineage in my analysis. They are known to the [colonial] 
Administration as ‘clans’”.
In some contexts, however, people also used the term clan to designate larger 
social units, i.e. chiefdoms. 52 “chiefdoms” (often referred to as clans) are formerly 
recognized by Ker Kwaro Acholi, the “traditional institution” of the Acholi since 
1995 (cf. Constitution of Uganda, 1995: Chap. 16, Art. 246; Liu Institute for 
Global Issues, 2005: 30f.).
Most of my interlocutors considered clans to still be relevant today. However, 
according to some elders I spoke to the knowledge about clans and clan member-
ship was declining among the young generation, which seems to be a recent phe-
nomenon and is also related to the massive displacement and break-up of families 
and clans during the war. In a group interview (in Paicho, 17.10.2010, translated 
from the Acholi original by John Omara), an elder lamented this loss of knowledge 
by saying: “These days people don’t know their cousins, uncles and aunties… That 
is why sometimes there is a lot of incest”. I often encountered similar statements 
which reflected a fear of incest as a result of the dispersion of families and clans and 
the lack of knowledge about kinship relations among the younger people. In fact, I 
even witnessed a particularly dramatic example of an ‘incest case’, when one of my 
interlocutors found out by coincidence that the man she had been dating for years 
was too closely related to her (field notes 20.–21.12.2010).
According to the literature, in former times knowledge about clan membership 
had been common knowledge. Crazzolara (1950: 109f.), describing the situation in 
the 1940s, writes that
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“[i]f one asks any Acooli, man or woman, about their clan membership, one 
can be certain that (…) the (sic) know and state without the least hesitation 
that they belong to such and such clan. (…) [T]he fact of one’s clan-mem-
bership is common knowledge in the district (…) and no knowledge is more 
general than (…) distinctions and divisions [between clans]. (…) [A] group, 
as a whole knows moreover very well about the existence of separated groups 
of their own clan in possibly distance parts of the country and beyond, and 
consider them as ‘brother’ clans in which one could not marry”.
Some 40 years later, Atkinson (1994: 4) writes that “[over] the twentieth century, 
chiefdoms in Acholi have become vestigial institutions”. When I asked my interloc-
utors about clans, both older and younger people usually talked about the functions 
of the clan and thereby differentiated between intra-clan and inter-clan relations. 
The internal function of a clan was most commonly related to two aspects: land 
ownership109 and the performance of certain rituals such as the last funeral rite for 
so-called “big people”, for which all clan members would come together (personal 
conversations cf. field notes 10.05.2010).
Inter-clan relations were related to marriages which serve to establish bonds be-
tween different clans, and conflicts which create divisions between clans. When talk-
ing about marriages, people always stressed the ongoing importance of exogamy, i.e. 
the rule to marry someone from a different clan. People explained to me at length 
how marriage relations were established in the past, and how the marriage between 
a man and a woman not only affected the two individuals and their immediate fami-
lies, but their two clans as a whole. Many stressed that to this day some of the long 
established marriage principles such as the payment of a brideprice are valued (cf. 
Ker Kwaro Acholi, 2010a/b110). This is also reflected in the continuing importance 
and widespread practice of “traditional marriage” (which usually takes place be-
fore church marriage) throughout Acholiland (personal conversations cf. field notes 
10.05.2010, 10.09.2010; INT Okello, 26.09.2010). In addition to marriage rela-
tions, which served to establish peaceful bonds between clans, my interlocutors also 
mentioned conflicts between clans which still occurred today, especially in the rural 
areas. A commonly mentioned reason for inter-clan conflicts was murder, i.e. when 
a member of one clan murdered a member of a different clan. In such a case, the 
109 In Uganda, there are currently different, parallel existing forms of land ownership. In Northern 
Uganda, much of the land which is not privately owned is clan land. Particularly, when discussing 
the resettlement process after the closure of the camps, people would often debate issues relating 
to clan land: Who was entitled to clan land? Where were the former boundaries? Could clan land 
be sold if people decided to stay in town? The issue of land and the conflicts related to it are cur-
rently a matter of great debate in Northern Uganda, which, however, I cannot pursue any further 
at this point.
110 The reports by Ker Kwaro Acholi describes Acholi marriage traditions in detail with the aim of 
defining and codifying “cultural principles” relating to courtship, the marriage process, bride-
price, obligations, divorce etc. 
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performance of certain rituals as well as compensation payments would be required 
in order to appease the clan relations (field notes 26.09.2010; group interview Wii 
Aweng, 26.09.2010).
In conversations and interviews about clans and the socio-political organization 
of the Acholi, my interlocutors always came to talk about the role of the chiefs. The 
chiefs constituted the most important representatives of the clan, both in symbolic 
and practical terms. It seemed to me that the term “chief” was used to refer to both 
‘local chiefs’, i.e. lineage elders (ladit) and ‘traditional’, i.e. ‘chiefdom chiefs’ (rwot) 
depending on the context. To further complicate matters, “chief” could also be used 
to refer to government officials111.
As stated above, Ker Kwaro Acholi, the “traditional institution” of the Acholi 
since 1995, officially recognizes 52 Acholi “traditional chiefs” (rwodi moo), who 
are headed by one “Paramount Chief” (Liu Institute for Global Issues, 2005: 30f.). 
Whenever I asked about these “traditional chiefs”, my interlocutors stressed that 
they (still) played an important role in Acholi society today – as cultural role mod-
els for the young people and preservers of cultural norms and rules, as mediators 
in community conflicts and as political and spiritual authorities (group interviews 
Bobbi, 06.10.2010; Bungutera, 03.10.2010; Wii Aweng, 26.09.2010; INT Okello, 
26.09.2010). One of my interlocutors, who lived in Palabek, a rural area in Lamwo 
District112, summarized the current role of the chiefs as follows:
“Their most important role is in solving conflicts between clans, for example 
when a man from one clan murders a member from another clan. Then the 
big chief steps in to arrange for reconciliation and compensation so the rela-
tions between the clans are restored. Chiefs also play an important role in 
land wrangles. Another important function of chiefs is their role in dealing 
with evil spirits. Due to the war, many people have died outside their home-
land and were not buried properly. Thus, people now fear that the spirits of 
the dead are disturbing them. Chiefs have to go to these areas and perform 
some rituals so that the spirits are appeased and no longer disturb the people” 
(field notes 20.12.2010, my interpretation of exact wording).
When comparing popular representations of the chiefs and the (older) ethnographic 
literature, it seems that the relevance of chiefs has increased in recent times. Chiefs 
have become key representatives not only of their clans, but of Acholi culture as a 
whole. A report by El-Bushra and Sahl (2005: 14f.) explains the potential reasons 
behind this:
111 In Acholiland today, the term “chief” could mean different things. Besides the ‘traditional’ clan 
chiefs, there are also county, subcounty and parish chiefs, who are elected state officials in the 
Local Council system (cf. Tripp, 2010: 113) and have nothing to do with Acholi clan structures. 
Girling (1960: 195ff.) describes how these new ‘government chiefs’ were first introduced by the 
colonial administration. 
112 Cf. map (figure 2) in appendix.
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“From the 1930s onwards, the Acholi (like other Ugandan societies) were 
not allowed to anoint new chiefs. Instead, people were expected to hold alle-
giance to the Ugandan state and central government. However, in the 1990s, 
government liberalised its policy towards traditional authorities, and in 2000 
Acholi started to revive the institution by holding anointment ceremonies 
for chiefs of all the clans. This was a controversial decision: some people 
(especially women and young people) felt that it was inappropriate to put 
the clock back, while others saw the chiefship as an integral part of Acholi 
identity. The revival of the chiefship was widely viewed as a positive step 
towards peace. This was partly because the chiefs would be able to carry out 
conflict resolution within their communities, but also because the anoint-
ments would reaffirm Acholi identity after decades of it being devalued, both 
by the Acholi themselves and by others” (my emphasis).
This interpretation suggests that chiefs, while not undisputed, are important sym-
bolic figures, and serve as markers of Acholi identity both internally and exter-
nally.
The office and role of the chief have undergone significant historical changes, 
which partly account for their increased relevance today. The British colonial ad-
ministration initiated this process in an attempt to centralize the Acholi political 
administration and render it more similar to that of the central Ugandan kingdoms, 
particularly that of Buganda. The British ‘uplifted’ the status of the chiefs and were 
the first to officially install a Paramount Chief. Atkinson (1999: 5f.) describes this 
restructuring of political authority in Acholiland:
“First, the imported Buganda-style council of chiefs, with a new ‘paramount’ 
chief, was further entrenched. Second, many formerly independent chief-
doms were amalgated, thereby extending the authority of some chiefs over 
peoples they had never previously ruled while demoting or removing others. 
Third, even those chiefs remaining in office were controlled much more than 
before (…). Finally, the administration ‘jettisoned [their policy of follow-
ing] a rigid adherence to the Acholi law of succession in the appointment of 
chiefs’ in favour of a much more ad hoc process.”
While most people I spoke to did not principally contest the authenticity and rel-
evance of the clan chiefs, a matter of substantial debate was the office and role of the 
Paramount Chief. The post of the Paramount Chief, first installed by the British, 
was revived under the 1995 Constitution which lifted the ban on cultural institu-
tions that had been put up by the Obote II administration. My interlocutors often 
asserted that in former times the Acholi had only had different clan chiefs, but never 
an overall paramount chief. Some told me that this post had just been invented to 
have a representative figure similar to that of the Baganda (personal conversations; 
cf. Finnström, 2008: 44ff.; Paine, 2011; Atkinson, 1999: 5; Liu Institute for Global 
Issues, 2005: 30f.). One informant gave another reason for the introduction of the 
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Paramount Chief, namely the need for a political authority, which could solve con-
flicts between the Acholi people:
“Ah, this one was just introduced politically. This one has been bought be-
cause certain clans were fighting one another like that, always quarreling, 
killing, killing, always waging wars against one another, so they have brought 
people who decided that they should put a paramount chief, like the gover-
nor, if he can govern all, so that we have a small constitution which can guide 
them. (…) So people have a government now, to get that peace, you don’t 
misbehave, because if you misbehave, people have their traditional constitu-
tion there, they will just come together with the paramount chief, then they 
will act accordingly” (INT Okello, 26.09.2010).
In summary, one can say that with regard to the socio-political organization of the 
Acholi there are some disparities between (and within) the ethnographic literature 
and contemporary popular representations. This is due to political changes, which 
have occurred throughout the 20th century, but also due to discursive effects, i.e. 
that for reasons hinted at above some elements of Acholi political organization have 
been discursively constructed as more relevant than others (I will come back to this 
point in the third part of my analysis). The same can be said for the representations 
of social organization and family life, which I will turn to in the next section.
Social Organization & Family Life4.3.3. 
Both ethnographic and popular accounts of Acholi culture devote significant atten-
tion to the individual household, which can be comprised of a nuclear family or an 
extended family depending on the context and the definition. In the Acholi lan-
guage, one can differentiate between “‘Ot’ (household), [which] means the small-
est family unit consisting of a man, wife (or wives) and their children” and “‘Paco 
dogola’ (family), [which] is a collection of two or more households who are related 
and headed by a family head” (Ker Kwaro, 2010b: 2). Some major issues can be 
discerned which are commonly discussed with regard to the household and Acholi 
social life:
the formation of the household through marriage•	
the household as economic unit•	
the household as a place and institution for the socialization of children.•	
In the ethnographic literature, the household is described as the smallest unit of 
Acholi social organization which was headed by an adult man. Girling (1960: 21f.) 
describes the typical formation of a household as follows: upon marriage, a wife 
was expected to move into her husband’s hut, whereby the union was not fully 
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acknowledged until the birth of the first child113 (cf. Nzita, 1997: 92). Marriage 
constituted a central criterion for both men and women to achieve their full status 
as adults (Onyango-Odongo & Webster, 1976: 209f.) and it followed culturally 
defined rules, which Girling (1960: 65ff.) has outlined in great detail114. Polygyny 
was allowed and considered as ideal among men. A man could increase his number 
of wives (and thus his status) through different forms of marriage and also through 
inheritance of wives from his father or brothers. According to the literature, ar-
ranged marriages comprised the most common form and required the payment of 
a brideprice by the family of the husband. Among my interlocutors, the question 
whether marriages in the past were arranged (and whether this meant that the mar-
riage partners had no free choice) was a matter of considerable debate. Most of them 
believed that the right to select a marriage partner had existed for both the man and 
the woman and was the most common basis for marriage. However, most acknowl-
edged that arranged forms of marriage or “forced marriage” had also occurred in 
the past, and still occurred in the rural areas today (personal conversation cf. field 
notes 14.03.2010; INT Okello, 26.09.2010).
The literature states that the amount and the form (cattle, goats, cash…) of 
the brideprice was to some extent determined by the overall economic situation 
and thus varied considerably over time. According to both Girling (1960: 72) and 
Schäfer (2008: 332) the obligation to pay brideprice and especially the monetariza-
tion of the brideprice in the course of the 20th century has always prevented men 
from poor families to marry women of higher status (for instance the daughter 
of a rwot ), or to marry polygamously. Atkinson (1994: 5) states that divorce was 
not uncommon in former times and in some cases involved the refunding of the 
brideprice to the man’s family (for a contrary depiction see Onyango-Odongo & 
Webster, 1976: 210).
According to the literature, often written from a functionalist perspective, the 
household served both social and economic purposes and was spatially arranged ac-
cordingly (Ocholla-Ayayo, 1980: 21ff.)115. Girling (1960: 25ff.; 61ff.) describes the 
‘normal’ household116 as a unit of production. All family members, i.e. father and 
mother as well as the children, when they reached a certain age, were involved in 
113 The Acholi are generally classified as a localized patrilineal descent group, although, as Finnström 
(2003: 56f.) points out, the principle of matrifocality is (inofficially) recognized in some instanc-
es. Girling (1960: 68) writes that patrilocal residence often proved difficult for the young women 
at first. They were treated as strangers with no rights and eyed with suspicion until the marriage 
and the birth of the first child. 
114 There have been recent attempts to codify these principles of Acholi marriage (cf. Ker Kwaro 
Acholi, 2010a/b). 
115 Ocholla-Ayayo (1980: 21) writes: “Housing has a close functional relationship to the habits of 
social organization and of the cultural system of the people. (…) This is represented in the layout 
of the positions of the houses in a village, or general patterns of settlement of the society”. 
116 In his chapter on the Acholi household, Girling (1960: Chap. 3) first describes a typical Acho-
li household and then mentions other types of households, for instance mature and immature 
households, royal households etc. 
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agricultural work which provided the main base for subsistence. A division of labor 
existed within each household and was gender-based. Men carried out the heavy ag-
ricultural work (such as clearing the fields), participated in hunts and were in charge 
of the protection of the household. Women were also involved in the cultivation of 
the fields and, furthermore, were responsible for raising the children and for other 
household tasks such as collecting and preparing food and fetching water and fire-
wood. In polygamous households, each woman had her own fields, granaries and a 
hut with her private belongings for which she was responsible (Girling, 1960: 27f.; 
Ocholla-Ayayo, 1980: 34f.). Inheritance of land and other important household 
belongings (cattle, for instance) followed patrilineal principles. Atkinson (1994: 5) 
writes that “apart from land, the rights to which were passed on equally to all sons, 
the eldest son was traditionally the designated heir of his father’s property, although 
he was supposed to provide for his younger brothers”. Wife inheritance among the 
Acholi, i.e. the inheritance of the wife of one’s deceased father or brother, is also 
described in the literature (Girling, 1960: 62ff.).
It is widely believed that in pre-colonial and pre-missionary times, the house-
hold was the main site for the socialization of children. According to the literature, 
differences along the lines of gender were of high relevance in Acholi society and 
played an important role throughout the whole process of socialization (Ocholla-
Ayayo, 1980: 37ff.; cf. Ssekamwa, 2000: 2f.). Atkinson (1994: 5) writes:
“Form early on, girls and boys learn gender-appropriate behaviours and ac-
tivities, and these are reflected in both their play and their chores and other 
responsibilities. Sons have traditionally learned about farming, hunting, 
herding, and lineage and chiefdom traditions from their fathers and other 
lineage males; girls learn farming and domestic duties from their mothers”.
Girling (1960: 22f.) describes sex-specific rituals which were already performed dur-
ing the birth ceremony. For example, the umbilical cord of the new-born baby was 
cut with an instrument specific to its sex: a spear or an arrow if the child was a boy 
and a piece of thatching grass if it was a girl. Furthermore, during the birth ceremo-
ny, the baby was encircled by articles it would need in his/her later working life as a 
man or as a woman. For girls, these articles included millet stirring sticks, grinding 
stones for making millet flour, a winnowing basket and a small waist knife. Typical 
boy-items included a hoe, spear and shield or a bow and arrow.
The descriptions of a “traditional household” by my interlocutors in many ways 
resembled the accounts in the literature. According to popular descriptions, an ideal 
Acholi household was made up of a polygamously extended family and headed 
by an adult man. His wives would each have their separate hut and fields, but in 
the evening everyone including the children would come together to eat and share 
educative stories at the fireplace, the wango-o (see below). As one of my interviewees 
described:
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“We used to have homesteads like that, so people in that homestead gather 
together, they eat together, the children are taught together, cultural activi-
ties, the fathers used to tell us riddles, short stories like that, and the stories 
would just have meanings…” (INT Okello, 26.09.2010).
Generally, it seemed that many of my interlocutors had a very ‘romanticized’ under-
standing of family relations in the past. Marriage relations were seen as more stable 
and the relationships between all household members – between men and women, 
parents and children and even between co-wives (although this was a matter of 
much debate117) – were described as harmonious. My interlocutors explained that 
this was because marriage partners were more carefully selected in the past. Accord-
ing to their accounts, marriage had formerly been a long procedure, in which sev-
eral meetings and negotiations between the families and clan members took place 
before a couple could get married and establish their own household. When asked 
whether marriages were forced in the past, older people usually stressed that they 
were not so much forced, but more embedded and controlled by the family and that 
young men and women could not just choose anyone as their marriage partner. I 
discussed this matter in an interview (INT Okello 26.09.2010) with Samuel (25) 
and his father Okello (in his late 70s):
Samuel: “What I understand is that a girl and a boy first, after meeting, 
they had to agree first before telling the parents, because you cannot tell the 
parents if there is no agreement (…) So after they had come into agreement, 
then the parents would come in. You cannot do it alone without the parents, 
so after telling your father, the father will go and negotiate”
Okello: “There was no forced marriage. It may take two or three years before 
the boy marries that girl, the whole process, because it goes very very slowly. 
It goes back to asking about the history of the clan: ‘How are they behav-
ing there? Are there people, who are also involved in killing people?’ – Ah, 
no no no, then I don’t like my daughter to go there. And these people: ‘Are 
they magicians? Do they have local herbs to kill people?’ – No no no no, my 
daughter cannot go there! The relatives can get all those stories. Only after 
understanding that things were good, that the clan was good – no misbe-
havior, no killing…– then they would say: ‘Yes, my daughter can go’. That is 
why all those marriages were fixed.”
As will be discussed in the next section, today, most living arrangements did not 
resemble the ideal homestead, neither in the village nor in town, and this point was 
often stressed by my interlocutors and linked to the time of displacement. There 
117 Some of my interlocutors claimed that relationships between co-wives had always been conflict-
ridden and that polygamous marriages were inherently conflictive (personal conversations cf. 
field notes 04.09.2010; 07.09.2010; 10.09.2010).
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was a general decline in polygamous marriages, and in most of the still-existing 
polygamous families (at least in town), the women and their respective children 
would not stay together, but would have separate residences. Often violent quarrels 
between the co-wives erupted (personal conversation, e.g. field notes 02.01.2011; cf. 
Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza (1999) for a general analysis of violence between co-wives 
in Uganda) and most of my interlocutors, who had grown up in polygamous fami-
lies told me that this type of marriage and co-residence was no longer working in an 
urban, ‘post-traditional’ society. The following quotation is typical:
“Currently life is not fine, because there are a lot of conflicts within the 
family, conflicts among the children and the elders, and especially in po-
lygamous marriages. So in the past, some children would be very happy and 
grow up with their stepmothers. Co-wives would just be very happy among 
themselves, because people would follow culture. Culture says it is very nor-
mal for a man to have multiple wives and the women should be in good 
terms. And elders would tell their children ‘your stepmother is just like your 
mother, so respect your stepmother the way you respect your mother.’ This 
is not the situation now, people don’t respect stepmothers, co-wives just fight 
all the time…” (elderly man, group interview Bobbi, 06.10.2010, translated 
from the Acholi original by John Omara).
Gender relations were often described as having been complementary in the past, 
and this was generally seen as something positive. While the normative model 
of Acholi masculinity (which has been analyzed by Dolan, 2002 and El-Bushra 
& Sahl, 2005), emphasizes and historically legitimates the subordinated role of 
women in Acholi society, my interlocutors – both men and women – took a more 
nuanced stance on this matter. They agreed that “traditional Acholi culture” dis-
criminated against women regarding some aspects such as inheritance laws, but 
some also stressed that women had had a better standing and more influence in the 
past than is generally acknowledged. A female interviewee, who was working in a 
project on gender-based violence conducted by Ker Kwaro Acholi, told me:
“Traditionally, women elders were there and played an important role in 
the traditional councils. Also, traditionally men had to consult their women 
when making decisions for the household. So for example if they wanted 
to sell a goat they had to ask the women and if they refused, they couldn’t 
sell the goat. Or if they sold it without a woman’s approval she might ap-
ply witchcraft and in many cases the men died or were injured. So in a 
way women were very powerful and respected in Acholi society” (INT SK, 
23.03.2010).
Another interviewee, Okello (INT 26.09.2010), explained:
“In the clan, these elderly women were also having status, some of them were 
called rwot okoro, or rwot mon – that is the head of the women in the clan. 
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They would be just put in charge of that one, so all the women would just 
respect one elderly woman there, who has the knowledge to teach the young 
ladies how to manage their affairs. So they have very big roles, and if there 
is anything, like marriage, women would have to be consulted first, because 
everything was controlled by women. Even if you have a small chicken like 
this, you can’t take the chicken without asking the woman, if she says no, it 
is no, you don’t force it. If it is a goat, the goat belongs to that woman, if she 
agrees, it can be slaughtered, or it can be taken as part of the dowry. Women 
were the ones who were controlling our wealth, even when those ordinary 
coins came, the money… Like cotton, we were growing cotton, if cotton is 
sold and the money is brought you give it to mummy, the mummy would 
know how to keep it, keep it in a small pot there, put it in the ground, hide 
it and seal it well. Money was not taken to the bank, because they fear men 
could go hunting and they can be killed, so the wealth would be lost, so if 
the woman keeps it there at home… So that was their biggest role – control 
of money was on women.”
The same interviewee stressed that “traditional Acholi society” was much more gen-
der equal than today, despite all the recent talk of women’s rights in Uganda:
“Many of the men of these days are not familiar with the knowledge our big-
ger parents were giving at the wango-o, so they tend to deprive the women, 
they say ‘ah, this mere woman, how can you keep my money, no I keep the 
money myself…’ Then they go drinking, they spend it and say: ‘I am the one 
who married you, how can you come across and say you are the manager of 
my property’…” (INT Okello, 26.09.2010).
The gendered division of labor and learning was often referred to when people 
talked about Acholi family life. Akello once told me that even at school they were 
taught “what girls and boys are supposed to do in Acholi culture”. In history classes, 
they learned how in the past Acholi girls would be taught how to behave respect-
fully and be good housewives, while boys would learn how to control a family well 
(field notes 28.10.2010). My interlocutors always stressed that in the past gendered 
learning also took place at the wango-o, the fireplace, where everyone gathered in 
the evening. In the words of one interviewee: “Initially, just from the wango-o, girls 
and boys would be told their roles. So they would stick to their roles, from boyhood 
to manhood, from girlhood to womanhood” (participant in the group interview in 
Bobbi, 06.10.2010, translated from the Acholi original by John Omara).
In fact, the wango-o was the single most important aspect people mentioned 
when talking about the household or homestead “in those days”. I always asked my 
slightly older interlocutors whether they themselves had ever experienced the wan-
go-o when they were young – and those who had always remembered it with much 
nostalgia. Samuel (25 at the time of the conversation), for instance, reminisced:
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“I remember that when I was very young and still in the village there used to 
be a wango-o every night and that it was so beautiful. The children used to 
sit in one circle around the fire surrounded by the adults so they wouldn’t get 
cold. Then the elders would tell educative stories. (…) The best stories would 
always come from the hunters – about how they had to perform certain ritu-
als when they killed a lion or a leopard, how they protected themselves from 
wild animals, how there were different types of hunting, mainly in the dry 
season and how it was mainly young men but sometimes also women who 
would go for hunting. I never went hunting because I left the village, when 
I was still young, about six years, in 1989, and then grew up in town. Today 
hunting is banned in many areas in order to protect the wildlife for tourists” 
(field notes 10.05.2012, my interpretation of exact wording).
Interestingly, in the older ethnographic literature the wango-o is only mentioned 
briefly, if at all. Girling (1960: 45), who conducted his fieldwork in the 1950s, writes 
that “the wang-o (…) is found more rarely today. But it was at one time a feature of 
every hamlet, and all the authorities from Baker onwards have mentioned it.” How-
ever, in recent attempts to ‘rebuild’ Acholi culture the wango-o has been singled 
out as the “foundation of Luo culture and family values” as has been described by 
Cagney (2011: 22). She also states that
“Wang’oo is already being used by various Ugandan and non-Ugandan or-
ganizations in the community setting, and they are also adopting the con-
cept for use in rehabilitation and community centers. (…) With the myriad 
of social restructuring, hybridizations, and tension amongst social groups, 
fully reviving wang’oo can be a very powerful tool, as it opens up a safe space 
for dialogue in which communities can discuss their traditions, their issues, 
and their reactions to globalization’s effects on their communities” (ibid.: 
53).
While my interlocutors talked about many different aspects of “traditional Acholi 
culture” in “those days” with much nostalgia, the mutual solidarity inherent in 
Acholi family and social life, symbolically represented by the wango-o, was among 
the things most positively remembered. The perceived loss of this communal life 
was always mentioned when people discussed socio-cultural changes in Acholiland 
as will be further analyzed below.
Economic System4.3.4. 
The ethnographic literature states that in pre-colonial times the Acholi relied on a 
mixed economy. Subsistence farming was complemented by large dry-season hunts, 
the gathering of wild foods and the tending of small stock. Home-grown staple 
foods included millet, sesame, sweet potatoes, ground nuts, cassava, peas, beans 
and maize (Girling, 1960: 16; Atkinson, 1989: 20f.; Nzita, 1997: 96). Furthermore, 
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ironworking is mentioned by different authors as an ancient profession among the 
Acholi for which they were well-known (Girling, 1960: 17f.; Atkinson, 1994: 4). 
According to the literature, the Acholi relied largely on their own subsistence until 
the 1920s, when the British colonial administration introduced money as a form 
of payment and cotton as a cash crop to be grown for the exchange economy. Pre-
colonial trade focused mainly on obtaining iron ore and later, in the late 19th century, 
also on ivory, slaves and cattle (Girling, 1960: 16f.; 190ff.; Atkinson, 1994: 4).
There is some debate regarding the importance of cattle in the Acholi economic 
system. While many authors (for instance Ocholla-Ayayo, 1980: 31ff.) assume that 
all Luo are principally pastoralists, Atkinson (1989: 21; 1999: 61f.; cf. also On-
yango-Odongo & Webster, 1976: 212f.) states that among the Acholi cattle seem 
to have been a significant economic and occupational factor only for those groups 
living in the dry areas in the East and in the North of Acholiland118. However, as 
will be discussed below, in popular recollections of “those days”, cattle are always 
mentioned as a very important form of economic and symbolic capital as they con-
stituted a central part of the brideprice (cf. Girling, 1960: 71f.).
According to the literature, a low diversification of the early economic system 
of the Acholi accounted (among other things) for a low stratification of Acholi 
society. Mamdani (1976: 21) states: “The relations of production under the com-
munal mode of production were cooperative, not antagonistic. (…) This was a poor 
and fundamentally egalitarian society. Material distinctions between families were 
of little importance.”
Ethnographic sources describe that land rights were vested in localized patri-
lineages, which assigned small patches of land to each household. Everyone was 
required to help in the cultivation of the fields. Therefore, working parties (awak) 
were formed. Only the rwot was exempted from communal work. To him all mem-
bers of his domain had to pay customary tribute in form of agricultural labor (At-
kinson, 1994: 4; Girling, 1960: 21).
Girling (1960: 174ff.) analyzes how the organization of labor gradually changed 
after the arrival of the British colonizers. More and more land was privately owned 
and working groups were no longer organized among kin. Instead of relying on a 
system of mutual support and communal labor, wealthy Acholi started to pay work-
ers to cultivate their land (cf. Mamdani, 1976: 133f.).
When people today talk about economic life in “those days”, they usually re-
member it with great nostalgia. The past is envisioned as a time of economic pros-
perity, when every household had fertile land and was able to harvest enough to 
feed the family. “Digging”, i.e. cultivating the fields, is still seen by many as the 
embodiment of “traditional” Acholi identity and lifestyle. Most of my interlocutors 
described the Acholi of the past as proud, successful and responsible farmers, as in 
the following quote by Innocent, a university graduate:
118 He speculates that this may be due to the heavy tsetse fly infestation in large parts of Acho-
liland.
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“In those days, people were more responsible and it was the prime aim of 
everybody to ensure food security and make a good living for the family. The 
men would try very hard to take good care of their wives and children and no 
one had to go hungry because people were really committed to digging in the 
gardens” (field notes 05.05.2010, my interpretation of exact wording).
While farming was by far the most important occupation attributed to the Acholi, 
other economic activities like dry season hunts and animal rearing were also men-
tioned frequently by my interlocutors. The widespread prevalence and important 
role of cattle were often emphasized as in the following two quotations:
“Our fathers were having hundreds of heads of cattle, the land was vast…” 
(INT Okello, 26.09.2010).
“Acholi were rich in the past – so every household had at least some goats 
and cattle so boys would also learn to take care of them” (male elder, group 
interview Kapedopong 28.06.2010, translated from the Acholi original by 
Kenneth Oyet Odong).
In a similar fashion, my interlocutors often reminisced about the economic suc-
cess of past days which enabled men to marry many women, while today many 
struggled to pay the brideprice for just one woman, as in the following quotations:
“Polygamism was rampant in the past, because people could dig, you could 
even have ten wives, so you give them gardens, they can dig on their own, 
they can look for food. Not like these days whereby people depend on the 
salaries. You depend on a salary from only one point – how can you serve ten 
women?” (Samuel, INT Okello, 26.09.201)
“Long time ago, people kept cattle, so if it comes to [brideprice] payment 
you just pick cattle from your Kraal, then you go and pay” (INT Henry & 
Bangi, 27.04.2010).
Economic activity in the past was described as a communal task, which served 
to unite the people who lived close to each other, and some of my interlocutors 
lamented that the communitarian spirit of past days had disappeared in today’s 
society. The following quotations are good examples:
“People used to live a communal life in the villages, share many good things, 
a lot of animals…There are changes, so that those things are no longer there. 
(…) Now that poverty has come, everyone is only for himself and for the 
family” (INT Ojara, 17.03.2010).
“We used to have community work, we call it awak – that is community 
work. One day, everybody, all the men, go to serve in his garden, so if we 
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have 40 men, we can work on two gardens in one day, finish it all for you. 
Then the next day for me and my wife, the next day for him [points to Samu-
el, who is sitting next to us]. So everybody will have the same garden. In time 
of weeding – do it together, rotating; during harvesting – also rotating like 
that. So food is harvested and put in the granary, everybody must have five 
granaries, so we all have enough food. How can you quarrel now? You want 
simsim [local term for sesame] – you go and get it from the granary. So there 
was peacefulness in the family…” (INT Okello, 26.09.2010).
One interviewee, who was working for SPRING (Stability, Peace and Reconcilia-
tion in Northern Uganda), a development program, told me about a project which 
aimed to revive (the knowledge about) communal farming and storage of past days. 
He explained:
“In those days the Acholi used to farm together. This is why the project is a 
little bit unique – people get interested in knowing the old old things (…) 
We decided to produce a corporative bilo for this farmer’s group (…) People 
used to dig together during the old days, it is a communal type of farming, 
now when you look at the cover of the bilo itself, it talks about those old days 
and how the Acholi used to farm (…) So when people look at it, they say ‘this 
is part of the culture”, so they tend to respect it (…) and they start mutual 
respect between the farmer’s groups…” (INT Mike, 23.03.2010).
In Acholiland today, farming is still considered an important economic activity 
even for those employed in the monetary economy. Most people in town either 
have a small patch of land close to their homes or larger plots of land in their home 
villages which they use to cultivate different food crops for their own consump-
tion. During my research, children and youth often told me that they spend their 
school holidays in the village to help their families with farming. Some youths even 
managed to pay their school fees by selling part of what they harvested from the 
fields in the local markets (INT Ajoka, 08.05.2010). Most young people in town, 
however, could not imagine relocating to a village to start a life as farmers. As one 
of my interviewees put it:
“I don’t fit in a village, because – what I want in life is not there in the vil-
lage. The village is fit for the farmers. Well, for me I don’t look like somebody 
who can hold a hoe, for me to survive I use my head, I don’t use much of my 
energy…” (INT Joseph, 14.12.2010).
Although a complete change to a lifestyle as farmers was not an option for the ma-
jority of my urban interlocutors, farming was still seen by many as the embodiment 
of Acholi identity and one of the most characteristic elements of Acholi culture.
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Religious & Spiritual Beliefs4.3.5. 
Much has been written about Acholi religious and spiritual beliefs, especially due 
to the emergence of different ‘spiritual’ (military) movements in the 1980s, which 
gained international prominence due to their ‘spectacular’ resistance against the 
new NRM government. The Holy Spirit Mobile Forces founded by Alice Auma at 
the beginning of the war in Northern Uganda are probably the most well-known 
of these (cf. Chap. 3). In my summary of the ethnographic literature, I will only 
recapitulate the most commonly mentioned and important aspects of Acholi spiri-
tual life.
According to ethnographic accounts, the Acholi believe in several different spir-
its, usually referred to by the term jok ( pl. jogi ), which can take possession of ani-
mals and humans and which live in the wilderness, i.e. in mountains, rivers and 
lakes (Behrend, 1993: 120; cf. Okot p’Bitek, 1980: 71 cited in Behrend, 1993: 120; 
Girling, 1960: 80f.). Atkinson (1994: 6) differentiates between three types of spirits: 
the spirits of known relatives, mainly lineage ancestors, non-ancestral spirits related 
to a chiefdom, and spirits of unknown persons and dangerous beasts. While the two 
former are described as beneficial spirits, which bring health and fertility, the latter 
are classified as hostile spirits, which cause sickness and misfortune and are dealt 
with through processes of spirit possession.
Behrend (1999: 22) depicts the power of jok as deeply ambivalent and explains:
“It could be used for good and bad purposes, for healing, and for killing. 
Thus, in precolonial times, the chief (…) would use the power of the chief-
dom jok to advance the well-being and the fertility of the land and its people. 
However, he would use the same power to wage a war against a neighboring 
chiefdom. The chiefdom jogi were guardians of the moral order. A more or 
less immoral state of society would make them angry and would result in 
their sending social or natural catastrophes. Thus the jogi were held responsi-
ble for misfortune and catastrophes which hit the chiefdom and, at the same 
time, were a power against them.”
Atkinson (1994: 6) portrays different religious specialists among the Acholi. Lin-
eage heads and elders were most knowledgeable about spiritual matters and there-
fore most involved with the spirits. Spirit mediums (ajwaka) who used their spiritual 
powers for the general good could be consulted in cases of sickness or disaster. By 
contrast, witches and sorcerers worked for evil and destructive purposes (cf. Beh-
rend, 1991; 1993: 127f.; 1995; 1999; Onyango-Odongo & Webster, 1976: 211f.).
Different ceremonies, associated for instance with birth, death, harvest or hunt-
ing, which served to worship and appease the spirits, are commonly mentioned 
in the literature. During these public events, small offerings were provided to the 
spirits at the ancestral shrines (abila), so that they would exercise their power to fight 
evil spirits which could negatively influence the planned events (Atkinson, 1994: 6; 
Nzita, 1997: 92f.; Behrend, 1993: 121ff.).
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Behrend (1993: 123ff.; 1999: 22f.) has analyzed how in the course of history, and 
especially due to political developments since the end of the 19th century (e.g. the 
arrival of the British, the increase in local warfare, the war in Acholiland) several 
new spirits appeared among the Acholi, which she labels “free jogi ” (Behrend, 1995: 
55; 1993: 123ff.). She proposes that in this way external influences and contacts 
with foreigners were incorporated into the local cosmology and mythology:
“Zu Beginn der Kolonialzeit, aber vielleicht auch schon davor, erschien 
eine Anzahl neuer Geister in Acholi, die von außerhalb des Landes kamen. 
Diese waren mit Attributen ethnischer Fremdheit versehen, die bestimmte 
Erfahrungen der Acholi in dieser Zeit zu Hypostasen verdichteten. Anhand 
der Bilder, die die Geister entwarfen, ließe sich eine Geschichte der Fremder-
fahrungen aus der Perspektive der Acholi rekonstruieren.”119
The first Christian missionaries arrived in Northern Uganda in the context of the 
insetting colonialism at the end of the 19th century (Ssekamwa, 2000: 27ff.)120. Ac-
cording to Behrend (1993: 129f.) the missionaries were met with scepticism at first, 
among other things because the local people regarded them as collaborators of the 
colonial administrators, especially since they supported the collection of taxes and 
exerted influence on the local political administration. However, as in many other 
African contexts, the missionaries were the first to instate formal education which 
quickly gained importance among the local population. Up until the 1950s, more 
and more Acholi joined one of the Christian churches. Behrend (1993: 128ff.; 168f.) 
asserts, however, that Christianity did not completely supplant local spiritual be-
liefs, but rather that elements of both systems of belief were combined or coexisted 
(cf. Girling, 1960: 187).
During my time in Gulu, I did not conduct any systematic research on religious 
and spiritual beliefs among the Acholi121, although the topic often came up in dis-
cussions of cultural practices which had been forbidden by the Christian churches. 
Most of my interlocutors were members of a Christian congregation (i.e. Roman 
119 “At the beginning of British colonial rule, or maybe even before, several new ghosts appeared in 
Acholi, which came from outside the country. These were associated with ‘foreignness’, and they 
reflected certain experiences of the Acholi during this time (‘hypostasis’). Based on the images of 
these ghosts one could reconstruct the experiences of foreign influences throughout history from 
an Acholi perspective” (Translation J.V.).
120 Ssekamwa (2000: 29ff.) describes that the Muslim Arab traders also tried to spread their faith 
through the establishment of educational institutions, and that subsequently severe conflicts 
erupted between Muslims and Christians in Uganda. These conflicts about religious and educa-
tional hegemony, however, were centered in the Buganda region and revolved around who would 
gain influence over the Kabaka and his followers. The ethnographic literature does not mention 
any substantial Islamic influence on Acholi beliefs. Some recent writings discuss the existence of 
Islamic influences within Joseph Kony’s LRA (cf. e.g. Doom & Vlassenroot, 1999: 25ff.).
121 In fact, I tried to avoid the topic, because I did not want to discuss my own religious convictions. 
People, especially those with strong religious convictions, often expressed surprise and irritation 
when I admitted to them that I was not a member of any Christian church or other faith group.
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Catholic, Protestant or one of the many Pentecostal churches)122. While some of 
them actively practiced and ‘preached’ their religion, others did not actively follow 
religious traditions at all, although they asserted that their religious association was 
an important part of their identity. When I asked about Acholi spiritual beliefs and 
practices, many people were quite ambivalent. At first, they usually emphasized 
that “traditional beliefs” were an outdated idea which had been practiced by former 
generations but were no longer applicable today because they had been ousted by 
Christianity. This interpretation is reflected in the following quote by a male inter-
viewee (20 at the time of the interview):
“They used to have a very local generation, because…, maybe I start with 
their belief: Their belief was not on the issue of God or maybe Allah or 
whatever, but they used to believe in things like big mountains and hills or 
big trees. They believed that their ancestors had gone there, that their spirits 
hung around that place. So when they want to beg for rain, maybe when the 
rain has delayed, they go there, beg for it, pray, pray over the big mountains. 
They say the ancestor has gone with the rain. If they ask them, then they will 
bring the rain, they go, celebrate the thing, maybe they slaughter [an animal 
for sacrifice] and do many things… Their culture was quite different from 
ours. Nowadays, things like funeral rites, it is not done nowadays due to this 
idea of Christianity. They [Christians] take it as a bad act nowadays, if you 
do it…” (INT Nura, 21.04.2010).
However, many of my interlocutors also expressed uncertainty when I asked them 
whether they believed in jok. Some tried to avoid the topic, others acknowledged 
that there could be something like spiritual powers, and admitted that there had 
been situations in their lives, where they had felt the power of jok (personal con-
versations cf. field notes 09.10.2012; 07.09.2010; 15.08.2010; group interview Bun-
gutera, 03.10.2010). It seemed that some of my interlocutors could integrate their 
acknowledgment of jok with their Christian beliefs, while others, especially those, 
who were very active church members, were radically opposed to everything con-
nected with ‘traditional religion’ and the idea of jok. The following is an extract 
from my field notes about a conversation I had with a pastor of a Seventh Day 
Adventist Church in Palabek:
“We also briefly talk about jok as he tells me about the mountains near Palabek 
which mark the border to Sudan. I ask him whether people go there to make 
sacrifices to the ancestors. At first he seems a bit reluctant to talk about this issue. 
He says that he isn’t sure whether people go to these mountains here, but that 
there are certainly mountain places where people, who believe in jogi, go. Then he 
says that he as a Christian does not believe in these things and that he sometimes 
122 Islam is also present in Acholiland, and – according to popular perception (personal conversation 
cf. field notes 28.10.2010) – the number of Muslims is on the rise. However, none of my closer 
interlocutors was a Muslim.
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has trouble with other people because of that. He gives an example: his wife had 
twins three times and each time people would tell him that they should perform 
the twin ritual. Each time he refused. He says he also doesn’t make sacrifices to 
the shrine and that he opposes the practice of traditional funeral rites, which is 
still widespread. He adds that nowadays most people accept his behavior…” (field 
notes 20.12.2012).
Funeral rites and the ritual performed to celebrate the birth of twins123 were the 
most common examples of spiritual practices mentioned by my interlocutors (per-
sonal conversations cf. field notes 23.08.2010; 07.09.2010). People often stressed 
that these practices had been forbidden by the Christian churches, whereby some 
felt that this was a good thing, while others lamented that it contributed to the ero-
sion of “traditional culture” (cf. e.g. group interview Pabbo, 23.10.2010). Sometimes 
my interlocutors also mentioned that they feared the spirits of the dead, especially 
of those who had died during the war and who had not been buried properly, when 
I asked them about spiritual beliefs. The following is an extract from an interview 
in which this subject is discussed:
“Samuel: The belief [in spirits] is still there (…) Do you hear about what 
NUTI [Northern Ugandan Transition Initiative – a peace-build-
ing program by USAID] is doing? They are reburying, they are 
collecting the bones [of the dead]…
Okello: They are exhuming the dead which were not buried, they slaughter 
goats, they rebury it [the bodies] again, do the necessary part…
Samuel: And they also still do sacrifices to the hills, they sacrifice things…
Okello: Because, especially during the time when people were beginning to 
go back home, when they go to certain places where they had been 
[before the war], where their ancestors had been, people get mad, 
they shout… The ghosts would just come and scare people…
Samuel: … when you are digging in the gardens, you can hear very many 
soldiers singing, but you cannot see them…
123 Nzita (1997: 92f.) states that the Acholi attributed any “abnormal” birth to the gods, and twins 
constituted the most common form of abnormal or godly births. Thus, when twins were born, 
various ceremonies were conducted. My interlocutors explained to me that these rituals are per-
formed to honor the twins and the parents because people believe twins have supernatural pow-
ers and thus must be honored and appeased. They also pointed out that the Acholi believe that 
without the rituals the twins may die or have a bad life (field notes 07.09.2010; 23.08.2010).
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Okello: … or at times you hear guns – bumbumbum – people get scared, 
they run, although you don’t see anything… So that spirit – you 
know it is there. So the Paramount chief is going to places like 
that, giving sacrifices to certain mountains, in certain hilly places, 
to just cool things…
Samuel: But the belief is there!
J.V.: So is that what you call cen124?
Okello and Samuel: Yes, cen!”
(INT Okello, 26.09.2010).
To conclude, one can say that knowledge about jok and certain spiritual practic-
es are still widespread in Gulu even among the younger generation. However, it 
seemed to me that in public most Acholi, at least those living in the urban centers, 
only disclose their association with one of the ‘official religions’, which they regard 
as an important part of their identity. The belief in jok is rarely discussed in public, 
and when I directly confronted people with the topic, many of my interlocutors 
expressed quite ambiguous attitudes towards Acholi spiritual beliefs. Thus, while 
the supposed decline of ‘traditional’ social and economic practices is bemoaned by 
many, the perceived fading of ‘traditional beliefs’ is regarded with greater ambiva-
lence.
External Influences & Socio-Cultural Changes before the War4.3.6. 
All the ethnographic accounts I consulted acknowledged that Acholi culture was 
by no means static and had undergone substantial shifts over the course of the past 
centuries – through migrations, internal dynamics, but most importantly through 
contacts with foreigners and external influences.
The first major external impacts, which have been extensively documented in 
the literature, occurred in Acholiland in the middle of the 19th century through the 
slave and ivory trade. Acholiland was positioned in the middle of two large trading 
systems – Zansibar in the South and Egypt/Sudan in the North – which both at-
tempted to control the slave and ivory trade on the East African coast. According 
to Mamdani (1976: 20), the kingdoms in the South of Uganda were able to con-
trol and profit from the trade to some degree, while the peoples in the North were 
fundamentally exploited as slaves, and cattle and ivory were raided from them on a 
large scale (cf. also Onyango-Odongo & Webster, 1976: 163). Girling (1960: 131) 
124 According to Finnström (2008: 159ff.), cen are the spirits of people, who died violently (cf. Beh-
rend, 1993: 124f.).
“Our Culture is getting lost!” – Pre- & Post-War Representations of Acholi Culture   145
states that by the mid-1860s most of the Acholi cattle had disappeared. Atkinson 
(1989: 35), however, maintains that the Acholi suffered to a lesser degree from these 
raids than their neighbouring ethnic groups and even assisted the foreign invaders. 
According to Girling (1960: 131), the interests of the Arabic speaking traders were 
mainly economic, therefore neither the traders form the North nor those from the 
South tried to gain direct political control of the area and thus interfered relatively 
little in the political organization of the Acholi.
Coastal trading is seen to have caused major changes in the relationships be-
tween different Acholi groups. Atkinson (1994: 6) states that the introduction of 
small firearms and attempts by different Acholi domains to profit from the trade led 
to a massive increase of cattle raids and a drastic intensification of local conflicts. 
Behrend (1993: 26) speaks of an insetting endemic war in the North which lasted 
until the arrival of the British colonial power at the end of the 19th century (cf. 
Onyango-Odongo & Webster, 1976: 164ff.). Crazzolara (1951: 239ff.) and Girling 
(1960: 129ff.) have furthermore described how the loss of Acholi cattle resulted in 
changes in the economic and social system of many Acholi groups. The bridewealth, 
for example, could no longer be paid in cattle and thus had to be paid in goats.
According to the literature, the first contacts with Europeans also occurred dur-
ing the 1860s when different European explorers led expeditions into North East 
Africa. The two most important of these were the Englishmen Samuel Baker and 
Isaak Eduard Schnitzer, a German known as “Emin Pasha”. Both occupied the post 
of governor-general of the Equatorial Nile Basin – Baker from 1869 till 1874 and 
Emin Pasha from 1878 till 1889. They were installed in this office by the Khedive 
Ismail of Egypt (pressured by England) with the order to abolish slavery and es-
tablish a system of regular commerce in the area (Girling, 1960: 135ff.). Although 
both recognized the local Acholi chiefs and did not interfere with their powers, 
they adhered to racist ideas and used massive violence against the local population 
in the pursuit of raw materials, new markets and the ‘civilizing project’ as has been 
discussed by Finnström (2008: 55ff.). Atkinson (1989: 36) argues that through the 
contacts with the Arabic-speaking traders and the European explorers new forms of 
wealth were introduced in Acholiland, which for the first time led to a significant 
social stratification of Acholi society and caused effects which were felt in the social, 
economic and political spheres. He explains that
“the most important feature [of this new wealth] was its extremely unequal 
distribution in Acholi society. The main beneficiaries belonged to one of two 
categories: the rwodi and the interpreters for the outsiders (…) The inequality 
in the distribution of new wealth took on special importance because for the 
first time in Acholi significant amounts of wealth began to be accumulated 
over time” (ibid.).
1884 marked the beginning of the British Protectorate in Uganda, whereby Acho-
liland was only annexed in 1898. The colonial rule by the British is seen to have 
brought massive changes to the political and social organization of the Acholi al-
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though, as Atkinson (1989: 20) points out, one must bear in mind that there is an 
inherent “danger” in the “tendency [of many authors] to divide sharply the pre-
colonial and colonial pasts, [and] to focus on the unique and discontinuous rather 
than the many patterns and processes of change that link and overlap the two 
periods”. In the following, I will only briefly mention some examples of colonial 
influences on Acholi lifestyle and cultural practices, which are commonly cited in 
the literature.
Girling (1960: 84f.; 107ff.; 195ff.) analyses the changes in the political sphere. 
He states that instead of relying on the local lineage heads and rwodi, whom the 
colonial administration found unsuitable for collaboration, the British installed 
“County chiefs” who were responsible for collecting taxes and organizing commu-
nal labour. According to Girling (1960: 201f.), this policy eventually led to a dis-
integration of the different subgroups throughout Acholiland and the importance 
of organizing in lineages and domains decreased. Furthermore, he states that the 
assignment of new political leaders through the British disrupted local power struc-
tures and led to a change of hierarchies among men. Elders lost some of their former 
authority whereas young men could use the new opportunities provided to them 
through access to education and jobs in the cash economy to access more influential 
positions in the colonial administration (Girling, 1960: 188f.).
As already mentioned above, the colonial administration is also seen to have 
caused massive changes in the local economic organization, mainly through the 
monetization of the economy and the introduction of cotton as a cash crop. Girling 
(1960: 176) describes how the local population, who formerly relied on subsistence 
farming, was forced to cultivate cotton in order to be able to pay taxes. Mamdani 
(1976: 133f.) emphasises that for the same reason, the colonial state encouraged 
labour migration of Northerners to the South where the main economic develop-
ments were centred.
The changes in the political and economic order are also seen to have affected 
other parts of Acholi culture. Girling (1960: 89ff.) analyses that the former coop-
eration in the organization of agricultural labour, including the customary tribute 
for the rwot, was no longer practiced. Instead, wealthy families with a lot of land 
paid workers to cultivate it and thus supported the colonial system of wage labour. 
Poorer families formed private working cooperatives which were no longer based on 
kinship.
According to Schäfer (2008: 332), Girling (1960: 174–195), Dolan (2002: 63f.) 
and El-Bushra & Sahl (2005: 14ff.), British colonial rule brought some alterations 
of gender and generational relations among the Acholi. They attribute these to dif-
ferent factors. Changes in the labour organization forced several men to migrate 
to and work in Southern Uganda, so that they could no longer fulfil their roles as 
household heads and lost their political influence in the community. Subordination 
to the colonial administrators made Acholi men feel incapacitated, and racist stereo-
types picturing Northerners as primitive and backward in comparison with people 
from Southern Uganda destroyed the collective self-esteem and self-respect espe-
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cially of Acholi men. Property rights changed, more property was privately owned 
and women and youth had more chances of accumulating own property. The in-
troduction of Christianity and the influence of the missionaries established new 
moral standards among some Acholi groups and led, for instance, to an increase in 
monogamous households. Access to education provided to some Acholi by the mis-
sionaries increased the stratification in the Acholi society along educational lines.
All in all, when judging from the accounts in the literature, it seems that societal 
conflicts, especially along the lines of age, gender and socioeconomic status increased 
in Acholi society after the first major contacts with foreign regimes and especially 
after the inset of colonial rule. Interestingly, the wide-ranging changes attributed to 
external ‘invaders’ before the 1980s in the ethnographic literature were not a topic 
of much debate among my interlocutors. The negative (and positive) influences of 
British colonialism were sometimes mentioned, but generally it seemed to me that 
in contemporary discourses the major reason for changes in “traditional culture” 
were ascribed to the recent war and the forced displacement of the majority of the 
Acholi population by the NRM government. This discourse on the war-related loss 
of Acholi culture will be discussed in greater details in the next section. A further 
(and related) reason for the change and loss of Acholi culture was seen in “western-
izing” and “neo-colonial” influences (cf. Vorhölter, 2012), which will be further 
discussed in chapter 6.
The Situation in the Camps & the Perceived Effects on 4.4. 
Acholi Culture
In the discourses on loss of Acholi culture and socio-cultural change a key role is 
attributed to the displacement situation. I will briefly recapitulate the most impor-
tant key data on the displacement situation which I already summarized in the 
introduction.
In the years between 1996 and 2006 an estimated 1.8 million125 people in North-
ern Uganda – in Gulu District over 90 percent of the population – were forcibly dis-
placed into huge refugee camps, commonly known as IDP camps, by the Ugandan 
government allegedly to protect the people from the LRA attacks in the villages. The 
Acholi of whom the majority had before lived in rural homesteads and villages were 
coerced, often with military force by the UPDF, to leave their local villages and re-
settle in camps which were established around local trading centers. Branch (2011: 
92) describes the formation of the camps in September 1996 as follows:
125 Estimates vary between one million and 1.8 million displaced people (Branch, 2011; RLP, 2004: 
21ff.; OCHA, 2006; IDMC, 2010). For more details on the formation and development of the 
camps as well as data on the increasing numbers of refugees cf. Dolan (2009: 109ff.).
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“The UPDF drove hundreds of thousands of Acholi peasants out of their vil-
lages and into camps through a campaign of intimidation, murder, torture, 
and bombing and burning entire villages (…). After the formation of the 
camps, the UPDF announced that anyone found outside of the camps would 
be considered a rebel and killed.”
Dolan (2009) has depicted the situation in the camps as a form of “social torture”, 
involving fundamental violations of human rights, humiliation and cultural and 
economic debilitation of the Acholi refugees. According to him and others, the situ-
ation in the camps caused more suffering and more fatalities than the actual war. 
Branch (2011: 92; cf. Finnström, 2008: 133) cites statistics according to which the 
excess mortality levels in the camps reached 1,000 per week – due to diseases, epi-
demics and lack of access to health care (Dolan, 2009: 139ff.), rapidly rising HIV/
AIDS infection rates (ibid.: 178ff.), killings by the LRA or UPDF126, and suicides 
committed out of despair (ibid.: 165f.; 207ff.). Contrary to the proclaimed protec-
tion the camps were to provide to the displaced, they seem to have lacked every-
thing necessary for a humane livelihood: sufficient and nutritious food, proper liv-
ing space, and physical protection, which the UPDF failed to provide (ibid.: 144ff.). 
A commonly stated claim is that over night, a whole people, who had formerly been 
independent subsistence farmers, became dependent on food and relief aid by the 
World Food Program and other international NGOs (ibid.: 124ff.; cf. also Branch, 
2012).
Most of the people who did not move to the camps – usually those who had 
better financial means and/or relatives in town – moved to urban centers like Gulu 
and Kitgum as has been analyzed by Branch (2008; cf. introduction). The most 
fortunate and economically well-off Acholi left Northern Uganda altogether and 
moved either to the Ugandan capital, Kampala, or abroad127. Due to the experience 
of forced displacement and the subsequent radical change of social, cultural and 
economic practices and routines, Acholi, particularly those in the camps but also 
those in town, increasingly perceived the war situation as a situation of ‘cultural 
breakdown’.
To this day, a frequently voiced claim, especially among the older generations, is 
that Acholi culture has been lost due to the war and its social consequences, and that 
126 It was not always clear whether attacks on the camps had been committed by the LRA or the 
UPDF. Dolan (2009: 147ff.) refers to attacks on the camp inhabitants by government soldiers 
disguised as LRA rebels. Furthermore, the UPDF is accused of being indirectly responsible for 
many deaths, for instance because it encouraged the civilian population to form “Local Defense 
Units” to counter attacks by the LRA rebels. The badly armed groups became major targets of the 
LRA who accused them of betrayal and killed several LDU members in revenge (Behrend, 1993: 
196ff.; 213ff.; El-Bushra & Sahl, 2005: 19f.; Finnström, 2003: Chap. 3&5; 2005: 99f.; ICC, 
2004: 4ff.).
127 Parts of the large Acholi diaspora later played a prominent role in the peace negotiations with the 
LRA (Westbrook, 2000: 4; Poblicks, 2002).
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Acholi society is experiencing a profound “moral degeneration”. In discourses about 
the war and the displacement situation the IDP camps have come to symbolically 
represent the loss of Acholi culture. Like nothing else they stand for a total change 
in lifestyle, values and social relations, and for a prolonged period of foreign occupa-
tion. A report by the Refugee Law Project describes the discourse on displacement 
as follows:
“[T]he impact of displacement (…) is seen to have eroded the very roots of 
Acholi culture. (…) There was frequent reference to the fact that cultural 
taboos were being broken by families having to live close together, and that 
social support networks within the society were being eroded. As a local 
businessman commented, ‘We grew up with dignity. These children are not 
growing up as true Acholis. Our culture is being destroyed completely. The 
children won’t know about seasons and agriculture’. A religious leader sum-
marised the impression of humiliation that came through so tangibly in dis-
cussions about displacement: ‘This community is destroyed because the cul-
ture has gone. What is a community without a culture? There is no privacy, 
no morality in the camps. Children die very young. (…) The whole future of 
Acholi people is at stake, and this will also cause problems throughout the 
country’” (RLP, 2004: 26).
There has been extensive research on the situation in the camps and the changes in 
formerly established social, cultural and economic practices it assumingly caused. 
This literature not only documents but contributes to reinforcing the discourse that 
Acholi culture has been lost as a result of the camp interregnum.
Most of the camps had already been closed when I started my research in North-
ern Uganda. Thus, my own data only refers to the narratives I encountered about 
the camp situation. Furthermore, since most of my interlocutors had been displaced 
from their original villages to Gulu Town and had thus spent the war years there, 
I only rarely collected personal accounts of camp life. Notable exceptions were the 
group interviews I conducted in the rural areas outside Gulu Town (cf. group inter-
views Bobbi, 06.10.2010; Bungutera, 03.10.2010; Wii Aweng, 26.09.2010; Kape-
dopong 28.06.2010, Pabbo 23.10.2010; Paicho 17.10.2010). All of the groups I 
spoke to had stayed in the camps, most of them over many years, and had only 
recently resettled in their original villages.
In order for the reader to understand the importance of the camp interregnum 
for current discourses on socio-cultural change, I want to briefly summarize the 
most commonly cited effects camp life is believed to have had on Acholi cultural and 
social life. I will base my analysis on statements by my informants as well as on the 
works of Dolan (2009) and Kuster & Santschi (2006) who have provided extensive 
analyses on this matter. Further, detailed accounts and critical analyses of the camp 
situation, the devastation and suffering it caused among the Acholi population, the 
political interests of the Ugandan government in setting up and maintaining the 
camps, and the complicity of the international humanitarian regime in establishing 
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and enabling the continuance of the camps can be found in the acclaimed books by 
Branch (2011), Dolan (2009), Finnström (2003; 2008) and the articles and reports 
by ARLPI (2001), Branch (2012), Dolan (2002), El Bushra & Sahl (2005: 11–30), 
HuRiFo (2002), IDMC (2010) and Whyte et al. (2012).
When discussing contemporary Acholi culture, most of my interlocutors con-
trasted it with “traditional culture” in “those days”, usually meaning those days be-
fore the war. In the preceding section, I have described what people generally under-
stood by “traditional culture”. In the following, I will take up some of the different 
aspects of economic, social and political life and ethical values discussed above. I will 
show how – in popular imagination – the camp situation and the effects of the war 
more generally are seen to have fundamentally altered and negatively affected these 
different spheres of Acholi culture.
Economic Sphere: Impoverishment & Loss of Former Living Standards4.4.1. 
The literature dealing with the living circumstances in the camps has repeatedly 
emphasized how people were forced to live under circumstances very different from 
those in the villages from which they had come. Dolan (2009: 110–131) describes 
the loss of people’s former living standards in great detail. According to his ac-
count, all of the camps were overcrowded with huts having been set up one next to 
the other often within a meter of each other. There were hardly any proper sanita-
tion facilities. Economic opportunities, enabling families to provide for their own 
subsistence, were very limited. There were no fields within the camp, and people 
could only access the fields in their home areas at great risk. Thus, agricultural ac-
tivity became very marginal throughout Acholiland as more and more people were 
resettled in the camps. Similarly, hunting activities, which had formerly served to 
supplement subsistence especially in the dry season, decreased due to their inher-
ent risks. Other employment opportunities in the camps were limited and the jobs 
available were usually on a temporary basis. Hence, over time, and despite people’s 
efforts to find sources of income and provide for themselves, more and more camp 
inhabitants became dependent on food aid.
In contemporary discourses, impoverishment and the loss of former living stan-
dards are perceived by many as having had a thorough effect on Acholi cultural prac-
tices and norms. The cramped living conditions in the camps and the lack of space 
and privacy were described as a serious humiliation by the internally displaced. They 
often emphasized that in their rural villages and homesteads, they had formerly lived 
in widely spaced huts, surrounded by their fields and gardens. Each family member, 
after reaching a certain age, would be assigned a separate living space, usually a hut 
of his or her own. They explained that the clear separation of living space – between 
parents and children, or men and women – was linked to cultural taboos, and that 
the housing situation in the camps, which forced extended families to sleep under 
one roof, led to serious breaks of these taboos, especially regarding sexual relations 
(Kuster & Santschi, 2006: 134f.; Dolan, 2009: 169ff.). I also encountered these 
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discourses whenever I asked my interlocutors about the camps. During a group in-
terview (Kapedopong, 28.06.2010), for instance, a young woman explained:
“Everything changed because of the war. The IDP camps brought together 
so many different people who had to stay on the same compound in cramped 
conditions. Boys and girls were staying too close by each other so it was natu-
ral that they started to fall in love and have sex. Respect was no longer there 
because people were just living too close – how can you respect someone if 
you are always cramped together?” (translated from the Acholi original by 
Kenneth Oyet Odong).
During a different group interview in Bungutera (03.10.2010), a young man de-
scribed not only the humiliating aspects of the living situation in the camps, but 
also emphasized the practical difficulties it caused. He stated:
“Life in the camp was not easy. We had to live with very many people in one 
house which was very cramped. The children had to stay in the same house as 
the parents. When the children wanted to go to school in the morning they 
sometimes couldn’t wash because the jerry can would be in one corner of the 
house where some adult was still sleeping so they would have to go to school 
without even washing their face…” (translated from the Acholi original by 
Wilfried Ochieng).
In addition to the humiliating housing situation, the breakdown of farming and 
other economic activities was perceived as a threat to Acholi cultural identity as in-
dependent agriculturalists and hunters. Former camp-inhabitants often complained 
that they had been prohibited (or severely restricted) by the UPDF (and the LRA) 
to leave the camps in order to work on their fields, or to go for hunting in the dry 
season – allegedly for security reasons (cf. Kuster & Santschi, 2006: 137ff.; Dolan, 
2009: 118ff.). My interlocutors reported how the restrictions in the camps led to 
dependence and frustration. As an elderly man, for example, explained during a 
group interview in Pabbo (23.10.2010):
“Before the camp, we were very free, we could do anything. Even now we are 
really free again and there is a lot of stability. In the camp situation we were 
very restricted. All of us were told not to move outside the camp after 8pm. 
Then, if you wanted to go to the garden the earliest time you could leave the 
camp officially was 9am, so you could not stay outside very long. At another 
time they also completely restricted us from going to the gardens, because 
it was not safe outside the camps, so people were just waiting for deliveries 
from World Food Program” (translated from the Acholi original by John 
Omara).
Similar statements collected by Kuster and Santschi (2006: 139) reveal that the in-
ability to provide for themselves and the subsequent heavy dependence on food aid 
by the World Food Program severely affected the ‘collective pride’ of the Acholi. 
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Kuster and Santschi (ibid.) further point out that some people took up jobs like 
boda boda driving128, which, however, were perceived as being badly paid and re-
garded as inferior and dishonorable. According to their analysis, men especially, 
who had always seen themselves as proud farmers and breadwinners for their fami-
lies, found it difficult to accept to work in these jobs (see further discussion below). 
One of the most frequent claims I encountered when discussing camp life with my 
interlocutors was that people in the camps became idle, and out of frustration and 
boredom spent their days in video halls or drinking alcohol. The changed economic 
situation in the camps is thus also related to changes in social practices and relations 
among the Acholi.
Social Sphere: Increase in Gender & Generational Conflicts4.4.2. 
The impoverishment and economic deprivation caused through the prolonged stay 
in the camps is also seen to have sustainably affected social relations among the 
Acholi people. Furthermore, the perceived inability of the camp inhabitants to ful-
fill the social roles and responsibilities expected of them further aggravated the feel-
ing that camp life caused a fundamental breakdown of Acholi culture.
One serious and often mentioned consequence of poverty and lack of social 
capital in the camps was seen in the inability of most families to pay brideprice (cf. 
Schäfer, 2008: 332; El-Bushra & Sahl, 2005: 16ff.). My interlocutors, with whom 
I repeatedly discussed this topic, claimed that this led to a general decline in mar-
riages. To this day, brideprice payments are perceived by the majority of Acholi to 
be a fundamental requirement in the “traditional marriage” process129. According to 
Dolan (2002: 72; 2009: 199ff.), the only men in the camps with access to substan-
tial capital to pay brideprice and provide for a wife and family or to attract women 
for “transactional” sexual relationships (cf. Hunter, 2002: 100f.) were usually sol-
diers. He has analyzed, how this further reinforced conflicts between (military and 
civilian) men, and also contributed to an increase in rape incidents (cf. Dolan, 2009: 
178ff.).
As has been discussed above, marriage is seen as one of the most important social 
requirements both men and women need to achieve in their lives in order to become 
128 Boda boda is a colloquial Ugandan term for motorbike taxis. 
129 Whenever I asked during the group interviews whether the brideprice should be abolished be-
cause it was preventing poorer men to get married, the majority of both young and old people, 
men and women, rejected this idea. The group in Wii Aweng (23.10.2010) told me of a very pe-
culiar incident which had taken place in their community. The local rwot had suggested that the 
brideprice for the women should be fixed at 400,000 USh [approx. 130 Euro] in order to prevent 
unreasonable demands by the women’s family and thus to enable more men and women to get 
married. But despite the fact that the severe decline of marriages in the community was perceived 
as a great problem, the community had collectively rejected the idea of the chief because they 
believed that the negotiation of the brideprice was for each family to decide. Similarly, attempts 
to abolish or regulate the brideprice on the national level have been rejected by the majority of the 
Ugandan population (INT Rocki, 16.03.2010; cf. Anyoli & Nanteza, 2010). 
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respected members of the Acholi adult society (cf. Dolan, 2002: 62f.). According 
to popular understanding, marriage relations establish wider social bonds between 
families and clans and constitute the basis for the formation of an independent 
household. Due to the central importance of marriage, the increasing inability of 
men and women in the camps to achieve marriage was perceived as a serious threat 
to Acholi culture. In this context, the real and symbolic importance of cattle as a 
source of wealth and form of brideprice payment increased. According to a wide-
spread narrative, almost all of the cattle, which had formerly belonged to the Acholi, 
had been raided by the NRA/UPDF and the Karimojong since the beginning of the 
fighting (cf. van Acker, 2004: 354). My older interlocutors sometimes mentioned 
that this loss had robbed the people of an important source of social capital and 
now prevented them from being able to pay brideprice. During a group interview in 
Pabbo (23.10.2010), an elderly man explained how the war-related loss of cattle had 
contributed to a fundamental change in marriage practices as follows:
“In the past there were so many cattle around, so you could just go and pay 
for the girl in cattle. But now, because of the war, so many cattle were taken 
away. So in most cases, instead of paying in cattle, people are forced to pay 
money, to give an equivalent. But money is even scarce now and that is mak-
ing most people today boycott traditional marriage. As a cause of that, girls 
end up living in the streets because the girls cannot get married. And there is 
no respect between the two families, so sometimes the girl’s parents charge 
so highly. Then you marry a girl at a very high price and then you mistreat 
her… these days, marriage is just about business…” (translated from the 
Acholi original by John Omara).
As this quotation implies, camp life is not only seen to have caused a decline in mar-
riages. The scarcity of resources to pay the brideprice has also made marriages to 
become a “business”, and this in turn has led to increased conflicts within marriage 
relations (cf. Kuster & Santschi, 2006: 131ff.). Like in the interview quoted above, 
I often heard that camp life had eroded the communal spirit which people believed 
had characterized former Acholi social relations because in the camp everyone had 
to fend for themselves. Marriages were not the only aspect of social life seen to be 
affected by this.
Different researchers (e.g. Branch, 2008: 10ff.; 2011: 129ff.; Dolan, 2002; 2009: 
Chap. 7; El-Bushra & Sahl, 2005; Schäfer, 2008: 350ff.) have analyzed how the 
situation in the camps brought about significant changes in gender relations, roles, 
and norms. Dolan (2009: 203f.) describes a discourse according to which changes in 
gender roles came about through an emerging new division of labor. Women were 
supposedly more able and willing than men to find new (economic) roles in the 
camps. Many started engaging in petty trade and, for the first time, started earning 
an income in the monetary economy, while men did not find acceptable alternatives 
to their former occupation as farmers and thus lost their role as main breadwinner 
of the family. Furthermore, relief organizations started to involve women in the dis-
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tribution of food and other relief items as they considered them more trustworthy 
than men in making sure that the items would also reach the children and other 
family members. According to Das and Nkutu (2008: 50), this “created leadership 
opportunities for women in a society where leadership positions were traditionally 
held by men”. It is a widespread belief that women gained more independence in 
the camps than they formerly had in Acholi society, and the increasing number of 
women-headed households is often interpreted as an indicator of this trend (Branch 
2011: 137ff.; El-Bushra and Sahl, 2005: 20f.). However, El-Bushra and Sahl (2005: 
23) point out that although the
“direct and indirect effects of the war (…) include a significant change in 
gender roles and norms, in which women appear to have gained and men to 
have lost (…), the fact that everyday behaviour has changed does not neces-
sarily mean that attitudes and values have changed. Indeed, the changes in 
gender roles described by respondents seem to indicate a reinforcement of 
gender ideologies, rather than fundamental shifts. (…) For both men and 
women, the ideals of the Acholi cultural code do not seem to have changed 
as a result of war, but have simply become harder to put into practice.”
Dolan (2002; 2009: Chap. 7) has argued in great detail how changes in gender roles 
caused a widely perceived breakdown of masculinities and loss of male authority at 
the household level. According to Dolan, men’s frustration about being unable to 
fulfill their role as husband and father, or to get married and start a family in the 
first place, in many cases resulted in forms of violence against the self and others. 
He describes alcohol abuse and in extreme cases suicide as forms of violence men di-
rected against themselves, while family members and other men became ‘external’ 
targets of violence. Dolan reports that incidences of domestic violence escalated in 
the camps, as men tried to regain the control over their wives which they felt they 
had lost.
The perceived changes in gender roles and relations and the effects of camp life 
on gender hierarchies are still felt and heavily debated in the post-war phase. Among 
my interlocutors the negative and positive changes in gender relations caused through 
encampment were a frequent topic of debate (as will be further debated in chapter 
6). One interviewee in Bobbi (06.10.2010) related the changes in gender roles to 
the breakdown of former socialization practices. According to him,
“now the ladies are doing what the men are doing, the men are doing what 
the ladies are doing. In the camp things changed, because the parents were 
drinking all the time and no longer teaching their children like they used, 
so you find that a boy might do the cooking, which is not what they were 
originally taught to do. The girls ended up doing what the boys used to do.”
Another respondent added:
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“Initially a woman would not be allowed to head a family, so there was wife 
inheritance where the brother would take over the wife when the husband 
dies. But now it [women-headed household] is there, because people are run-
ning away from inheritance. And even if you look at wills, girls nowadays are 
also recognized in the wills and given property to own. So there are quite a 
lot of changes” (both statements translated from the Acholi original by John 
Omara).
While most of my interlocutors still considered gendered socialization practices like 
those mentioned in the first quotation important and were concerned about their 
decline, the abandonment of wife inheritance and the increased recognition of girls 
in inheritance processes mentioned in the second quote were generally regarded as 
positive changes in gender relations and rules.
A different claim, frequently voiced by my interlocutors, was that camp life had 
severely affected intergenerational relations, particularly those between parents and 
children. According to common belief, due to fundamental changes in socialization 
practices the young generation never learned societal rules and norms and there-
fore no longer knows Acholi culture (cf. Kuster & Santschi, 2006: 119ff.). One 
reason for the breakdown of former education practices was seen in the decline of 
the wango-o. Wango-o sessions could no longer be held in the camps because it was 
prohibited to light fires at nights which might have attracted the rebels. Younger 
people, who had grown up in the camps, furthermore blamed the adults for their 
lack of initiative in holding the wango-o during the encampment situation as in the 
following quote by a girl in Bobbi (06.10.2010):
“Wango-o is still important, because from the wango-o you learn very im-
portant facts and lessons about life. At the wango-o, the parents used to have 
enough time to educate their children. But in the camps, the parents were 
just drinking all the time, so they didn’t take time to educate their children” 
(translated from the Acholi original by John Omara).
In a similar vein, my interlocutors in Gulu often emphasized that a mixture of 
disillusionment, lethargy and alcoholism had led some parents to simply leave their 
children to take care of themselves. They explained that as a consequence, and 
reinforced through the parallel breakdown of school education130, children failed 
to learn about their societal responsibilities and cultural norms, lost respect for 
130 Dolan (2009: 131ff.) has described the appalling state of formal education – if it was provided at 
all – in the camps: there was a lack of school buildings, learning materials, as well as of trained 
and motivated teachers. Secondary schools hardly existed at all, because all but two schools had 
been displaced to Gulu Town (cf. Kuster & Santschi, 2006: 128ff.). The District Education Offi-
cer Vincent Ochieng, whom I interviewed in Gulu (INT 26.03.2010) described the state of camp 
education as follows: “They [students in the camps] were not taught properly, people were run-
ning up and down, they themselves were not in class, some children were being abducted from 
class, so it was totally emergency education, just to make sure that the system could be running, 
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their parents and started to engage in ‘anti-social behaviour’ (cf. also Dolan, 2009: 
168ff.; Kuster & Santschi, 2006: 129). This widespread conviction is reflected in 
the following quotation, taken from an interview with the District Education Of-
ficer of Gulu Vincent Ochieng (INT 26.03.2010):
“The present generation, they grew up during the war time in the camps and 
in town, they didn’t grow up in the villages, so they don’t have so much the 
spirit of being self-reliant, to do work on their own. They are not self-driven 
even to be ambitious, to be on their own, to read and do work for themselves, 
that is the big problem now we are having with this new generation here. For 
them they feel people should do things for them; like during the war time 
the [development] partners would give food, give clothes, give everything 
you need, because people were in the camps. Now the young still want that 
hand-out to continue in their lives. (…) Some [who returned to their villages] 
have even failed to fit in the villages, they are coming back to town, because 
they can’t dig. (…) Very few of them are trying to cope up, so you find some 
of them have even left their parents even now alone in the villages to dig and 
they are here. So there is needed quite a lot of time to reorient their mind to a 
system where they will know that their life is there in their villages, and they 
have to work for their life. Cause if we go – our generation – when we are no 
longer there, we don’t know if many of them would take leadership.”
The changes in generational relations and leadership structures mentioned by the 
respondent, and particularly the perceived dissolving of gerontocratic principles, 
were generally taken as further indicators of the breakdown of “traditional culture”, 
especially by the older generation (cf. Kuster & Santschi, 2006: 125ff.). Younger 
people sometimes positively interpreted these changes as a form of youth empower-
ment, but they also acknowledged that the loss of age-based respect caused instabil-
ity and disorder in Acholi society. One of my interviewees, a young man in Pabbo 
(INT 23.10.2010), analyzed the negative influence of camp life on intergenerational 
relations very bluntly, when he explained:
“The insurgency forced people to live in camps. There, the young started 
mixing with the elderly. They became friends. There was no respect, the 
young would not listen to elders, elders would not listen to the young, be-
cause the lifestyle of young and old became the same: people were all drink-
ing together, watching films…”
Similarly, a young woman in Bobbi (06.10.2010) argued:
“Camp life brought a lot of conflict because old and young people were rated 
at the same level. Both the old and the young went to video halls; you would 
find a father, a mother, a daughter and a son there. So it would be difficult 
because we feared that if we had stopped completely then starting after some years would be a 
problem. (…) At that time there was no quality education, it was just to fill in the gap.”
“Our Culture is getting lost!” – Pre- & Post-War Representations of Acholi Culture   157
for the parents to forbid their children to go there, to tell them that some 
of these films were not suitable for them, because they themselves were set-
ting bad examples. And also parents did not take the time to educate their 
children. Young and old became too close because they were sharing the 
same hobbies” (both statements translated from the Acholi original by John 
Omara).
The quotations reveal that the equalization of members of formally distinct social 
categories was seen to have dissolved established authority structures. According to 
the interviewees, parents and elders were no longer regarded as positive role models 
and guardians because they behaved in ways regarded as irresponsible and typical 
for younger members of society.
The radical change in former social relations and hierarchies, and especially the 
perceived relative empowerment of women and youth, was also related to foreign, 
usually Western, influences. A common claim was that foreigners introduced new 
values and norms, for instance through campaigns on women and children’s rights, 
through Western media programs and movies, and through the behavior of aid 
workers in the camps, which conflicted with Acholi social conventions and hierar-
chies. The general feeling of being controlled by foreigners and having lost (politi-
cal) self-determination will be briefly discussed in the next section. A more thorough 
analysis of discourses on Westernization and neo-colonialism will be provided in 
chapter 6.
Political Sphere: Foreign Occupation & Loss of Self-Determination4.4.3. 
Different authors (e.g. Branch, 2011; 2012; Dolan, 2009; Finnström, 2008: Chap. 
4) have described how the life in the camps represented, for many, not only a situa-
tion of displacement, but also a situation of foreign occupation and determination. 
Branch (2011: 100) argues that the complete control and related victimization of 
camp inhabitants represented a deliberate strategy of the camp administration and, 
in fact, constitutes an underlying principle of the international humanitarian re-
gime more generally. He writes:
“Humanitarianism is an administrative regime that combines macrolevel 
surveillance and direction with microlevel discipline in order to efficiently 
provide aid to victim populations. In order for it to efficiently distribute aid 
according to the humanitarian imperative of promoting statistically defined 
life, the humanitarian regime needs to contain, control, and discipline popu-
lations so that they passively accept that aid. In practice, this means that the 
aid industry not only sees people as helpless victims, but also needs people 
to be those helpless victims and ends up disciplining them toward that iden-
tity.”
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In Northern Uganda, camp-inhabitants felt incapacitated to take even the most 
important decisions pertaining to their life. Their movement was controlled by the 
Ugandan army, the food ratios and daily diet were determined by international 
relief organizations, international rights discourses prescribed people how to live 
their lives, and the only entertainment programs widely accessible were Western 
movies and media programs. Even matters pertaining to cultural leadership and 
“traditional justice” (see discussion below) were heavily influenced by the Ugandan 
government as well as Western development actors131 (Dolan, 2009: 112ff.; 172ff.; 
Kuster & Santschi, 2006: 122ff.).
A further, often discussed problem was that family and clan structures, which 
had formerly served to regulate political affairs among the Acholi, broke down in 
the camps, because homesteads were dismantled and communities torn apart as a 
result of displacement (cf. Kuster & Santschi, 2006: 121f.) Many of my interlocu-
tors complained, for instance, that due to the erosion of former social and political 
institutions and the introduction of new authority structures young people no lon-
ger knew about the functions and values of clans and chiefs and could not appreci-
ate the important role they had formerly played in Acholi society. Furthermore, the 
lack of education on Acholi socio-political affairs and clan structures, which had 
formerly been provided by elders at the wango-o, was seen to have prevented the 
young generation from knowing their roots and having a sense of belonging. Okello 
(INT 26.09.2010) explained:
”Well, [young] people know their clan, but because there are certain mis-
understandings, people are now mixed [confused] about… Like, let me say, 
like myself – if I cannot inform my children at the wango-o that you belong 
to this [clan], then the children can just be going about… Like these street 
children, they will not know their clan, but when they stay with their elderly 
people, they are always informed [where they] (…) belong…”
The feeling of having lost control of matters pertaining to Acholi political and social 
life was further aggravated through the perceived systematic exclusion of the Acholi 
in national politics. Many Acholi (as well as external observers) interpreted the 
encampment of large parts of the Acholi population and the failure to end the con-
flict as a deliberate attempt by the NRM government to keep Northern Uganda, 
a stronghold of the opposition against Museveni and the NRM, under control. 
People often referred to the North-South divide in Uganda (cf. Chap. 3) and argued 
that politicians from Northern Uganda were not represented in the government and 
other important administrative posts (cf. Kuster & Santschi, 2006: 156f).
131 The idea for the revival of Acholi chiefs (rwodi moo) and the installation of a Paramount Chief 
first gained prominence through a widely cited report by Dennis Pain (1997), who suggested 
that the rwodi moo could help to restore ‘traditional culture’, which had been eroded through the 
camp situation. Based on this idea several international organizations including the World Bank 
supported the revival of these chiefs and even financed Conflict Resolution courses in the U.S 
and the U.K for the Paramount Chief (cf. Paine, 2011: 4ff.; see discussion below).
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Overall, the war situation seems to have caused a widespread feeling that the Acholi 
as a people have been deprived of the autonomy to decide over internal ‘cultural 
affairs’ and, in addition, have been excluded from decision-making processes on a 
national political level. The perceived breakdown of the economic, social and politi-
cal elements of Acholi culture and its disastrous consequences have been discussed 
in the previous pages. I will now turn to the changes displacement is seen to have 
caused regarding ethical and moral principles and values.
Ethical Sphere: Loss of Morals, Respect & Values4.4.4. 
Among all the negative influences displacement is seen to have had on Acholi cul-
ture, no aspect was regarded as devastating and consequential – by my interlocutors 
and in the general discourse on socio-cultural change – as the perceived breakdown 
of morality and respect. According to a widespread narrative, the inhumane living 
conditions in the camp had corrupted the previously morally intact Acholi society. 
The typical portrayal of camp life I encountered was in many ways reminiscent of 
Sodom and Gomorrah and usually included references to several ‘sins’ like idleness, 
promiscuity, substance-abuse and violence, which had supposedly been committed 
by the majority of camp inhabitants.
The most frequently mentioned aspect, which always came up when I spoke 
with people about camp life, related to ‘immoral’ forms of sexuality. Promiscuous 
relationships, premarital and extramarital affairs as well as prostitution and “transac-
tional sex”132 were believed to have skyrocketed in the camps, leading to a rapid in-
crease in divorces, teenage pregnancies, abortions and rising levels of HIV and other 
sexually-transmitted diseases (cf. Kuster & Santschi, 2006: 133ff.; Dolan, 2009: 
178ff.). My interlocutors often claimed that out of boredom and facilitated by the 
cramped, uncontrolled living space men and women started to engage in new, “im-
moral” kinds of sexual relationships which had been considered taboo in “traditional 
Acholi culture”. One of my interviewees narrated his impressions of camp life:
“You know when people were in the camp, there were so many things hap-
pening. I remember staying in a camp, just when I was for my holidays [from 
boarding school], I stayed for one complete month, and I saw the kind of 
life there. It was not all that ok (…) Those days in our culture, when it was 
almost approaching night, you began gathering firewood, sat round the fire, 
telling stories. Things changed when people were in the camp. There, you 
132 The term “transactional sex” (sometimes also “something for something love” or “cross-gener-
ational sex”) was used by my interlocutors to refer to sexual relations which involved both, a 
material dimension and an intergenerational dimension. The more common form was a girl/
young woman having sex with an older man (“sugar daddy”) in exchange for material goods (e.g. 
phones), economic needs (e.g. school fees) or leisure time activities (e.g. going to a restaurant). 
Somewhat rarer was the case that boys/young men engaged in transactional sexual relationships 
with older women.
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found that during night a boy and a girl were moving up and down, going 
there and there and there… Those days we used to respect the women, but it 
has changed these days when people were in the camp. You find that another 
man is caught doing all sorts of nonsense with another guy’s woman. You 
find that was not in the culture before” (INT Laurence, 28.04.2010).
The decline of discipline and respect is stressed by the respondent as one of the most 
important causes of the mayhem in the camps. The many problems and challenges 
resulting from the generally perceived breakdown of social order in the camps came 
up as in an interview I conducted with the manager of Gulu Youth Centre. She 
reflected:
“There are some challenges that have come as a result of the situation that ex-
isted in the North for the past 20 years. Family structures were broken down 
because people had to flee their homes, and they got internally displaced 
and had to live in camps. So because of that, this issue of auntie telling you 
‘be careful’, mum telling you ‘you’re too young to be having sex’ [was no 
longer there]…, family structures generally broke down. In the camps the 
kind of life was not comfortable, families had to live together under one 
roof, the children saw mum and dad have sex when they thought they were 
sleeping. Children got exposed to sex early, because, you know, young men 
and women were idle, and living in close proximity maybe they might have 
passed time together. One thing led to the other and then they had sex. And 
remember that in most cases health centers were far off, opportunities to test 
[for HIV] were limited. And remember, HIV had come in, so the spread of 
HIV was increasing. And remember, in the camp accessibility to condoms 
was limited or non-existent. And like I told you in the beginning, people 
were commuting, there were night-commuters133 (…) So imagine a situation 
in which [Gulu] town was filled with young people lying down in the street. 
What was happening in the night? People normally turn to each other… (…) 
And then remember that girls were raped, some became child mothers really 
early, 14 years. Others were having sex earlier, not only getting pregnancy, 
but also getting affected with HIV, because the men were older in some 
cases…” (INT Faith, 18.03.2010).
The interviewee argues that the breakdown of established family structures and 
spatial arrangements facilitated uncontrolled sexual behaviour, which resulted in 
an increase of HIV-infections and thus created fundamental problems for the post-
war society. She particularly emphasized this point because in her function as the 
133 During the height of the war years, especially from 2003 onwards, several thousand children (and 
adults) left their homes in the villages and in the camps to spend the night in one of the night 
commuter centers which had been set up in Gulu and Kitgum. The town centers were considered 
safer than the rural areas where children feared to be captured or attacked by the LRA (cf. Lunde, 
2006).
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manager of Gulu Youth Centre, which was primarily a VCT134 drop-in centre for 
young people, she had to deal with the results of the high HIV/Aids prevalence on 
a day to day basis.
Generally, the rise of uncontrolled or ‘immoral’ forms of sexuality seemed to be 
one of the most crucial negative and sustainable outcomes of camp life (cf. Chap. 6). 
My younger interlocutors reported that nowadays, due to poverty or out of desire 
for material wealth, it had in fact become common for many young men and wom-
en to engage in transactional sexual relationships with “sugar mummies” and “sugar 
daddies”. This so-called “something for something love” and its inherent danger of 
getting infected with HIV was a constant topic in the bi-weekly group discussions 
with male and female youth conducted at Gulu Youth Centre. After one of these 
sessions, I discussed the issue with Omara, a councelor at GYC. In my field notes, 
I reflected on the conversation:
“He tells me that there is also the problem of sugar daddies who are rich and can 
pay for many things in order to convince a young girl to have sex with them. He 
says there are even sugar mummies these days who pay for young boys. There is 
one well-known lady in town who is quite wealthy and who is HIV-positive. She is 
well-known for paying young boys something around 800,000 USh [approx. 250 
Euro] to sleep with her. He says although people know someone is infected they 
don’t care because they are poor and if someone offers the money they don’t 
think of the consequences. (…) He talks about the situation of girls, and that it 
is worse for them because they are so vulnerable. Some, especially those in the 
villages, have to sleep with men to get money. He says there is so much of this 
kind of prostitution going on in the villages. Sometimes the women even force 
their daughters to sleep with men for money. He says it was even worse in the 
camps, where people were living in cramped conditions and there was nothing 
to do and a lot of poverty. Soldiers who had money often came and slept with 
the young girls – he says that the soldiers didn’t care whether they got infected 
with HIV because they were living such a risky life anyway because they could get 
killed in the bush everyday. So they tried to enjoy life to the maximum as long as 
they could (field notes, 20.04.2010).
Again, the explanations by Omara reflect the general conviction that certain harm-
ful sexual practices, which had first appeared in the camps, had become established 
and were now common in post-camp and post-war Acholi society.
A further widely discussed long-term consequence of camp life I encountered 
during my fieldwork relates to the militarization of society during the camp inter-
regnum (cf. Kuster & Santschi, 2006: 146ff.; Dolan, 2002; 2009: 204) and a heavy 
rise in crime-levels and incidents of violence in post-war Acholi society. In an inter-
view, a staff member of American Refugee Council, who was working in a project 
on gender-based violence (GBV), explained that GBV had been a problem before 
134 Voluntary Counseling and Testing for HIV/AIDS
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the conflict, but that it came to be noticed and talked-about on a big scale for the 
first time in the camps. According to the interviewee, levels of GBV increased be-
cause of the general frustration and the violent surrounding in the camps where men 
were carrying guns all the time (INT EM, 16.03.2010). In a similar vein, another 
interviewee, who also worked in the field of GBV, reported that the war had led to 
a big increase in violence although “originally Acholi culture does not condone vio-
lence”. She told me that in former times there had been wars, but that violence in 
these wars had never been directed against women and children. In this recent war, 
however, things like rape and defilement had become very common. The intervie-
wee attributed the increased violence to the cramped conditions in the camps and to 
poverty, which made people feel frustrated, and emphasized several times that “these 
are new things to the culture” (INT SK, 23.03.2010).
“Post-conflict trauma” was regarded as another devastating consequence of the 
militarization in Acholi society during the war. One of my interviewees poignantly 
described the problem and stressed the importance of dealing with war and displace-
ment traumas in order to build a stable post-war society when he said:
“Post-conflict trauma, that is the biggest challenge, and making people 
go back to their normal moral way of living. The people who grew in IDP 
camps, they have seen a lot of bad things. An example is seen when you move 
to these villages, where people are settling back. You ask any kid to draw for 
you a picture or make a toy – what they will do number one is draw a gun 
shape or make a gun. So look at the situation we are entering into, we need 
a lot of training to the young people, so the generation we will be having in 
future will be a better one” (INT Ojara, 17.03.2010).
In the general discourse, the rise of violence, especially GBV, was frequently related 
to widespread overconsumption of alcohol, which people had become accustomed 
to in the camps (cf. Kuster & Santschi, 2006: 135ff.; Dolan, 2009: 167f). Omara, 
the GYC councelor quoted above who also sometimes assisted me in organizing 
and conducting group interviews in the rural areas (cf. Chap. 2), once explained to 
me that alcoholism was such a big problem in the camps because people were idle, 
could not cultivate their fields and got all their food from the World Food Program. 
According to him both, men and women, would start drinking alcohol at 6 am in 
the morning when they woke up and continue all day, simply because they had 
nothing else to do (field notes, 20.04.2010).
Alcohol abuse still constituted a severe problem in many rural communities 
which had returned from the camps. During a group interview in Wii Aweng 
(26.09.2010), I discussed the issue with my interlocutors. They reported that alco-
hol was still a big problem today, although it had been much worse in the camps. 
A woman explained: “Some men wake up in the morning and go and drink. They 
don’t even go to dig, they send their wives and children to dig for them. For them, 
their work is to drink and wait for food. If you don’t give them food, they cane 
[beat] you properly” (translated from the Acholi original by Ruth Lagen). A man 
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added that even the women are “drinking seriously”, although this statement was 
contested among the group.
Many Acholi felt that the breakdown of morality and the disrespect of formerly 
established norms in the camps had irreversible consequences for Acholi society, not 
only because ‘immoral practices’ continued in post-war society, but also because 
other institutions, most notably the Christian churches, had used the general confu-
sion in the camps to install new moral principles and put a ban on ‘pagan’ cultural 
practices135. Omara even claimed that nowadays there was a real conflict between 
religion and culture because so many cultural practices had been forbidden by the 
churches, especially the funeral rites (cf. Dolan, 2009: 171f.) and the twin rituals (cf. 
Nzita, 1997: 92f.; see above). In my field notes (06.10.2010), I noted:
“According to Omara, Born-again Churches are the strictest, but the Catholic 
Church and the Protestants are also becoming ‘more and more strict’. I ask him 
why he thought this conflict [between religion and culture] was a recent one, 
and why the people now, all of a sudden, were so committed to the churches 
which had been around since the first missionaries came to Northern Uganda. 
He answers that during the war, especially in the camps, the behavior was really 
deteriorating, so that religious leaders were called in to help. They did a lot of 
preaching and really mobilized people to join and practice religion. That, he 
concluded, is why the influence of religious institutions now is much stronger 
than before the war.”
A very similar argument, namely that religious institutions had gained influence 
because they were called to discipline the people in the camps, was put forward by 
two participants in a group interview in Bobbi (06.10.2010) who stated:
“The camp life affected the funeral rites. Because of the bad behavior and 
moral degeneration in the camps, the religious leaders were called in to in-
tervene. As a result of that, people got to learn that funeral rites were not so 
important, because according to religion, when somebody is buried you can 
just finish everything there… So some people now only bury the people and 
everything stops there. Funeral rites are still done but it is not very common 
now. Most people just do the funeral and stop it there” (translated from the 
Acholi original by John Omara).
The decline of the funeral rites and the twin ritual which had both been ‘banned’ 
by the churches often came up in discussions on socio-cultural change (cf. Kuster 
& Santschi, 2006: 122ff.). Most of my interlocutors, especially Born-again Chris-
tians, claimed that abandoning these practices was a good thing. Some, however, 
135 Leaders from all major religions in Northern Uganda (Catholicism, Anglicanism, Islam) were 
very involved in providing support to their followers from the beginning of the conflict. Later, 
they started to play an active role in peace-building initiatives and gained international influence 
and prominence through the foundation of the Acholi Religious Leader Peace Initiative (ARLPI), 
see Rodriguez Soto (2002).
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admitted that they were still performing the rituals although they were Christians 
and it was against the doctrines of the Christian churches (cf. group interview Wii 
Aweng, 23.10.2010).
In summary one can say that camp life is seen to have caused a devastating, all-
encompassing impact on Acholi culture – in the economic, social, political and eth-
nical sphere – which many believe cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, since the end 
of the fighting in 2006 (and even before), there have been several attempts to revive 
‘traditional culture’. These will be discussed in the last section of this chapter.
Contemporary Attempts to Reconstruct  4.5. 
“Traditional Acholi Culture”
The late 1990s brought about a change in the field of international interventions in 
conflict settings. After the failure of humanitarian rights interventions in Somalia 
and Rwanda, a new interventionist agenda, which Branch (2011: 16) has termed 
“total intervention”, was set up with the aim of “reforming and constructing Afri-
can societies, polities, economies and even psychologies and cultures toward what 
were considered peaceful and responsible models” (ibid.). He describes the concep-
tual framework underlying this agenda as follows:
“The framework begins with the consequences of conflict, arguing that vio-
lence leads to crisis and breakdown in a wide array of different domains. 
In the political domain, conflict leads to state weakness and failure; in the 
economic, it leads to poverty and underdevelopment; in the social, it leads 
to a breakdown of social solidarity and civil society; in the cultural, it leads 
to a crisis of traditional values and authority; and in the legal, it leads to 
a breakdown of accountability and a rise of impunity. (…) Consequently, 
peace will be established through the rebuilding of order in those many do-
mains” (ibid.: 27f.).
Branch further states that in this context, the revival of ‘traditional culture’ (or 
certain elements thereof) has been discovered by humanitarian organizations and 
NGOs as an important component of ‘post-conflict peace-building’ and a means of 
re-creating social stability in post-war settings (ibid.: 154ff.).
In Northern Uganda, which in the 2000s was among the regions worldwide 
most densely populated by humanitarian organizations (Perrot, 2010: 189), the first 
projects aiming for ‘cultural revival’ emerged in the late 1990s. Starting with the 
Kacoke Madit conference in London in 1997136 and the subsequently commissioned 
136 The Kacoke Madit (Acholi for “big meeting”) initiative was started by Acholi living in the diaspo-
ra to raise awareness about the conflict in Northern Uganda and discuss opportunities for peace. 
The KM initiative organized a series of international conferences, which were attended by Acholi 
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and published report The Bending of Spears by Dennis Pain (1997), international 
organizations started to engage in reviving Acholi cultural practices (especially those 
concerned with justice and reconciliation) as a means of peace-building. Soon, local 
CBOs and NGOs jumped on the bandwagon and new ones were founded which 
had discovered that international funding was available for ‘cultural revival projects’ 
(Allen, 2006: 130f.; 2010: 243ff.). Despite the large number of projects and orga-
nizations involved, attempts to revive Acholi culture from the beginning seemed to 
concentrate on a few, highly symbolic key elements. Among these were the revival of 
Acholi “traditional authorities”, the revival of “traditional justice”137, especially the 
reconciliation ritual mato oput, and the revival of ‘harmless cultural practices’138 such 
as traditional dances and the wango-o.
In the following, I give a brief overview of program interventions in these key 
areas and the way they are debated in academic circles and by the local population. 
For a more extensive discussion of this matter see Acirokop, 2010; Afarko, 2002; 
Allen, 2006; 2010; Baines, 2007; Branch, 2011: Chap. 5; Cagney, 2011; Harlacher, 
2009; HuRiFo, 2007; Liu Institute for Global Issues, 2005; Mato Oput Project, 
2009; Pain, 1997; Paine, 2011; RLP, 2005 and Wasonga, 2009.
The Revival of Traditional Authorities: 4.5.1. Rwodi Moo & Ker Kwaro Acholi
According to oral and written sources (see the discussion in the first part of this 
chapter), the traditional chiefs (rwodi moo) used to play an important role in medi-
ating conflicts in Acholi society and had still fulfilled this role in the 1980s when 
the war broke out. Officially, the rwodi moo had been supplanted by the rwodi 
kalam, chiefs appointed by the colonial administration in 1911, but the former are 
said to have remained important conflict mediators on the local, informal level 
(Afako, 2002: 67).
There is some debate as to whether the conflict and the displacement of the 
Acholi population strengthened or weakened the role of the traditional chiefs. Some 
argue that due to the rise of conflicts within the camp communities and between the 
LRA fighters and the local population, the relevance of mediation and dispute set-
tlement increased and the chiefs as ‘traditional’ facilitators of such processes gained 
recognition. Others claim that displacement weakened the power of the chiefs for 
from Northern Uganda and the diaspora, as well as representatives of the Ugandan government, 
the government of Sudan, the LRA and the international community. The first of these confer-
ences was held in London in April 1997 (cf. Poblicks, 2002).
137 “Traditional authorities/chiefs/leaders” and “traditional justice” have become established terms 
in the discourses on ‘(post-conflict) cultural revival’. For readability purposes, I will use them 
without quotation marks in the following sections, while bearing in mind the problematic notion 
of the term “traditional”.
138 I use this term as an antonym to “harmful cultural practices”, an increasingly common, albeit 
often misleading, term in development and human rights work (4,730,000 Google hits, retrieved 
13.07.2012) used to refer to practices like female genital cutting or widow inheritance.
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two reasons: first, their communities were widely scattered and people in the camps 
and in town became accustomed to new social practices and authority structures. 
And second, the insecurity and restrictions of movement within the camps prevent-
ed people from accessing ritual sites and thus led to a decline of ritual practices in 
which the chiefs had formerly been involved (cf. Kuster & Santschi, 2006: 122ff.). 
Some influential local leaders and the international donor community (cf. especially 
the reports by Liu Institute for Global Issues, 2005 and Pain, 1997) favored the 
latter interpretation. They started to promote the argument that the breakdown of 
traditional leadership was an impediment to conflict resolution and peace and from 
this insight drew the logical conclusion that the role of the chiefs as mediators of 
conflict needed to be revived.
In his 1997 report, Pain therefore suggested that outside donors should actively 
promote the set-up of a council of rwodi moo and the revival of the Acholi cul-
tural institution Ker Kwaro Acholi139. Pain argued that these “traditional leaders” 
were the best suitable local peace-building actors and the only ones, who might be 
able to restore social order and revive cultural norms and practices to foster peace 
and stability among the Acholi. The international development community quickly 
took on this idea and started to support “the restoration of relationships” (Roco Wat 
I Acholi140). Ostentatious anointing ceremonies for a number of rwodi moo and for 
the Paramount Chief as well as the rebuilding of “royal houses” were financed by 
international donors (Paine, 2011: 4). The following statement by Afako (2002: 67) 
captures well the discourse on the role of traditional leaders at the time and reflects 
the hopes placed on the chiefs as the chief mediators of the peacebuilding process. 
Afako solemnly declares:
“Today, in a project supported by the Belgian government, the rwodi of all 
the Acholi clans have been reinstated and the Lawi Rwodi (head chief) has 
been elected by the other rwodi. After years of conflict and marginalization, 
the chiefs, like most of their people, are poor and royal houses are in need of 
repair. However, the greatest asset of the chiefs – their political independence 
– gives them enhanced credibility in mediating reconciliation.”
The reinstatement of the chiefs was seen to go hand in hand with the restoration of 
Ker Kwaro Acholi. Both, the donors and the traditional leaders themselves, estab-
lished a discourse according to which Ker Kwaro was an ancient Acholi institution 
and as such had the legitimacy to represent Acholi interests. Different authors have 
139 The new 1995 Ugandan Constitution allowed for traditional authorities to be officially recog-
nized and set in motion a country-wide revival of so-called “cultural institutions”. Ker Kwaro 
Acholi was recognized as the Acholi cultural institution, but did not gain any substantial influ-
ence until the international community took on the discourse of cultural revival two years later 
(Afako, 2002: 67). 
140 “Roco Wat I Acholi”, meaning “the restoration of relationships in Acholiland”, is the title of an 
influential report by Liu Institute for Global Issues, 2005.
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argued that this was rather an act of ‘inventing’ tradition and ‘myth-making’ than 
a reconstruction of ‘cultural facts’. Paine (2011: 7), for instance, writes:
“The historical narrative offered through the Strategic Plans presents KKA’s 
[Ker Kwaro Acholi’s] past as the undisputed traditional institution of the 
Acholi, utilising particular truths and myths to create the impression KKA is 
a primordial institution dating back to the fifteenth century. Even a cursory 
understanding of Acholi history shows this to be inaccurate.”
She goes on to delineate that this ‘myth-making’ was crucial for Ker Kwaro because 
its central role in the international peace and development strategies derived from 
its status as ‘authentic’ cultural institution. In her words:
“One of the most crucial aspects of the Strategic Plans has been the way 
they have not only presented KKA as the natural gatekeeper and custodian 
of Acholi traditions and customs on the one hand and as the key to future 
sustainable development on the other, but that KKA has positioned itself as 
the key to development because it is the gatekeeper of culture” (Paine, 2011: 
8, emphasis in original).
This implies that Ker Kwaro actively sought being represented in a particular way 
in order to gain a new and profitable role as a development and peace-building 
institution.
Local perspectives on the attempts by the international community to revive 
traditional leadership were quite diverse. While Acholi people, especially those who 
had been displaced, did lament the breakdown of traditional leadership and longed 
for the re-establishment of former social relations, many were skeptical about the 
intense involvement of their traditional leaders in Western development programs. 
While many supported the idea of reviving and strengthening the role of traditional 
leaders in dispute settling, conflict mediation and reconciliation, they also feared 
that their clan chiefs might be instrumentalized by donors for their own agendas 
and thus would no longer be able to represent the interests of their clans (Paine, 
2011: 12; Kuster & Satschi, 2006: 122ff.). Paine relates to this debate when she 
writes:
“Although most rwodi mo in Acholiland are struggling for local recognition 
and respect, for reasons quite apart from donor intervention, the shaping of 
KKA through engagements with donors seems to be hindering any potential 
rwodi mo could play in the future of Acholiland. Even though a handful of 
academics have been very critical of KKA’s ‘revival’, there has been a broader 
and more widespread foreclosing of critical reflection on whether the revival 
of KKA, with a Council of Rwodi mo, a newly created Paramount Chief, a 
cabinet of ministers and a secretariat, is, as the Ugandan Constitution stipu-
lates it should be, in accordance with the aspirations of the people to whom 
it applies” (Paine, 2011: 14f.).
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The “critical academics” Paine refers to (among them Branch, 2011 and Allen, 
2006; 2010) have voiced their concerns about the ways traditional authorities and 
especially Ker Kwaro Acholi, despite the institution’s uncertain stance among the 
local population, have been instrumentalized by the Western donor community to 
fit current peace-building agendas. Branch (2011: 171), for instance, argues:
“The motivation is clear: to channel donor funding to the promotion of ‘tradi-
tional authorities’, who can lead a cultural revival and, through mechanisms 
of traditional justice, restore social order among the Acholi, as an alternative 
to Western systems of justice through punishment. It is an empowering, 
participatory project, where Acholi are empowered to participate as proper, 
‘responsible’, Acholi under the authority of chiefs. As with all ethnoscience 
discourses, this is oriented principally toward a Western audience – in this 
case, toward donors.”
This statement only implies that the merits and downsides of creating and support-
ing traditional authorities were heavily debated among development practitioners 
and academics. Even more debated, however, was the (related) question, wheth-
er peace in Acholiland could be better achieved by following ‘traditional justice’, 
centered on restorative approaches, or whether LRA combatants and collaborators 
should be subjected to ‘Western’, retributive forms of justice. In the following sec-
tion, I will briefly recapitulate the debates on supporting traditional justice and 
especially the emblematic role of the reconciliation ritual mato oput.
The Revival of Traditional Justice & the Reconciliation Ritual 4.5.2. Mato Oput
In the mid-1990s, the scope and length of the conflict in Northern Uganda, the 
difficulty to resolve it and the failure of numerous peace attempts led to a reassess-
ment of conflict settlement approaches. Due to the complex relationships between 
the LRA and the local population – many LRA perpetrators being former victims 
of LRA abductions (cf. Baines, 2009) – many Acholi141 supported a restorative ap-
proach to conflict settlement rather than calling for the persecution of perpetrators 
(Afako, 2002: 64; Peachey, 2012).
Following these debates, in 1998, a first Amnesty Act was introduced, which 
offered pardon to insurgents, who had given up fighting and wanted to return to a 
peaceful life as civilians. Offenders of especially heinous crimes (genocide, murder, 
kidnapping and rape), however, were excluded from the regulation. In 2000, based 
on the close involvement of representatives from the Acholi community (most no-
tably ARLPI), a new and reformed Amnesty Act was introduced. This act granted 
141 Different sources, especially reports produced by development organizations, claim that the ma-
jority of the Acholi population favored forgiveness and reconciliation over persecution and pun-
ishment (for a moderate presentation of this argument see Peachey, 2012). Allen (2006: 138ff.) 
contests this claim and argues that the local population was more divided on this matter than is 
commonly acknowledged.
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general amnesty to all insurgents, irrespective of the crimes they had committed, in-
cluding combat, collaboration and aiding rebellion (Afako, 2002: 65f.). According 
to Afako (2002: 65), the act was widely supported by the Acholi population because 
it was “building on tradition and responding to the expressed wishes of the people 
of Uganda – particularly those of the people of Acholi whose specific concerns were 
incorporated into the law”.
Despite some successes of the amnesty act142 and its continuous renewal, it al-
ways remained a matter of much debate. For different reasons, neither the Ugandan 
government, nor senior commanders of the LRA unanimously supported the Am-
nesty Act (Finnström, 2008: 92; 119f.). Contrary to the idea of granting amnesty as 
a first step towards peace, the Ugandan government intensified counterinsurgency 
warfare in Northern Uganda at the beginning of the 2000s. Furthermore, in 2003, 
Ugandan President Museveni called upon the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
in The Hague to investigate the crimes and human rights violations committed by 
the LRA. The ICC took on the case and in 2005 issued arrest warrants against Jo-
seph Kony and four other leading LRA commanders (Brubacher, 2010: 268ff.).
The involvement of the ICC sparked great debates among local and interna-
tional actors about which form of justice – restorative as intended in the Amnesty 
Act or retributive as envisioned by the ICC – should be applied in dealing with 
perpetrators and would be more suitable to solving the conflict and establishing sus-
tainable peace143. An influential group of local traditional and religious leaders and 
international development actors argued that a ‘cultural approach’ to justice should 
be taken due to the complexity of the conflict situation, particularly the fact that 
most of the former LRA fighters would eventually return to their communities and 
thus would need to be properly reintegrated in order to prevent a renewed escalation 
of conflicts. The claim that the Acholi have long adhered to an alternative system 
of justice – “Acholi justice” – based on a “special capacity to forgive” became highly 
institutionalized and widely regarded as a way to resolve the complex relationships 
between Acholi victims and Acholi perpetrators resulting from the conflict (Allen, 
2006: 129). The basic argument brought forward by promoters of the traditional 
justice approach is probably best captured by an often cited quote from Pain’s re-
port. Pain writes (1997: 2):
“Acholi traditional resolution of conflict and violence stands among the high-
est practices anywhere in the world. After factual investigation, it requires 
acknowledgment of responsibility by the offender, followed by repentance 
and then payment of compensation, leading to reconciliation through mato 
oput, the shared drinking of a bitter juice from a common gourd. This prac-
tice of reconciliation lies at the heart of a traditional approach to ‘cooling’ 
142 According to Afako (2002: 66), by 2002 over 4,000 people across Uganda had applied for Am-
nesty.
143 This debate has been carried out and analyzed in numerous articles and books and can only be 
briefly summarized in this section. For an overview see Allen, 2006 and Branch, 2011: Chap. 6. 
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the situation and healing the land and restoring relationships, far beyond 
the limited approaches of conservative Western legal systems and a formal 
amnesty for offences against the state”.
Thus, the key to justice and reconciliation was seen in the revival, adaptation and 
extension of different ‘traditional’ rituals designed for reconciling clans and indi-
viduals after conflict. Traditional authorities were regarded as key actors in carry-
ing out these rituals (cf. Liu Institute for Global Issues, 2005: iif.; Afako, 2002: 67; 
Mato Oput Project, 2009: 8). Despite the diversity and complexity of reconciliation 
rituals in Acholi society (cf. Allen, 2010: 251; cf. Harlacher, 2009: 175ff.; Acirokop, 
2010: 276f.), one specific ritual – mato oput – was singled out and became a syn-
onym for reconciliation and “a sort of euphemism for healing rites or blessings per-
formed by the rwodi moo (anointed chiefs), which promote reintegration of former 
LRA combatants into society by offering ‘forgiveness’” (Allen, 2006: 134; cf. also 
Acirokop, 2010: 277; Harlacher, 2009: 186).
According to widespread opinion among the Acholi, which was also cited to 
me by my interlocutors, mato oput was originally a ritual to reconcile clans after a 
member of one clan had been killed by a member of the other clan. It centred on the 
principles of confession, compensation and reconciliation. Relationships between 
the two clans were re-established after the offender’s clan had claimed responsibility 
for the killing and paid compensation to the victim’s clan (Harlacher, 2009: 186ff.). 
Acirokop (2010: 277) describes mato oput as follows:
“Mato oput literally means ‘drinking bitter root’, as it is made from the 
ground, bitter roots of the oput tree, which is common in Acholi. The cer-
emony aims at reestablishing relationships suspended between two clans in 
response to a killing, whether deliberate or accidental. Participants share this 
bitter drink at the peak of the ceremony, at the end of a long process of con-
fession, mediation and payment of compensation. Essential to the process is 
the willingness of the offender’s clan (not the offender as an individual) to 
assume responsibility for the act committed and a readiness and ability to 
pay compensation.”
In the evolving peace-building discourse in Northern Uganda in the mid-1990s, 
the ideas of reconciliation and forgiveness underlying mato oput were seen to epito-
mize the principle of Acholi traditional justice. Mato oput was regarded as a solution 
to the problem of reconciling victims and perpetrators from the same community. 
By the mid-2000s, mato oput rituals were being performed on a large scale through-
out Northern Uganda, often accompanied, financed and promoted by Western de-
velopment organizations and the Western media (Allen, 2010: 249; Peachey, 2012: 
298ff.).
Many authors have pointed out, how mato oput came to be re-invented by do-
nors and traditional authorities. In order to suit the conflict situation in Northern 
Uganda, the original meaning of the ritual had to be altered. The focus was no 
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longer on reconciling two clans but on re-establishing relations between individuals 
and their communities. Compensation payments to the communities were often 
disbursed by Western donors, rather than by the offenders themselves, as the latter 
did not have the means (Pain, 1997: 3). This led some observers (e.g. Allen, 2010: 
250) to conclude that the widespread acceptance of the mato oput rituals was mainly 
due to the availability of donations.
There have been extended debates about the benefits and downsides of the re-in-
vention of mato oput, which are too complex to recapitulate here (for an overview cf. 
Acirokop, 2010; Wansonga, 2009; Mato Oput Project, 2009; RLP, 2005). Sceptics 
have often pointed out that it was not possible to adapt the ritual to the war context, 
while supporters have argued that the principles and symbolic meanings underlying 
mato oput were crucial to ‘rebuilding’ Acholi society and should thus be promoted 
(Liu Institute for Global Issues, 2005: iii).
During my own research, I rarely came to discuss mato oput and the ‘invention’ 
of traditional justice with my interlocutors. The peak time of these debates had been 
during the last years of the war and in the immediate post-war phase, and I felt that 
everything had been said on this issue. Among the young people I worked with the 
revival of other aspects of “traditional culture” – especially traditional dances and the 
wango-o – were considered more important and relevant to their current lives. In the 
remaining section, I will focus on these aspects.
The Revival of Traditional Dances4.5.3. 
The younger people I worked with in Gulu had various opinions on the question 
whether “traditional culture” should be revived (which will be further discussed in 
chapter 5). Some idealized the past and dreamed of a return to social order, intact 
social relations and established cultural practices, rules and norms. Others saw the 
change in lifestyle, which they felt had occurred across Acholiland and especially in 
the urban areas in the past years, as a sign of progress and modernity and did not 
want to return to the old ways of life. There were two aspects of “traditional culture”, 
however, which were nearly unanimously regarded as positive, and which nearly all 
young people hoped would be revived: traditional dances and the wango-o. In the 
following section, I will concentrate on the former, as I have already discussed the 
subject of wango-o earlier144.
144 As stated earlier, people saw the decline of the wango-o tradition in the camps as one of the main 
reasons for the loss of Acholi culture. During the time of my research, there were different at-
tempts to revive the wango-o. Donors involved in ‘post-conflict peace-building’ had discovered 
wango-o as a means to foster peace, societal reconciliation and ‘cultural revival’ (for an account 
of recent attempts by NGOs to reinstall the wango-o tradition, see Cagney, 2011). Some com-
munities, who had returned to their original villages from the camps, had restarted the practice 
(group interview Bungutera, 03.10.2010). However, the majority of the young people I encoun-
tered, both in town and in the villages, had not actually experienced the wango-o themselves and 
many did not believe that the practice could be revived. One of my interlocutors, a young man in 
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The topic of traditional dances has not been a major focus in the literature dealing 
with ‘cultural revival’145. This is somewhat surprising, because of the widespread 
popularity of traditional dances among all segments of the Acholi population and 
the extent of international and local attempts to set up and support so-called cul-
tural groups, which perform these dances and teach them to youth. During my 
research, I spent a lot of time working with youth cultural groups, especially one 
group, the Gulu Theatre Artists (GUTA, cf. Chap. 2). I watched their practice 
sessions, accompanied them to traditional dance competitions, and discussed the 
meaning and relevance of traditional dances with members of the group. The fol-
lowing analysis is largely based on my own observations on contemporary practices 
and interpretations of traditional dance, and on interviews and personal conversa-
tions in which this topic was discussed.
According to my interlocutors, the Acholi have a very rich dance culture and 
are widely known for their repertoire of traditional dances. In one of my first visits 
to GUTA (cf. field notes 14.03.2010), one of their members introduced me to the 
most popular and well-known dances of the Acholi and their specific functions:
Bwola,•	  the royal dance, which was originally performed only for the rwot but 
is nowadays performed whenever an important person comes to visit.
Ajere•	  and Larakaraka, both courtship dances, which were originally organized, 
so that boys and girls from different clans could meet and get to know poten-
tial marriage partners.
Dingi Dingi,•	  a dance for young girls.
Myel lyel,•	  a funeral dance, which was originally practiced during funeral 
ceremonies, especially those of “big people”, and is still sometimes performed 
today. (I was later explained that the funeral dance is performed to find out 
what killed the person who is being buried and to eliminate the source of evil, 
personal conversation cf. field notes, 26.06.2010).
Otole,•	  the war dance, which was practiced in the olden days to declare war on 
another tribe, but is rarely performed today (field notes 14.03.2010).
his early twenties, told me that it was mainly the Western NGOs who were calling on people to 
revive the wango-o, but that without the effort of these NGOs the wango-o tradition would even-
tually disappear. He cited a number of reasons why nowadays people were no longer interested 
in wango-o: there was electricity so people no longer needed to sit by the fire to have light; young 
people in town preferred watching TV and Western movies; and even in the villages people went 
to the disco halls or bars in the trading centers to “hang out” instead of sitting at the wango-o 
(personal conversation cf. field notes 30.03.2010). 
145 However, there is a well-known and internationally celebrated documentary film “War Dance” 
(Nix & Fine, 2007) about a group of children from Patongo IDP Camp who travel to Kampala 
for the national music and dance competition. 
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Bwola, Larakaraka, Ajere and Dingi Dingi were among the dances, which were 
most frequently performed in competitions and festivals. Others included Nanga 
and Apiti, both dances for married women (field notes 26.06.2010; cf. INT Simon, 
31.03.2010).
In the current discourses on Acholi culture, traditional dances have come to be 
regarded as one of the most important cultural practices of the Acholi. They are seen 
to represent the richness and vivacity of Acholi culture and are thus celebrated by 
all segments of Acholi society. In the context of ‘post-conflict peace-building’, the 
development community has also discovered traditional dance as an example of a 
positive and ‘harmless’ cultural practice, which can be easily supported in order to 
revive Acholi culture. In urban Gulu today, traditional dances are mainly performed 
for entertainment purposes – during music and art festivals, in competitions, but 
also during important political functions (e.g. election campaigns). Due to these 
public performances, traditional dance is one of the most visible and wide-known 
cultural practices.
Despite the high public visibility, many young people I talked to lamented that 
they only knew very little about the original functions of the dances and the way 
they were performed. Most had heard about the Bwola dance and the courtship 
dances, and many knew how to perform at least one or two of these. Some did not 
have any practical knowledge at all. My interlocutors sometimes complained to me 
that in former times all young people had known many different dances, because 
they were taught by elders or older youth in their communities, which was no longer 
the case today (personal conversations cf. field notes 14.03.2010; 20.06.2010; INT 
Ojok 31.03.2010; INT Elima, 09.04.2010; INT Denis, 16.04.2010; INT Martin, 
21.04.2010; INT Laurence 28.04.2010). One of my elder interviewees, Okello, 
once vividly explained to me how dance training for the young was provided at the 
wango-o:
“After people have eaten, they are satisfied, people are now fit. Children would 
just get in groups like that, then they would practice traditional dance. The 
big men [elders] would teach them, they would go, showing them how to 
dance Bwola. Then people would just stand in a circle like this, they begin 
the song, the movement, the up movement, the down movement, the move-
ment across, just inside like that [imitates the moves while speaking]. So chil-
dren would just learn traditional dance, the ladies would be assembled and 
the [older] ladies would teach [the younger girls]. The men would teach the 
boys. But in case of certain dances which need ladies to dance together with 
the men, the ladies will come, knowing their steps, and the boys also will 
know their steps. So when the boys are dancing there in the outside circle, 
the ladies always have the inside circle, then they dance with the same drum, 
but the movement will be the same…” (INT Okello, 26.09.2010).
Nowadays, rather than being taught by older relatives as described by Okello above, 
most young people are introduced to traditional dancing in school. Dance and 
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music classes are a compulsory part of the primary school curriculum and there 
are nation-wide competitions between students from different primary schools (cf. 
Cheney, 2007: Chap. 7; field notes 16.06.2010). Many of the dance and music 
teachers at school are specifically hired experts, who are also involved in tradi-
tional dancing outside of the school context – as trainers or chairpersons of cultural 
groups or as judges in dance competitions. Students thus learn about the existence 
of cultural groups from their teachers, and those who enjoy traditional dancing and 
wish to continue, often join one of these groups in order to intensify and practice 
their knowledge and skills (personal conversation, cf. field notes 20.03.2010). The 
majority of my interlocutors, who were members of a cultural group, had been in-
troduced to traditional dancing through school. When I asked them why they had 
joined a cultural group, I often got responses like the two following:
“I started liking this traditional thing, because you know in primary [school] 
they conduct what is called music festival. In music festival in primary they 
do all these kinds of activities, there is creative dance, there is traditional 
dance, there is Western piece [choir]146 (…) I was one of the participants in 
the music festival, so we went for several competitions, (…) so when I joined 
S1 [first class of secondary school], I joined this [cultural] group. I joined this 
[specific] group, because the person who was aiding the music department at 
that school was the chairperson of this group” (INT Odong, 04.05.2010).
“At first I was in the music festival, I was doing music at school, so I had 
interest in music. So from there I started feeling interest in cultural things, I 
joined [this group], now I am 12 years old in this group. I joined when I was 
in P7 [last year of primary school]… in 1999” (INT Innocent, 04.05.2010).
It seems that in their current form, cultural groups had only been started in North-
ern Uganda in the late 1990s (cf. INT Innocent, 04.05.2010). During this time, 
international donors involved in societal peace-building had been eager to support 
youth activities, especially for ‘vulnerable youths’ (i.e. those who had been formerly 
abducted by the LRA, and those living in the camps). Due to donor’s provision of 
funding (and attributable to their need to have local partner organizations), many 
local CBOs were founded, which started to carry out youth projects involving 
(among other things) sports activities, break-dance and traditional dance. These 
projects were seen both, as a means for healing youth from war traumas and as a 
means for ‘normalizing’ social relations. Traditional dance and music were further 
regarded as a means to support the revival of culture and thus became especially 
prominent.
146 Apart from “traditional” music and dance, students in primary school are also introduced to 
“Western” music, i.e. choir. In the nation-wide school competitions, traditional dance perfor-
mance is only one of the disciplines. Others include choir, drama, instrumental piece (i.e. a 
performance with “traditional instruments”), and “original composition”, i.e. the composition of 
an original song (cf. Cheney, 2007: Chap. 7).
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One of the most well-known organizations, which aimed to provide “life skills 
through health, formal education, play therapy and arts” to vulnerable children 
and youth in Gulu, was H.E.A.L.S (Health, Education, Arts, Literacy and Sports). 
H.E.A.L.S’s provided school sponsorships, health education and literacy classes 
as well as a “Play Therapy Program”, which offered traditional dance and music 
classes, sporting activities, and art classes (H.E.A.L.S., cf. http://www.facebook.
com/healsuganda?v=info, accessed 24.07.2012). Despite its popularity and initial 
success, H.E.A.L.S was no longer operating, when I did my field research in Gulu. 
According to one of my interlocutors, who had attended many of their programs, 
H.E.A.L.S. had been closed down due to mismanagement (personal conversation 
cf. field notes 22.05.2010).
By the time of my field work, donor support for youth activities had started to 
fade. Some youths, who had formerly participated in donor-funded youth projects, 
reported that many had been closed down due to lack of funding. One interlocu-
tor speculated that NGOs were pulling out of youth projects because many young 
people had returned to the villages. He believed that, because the returnees had 
restarted farming, the only programs donors were now concentrating on were agri-
cultural projects (personal conversations cf. field notes 14.03.2010; 22.05.2010).
Of all the former donor-funded youth activities, traditional dancing proved to 
be the most sustainable. Cultural groups, which had been formerly supported by 
donors, continued and were often re-organized by young people themselves. Older 
youth, often young men in their late teens and early twenties, organized the practice 
sessions and trained the younger members of the group. They also arranged for the 
groups to participate in competitions and festivals or to perform at weddings, funer-
als or business functions. The latter were important income-generating activities, 
which were needed by the groups to compensate the cut in donor-funding. While 
many cultural groups still received smaller amounts of support by external donors 
(often, for instance, donors paid the school fees of members or financed specific 
programs such as the organization of the Miss Acholi Event), the money was not 
enough to cover the rent for office and training venues, for costumes and instru-
ments, or to pay the fees to enter competitions (personal conversation cf. field notes 
17.12.2010).
Members of the cultural groups, especially those in leading positions, often saw 
their role as preservers of Acholi tradition. My interlocutors sometimes stated that 
without cultural groups young people (especially those in town) would simply for-
get about Acholi traditions and cultural practices. They lamented that many of their 
peers only knew “the Western culture” and further claimed that the urban lifestyle 
was spoiling their generation. The following two quotations are exemplary:
“In fact, they don’t know [young people today who are not in cultural groups 
no longer know their culture], because they lead this life like Westerners. 
They like picking the style from the Westerners… Like for my case and him, 
Odong [points to his friend], we like cultural groups. Other people, they pre-
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fer going for clubbing rather than [joining a] cultural group, they like [disco] 
music better than this cultural group. Yet cultural group, it has more value 
than going for clubs, for disco…” (INT Innocent, 04.05.2010).
“At least for us we are lucky, because we are just in a cultural group. We don’t 
go in for other things like stealing, (…) all those things, taking drugs… But 
other people, who are idle, they are just outside there. They are so many (…) 
mostly youths, not old people, but mostly youths, you find them there, tak-
ing drugs, (…) all those kind of things (…) If you do your research a little, 
you find that people who are in groups, in cultural groups, their lifestyle is 
different from people who are outside there. Because they teach you morals, 
behavior, on how to conduct yourself, and the way you should behave to the 
whole community. So you find that people who are here, in cultural groups, 
you see the way they behave it is quite different, it is quite different to people 
who are outside” (INT Odong, 04.05.2010).
However, my interlocutors also recognized that the opportunities of preserving 
Acholi culture through cultural groups were limited. They acknowledged that 
many of the cultural practices they were trying to promote were very different from 
the way they had been practiced in former times. The meaning and context of tra-
ditional dances, for instance, had been fundamentally altered in response to vari-
ous internal and external influences throughout the war years. Cagney (2011: 31) 
illustrates this ‘problem’ with reference to the Bwola dance:
“Another example of this dilemma, and the changing context of dance, is 
in the iconic Bwola dance. Not only are the costume pieces expensive, its 
performance has been made much more public and less exclusive than in 
the past. Dances were not meant for entertainment for a crowd of strangers. 
Most of them serve a functional purpose. (…) [T]he Bwola was only per-
formed for royal events, not for outsiders. Now, the Bwola may be performed 
in national dance competitions, celebrations, or when heads of state visit 
from other countries.”
In a similar vein, my interlocutors often pointed out that most of the traditional 
dances were nowadays performed for entertainment purposes only. As an exam-
ple, they usually mentioned the courtship dances. They explained that in former 
times these had served as an important social setting, where young people could 
meet their future husbands and wives, while today young people met at school 
or in disco halls and no longer followed the original courtship procedures (INT 
Okello 26.09.2010; INT Simon, 31.03.2010; personal conversations cf. field notes 
14.03.2010; 08.05.2010; 20.06.2010).
Another commonly mentioned example of a tradition in change was the funeral 
rite (see above) and its corresponding funeral dance Myel lyel. The Myel lyel originally 
had a spiritual purpose (i.e. to find out who or what had killed the deceased and to 
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eliminate the source of evil), but was nowadays performed by dance groups, which 
were hired and paid for their performance. In the words of one of my interviewees:
“There are things that are difficult to revive. I think people just abandon 
them, things that… I have seen for example practices like funeral rites, yeah, 
that one, it is there, it is on, but it is modernized in a way. We used to have 
the drums and all this, now what I see happening is: [People say] ‘we’re go-
ing to have a funeral rite of the late bla bla [substitute for the name of the 
deceased person]’, several of them. And then they make announcements and 
people gather and then maybe dance and so forth. The traditional way would 
be to bring on drums and people sing and dance for one night or two. What 
now happens is you hire a public dance team and you go and play disco. Peo-
ple still dance, and so I think even if the principle is still there, but the real 
practice has changed, it is different” (INT Rocki, 16.03.2010).
Apart from the desire to contribute to ‘cultural revival’, for most of my interlocutors 
traditional dance was also an opportunity to enter social realms that were normally 
not accessible for young people of a poorer background. Being a member of a cul-
tural group provided them with the prospect of traveling to exclusive and/or distant 
places, and offered the chance to gain recognition and prestige. When I asked one 
of my interviewees whether Acholi traditions were still important for him he an-
swered:
“Yes, yes, the reason why I say it is still important [is the following]: those 
days I don’t used to know those big people like RDCs [Resident District 
Commissioner], other big people. But when they hire us for dances, that 
is the opportunity, we get to see them and talk to them, like RDC Walter 
Ochora [the RDC of Gulu at the time], or [Norbert] Mao, the chairman 
of Gulu District. In 2008, the German president Horst Köhler, he came to 
Gulu, we appeared in the newspaper with him, we went in Bouma Hotel [one 
of the most expensive hotels in Gulu], and we danced. He came and shook 
my hand and we talked (…) It [culture] is still important for me, cause I get 
the opportunity of seeing where I would not see if I was not in the [cultural] 
group, so I still like it and I still do it (…) If the other deal works out well, we 
are going up to Sweden for a show (…) These people like traditional dances 
(…) When I was in O-Level [first four years of secondary school] I was elect-
ed entertainment prefect, simply because of the traditional dances I do (…) 
When I get back to the school, in A-level [last two years of secondary school] 
there, they still wanted to elect me entertainment prefect, because I used to 
do things that make them happy” (INT Simon, 31.03.2010).
Apart from gaining new experiences and social acknowledgment, successful cultur-
al groups also had the chance to make some extra money. Through performances at 
business functions, weddings or in tourist locations they could easily earn 150,000 
UGX (approximately 50 Euro) or more. Even more profitable were the prize moneys 
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offered in big dance competitions, for instance by Senator (a beer-brewing com-
pany) or Radio Rupiny (a local radio station). According to my interlocutors, the 
winner of these competitions could earn between one and six million Ugandan 
Shilling, i.e. up to 2,000 Euro (personal conversations cf. field notes 26.06.2010; 
17.12.2010; 03.01.2011). I sometimes had the impression that the prospect of win-
ning so much money paralleled or even superseded the primary motivation of the 
cultural groups of being cultural ambassadors. It was also a reason for the fierce 
competition between different cultural groups (cf. field notes 22.05.2010; 30.05. 
2010; 26.06.2010; 28.11.2010; 17.12.2010; 03.01.2010). The following is an extract 
from my field notes, which deals with this issue:
“We (Odong, Innocent, David and me) talk about the Senator competition: 
Odong tells me that some years ago GUTA was second at the National finals 
and received 1.5 million Shillings. He says the winner received six million and 
adds that the money is the main reason why everyone likes Senator so much. 
‘At least they pay you well unlike in other competitions.’ The three guys tell me 
about a competition, which used to be held in Kampala every year and which 
was sponsored by the Italian government. One cultural group from each district 
Illustration 1: Radio Rupiny Traditional Dance Competition at Kaunda Grounds, Gulu  
(photo by author)
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used to perform there and the whole event took a week. All participating groups 
received free food, transport and accommodation. ‘But’, so the guys complain, 
‘there wasn’t any money to win and it was therefore really a waste of efforts to 
participate in the event. Even the winners only got trophies’. I am surprised and 
say that staying in Kampala for free for a whole week is already quite a good deal, 
whereupon Odong replies that they actually ‘perform to get money and not just 
for fun’…” (field notes 03.01.2010).
This extract shows that locally organized and seemingly ‘pure’ attempts to revive 
Acholi culture, such as those by the cultural groups, were also influenced by ma-
terial interests, and irrespective of the enthusiasm and the genuine motivation of 
many Acholi involved in these groups, also served particular interests.
The preceding analyses have shown the ambiguity and creativity of contem-
porary attempts to revive ‘traditional culture’ in Gulu. While the loss of Acholi 
culture is generally perceived as a very serious matter with profound social, ethi-
cal and moral implications, not all attempts to revive the culture are unanimously 
celebrated by the Acholi people. Especially the large projects which were supported 
and sometimes initiated by the international donor community were regarded with 
scepticism as they seemed to mainly serve the interests of some key actors in Acholi 
society. Irrespective of their underlying motivation to revive Acholi culture, these 
projects were always also opportunities to make money, to gain status and respect 
and to influence current discourses and dynamics. Local attempts to revive Acholi 
culture, such as the formation of cultural groups and the pervasiveness of traditional 
dances, were extremely popular and regarded with less skepticism. But upon closer 
inspection, even these attempts, just like the revival of traditional authorities and 
traditional justice, were in many ways “inventions of tradition” (Hobsbawm, 1983) 
which served particular interests.
Concluding Remarks:  4.6. 
Contemporary Discourses on Acholi Culture
In the preceding chapter, I have dissected older as well as contemporary notions of 
Acholi culture. In the first part, I cited accounts from earlier ethnographies writ-
ten by social scientists and local ethnographers, which have contributed to shaping 
contemporary representations of Acholi culture. Thereafter, I discussed what Acholi 
people today mean when they speak of “traditional culture in those days” and ana-
lyzed how they perceive socio-cultural changes, which have occurred in the past 
decades and which they largely attribute to the war and the displacement situation 
in Acholiland. Lastly, I have given a brief overview of current attempts to revive 
and ‘re-invent’ Acholi culture. Throughout the chapter, I have made extensive use 
of direct quotes in order to give the reader a more vivid insight into contemporary 
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discourses on Acholi culture and to present some of the multiple voices involved in 
the production and reproduction of these discourses.
As discussed, the issue of reviving culture was widely debated among all seg-
ments of Acholi society. However, most of my interlocutors, both young and old, 
doubted that “traditional culture” could be completely revived because people had 
become accustomed to a new way of living during the war years. Some were con-
cerned that especially the younger generation might not be interested in returning 
to a lifestyle as rural farmers because they felt more attracted to a “modern”, “West-
ern” and urban life. In the words of one of my interlocutors:
“So you find that although people have already gone back to their homes 
and their villages, people I don’t think they are going to revive the culture. 
People are so much addicted. Even others they don’t want to go back to the 
villages, they just want to remain in the camps, because in the camps you 
have so many things: the video halls, the bars, all those… So they want to 
stick to that kind of life and don’t want to go back to the villages and again 
digging…” (INT Laurence, 28.04.2010).
The people in urban Gulu generally seemed to believe that those Acholi, who had 
returned to their villages, had a better chance of reviving old practices and conven-
tions than the people living in town. But they always asserted that this would take 
time and that many of the changes caused by the camp interregnum were irrevers-
ible. When I asked Okello whether he thought that “traditional Acholi culture” 
could be revived, he said:
“Not really, because the ideology that the children and the parents got from 
this insurgency are sticking in their minds. They cannot really go back to 
this original lifestyle, they cannot. But because they will have something to 
do at home, it will be reduced, the careless life will be reduced. Because now 
people who have gone back to the village have got self-employment, they are 
employing themselves, you find boys are just cultivating land, they are plant-
ing cassava, sugar cane, like that. They get small small money and it goes in 
their pocket, so they are now self-independent. It is now much better than 
the time when people were in the camp” (INT Okello 26.09.2010).
When my interlocutors spoke about the situation in town, they usually assumed that 
there the attempts to revive or preserve Acholi cultural practices were more difficult 
to reconcile with the daily routines of the people. This might explain why initiatives 
to revive Acholi culture often concentrated on specific, extra-ordinary events. A 
vivid example of such an event is the Miss Acholi Contest which I described in the 
beginning of this chapter. The event revealed both the enormous importance that 
is attributed to Acholi culture as well as the creativity in the attempts to preserve 
and revive it. The fact that the Miss Acholi Contest was “not a conventional beauty 
contest”, but a “competition about cultural knowledge”, reflects the widespread 
feeling that it is no longer self-evident for the younger generation to “know their 
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culture”. On the contrary, the assumption underlying events like the Miss Acholi 
Contest was that young people need to be encouraged to re-learn the “traditions” 
of their forefathers and -mothers. One could thus argue that such events serve to 
advertize Acholi culture in order to render it more attractive to young people, and 
to demonstrate how Acholi cultural practices can be combined with a ‘modern’, 
urban lifestyle. Hence, in contrast to the hegemonic discourse, which proclaims that 
“traditional Acholi culture” as it was in “those days” has been lost and thus seems to 
imply a uniformity and unchangeability of Acholi culture, in practice, imaginations 
of Acholi culture are innovatively adapted to fit people’s lived realities.
I will turn to this matter in more detail in the following two chapters, where 
I show that different social groups have different opinions on the question whether 
Acholi culture should be revived. I will discuss how socio-cultural change and ‘cul-
tural revival’ are negotiated in urban Acholi society today – between the younger 
and the older generations, between men and women, and between richer and poorer 
segments of the population – and will focus on the conflicting imaginations of a 
future society and the social conflicts which erupt on this matter between different 
interest groups.

Between “Tradition” & “Modernity”5.  
Cultural Styles & Discourses on Socio-Cultural Change 
Among the War Generation in Urban Gulu
In this chapter, I analyze how young people in Gulu position themselves in dis-
courses on Acholi culture and how they evaluate the changes Acholi society is seen 
to be undergoing. I discuss the various strategies they adopt in dealing with a situa-
tion of cultural flux and uncertainty. The chapter intends to illustrate how youth in 
Gulu, particularly members of the war generation, strategically react and contribute 
to contemporary discourses on socio-cultural change in post-war Acholi society. 
I show that, on the one hand, members of the war generation experience socio-
cultural changes in a similar way, while on the other hand their interpretations of 
and reactions to change are also dependent on individual characteristics, situational 
context and, related, societal power constellations and dynamics. In support of my 
research hypothesis, I explicate that members of the war generation experience their 
current situation as being torn between conflicting notions of tradition and moder-
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nity and that, as a result, many feel ambivalent about the way they imagine their 
future society and about the role they are to play in realizing this society.
Youth Perspectives on Socio-Cultural Change5.1. 
In the previous chapter, I outlined the hegemonic discourse on Acholi culture 
which proclaims that “traditional Acholi culture” as it was in “those days” has been 
lost through war and displacement. I discussed the multiple voices and authorities 
involved in the construction of this discourse and already hinted at the fact that the 
understanding of Acholi culture and the role it is to play in contemporary and future 
Acholi society are heavily contested among different groups of actors within (and 
outside of) Acholi society. When looking at some of the literature about the post-
war-situation in Northern Uganda, especially NGO-reports, one can easily get the 
impression that the ‘retraditionalization project’ is widely supported by all members 
of Acholi society. However, when engaging with the matter more thoroughly, it be-
comes evident that support for reviving Acholi culture (or certain aspects thereof) 
is strongly dependent on the background of the speaker (as regarding for instance 
gender, class, age) and the context, in which he or she is asked to comment on the 
matter. In this chapter, I focus on urban youth and specifically on members of the 
“war generation” with whom I worked in Gulu. I address the following question 
(and related sub-questions), which is central for my study:
How do members of the war generation perceive changes in Acholi society and  →
(how) do they position themselves as agents or ‘victims’ of these socio-cultural 
changes?
How have their life experiences influenced their understanding of Acholi cul-•	
ture and values?
How do they picture their individual futures and the future of Acholi soci-•	
ety?
How do they react to the expectations directed at them by older members of •	
Acholi society?
I argue, as others (e.g. Branch, 2008: 16) have done, that although there is a general 
concern among all members of Acholi society about the perceived loss of their cul-
ture, the main proponents of ‘cultural revival’ and a return to the old life are adults 
and elders. Young people, as I have shown in the example of the cultural groups in 
the previous chapter, do take an active part in and support the discourse on cultural 
revival. However, due to the specific situation they have been confronted with in 
the past and the specific challenges and opportunities they face today and regarding 
their future, their position on the whole is somewhat different from that of the adult 
and elder population.
Between “Tradition” & “Modernity”  185
On a theoretical level, one can apply Mannheim’s concept of historical genera-
tions (1972: 288ff.), and argue that the young generation’s “similarity of location” 
in time, space and the social whole offers them new perspectives and experiences 
which are different from those of former generations. Based on my emprirical in-
sights and as stated in the introduction, I assume that the generation which grew up 
during the turbulent years of the war (especially those born between the mid-80s 
and early 1990s) has developed a distinctive generational consciousness, which has 
led its members to re-orient their practices, attitudes, feelings and to engage dif-
ferently with accumulated social and cultural heritages when compared to former 
generations147. Within the historical generation of urban youth in Gulu, however, 
one can make out different responses to and interpretations of the ongoing socio-
cultural changes, which I will analyze more thoroughly throughout this chapter. 
Mannheim uses the term “generation units” to refer to those generational sub-
groups which share an “identity of responses” (Mannheim, 1972: 306), i.e. similar 
convictions how to respond to a particular historical situation. I will not apply the 
term, however, because the different perspectives on socio-cultural change I found 
among the young generation in Gulu did not map neatly onto distinct groups or 
units, but – as I will argue in the course of this chapter – were among other things 
also dependent on situational context.
In the debates on socio-cultural change which I discuss throughout this and the 
following chapter, one frequently finds references to “tradition” and “modernity”. 
From a social science perspective, both are very problematic and contested terms, 
which have undergone many shifts in recent decades. Up until the 1980s, tradi-
tion was generally understood as an inherited legacy which establishes continuity 
with the past (cf. Otto & Pedersen, 2005: 12). Following Weber, tradition was 
taken to imply the opposite of modernity and rationality, and was seen as charac-
teristic of non-Western societies (Appiah, 1991: 343). This ‘commonsense’ meaning 
of tradition still exists today, mainly outside of anthropological circles. But many 
anthropologists and other social scientists have over the years attempted to refine 
and redefine this notion of tradition as it has proven empirically and theoretically 
inadequate (Handler & Linnekin, 1984: 273; for a summary of these debates see 
Otto & Pedersen, 2005, and Hermann, 2011: 3ff.).
Just like tradition, the concept of modernity has undergone several shifts in 
meaning and can refer to a plethora of things. On the one hand, modernity is used 
to refer to a historical epoch, characterized by scientific, technological and intellec-
tual innovations, industrialization, insetting capitalism and the establishment of the 
modern nation state which started in Western Europe throughout the 15th and 18th 
century. On the other hand, modernity has increasingly come to be understood as a 
147 According to Mannheim (1972: 293f.), every new generation establishes “fresh contact” with the 
already existing social and cultural heritage but with a different attitude than former generations. 
Thus, every generation assimilates accumulated heritages differently and selects different cultural 
elements to be kept and others to be forgotten.
186 Julia Vorhölter: Youth at the Crossroads
concept, which contains specific institutions, practices and ways of thinking about 
the world including democracy, a capitalist market economy, science-based technol-
ogies and ‘rational discourse’ (Wittrock, 2000). In the 1990s, social scientists started 
to criticize such Western-centered conceptualizations of modernity and a debate 
emerged on the possibility of alternative, multiple, subjectively and culturally de-
fined modernities (e.g. Knauft, 2002, Appadurai, 1996; Eisenstadt, 2000, Wittrock, 
2000). These debates were of particular relevance to anthropologists working in 
non-Western parts of the world where they were confronted with local versions and 
discourses of modernity.
Among Africanist scholars, a new focus has emerged in the study of tradition 
and modernity since the 1990s, which concentrates on emic discourses within Af-
rica (cf. for instance Comaroff & Comaroff, 1993; Ferguson, 1999; Kratz, 1993; 
Gable, 2000; Geissler & Prince, 2010). Modernity and tradition are seen to have 
become “highly problematic terms, meaningful only at a very high level of abstrac-
tion, but of little use as concepts guiding empirical research and critical enquiry” 
(Probst et al., 2002: 10), and are thus understood as being “contingent” (ibid.: 10f.). 
Recent studies, including my own research, reveal that in emic discourses a very 
normative and ambivalent meaning has been attached to modernity and tradition 
(cf. Ciaffa, 2008: 122f.). On the one hand, modernity is seen as a blessing, a sign of 
progress and an ideal to be pursued. On the other hand, one can find strong support 
for attempts to ‘retraditionalize’ African societies and proponents of these attempts 
often regard modernity as an abomination, which has destroyed local traditions and 
created rather than solved the problems people face today (Geschiere et al., 2008b: 
1). The ambivalence inherent in the two concepts and the diverse ways they are 
applied and negotiated in different African contexts and among different actors lie 
at the heart of the current debates in anthropology (and beyond). In the following 
two chapters, I will relate to these debates, when I discuss notions of tradition and 
modernity among my interlocutors in Gulu. I will show how the two terms have 
come to be central reference points in discourses on Acholi culture and the future of 
Acholi society. As with other ‘problematic’ concepts I discuss throughout this book, 
like culture (cf. Chap. 4), I concentrate on the emic conceptualizations of tradi-
tion and modernity among my interlocutors. Thereby, I loosely draw on Hermann’s 
(2011) concept of tradition (and modernity148) as “context-bound articulations” 
which she delineates as follows:
“The meanings ascribed to cultural traditions constantly shift in the course 
of interactions between people and their ideas, actions and objects. They are 
always articulated from specific perspectives that social actors have staked 
out within historically developed interconnectivities and multifaceted power 
relations. Being formed and expressed in relation to particular circumstanc-
148 Hermann only applies the concept in the context of debates on tradition, but I argue that notions 
of modernity can similarly be understood as “context-bound articulations”.
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es, they can be said to articulate the specific contexts in which interactions 
take place” (Hermann, 2011: 1).
Based on this idea, I analyze how young people in Gulu attribute certain meanings 
to concepts like tradition and modernity, which they use to articulate their past, 
present and future imaginations of Acholi society.
I introduce this chapter with a further extract from my field notes which de-
scribes my first visit to Herm’s Club, a night club in Gulu, which at the time of 
my research was extremely popular among youths. I selected the extract to give a 
very vivid insight into (one aspect of ) contemporary youth culture in Gulu, which 
contrasts starkly with the representations of ‘traditional’ Acholi lifestyle and prac-
tices depicted in the former chapter, in order to give the reader an impression of the 
broad spectrum of youth cultural practices in Gulu. Following and complementing 
this particularistic ethnographic introduction, I characterize the generation of urban 
young people who were born and raised during the war years and who live in Gulu 
Municipality today (cf. also introduction). I also point out important differentiating 
factors between members of this generation.
In the subsequent part of the chapter, I first discuss youth practices and behaviors 
with regard to Ferguson’s (1999) concept of “cultural styles”. Thereafter, I focus on 
discourses on culture and socio-cultural change among the young generation. I delin-
eate four ‘prototypical’ positions young people adopt regarding this subject: a desire 
to retraditionalize Acholi society, a desire to modernize Acholi society, ambivalence 
or creativity.
The data underlying the analyses in the chapter are based on participant observa-
tion, personal conversations, interviews as well as a questionnaire149. The combina-
tion of these different research methods, especially the combination of interviewing 
and observing, revealed to me how youth in Gulu strategically conjured different 
facets of identity depending on the setting they were in and the power constellations 
involved. Throughout this and the following chapter, I discuss the complexities of 
analyzing and understanding youth practices and discourses against the backdrop of 
shifting societal expectations, different power influences as well as local and global 
discourses.
149 I distributed the questionnaire to approximately 100 youth in Gulu Municipality (cf. Chap. 2). 
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Hip Hop Contest at Herm’s Club –  5.2. 
Extracts from my Field Notes
April 1st, 2010. 6.30 pm. I am waiting in front of “Da Pub”, a tavern in the center of 
Gulu Town, to meet Lisa, a MA student from Marburg who wants to talk to me about 
her research in Gulu150. While I am waiting, I bump into Simon, who is coming home 
from a traditional dance practice at his school and we start talking. When Lisa arrives, I 
introduce her to Simon and he joins us for some drinks. After we have chatted for a while, 
Simon becomes very absorbed into watching “La Tormenta”, a Latin American soap on 
the TV playing behind us, and Lisa and I exchange some thoughts about our respective 
researches.
It is Thursday night and I remember that Akello had asked me to meet her at 
Herm’s Club, a local night club, where she will be performing in a hip hop competition. 
I have never been to the club before, but Simon says he knows it very well. So I ask 
Lisa and Simon whether they would be interested in joining me and watching Akello’s 
performance. Around 10pm we leave Da Pub and walk to Herm’s Club through the dark 
streets of Gulu. Simon leads the way and tells us that he also performs in the hip hop 
contests sometimes. I am really surprised that so many young people know about these 
contests, and I think to myself that I cannot believe that Simon, who always seems rather 
quiet and does not really seem to have quite the right ‘hip hop style’, would actually 
perform on stage in front of a crowd.
We pay the entrance fee of 1,000 UGX (approximately 0.35 Euro151) and enter the club. 
Downstairs, there are two bars, one at the back and one at the side. The stage is at the far 
side of the room. On the dance floor, in front of the stage, several lines of plastic chairs 
have been set up and Lisa and I sit down on two of them (Simon has briefly gone home 
to get changed). The first thing we both notice is that there are mainly guys around 
us, and that we are the only two munu (white people). The club is still fairly empty and 
although it is already 11pm the competition has not yet started. Akello, who had told me 
to be there by 9pm, is not there. A Premiere League football game is playing on one of 
the TVs and several young guys seem to be watching it. On the side of the club, near the 
bar, a group of five or six women in their 20s is sitting on high chairs around a table. They 
are all wearing extremely tight and short pants and tops and a lot of make-up. I have to 
think that most of my Acholi interlocutors would probably identify them as “prostitutes” 
straight away, and even to me they look very different from the average Acholi women 
I have seen in public. The women are joined by some men, some of whom seem quite a 
bit older, maybe in their late 40s. The table is full of empty bottles of alcohol.
150 In the context of my work at IPSS, I occasionally met some of the international students and re-
searchers, who came to IPSS to collect information on the war and the current situation in Gulu 
(cf. Chap. 2). 
151 There is also a “VIP area” upstairs, which would cost 5,000 UGX (for information on the average 
income in Gulu cf. Chap. 4 and figure 3 in the appendix). 
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The music is playing so loud that one can hardly talk, so Lisa and I just observe our 
surroundings. Occasionally, guys come up to us to talk or just sit next to us. I know one 
or two of them from the hip hop group. Slowly, more people start coming in and after 
some time Simon is also back. He is wearing a pink hoodie-jacket and a pink hip hop cap, 
which makes him look even more out of place than before. He says he wants to register 
for the contest, but then finds out that it is the monthly final today and only those who 
previously qualified will be allowed to perform. Simon seems to know quite a few people 
in the club and talks to some of them.
At 11.30pm, two MCs enter the stage to announce that the contest will be starting 
soon. Most of the plastic chairs are taken by now, but Akello is still nowhere to be seen. 
The audience is made up largely of young men, probably in their teens and early twenties. 
Simon says he knows many of them from school. I am surprised, because I somehow 
imagined the hip hop scene in Gulu to be quite marginal and that most of these kids 
would be out-of-school youths, who have nothing better to do on a Thursday night than 
hang around in places like this. More and more, I get the impression that hip hop is a vital 
part of urban (male) youth culture in Gulu and I wonder when this trend started.
Finally, the show begins. The first part consists of playback performances for 
which anyone could sign up. The second part will be the final of the so-called “lifeline” 
competition in which the participants perform their self-composed raps on stage. I learn 
that the preliminaries for the lifeline contest take place every Thursday and that the best 
two competitors qualify for the final which is held on the last Thursday of each month.
The playback competition starts. The two MCs call out the names of the people who 
have registered and give them a microphone. Each contestant gets to perform only one 
song. No girl has signed up152. Most of the guys on stage have chosen US-American rap 
songs and look like they are trying hard to imitate the ‘gangsta style’, well-known from 
US-American rap videos. Even the stage names some of the performers have chosen are 
copied from US-American rap artists like Nas, 2Pac or 50 Cent. They are wearing baggy 
pants, caps, wide shirts, and skater shoes. From the look of their clothes one can infer 
whether they are from a poorer or richer background – at least I think so, because some 
of the clothes seem very new and ‘stylish’, while others have designed their outfit from 
torn rags.
To me, the atmosphere on stage and in the club seems ‘ultra-masculine’. Some of the 
gestures by the performers are extremely sexist and, judging from a woman’s perspective, 
actually quite offensive. Nearly all the performers grab their crotch and/or imitate obvious 
sexual movements. One guy, who seems highly intoxicated, is especially extreme. His 
huge baggy pants has a big hole around his crotch and at one point of his performance 
he flips out his penis, while he is scratching himself and making unmistakable sexual 
movements. I have to laugh to myself when, in this context of aggressive masculinity, I 
suddenly notice that one of the MCs is wearing a t-shirt, sponsored by UNIFEM, which 
152 During some of my later visits to Herm’s Club I do occasionally witness performances by girls, 
but they are comparatively very rare
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has the slogan “Fathers should accompany their wives to antenatal care” written in 
capital letters across the back.
There are some few performers who do not engage in this chauvinist behavior and 
rather seem to expose their ‘soft and romantic side’. They have chosen R&B or dancehall 
songs and their performances are more reminiscent of soft rock videos than of gangsta 
rap, which seems a little strange in this context. Most of the performers seem intoxicated 
(by alcohol and maybe other substances?153), which negatively affects their performances. 
One guy nearly falls of the stage and is not allowed to perform any further. Towards the 
end of most songs people from the audience walk up to the stage to put coins or small 
notes into the pockets of the contestants as a sign of appreciation.
While the contest on the stage is continuing, I observe some ‘interesting’ side-
incidences: one very drunk guy is getting kicked out of the club after screaming around 
and trying to pick a fight; two young couples are more or less falling over each other, 
exposing far too much skin and intimacy than would generally be considered appropriate 
for a public location in Uganda. All in all, the whole situation in the club to me seems very 
bizarre and so different to anything I have seen and learned so far about Acholi culture. 
I wonder whether this is what older people mean when they say that Acholi values have 
been lost among the young generation.
After what seems like an endless amount of playback performers, the first part of 
the show is over. But before the lifeline contest starts, there are some more acts for 
entertaining the crowd. At first, three women perform a dance act on stage. I guess 
they are in their early 20s. They are wearing very short hot pants and very short tops, 
combined with what looks like football socks pulled up to their knees – again very unlike 
the conventional dress codes for Acholi women. Similar to their male precedents, their 
dance is highly sexualized, but in this context it does not seem emancipatory but rather 
very degrading to the girls, who do not look as if they feel very comfortable with their 
performance. Many guys go up on the stage and put money into the girls’ pockets. Some 
actually touch the girls in very inappropriate ways and one guy even licks the girl’s legs 
and pants. While some young guys in the crowd cheer and encourage the guy to push 
things further, Simon and many others seem to find this sort of behavior very disgusting 
and Lisa, who is sitting next to me, just looks at me – in disbelief…
After the girls have left the stage, the MCs announce a comedy act. Two young guys, 
who are dressed in very strange costumes (both are wearing stockings with G-Strings 
and very tight shirts, one of them has a pillow under his shirt to make him look pregnant) 
and have white paint in their faces, enter the stage. Basically their whole performance 
is centered on imitating a sexual act on stage, in various positions. I am not quite sure 
what to make of the performance and it seems to me that many people in the audience 
feel likewise.
After the guys have left the stage, it is finally time for the lifeline competition we have 
been waiting for. It is nearly 1 am. The MCs call the eight finalists onto the stage. Only 
153 According to one of my interviewee, alcohol, marihuana and khat were the most commonly con-
sumed drugs among urban youth (INT Joseph, 14.12.2010).
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now do I notice Akello who must have arrived in the meantime. She is the only woman 
in the contest. The performances start. Each contestant gets some background beats 
and has to fit his/her self-composed raps to match the beats. Most of the raps are in 
English and again strongly remind me of US-American rap songs. Only Akello and one 
other guy rap in Acholi. Akello is the sixth performer. She seems very nervous and when 
she walks past me on her way to the stage she does not look at me. When the beat 
starts, she performs a very hard rap. I have never actually heard her rap like this and am 
surprised how good she is. The audience cheers and many walk up to the stage and give 
her money. I think many people are actually impressed by her courage and the quality 
of her performance.
After all finalists have performed, there is one more entertainment act: a break-dance 
performance by four young men, which, to my surprise, has no sexual implications. Then it 
is time for the jury, made up of three young men in their twenties, to select the respective 
winners of the playback and the lifeline contest. The judgment process reminds me of a 
TV casting show. First, the competitors of the playback contest are judged. One by one, 
they are called to the centre of the stage and receive a short comment by the jury. Some 
comments are actually quite harsh. The best three performers are told to stand aside, 
while all the others have to leave the stage. Finally, the third, second and first are called 
out and they each receive a small prize.
The same process applies to the lifeline competition. I watch Akello lingering around 
on stage, waiting for her judgment. She does not look very confident. With great interest, 
I listen to the comments of the judges, who often say things like “you should try to be 
more authentic, don’t imitate American gangsta rap, try to rap in Acholi…” I wonder 
what “being authentic” means to this young generation of Acholi? Maybe being gangsta 
rappers is authentic to them? Akello gets a long and quite controversial feedback from 
the judges. One criticizes her performance, while the other two say that they really liked 
it and that it was great that she rapped in Acholi. In the end, she comes second and 
receives an umbrella as a prize154. Akello seems relieved when she leaves the stage and 
is no longer the centre of attention. She greets me briefly and then returns to her seat 
in the back.
It is around 2am and Lisa and I are ready to leave. Outside, I meet some people I 
know from the hip hop project and I chat with them for a while. Akello is also there, but 
as usual, seems very shy around all the guys. While we are standing outside, a small fight 
erupts between some drunken guys, but can be resolved fairly quickly. We decide that 
Simon will accompany Lisa home on a boda, while I go with Akello. I am surprised to learn 
that she came all by herself. We get a boda together and ride back to Pece [subdivision of 
Gulu, where both Akello and I were living at the time]. On the boda, for the first time, she 
seems more at ease. We talk briefly and then say goodbye (field notes 01.04.2010).
154 Throughout my research, I learn that the prizes given out at hip hop contests vary quite substan-
tially and range from large sums of money (apparently up to 100,000 UGX) to smaller amounts 
of money and/or material prizes like umbrellas, flasks or bicycles. Often, however, the promised 
awards are much bigger than what the winners receive in the end.
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At the time of these happenings, I had been in Gulu for less than a month. During 
this time, I had started to gain some first insights into social practices, norms and 
rules in Acholi society by talking to various people, old and young. I had met and 
interacted with different groups of young people, at the Gulu Youth Centre, the hip 
hop project and the cultural group at Luo Talent Centre. I had been to a “show” at 
a night club before, in which local artists had performed their songs on stage (while 
the CD they had recorded was playing in the background), but which had been at-
tended by a much broader audience including youth, adults, elderly people and even 
some families with young children. I am no longer sure, what I expected before I 
went to Herm’s Club, but it was certainly very different from what I encountered 
there. I remember being amused and shocked at the same time.
In my former encounters with youth, most of them had been very disciplined, 
rule-abiding and rather quiet. I had frequently been told that moral integrity was 
of highest value in Acholi society. Excessive drinking, inappropriate dressing and 
exposure of intimacy and sexual gestures in public had always been described to 
me – by both younger and older interlocutors – as something “Western” which was 
considered disgraceful in Acholi society. I had heard different people complain-
ing that a “moral degeneration” had set in and that young people were no longer 
respecting Acholi norms and customs, but I had rarely encountered any evidence 
of this “moral degeneration” in public. Thus, I was quite surprised by the events at 
Herm’s Club, where ‘ordinary’ school-aged youths transcended all social norms and 
rules and excessively engaged in what was locally referred to as “immoral Western 
cultural practices”.
I will discuss in the next chapter how the binary opposition Western vs. Acholi 
is often used in local discourses to comment on contemporary Ugandan society. At 
this point, however, it is important to note that the young people in the club did 
not simply imitate Western, especially US-American, popular culture they knew 
from music and films. Instead, I had the impression that the scene at the club was an 
example of a truly “transcultural” phenomenon (cf. Welsch, 1999), which cannot be 
grasped analytically without considering its origins in both, local and global youth 
cultural practices and their respective frames of reference (cf. Loimeier et al., 2005b: 
17ff.), including Latin American soap operas, English Premier League football, US-
American rap music and UNIFEM slogans as well as Acholi norms and rules against 
which the young people seemed to rebel.
For the purpose of this chapter, the scene at Herm’s Club serves to introduce one 
example of contemporary youth culture in Gulu which is very different to the phe-
nomenon of youth cultural groups portrayed in the former chapter. At first sight, 
the ways the young people spoke and acted in the club seem diametrically opposed 
to the way young people positioned themselves in the context of cultural groups 
and traditional dance. While the former openly rejected established Acholi social 
conventions, the latter were explicitly critical of the type of disrespectful and ‘non-
traditional’ behavior the young people exposed in the club. Interestingly, however, 
there are quite a number of young people who participate in both, cultural groups 
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and hip hop events like the one described above, and seem to switch between ‘tra-
ditionalist’ and ‘modernist’ “cultural styles” (Ferguson, 1999, see discussion below). 
On the one hand, the ability to combine the membership in different cultural scenes 
is heavily dependent on the individual traits of a young person (regarding especially 
gender, class and social upbringing). On the other hand, the different, at times over-
lapping cultural scenes in Gulu and the various cultural elements and practices they 
reflect can only be understood against the backdrop of the particular time and place 
of their setting, and the generational characteristics of their main protagonists. In 
order to give the reader a more complete picture, I will briefly portray the genera-
tion of urban youth, which I focus on in this chapter, and point out similarities and 
differences among its members.
Characteristics of the War Generation5.3. 
In the following section, I analyze the life conditions of young people currently 
living in Gulu and focus especially on the generation that grew up during the war 
years (i.e. roughly those born between the mid-80s and early 1990s) and which 
I will subsequently refer to as the “war generation”. I identify important similarities 
Illustration 2: Breakdance Performance at Gulu Youth Centre (photo by author)
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between its members, which underpin my decision to speak of a “historical genera-
tion”, but also point out important differences between members of this generation 
which are relevant to understanding their different positionings in discourses on 
socio-cultural change.
Similarities of the War Generation5.3.1. 
Due to their “similarity of location” (Mannheim, 1972: 290) in time and space, 
members of the war generation share a number of experiences and face a number of 
similar challenges when compared to other, older and younger, generations. Above 
all, their lives have been characterized by a particular form of uncertainty and am-
bivalence. During their childhood and early youth, they experienced the insecurity 
and confusion associated with growing up in a war zone as well as the marginalization 
of Northern Uganda and the nation-wide stigmatization of the Acholi. In the current 
phase of their youth, they are confronted with the challenges and chances of living 
in the post-war setting of Gulu Municipality which has given rise to new hopes and 
aspirations but has also created new asymmetries and exclusions for members of the 
war generation. I will briefly elaborate each of these points.
Insecurity and Confusion Associated with Growing up in a War Zone
Most of the young people I encountered during my research had spent a large part 
of their lives in Gulu Municipality. Some had been born in Gulu, while others had 
been born in their ancestral villages and moved to Gulu at a young age due to the 
war. Some, especially those with a higher education and from economically better-
situated families, had spent part of their schooling in other parts of Uganda. But 
generally speaking, the majority of my interlocutors had experienced the war years 
and the rapid changes, which occurred in Acholi society during this time, in urban 
Gulu155. They often described to me how Gulu had changed from being a small, 
provisional town to becoming the center of international relief operations with all 
its required amenities (e.g. INT Laurence, 28.04.2010). Living in Gulu during the 
war had many advantages when compared to its alternative, i.e. living in one of the 
IDP camps. Town residents enjoyed greater freedom and safer living conditions. 
However, town life also had its detriments and many families struggled with the 
high costs of living, unemployment and sometimes hunger since no food aid was 
given out (cf. Branch, 2008: 5ff.).
Although LRA attacks were rare in Gulu and the security situation much bet-
ter than in most of the surrounding rural areas, many of my interlocutors reported 
that they constantly felt threatened and were always aware that they were living in 
the middle of a war zone. They sometimes narrated how there had been curfews 
155 46.8 percent of the respondents to my questionnaire had been born in Gulu Municipality and 
63.8 percent had spent the largest part of their lives in Gulu Municipality. 
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at night and roadblocks along the Kampala highway, how night commuters had 
walked into town every night to sleep in relative safety, and how fellow students had 
been abducted by the LRA. They also told me how the LRA had once attacked a 
night club and killed seven youths, how they had heard gun shots at night, how they 
had been harassed by UPDF soldiers and about the general situation of insecurity, 
confusion and turmoil which characterized life in Gulu during those years (personal 
conversations, e.g. field notes 14.03.2010; 20.03.2010; 27.03.2010; 14.04.2010; 
28.10.2010; INT Akello, 26.11.2010).
My interlocutors furthermore reported how established social practices, norms 
and rules had been suspended during the war time. For the majority of families 
who had fled to Gulu, life in town meant a total break with their former routines. 
As parents struggled to set up a new life, children were sometimes left to them-
selves. Others had lost one or both parents or had been sent to town to stay with 
relatives. Unguided by parental and community authorities, many young people 
found their own ways to adapt to urban life. Over time, they established new social 
practices and rules, which sometimes conflicted with the demands and expectations 
of parents and community elders. Conflicts within and outside of the family setting 
erupted more frequently due to the general frustration, despair and dissatisfaction 
of having to give up former living standards and established routines (e.g. INT 
Okello, 26.09.2010; group interview Kapedopong, 28.06.2010; personal conversa-
tion, field notes 30.03.2010).
One source of frustration and uncertainty was the social and political margin-
alization of Northern Uganda and the nation-wide stigmatization of the Acholi, 
which affected the young people in a very particular way.
Marginalization of Northern Uganda and Stigmatization of Acholi
Most of my interlocutors were aware of the war-related and politically-fabricated 
economic and political marginalization Northern Uganda had suffered during the 
war years (cf. Shaw & Mbabazi, 2008). For the young generation, marginalization 
became especially evident in the education sector. Due to insecurity, many schools 
had been closed or displaced from the rural areas to Gulu town. The quality of 
education suffered greatly due to lack of (government) funding, high fluctuation of 
students and teachers, and other war-related problems (cf. Shaw & Mbabazi, 2008: 
225). The Gulu District Education Officer (DEO), Vincent Ochieng, described the 
situation of education during the war years as follows:
“During the war, our education system was just run on emergency, it was not 
really proper education going on. And we are getting the results now by the 
poor results we are having in our performances. At all national level exami-
nation you can see the results now. These are students that started education 
during war time” (INT Vincent Ochieng, 26.03.2010).
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To this day, most schools in Northern Uganda are of inferior standard, so that 
parents who can afford to do so send their children to attend schools in other parts 
of Uganda. The DEO reported that out of all the thousands of primary school stu-
dents, who sat for their Primary Leaving Examination in 2009, only a total of 242 
students (!) had passed and thus qualified to enter secondary school156.
For Acholi students, who attended school outside of Northern Uganda, ethnic 
stigmatization was a frequent problem during the war years (and still occasionally 
happens today). Some of my interlocutors reported how they had been provoked 
and called “Kony” by fellow pupils and even teachers (personal conversations, e.g. 
field notes 09.04.2010). Negative stereotypes about the Acholi as a ‘war tribe’ pre-
vail in many parts of Uganda (cf. Chap. 3). As a consequence, some Acholi try to 
repudiate their ethnicity when they are not at home, for instance by refusing to 
speak Acholi. As the DEO explained to me:
“Because of the war, our children even fear speaking their language, because 
the name that you come from here is so negative: that you are a warrior, 
you are backward, you are primitive and all that. And so many people don’t 
want to admit and are ashamed that they are from the North and this war-
affected area, they rather speak other languages (…) So there is quite a lot to 
change that image of the North that has been created by the war and that 
now makes our children even fear belonging here.” (INT Vincent Ochieng, 
26.03.2010).
There were others, who felt more self-conscious about their Acholi ethnicity and 
who actively tried to change the negative stereotypes of the Acholi or lobbied for 
more Acholi visibility and influence in Uganda157. In any case, the sensibility and 
156 The DEO (INT 26.03.2010) gave me some rough figures for the schooling situation in Gulu at 
the time of my research. In the primary school sector, there were 113 government-headed schools 
with 61,298 students enrolled in the rural areas, and 32 government-headed schools with 41,000 
enrolled students in Gulu Municipality. In addition, there were a number of private schools (three 
in the rural areas with less than 1,000 pupils, and 25 in Gulu Municipality with about 10,000 
students). In the secondary school sector, there were 15 government-headed schools (with approx. 
10,000 students) and 25 private schools (with approx. 5,000–6,000 students). Of all the primary 
school students who sat for their Primary Leaving Examination in 2009 only 23 pupils had 
passed in the rural areas and 219 students in Gulu Municipality!
157 The following is a telling example from my field notes (06.01.2010): I once witnessed a debate be-
tween four university students who were having a big argument about language in Uganda. Three 
of them argued, that if there was to be a national language besides English it should be Luganda 
because most people even outside the Luganda region had some understanding of it and it would 
be easier for those people to adapt to Luganda than everyone adapting to Luo. Opio, a friend of 
mine, was the only one who heavily opposed this idea. He said that people who argued like that 
were not proud of being Acholi and that he had even intentionally refused to learn Luganda when 
he went to school in Kampala. The others replied that they were also proud of being Acholi but 
that they were just thinking practically and that there was no chance of Luo ever becoming a 
national language.
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explosiveness of the matter led to a heightened awareness of their Acholi ethnicity 
among the war generation and the marginalization connected with it, a phenom-
enon that Meyer & Geschiere (1999: 2), referring to the “hardening of cultural 
contrasts” in the context of globalization, have labeled “cultural closure”.
Post-war Setting of Gulu Municipality
In post-war Gulu Municipality today, the young generation is faced by specific 
chances and challenges of living in a place which is recovering from the traumas of 
war. On the one hand, Gulu is a rapidly growing economic center. It has promising 
business opportunities due to its reestablished and newly emerging national and 
international trade connections, for instance through the return of some prosperous 
members of the Acholi diaspora, who spent the war years in the UK and the USA 
and are now setting up businesses in Gulu (cf. Wesch, 2011), or through the trade 
opportunities arising from Southern Sudan’s newly gained independence. Busi-
nesses, banks and hotels are proliferating everywhere and the state has improved its 
service provision (at least in some domains, for instance regarding road conditions 
and electricity). Furthermore, since 2003, Gulu has its own public university. In 
search of business and higher education opportunities, people from all over Uganda 
are now coming to Gulu, and despite the withdrawal of many aid organization, 
there is still a relatively big international NGO scene.
On the other hand, few of the young people I met could profit from Gulu’s 
economic expansion. Most of them were struggling to pay their school fees even at 
the cheaper and generally lower-ranked public schools or had given up trying, were 
unemployed or working in poorly paid jobs, and were having difficulties in meeting 
even their basic needs. Some youths, whose families had resettled in the village and 
had restarted cultivating their land, earned a small income by helping on the fields 
(mainly during the school holidays) and selling some of the harvest. Most, however, 
could not imagine a future life as farmers, and instead dreamed of finishing school, 
attending university and finding good employment in town. For most it remained 
simply that – a distant dream. Even the luckier ones, who had attained a university 
degree, rarely had secure jobs. Thus, while Gulu youth grew up in an economically 
booming and increasingly globalized setting, most of them were in fact only “licking 
at the shop window” (Mbembe quoted in Meyer & Geschiere, 1999: 5).
Furthermore, HIV/AIDS constituted a big concern for young people. Resulting 
from the effects of war and camp life, but also from Gulu’s new role as trade centre, 
the HIV/AIDS prevalence in Gulu District was significantly higher (approximately 
16%) than in the rest of the country (approximately 6–7%). According to figures 
given in the New Vision (Ocuwun, 2010: 7) and the Daily Monitor (Lirri, 2010: 7), 
the HIV/AIDS prevalence in Gulu Municipality at the time was as high as 22.1% 
percent. In my questionnaire, 31.25 percent of the respondents named HIV/AIDS 
and other sexually transmitted diseases as the biggest problems for youth today, fol-
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lowed by unemployment (26.89 %), educational problems (high school fees, low 
quality etc., 12.5 %) as well as poverty and substance abuse (both 6.25 %).
Therefore, in many ways, young people remained untouched by Gulu’s eco-
nomic boom. The youth cultural scene, however, was heavily influenced by the 
rapid changes. In the growing number of internet cafes, in movie halls as well as 
in bars and eating places where TV programs and movies were playing 24/7, and 
through the personal exchanges with foreigners, young people were exposed to new 
forms of media and consumer culture on a day to day basis158. As the introductory 
extract from my field notes revealed, Gulu youth culture was therefore becoming an 
increasingly hybrid phenomenon. This was particularly reflected in the expanding 
music and club scene, in young people’s dressing styles and their consumer behav-
ior more generally159. Most of the young people in Gulu had a mobile phone, and 
many had joined online social networks such as Facebook or used the internet to 
watch and download music clips, films and the latest gossip on pop idols and other 
celebrities.
Despite these influences and changes in popular culture, Acholi youth still gen-
erally perceived themselves to be in what (Hannerz, 1996: 70ff.) has called the “pe-
riphery” of “cultural flows” – both nationally and internationally. When I asked 
one of my interviewees to state his perception of young people in Uganda today, he 
said:
“(…) I think the government is also doing very little to help the youth. (…) I 
think the youth are still being fed that ancient knowledge, it is ancient. (…) 
You cannot bring the solutions to the problems of the 20th century to solve 
the problems of the 21st. No, it can’t work like that! I think they should just 
wake up by themselves, and know that things have changed.”
When I asked him to comment more specifically on youth in Northern Uganda, 
he added:
“Well, these guys here are not so much different from the East, from the 
West, but with Kampala – they are a little bit different, because those guys 
down there can get inspired (…) there are so many influential people whom 
they see around them, so they work hard. They are not like here, there is no 
one who inspires these guys so much. They talk about Lumix [a successful 
Acholi hip hopper], but Lumix does not even live here, Lumix is in Kampala, 
158 On the crucial role of the “mobility of meanings” through media and human beings see Hannerz 
(1996: 19ff.).
159 When asked to name the biggest changes between their generation and their parents’ or grand-
parents’ generation, the second most common answer given by 14.74 percent of the respondents 
related to ‘style’, i.e. styles of dressing, dancing, walking etc. (The most common answer men-
tioned by 23.15 percent of the respondents was education). “Westernization” (8.42 %) and “mass 
media influence” (6.32%) were also common responses. Furthermore, when asked to evaluate 
the statement “young people today are too westernized”, 76.35 percent either agreed or strongly 
agreed. 
Between “Tradition” & “Modernity”  199
somebody very far cannot inspire. (…) So you get inspired when you are kind 
of close with the people who are inspiring you, but these guys, here it is still 
a little bit behind, it is still backward, the inspiration is still low here” (INT 
Joseph, 14.12.2010).
The quotation reveals the importance attributed to living in the ‘center’. The respon-
dent states that only there young people can find meaningful sources of inspiration 
whereby those in the periphery only admire their distant idols but do not have or 
believe in the chance of ever becoming part of their scene.
Hannerz (1996: 70) has argued that it is “particularly the asymmetries of the 
market and the state frames that create relatively unambiguous centre-periphery 
relationships” and this seems to be realized also by the young people in Northern 
Uganda, who in many ways feel excluded from the ‘processes of modernization’ sur-
rounding them. In this sense, Ferguson (2006: 20) has argued very aptly that (young) 
people’s “yearnings for cultural convergence with an imagined global standard (…) 
mark[s] not simply mental colonization or capitulation to cultural imperialism, but 
an aspiration to overcome categorical subordination.” As the introductory scene 
from my field notes revealed, youth in Gulu frequently sought inspiration from the 
‘(pop)cultural centers’ of the world – not only because they were lacking local idols, 
as the interviewee above maintained, but also to demonstrate that they wanted to 
take part in and be recognized as a part of the global youth cultural scene.
The War Generation in Local Discourses
The brief summary in this section has outlined only some of the unique experiences 
of the war generation, which clearly differentiate it from both older and younger 
generations. Members of the war generation experienced their childhood and youth 
as a situation of profound uncertainty in which many formerly established social 
norms and practices were in flux. Thus, one can argue that the young generation’s 
break with the past was more rapid and more radical than generational changes 
which happen in all societies under more conventional circumstances. As a conse-
quence, a deep-seated rupture seems to have occurred between the younger and the 
older generation which was reflected, for instance, in the way elder Acholi spoke 
about the young. They frequently accused Acholi youth of being materialistic, un-
disciplined, disrespectful, westernized and other similar vices, and related this to 
the turbulent circumstances in which they grew up (see e.g. group interviews Pabbo, 
23.10.2010; Kapedopong, 28.06.2010). Sometimes, elderly interlocutors expressed 
their hope that the new generation, which was born in the post-war phase, would 
again learn some of the Acholi virtues of the past. In the words of one male elder: 
“For the very young people – those who are under ten [years of age] now – things 
will change. But for those who are now in their teens the old values will not come 
back” (group interview Pabbo, 23.10.2010, translated from the Acholi original by 
John Omara).
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Statements like these seem to confirm what the above outlined factors would sug-
gest: namely, that not only from an etic perspective it is legitimate to distinguish 
the war generation from other, older (pre-war) and younger (post-war), generations 
of Acholi, but that this distinction can also be found in emic conceptionalizations 
of Acholi society.
Differences within the War Generation5.3.2. 
Despite the above outlined similarities of the war generation, one can make out 
significant divergences between its members, most importantly regarding their class 
and educational background, family situation and gender. I will briefly comment on 
each of these factors160.
Class and Educational Background
‘Class’ constituted one of the most fundamental differentiating factors among 
the war generation. In Gulu (as probably elsewhere), class correlated highly with 
the economic situation and the educational level of a person. Young people from 
wealthier families (henceforth ‘elite youth’) had usually attended better schools, 
often outside Northern Uganda, and had often studied or were in the process of 
studying up to university level. Due to their comparatively superior education and 
because their families were involved in local elite networks, they usually had better 
chances of attaining a good job, although I also knew many who were unemployed 
nevertheless. However, unlike for youth from poorer families, unemployment did 
not entail a situation of existential uncertainty for elite youth. They were less com-
pelled to work in underpaid jobs, rarely engaged in farming activities, ate and slept 
at home and spent their days hanging out in internet cafes and bars, waiting for a 
job offer that suited them.
Elite youth usually owned up-to-date media technology (smartphones, laptops, 
TVs and DVD players), wore new clothes, traveled more frequently, and often went 
out to clubs, restaurants or shows. In addition to their material advantages, elite 
youth also had many social benefits. They were invited to ‘high society’ social events 
(e.g. weddings, graduation ceremonies, political events), where they could intermin-
gle with the local business and political elites. For boys and young men, a further 
very important social advantage when compared with non-elite youth, concerned 
their prospect to get married (once they had found a suitable girlfriend) due to their 
families’ ability to pay the exorbitant brideprices currently demanded in Acholiland 
160 Of course, one could make out several other factors which distinguish members of the war gen-
eration from one another. But I will comment only on the three above because I regard them as 
the most fundamental, and also because I did not gain sufficient data on other potentially relevant 
differences like, for example, religion.
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(personal observations and conversations, e.g. field notes 09.03.2010; 18.04.2010; 
02.09.2010; 30.12.2010).
The majority of youth I encountered in Gulu (henceforth ‘ordinary youth’), 
however, came from poorer backgrounds. They generally had a much lower level 
of education, had usually attended government-schools, which, on average, were of 
lower quality than the private schools, and had often had to interrupt their school-
ing because of failure to pay the school fees. Many had dropped out of school in 
the first years of secondary school and were now looking for a sponsor who would 
pay for them to go back161. Some were working in underpaid and often temporary 
jobs, others took on volunteering positions (often in youth projects sponsored by 
international donors) in hope of getting permanently employed, while again others 
could not find employment at all and spent their days hanging around with fellow 
youth.
Many ordinary youth struggled to provide for their daily needs and wants. For 
some, especially those who had no relatives in town or were not supported by them, 
even food and shelter were not always secure. Nevertheless, ordinary youth often 
found innovative ways to participate in popular consumer culture: They bought 
cheap second hand clothes (often exported from Western countries162) on the local 
market and exchanged them among each other. They traded old phones which could 
be bought and sold in Gulu for little money. And they went to movie halls to watch 
films, where the entrance fee was only 100–200 UGX (less than 0.1 Euro) per film 
(personal conversations and observations, e.g. field notes 17.05.2010; 21.05.2010; 
10.08.2010). Generally speaking, the social networks and locations frequented by 
ordinary youth were different from those of elite youths. They lived in different 
neighborhoods, met in open spaces and not in bars and cafes, and attended social 
events that were free of charge. Although ‘youth scenes’ occasionally overlapped, 
especially among the younger ones, public spaces in Gulu were clearly demarcated 
by class. In local discourses, for instance, I often encountered expressions like “that 
place is for big people”, meaning people with money (personal conversations, e.g. 
field notes 30.12.2010; 31.12.2010).
In summary, present and future opportunities for ordinary youth in terms of 
job perspectives, livelihood security and marriage prospects were more limited than 
for elite youth. These differences in life chances were felt more intensely the older 
people grew. While interactions between youth from different class backgrounds 
were not unusual when they were still in their teens, their lives usually took very dif-
ferent paths once they reached their early 20s and subsequently interactions became 
less frequent.
161 Of the 94 youths, who filled out my questionnaire, 28 (30.11 percent) were (temporarily or fi-
nally) out of school; only five of them were currently working. 
162 For an in-depth discussion of second-hand clothing consumption in Africa, specifically Zambia, 
cf. Hansen (1999, 2002). 
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Family Situation
A second distinguishing factor concerned the family situation of youth in Gulu. 
While some had very stable family backgrounds, i.e. they lived with both parents, 
had a large family network which usually extended to the rural areas and were on 
good terms with their relatives, many families had been broken by the war, diseases 
and conflicts, or were spread throughout Northern Uganda and beyond. Many of 
my interlocutors had lost one or both parents and were staying in town with a sib-
ling or a more distant relative. Some families had returned to their original villages 
and had left their school-aged children in town – either in boarding school or with 
relatives. Some youth were also staying by themselves.163
Judging by the accounts of my interlocutors, family conflicts seemed to be com-
mon and usually occurred along generational lines or between husband and wife/
wives. Polygamous families seemed to be particularly conflict-ridden, especially 
where material resources were limited. I heard several stories of co-wives who fought 
each other not only verbally but also physically (personal conversations, e.g. field 
notes 04.09.2010; 17.12.2010; 02.01.2010). Children and youth often suffered 
the most from these conflicts. Some avoided spending time at home or tried to find 
alternative places to stay. Some were torn between their parents and often worried 
about the fighting at home. One young woman expressed this problem very clearly 
during a group interview when she said:
“The level of understanding between the parents is very low, there are many 
conflicts between the parents, in many cases the homes are conflict zones. 
So young people look at that and they identify with one of the parents, 
mostly on the mum’s side, because there are many situations where especially 
men – where men always go out to drink and they come home very late and 
beat their wives. In such situations the children will not respect the father. 
Another thing is love – fathers don’t show love to their children… For the 
young ones, sometimes there are situations where you want your father to say 
‘I love you so much’, but he doesn’t… Then they look at what their neighbors 
do, maybe the father of the neighbors is really a friend to the children. When 
he comes home he shows a lot of love and brings many things for them, he 
comes and carries [the child]… So as long as that love is also reflected in 
the family, there are not so many conflicts. It is like an institution: when 
there are many conflicts at work, then the work outcome will also be very 
negative…” (group interview Pabbo, 23.10.2010, translated from the Acholi 
original by John Omara).
163 Out of the 94 youths who participated in the questionnaire, only 24 were staying with both par-
ents. 30 were staying with a single parent and 13 with a sibling. The rest were staying with more 
distant relatives, with friends or alone.
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The quote well-summarizes the different emotional contexts in which youth from 
stable and youth from unstable family backgrounds grew up. Particularly interest-
ing is the way the respondent compares the family with an institution which can-
not function properly if its members are in conflict with each other. In many ways 
this is quite an accurate comparison. During my fieldwork, I often noticed that 
youth from stable family backgrounds had better support networks (even if their 
families were relatively poor) and felt more embedded in the society as a whole, 
while youth with unstable family backgrounds tended to live more precarious lives, 
moved around more often, engaged in risky behavior more frequently because they 
lacked parental control and had no one to support and speak up for them (personal 
observations, e.g. field notes 13.08.2010; 13.12.2010).
Gender164
Gender is one of the most important distinguishing factors when discussing youth 
and youth culture in contemporary Gulu. As the introductory-extract from my 
field notes has clearly shown, youth culture and youth spaces in Gulu were highly 
gendered. For instance, while the club and hip hop scene was very male-dominated, 
cultural groups usually had more female participants.
As has already been discussed in the previous chapter, contemporary gender rela-
tions were perceived by many Acholi as largely different from those in former times. 
In many ways, roles and opportunities between men and women were perceived 
as being more similar and less complementary. This was partly attributed to the 
disruptions in Acholi society caused by the war. The younger generation, especially, 
seemed to have a different understanding of gender relations, roles and images than 
their parents and grandparents. Urban youth, for example, had very different ideals 
and future plans regarding marriage and family life than members of older genera-
tions. Most of the respondents to the questionnaire stated that they wanted fewer 
children than was common in former generations and the great majority (93 per-
cent) said that they could not imagine living in a polygamous marriage. This could 
be due to their different life experiences during the war years, but also due to several 
national and international influences, such as media campaigns on gender equality 
or national initiatives under the Museveni regime to promote women’s and girl’s 
rights, especially in the education sector (cf. Vorhölter, 2010b).
But although opportunities for boys and girls were generally perceived as more 
equal than in former times, gender remained an important differentiating factor 
between male and female youth. I was told (and could observe) that at home, and 
to a lesser extent at school, children were still socialized and trained according to 
the long-established gendered patterns of behavior and division of labor common in 
Acholi society. This meant that within the family context, but also in society more 
generally, girls were still more restrained and controlled than boys: they had more 
164 I will focus more closely on gender issues in the next chapter.
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chores in the household and were more protected and confined to the family home, 
while boys generally enjoyed greater freedom, for example to hang out with friends 
or to go out at night. Therefore, in most places where youths hung out in town 
such as bars, night clubs, movie halls or sports clubs, one could find a much higher 
number of male youth although, as the example of Akello shows, girls did find ways 
to escape the confines of their home165.
Among the urban youth I worked with, it was interesting to observe that ideals 
of how women and men should be were very ambivalent. In some ways, it seemed 
that gender images and ideologies166 were changing while in others they remained 
highly conservative. My interlocutors conveyed to me that generally “traditional” 
attributes for girls and women were (still) more valued in Acholi society than “mod-
ern” attributes. Girls, who wore short skirts, drank alcohol or went to night clubs, 
for instance, were often later accused, even by their peers, of being prostitutes, and 
my male interlocutors sometimes remarked that they would never choose a girl 
who behaved “like that” as a girlfriend (e.g. INT Henry & Bangi, 27.04.2010). 
Furthermore, if a girl’s family found out about such ‘indecent behavior’, the girl 
could be thrown out of home or sent to a relative in the village, as I was often told. 
Even female university students, who were usually in their mid-20s and came from 
comparatively ‘modern’ families, often had to cope with being accused of neglect-
ing their child-bearing and marriage responsibilities by focusing too much on their 
education and the “modern lifestyle” associated with university life (personal con-
versations e.g. field notes 13.08.2010; 04.09.2010; 10.09.2010; 02.10.2010). Thus, 
overall it seemed that girls were more confined in choosing their lifestyle and that 
deviations from social norms were more seriously sanctioned than for boys. I will 
further take up this point in the next chapter.
Inner-generational Differences and Cultural Style
As has been discussed above, members of the war generation can be separated along 
the lines of gender, class, educational background and their family situations. There-
fore, a broad range of different experiences can be found within the war generation 
despite its “similarity of location” as a whole. When discussing young people’s be-
haviors and cultural styles and their perceptions and evaluations of socio-cultural 
change in Gulu, as I will do in the following section, it is important to keep these 
differences in mind because they can help to understand an individual’s reasoning 
for how he or she acts and argues in the face of the perceived rapid socio-cultural 
changes. It would be misleading, however, to assume that one can make generalized 
claims about which discourse or style a particular ‘generational subgroup’ supports: 
165 I still remember being very surprised when Akello once told me how she used to escape from her 
parents place (approx. 4 km out of town) at night and walk alone to a club in Gulu (INT Akello, 
26.11.2010).
166 The term “gender images” refers to the way women and men are seen, characterized and de-
scribed, whereas “gender ideologies” refers to the way they should ideally be.
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elite youth are not necessarily more ‘modern’ than ordinary youth, girls not neces-
sarily more ‘traditional’ than boys. Ferguson (1999: 92) has formulated this idea 
very well with regard to his concept of “cultural styles” which I introduce below. 
He writes:
“It is important to note, too, that this duality of cultural style [Ferguson 
differentiates between cosmopolitan and localist “styles”, see below] did not 
map neatly onto expected differences of other sorts – such as education, oc-
cupation, social status, length of residence in town, and so on. So-called 
modern economic occupations and institutional attachments by no means 
excluded localist style, and cosmopolitan style was no straightforward index 
of social status or education. At the very highest levels, those with profes-
sional employment and education did normally exhibit a cosmopolitan style. 
But so, in a different way, did many prostitutes and street criminals (…). 
Indeed, both cosmopolitanism and localism had their high and low forms, 
their respectable and disrespectable versions.”
Youth Practices & Cultural Styles5.4. 
Ferguson (1999) uses the term cultural style “to refer to practices that signify differ-
ences between social categories. Cultural styles in this usage do not pick out total 
modes of behavior but rather poles of social signification, cross-cutting and cross-
cut by other such poles” (ibid.: 95). Ferguson emphasizes that cultural style is “first 
of all a performative competence” (ibid.: 96), does not necessarily reflect “questions 
of identities or commonalities” and thus “means moving away from the quest to lo-
cate underlying ‘real’ identities and orientation” (ibid.: 97). Nevertheless, Ferguson 
argues that “cultural style tends to stick with a person” because “a style requires not 
simply a situational motive but an internalized capacity that can only be acquired 
over time” (ibid.: 96).
I found Ferguson’s concept of cultural styles very suitable to my research context 
in Gulu, where people I encountered often differentiated between “modern” and 
“traditional” style (although they rarely used the actual word “style”). In many ways 
these categories were quite similar to what Ferguson, who studied adult miners on 
the Zambian Copperbelt, has called “cosmopolitanism” and “localism”. In his chap-
ter Rural Connections, Urban Styles (1999: 82–122), Ferguson defines these two dis-
tinct “cultural styles” he encountered among his Zambian interlocutors as follows:
“Among the copper miners with whom I worked in Kitwe, it was impossible 
not to distinguish two contrasting cultural modes, which I will call ‘localist’ 
and ‘cosmopolitan’ (…). The extremes of these two contrasting modes were 
immediately visible and obvious. On the one hand were the cosmopolitan 
workers, relaxing in bars and clubs, drinking bottled beer or liquor, listening 
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to Western or ‘international’ music, speaking English and mixing languages 
with ease, dressing smartly (and even ostentatiously), and adopting an air of 
easy familiarity with whites like me. On the other hand were the localists, 
drinking in private homes or taverns, preferring ‘African’ or home-brewed 
beer, speaking the local languages of their home region, dressing in drabs 
or even ragged clothes, listening to ‘local’ music, and presenting to a white 
foreigner like me an impression of intimidation and sometimes even servil-
ity” (Ferguson, 1999: 91f.).
In a similar fashion, those Acholi in Gulu who were labeled and perceived them-
selves as “modern” often talked derogatively of Acholi culture, claimed that Uganda 
as a whole was still “backward” and needed to be “modernized”, tried to avoid go-
ing to “the village”, spoke English even in contexts where everyone present knew 
Acholi, and tried to copy fashions and technologies and imitate behavioral traits 
they regarded as Western (and thus modern) and which they usually ‘knew’ from 
films. Acholi who were labeled and perceived themselves as “traditional”, on the 
other hand, were often nostalgic about Acholi culture and ‘the good old days’, had 
stronger ties to the village, spoke Acholi even in contexts were non-Acholi were 
present, and talked derogatively of those Acholi who were trying “too hard” to copy 
the West. At the extreme ends, some of the young people I met framed their styles 
in very exclusive terms as either ‘fully modern’ or ‘fully traditional’, but these were 
by far the minority. Most young people rather seemed to be floating between these 
two styles, which may be explained not only by their age and life situation – youth 
generally being a time of uncertainty and change – but also due to rapidly changing 
living circumstances they had experienced during the time they grew up.
This floating between styles seems to relativize Ferguson’s argument that “situ-
ational switching of style is possible only to a limited degree” (1999: 95f.), because 
people have to invest in their style in order to acquire an “internalized capacity” 
to be able to perform it convincingly. During my research, I found that unlike the 
adult miners Ferguson studied on the Copperbelt, most of whom had long estab-
lished themselves as either “cosmopolitans” or “localists”, many of the young people 
I worked with in Gulu were still in the process of finding their style and thus were 
still more flexible in combining different stylistic practices or switching between 
styles depending on the situation. Furthermore, I found that various stylistic prac-
tices, like doing hip hop or traditional dance, not necessarily correlated with a co-
herent style or neatly mapped “onto an underlying cultural orientation” (Ferguson, 
1999: 97). Some of the young people who I observed in the scene at Herm’s Club 
described above, for instance, were also members of youth cultural groups.
As I observed the behavior of my interlocutors in different settings and got a 
more complete picture of their lives, I often had the impression that they strate-
gically conjured different styles depending on the setting they were in. This was 
especially evident when comparing how youth presented themselves among fellow 
youth in town as opposed to their behavior at home or when visiting relatives in 
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the village. One young man described to me very bluntly how he switched between 
different styles according to context:
“There is a saying that says ‘when you are in Rome, behave like Romans’. 
So maybe when you go to the village, you portray those kinds of characters 
there. But when you come back to town, you drop the village stuff in the vil-
lage, and you cope up with lifestyle in town” (INT Martin, 21.04.2010).
The interviewee acknowledges the different social expectations which are at work 
in the different settings – village and town. Although he considers himself a town 
person and regards the lifestyle in the village as “backward”, he nevertheless adapts 
to village life, because he fears that people and especially his family members would 
not accept him otherwise. In the village, elders are seen to have more influence and 
power than in town to define social conventions and to sanction those who deviate 
from them. Thus, the interviewee’s willingness to adapt his behavior to the village 
setting is also a reaction to local power relations which not only define behavioral 
guidelines, but also the rules of the discourse, i.e. who is allowed to say what in 
which situation.
I will turn to discourses on Acholi culture and socio-cultural change in the next 
section. As the example above shows it is not always easy to differentiate between 
discourse and social practice167, as discourses influence and recontextualize social 
practice and vice versa (cf. van Leeuwen, 2008; Fairclough, 2001: 14ff.). Thus, one 
cannot clearly make out whether the interviewee changes his style and behavior in 
the village because he is subjected to discourses which emphasizes that village and 
town are contrasting social spaces with different norms and forms of behavior (see 
below), or because his practical experience has taught him to imitate the village 
“habitus” (cf. Bourdieu, 1976).
Fergusons’s concept of style, which I have used in this section to discuss youth 
practices and behaviors, is able to accommodate the influences of discourses on so-
cial practices. Although Ferguson clearly uses cultural style to refer to social practices, 
he also draws on the work of Judith Butler (who bases her theory on the work of 
Foucault) to stress that differences in style are continually (and discursively) pro-
duced in the context of power relations (Ferguson, 1999: 94). As I demonstrate in 
the course of this chapter, both actions and ways of speaking are heavily affected by 
the situational context in which they occur, that is both by other social actors and 
supra-individual discourses.
167 The relationship between discourse and social practice has long constituted a major field of debate 
in anthropology (cf. van Leeuwen, 2008: 4f.).
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Discourses on Socio-Cultural Change among the  5.5. 
War Generation – Four Positions
As the previous chapter has demonstrated, there was an all-encompassing and on-
going discourse on socio-cultural change and the future prospects of “traditional 
culture”, in which all members of Acholi society engaged. In this chapter, I focus 
specifically on the perspectives of the war generation because, as I argued above, 
their exposure to different experiences during their childhood and youth, i.e. their 
“similarity of location”, suggests that their engagement with Acholi culture and 
their perceptions of socio-cultural change might differ from those of other genera-
tions. As discussed before, however, this does not mean that all members of the war 
generation have a shared perspective. On the contrary, one can identify different 
positions or ‘sub-discourses’, which I analyze in the course of this section.
Before I turn to the different positions, however, I will briefly point out some 
common elements which underlie the discourse on socio-cultural change as a whole. 
Following Foucault (1981a [1969]; 1981b [1970]; 1994 [1971]; 2005 [1968]) and 
the interpretations of his works by different authors (Hall, 2001: 73f.; Dracklé, 
1996b: 37f.; Mills, 2007: 51ff.; Ruffing, 2008: 105), I understand discourse as a 
highly regulated arrangement of statements or opinions which is internally struc-
tured and follows certain rules of formation. As I already stated in the introduction, 
the aim of discourse analysis, then, is to analyze what is said, how, and by whom, 
and under which effects of power (Dracklé, 1996b: 28; Foucault, 2005 [1968]).
In the previous chapters, I have already outlined the social and historical context 
in which the discourse on socio-cultural change in Acholiland was taking place and 
the “episteme” (cf. Foucault, 1995 [1966]: 213f.; 260ff.; Mills, 2007: 60ff.; Hall, 
2001: 73), i.e. the state of knowledge and the way the reflections about socio-cultur-
al change were structured. In the following, I will now identify certain statements, 
continually repeated terms and symbols which characterized the discourse and its 
different sub-discourses. Furthermore, I will allude to socially established, but often 
implicit rules among Acholi speakers. These rules guide who can say what at which 
point in time and thus also provoke that people (have to) switch between discourses 
depending on the situation they are in and the power constellations surrounding 
them.
Underlying the discourse on socio-cultural change as a whole seemed to be a 
general consensus that social relations and Acholi culture had substantially changed 
in the past two decades – although the exact date of when these processes began, 
the explanations what caused the changes and the normative assessment of these 
changes differed168. Furthermore, the overall discourse was characterized by clear 
168 In my questionnaire, 99 percent of the respondents answered “yes” when being asked whether 
they thought Acholi culture was changing. Interestingly, only 19 percent attributed this change 
to the war, while 39 percent argued that education was the most important reason for explain-
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temporal and spatial reference points, typified by a certain number of continually 
repeated terms. With regard to time, speakers differentiated between “those days”, 
referring to the pre-war past, and “nowadays”, i.e. the present time. With regard to 
space, speakers commonly applied a scale, ranging from “deep deep village”, “vil-
lage”, “town” (i.e. Gulu) to “the West”. Most of my younger interlocutors had not 
experienced the pre-war period. Neither had they spent longer periods of time in 
the (“deep, deep”) villages, nor been to a Western country, so their knowledge about 
these times and places was largely based on common narratives, information given 
by people who had lived then or had been there and images presented in the media. 
Rather than just being temporal and spatial categories, these categories were also 
symbolic or social categories, which implied a ranking and a valuation by the speak-
er and which correlated in some ways with a distinction between ‘traditional’ and 
‘modern’ cultural styles. “Those days” and “deep deep village”, for instance signified 
‘pure tradition’, while “the West” stood for ‘high modernity’. Depending on the 
speaker these attributes could be either positively or negatively connoted (I will dis-
cuss this aspect in more detail in the next chapter). Ferguson (2006: 6) has captured 
the idea of overlapping spatial and social categories very well, when he writes: “’The 
world’, in my usage, refers to a more encompassing categorical system within which 
countries and geographical regions have their ‘places’, with a ‘place’ understood as 
both a location in space and a rank in a system of social categories (…).”
Within the general discourse on socio-cultural change, I identified several sub-
discourses among the war generation, which reflect opposing normative evaluations 
(positive/negative/ambivalent) of socio-cultural change and, related, diverse imagi-
nations of a future Acholi society. Interestingly, when looking from a theoretically-
informed, anthropological perspective, the different contentual positions found in 
these respective sub-discourses seem to correlate with different conceptualizations of 
culture and agency. Culture is variously understood either as monolithic and static, 
or as fluid and in motion. Speakers’ perceptions of their ability to shape future de-
velopments (“agency”) range from feelings of apathy and victimhood to senses of 
optimism and creativity.
My understanding of agency in this section is based on Ortner’s (1997, 2001, 
2006) concept of “agency of intentions”, which designates the ability to imagine, 
plan and exert one’s own projects by drawing on personal and cultural resources (cf. 
introduction). The creative element inherent in the agency of intentions is arguably 
similar to what Appadurai (2004) has called “the capacity to aspire”, i.e. “a naviga-
tional capacity which is nurtured by the possibility of real-world conjectures and 
refutations” (Appadurai, 2004: 69). I use this concept of agency to assess youth’s fu-
ture aspirations. Do they have visions for the future or “projects” at all? If yes, where 
do ideas and inspirations for these projects come from? How do they perceive their 
chances to influence societal developments? I take the way young people reflected 
ing “cultural change”. A further 31 percent believed that the media had the greatest influence on 
“cultural change”. 
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on their future and the ways they practically tried to realize their goals as an indica-
tor of the way they perceived their own agency capacity in relation to societal struc-
tures, i.e. whether they felt they had to adapt to established structures or whether 
they believed that they could challenge and change them.
In the following, I elaborate the above-mentioned points by discerning four 
sub-discourses which I encountered among my young interlocutors in Gulu: the Re-
traditionalization Discourse, the Modernization Discourse, the Ambivalent Discourse, 
and the Creative Discourse. I developed this typology by following the four steps of 
“typification” outlined by Kelle & Kluge (2010: 91ff.). First, I worked out relevant 
dimensions of comparison in the course of coding my data (cf. Kelle & Kluge, 
2010: 94f.). As stated in chapter 2, I already started analyzing some of my data dur-
ing my fieldwork in order to make out recurring themes and identify contradictions 
or aspects I had not completely grasped. This enabled me to focus my observations 
and complement my interview guide with important questions I had not previously 
considered. After I returned from my fieldwork, I started to analyze my data system-
atically. This entailed reading through and coding all the interview transcriptions 
and observation protocols in order to identify central themes and potential analytic 
categories (“inductive coding”; Bernard, 2006: 493.). Afterwards, I clustered the 
different statements on socio-cultural change and discerned contexts of meaning 
(“Sinnzusammenhänge”) within the different categories of statements. In this way, 
I identified four different types of discourses on socio-cultural change among my 
interlocutors which I characterize in more detail below.
I first give a general overview of the respective discourses, their main line of ar-
gumentation and their respective conceptualizations of culture, and analyze selected 
statements by my interlocutors which are representative for the respective discourse 
as a whole. I present some background information on each of the ‘speakers’ in or-
der to clarify the subject position they are speaking from. I explore how they think 
about the future (both their individual future and the future of Acholi society) and 
analyze, with reference to the theoretical concept of agency, how they perceive their 
role and see their opportunities in shaping this future. By doing so, however, I do 
not imply that speaker-discourse positions are fixed. Although certain individuals 
are more ‘affine’ to one discourse than to others, speakers do switch between dis-
courses depending on the context and its interrelated power constellations which 
define the rules of the discourse, i.e. who is allowed to speak about what in which 
setting.
In interviews I conducted with mixed groups of elders and youth, for example, 
the latter rarely contradicted the opinions of the former and usually claimed to sup-
port retraditionalization because the discourse prescribed a ‘principle of seniority’ as 
well as a certain way of speaking about socio-cultural change when elders were pres-
ent. In a different context, for instance in personal conversations with me, the same 
young people, who had formerly claimed to support retraditionalization, would 
suddenly revoke their opinion and claim to support modernization and Westerniza-
tion.
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In a similar vein, gender-specific restrictions which were defined by the order of the 
discourse (cf. Hermann, 1995: 290ff.) had an important impact on what, when and 
how men and women spoke about socio-cultural change. Generally, and irrespec-
tive of the subject discussed, young women were very shy to express their opinions 
in public, especially when men were present169. In the group interviews, but also in 
individual interviews, my young female interlocutors usually kept very quiet and 
answered my questions very briefly with only a few words170. It seemed to me that 
they felt they had nothing to say which could possibly be of interest or relevance to 
my research, and that they did not want to risk criticizing or relativizing anything 
other people had said in front of the voice recorder (cf. Bernard, 2006: 222 on 
this type of “nonverbal respondents”). Furthermore, it seemed to me that in public 
contexts deep-seated ideologies regarding gender and ‘tradition’ were still at work 
which reinforced the notion that men should be the ones to speak in public while 
women, especially younger ones, should keep quiet. Women were commonly de-
picted as gossipers and thus discredited as serious speakers.
In more informal and private settings, however, I often found girls and young 
women to be very outspoken and explicitly political. In many conversations, I wit-
nessed how they heavily criticized their situation as young women in the family 
and the society at large and discussed situations in which they had surreptitiously 
deviated from “traditional” social norms. To me, the different roles (young) women 
assumed was most obvious when I visited my female friends in their family homes. 
While in most other contexts, we interacted and conversed very freely with one 
another, in the home setting they usually left me to speak with their fathers or 
elder brothers and kept very quiet. During meals, I was invited to join the men at 
the table, while the women sat on the floor or in a separate room (cf. field notes 
e.g. 17.04.2010; 20.07.2010; 20./21.12.2010). Even though these young women 
criticized gender-unequal social structures and discourses, and in many situations 
actively transgressed them, they nevertheless accepted and reproduced them in the 
family setting.
In this sense, subject positions or “identities” are always to a certain degree inco-
herent and even contradictory, or, as Stuart Hall (1996a: 4) puts it, “never singular 
but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, dis-
courses, practices and positions”. Furthermore, what people say not always neatly 
correlates with what they do in practice, so that the cultural style a person performs 
may not necessarily conform to the opinion he or she claims to have on this particu-
lar subject matter.
A further good example hereof was a public debate that I witnessed at Gulu 
University (cf. field notes 24.11.2010). During this event, students from the debate 
169 Even at university level, women who spoke in public debates were by far the minority (personal 
observations, cf. field notes 10.03.2010; 24.11.2010). For this reason, youth discussions, for in-
stance at Gulu Youth Centre, were usually organized in single sex groups.
170 This is also reflected in my data which has a male bias, especially in the interviews with youth (cf. 
Chap. 2). 
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club and the audience discussed the motion “This House resolves that Culture is 
being lost among the Youth”171. Most of the speakers supported the motion and 
criticized that Acholi youth were too much drawn to “the Western culture” and 
thus contributed to the erosion of Acholi traditions. They praised the morals and 
values of Acholi culture and contrasted these with the decadence and immorality 
inherent in Western modernity. However, during the debate, the speakers were con-
stantly mocking each other or even themselves for being exactly those “westernized 
Acholi youth” they were complaining about in their speeches. In the words of one 
speaker:
“I think it is high time we put ourselves to say that African culture is com-
pletely being lost. We cannot discuss a motion which reads ‘African tradition 
is being lost’ and we are discussing in English. You are Acholi! [A lot of sup-
portive noise from the audience.] You are being forced to discuss in English 
(…), so it is completely true that even you – your culture is being lost! Look 
at the way you are dressed – that is not African dress [laughter because he 
himself is wearing a track suit] (…) The dress code – it has eroded in me, 
this is not our African culture, so it is completely eroded…” (Audio record 
– Debate, 24.11.2010).
The situation exemplifies that the speakers in the debate all knew the implicit rules 
of the contemporary discourse on socio-cultural change which prescribed that all 
Acholi should be concerned about the “loss of their culture”. Furthermore, there 
seemed to be an implicit rule in student debate culture that critical and politically 
well-informed students should adopt anti-imperialist, anti-Western and in particu-
lar anti-US-American positions172. Very few of the participating students, however, 
practiced what they claimed to support, i.e. the rejection of a “Western” lifestyle, 
but instead conversed in English, wore “Western” fashion and consumed “Western” 
media products. Although in the particular context of the debate, nearly all the 
speakers claimed to support “traditional culture” and lamented its decline, they 
at the same time recognized the contradictions between their statements and their 
very ‘non-traditional’ behavior in most other contexts.
Generally, the positions of young people on the subject of socio-cultural change 
were more nuanced than this example suggests. Their imaginations of themselves 
and of an ideal Acholi society seemed to move along a continuum between ‘highly 
modern’ and ‘conservative-traditional’. I will now outline four positions, which are 
located along this continuum.
171 Debating is very popular in Uganda and is carried out in schools and universities. Although the 
positions taken by the teams in the debate and the statements given by the speakers do not neces-
sarily correspond to their personal opinions on the matter discussed and are often exaggerated, 
the statements nevertheless reflect popular discourses and common opinions.
172 I witnessed several examples of anti-imperialist and anti-US-American statements and discus-
sions – in seminars, public debates and student conversations (cf. e.g. field notes 06.03.2010; 
10.03.2010).
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The Retraditionalization Discourse: Idealization of Tradition & the Past5.5.1. 
Although the retraditionalization discourse was mainly promoted by conservative 
elders (both men and women), it was not uncommon among members of the war 
generation173. The basic underlying sentiment of the retraditionalization discourse 
was a strong idealization of an imagined past and a fear of future developments in 
Acholi society. According to Hall (1996b: 630), attempts by retraditionalists “to 
reconstruct purified identities, to restore coherence, ‘closure’, and Tradition (sic)” is 
one typical reaction to the (real and perceived) increased hybridity and diversity in 
the era of globalization.
Supporters of retraditionalization often maintained that everything had been 
better when Acholi culture was still ‘intact’, guided by clear moral principles, and 
when men and women, elders and youth still had their clearly defined roles in so-
ciety. Nowadays, they argued, Acholi culture had been lost and many feared that it 
could not be revived and reinstalled174.
Underlying the retraditionalization discourse was a very static understanding 
of culture which was somehow similar to outdated “anthropological culture con-
cepts” (cf. Hannerz, 1996: 30ff.). Culture was regarded as a bounded, coherent, 
continuous and unchangeable whole that was shared among a homogeneous group 
of people. Tradition and modernity, in this discourse, appeared to be irreconcilable 
binary oppositions. Youth who supported retraditionalization often blamed their 
fellow youths for becoming too “modern and westernized”, for no longer respecting 
Acholi traditions and values, and thus for destabilizing Acholi society. In many ways 
their arguments sounded similar to the expressions commonly heard among Acholi 
elders, as the following example of a quote by a young man (24)175 reveals. When 
I asked him about the biggest challenges for his generation and how these differed 
from those of former generations, he replied:
“This generation, I can see many young people floating. They are not going 
to school, [even] when they find good things they just turn their life to the 
worst, they don’t see that they should reach some point. Mostly they turn out 
drinking, even you find some who come from a very good family, you find 
them floating on the street drinking (…). For theirs [parent’s and grandpar-
ent’s generation] it was good, it was better, in those times. Our parents always 
listened a lot to our grandparents, and when they [the grandparents] are 
teaching a lesson you find them sitting together… Storytelling could also be 
there, there are a lot of things those grandparents were doing to our parents, 
173 For instance, 38.72 percent of the respondents to my questionnaire either disagreed (26.89 %) or 
strongly disagreed (16.13 %) with the statement “Life is better for young people today than it was 
in the past”.
174 38.30 percent of the questionnaire respondents believed that Acholi culture would eventually get 
lost completely. 
175 The ages indicated in brackets refer to the age of my interlocutors at the time of my research.
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so that generation was good. Nowadays you see AIDS is real, there is a lot of 
AIDS everywhere, so it has spoiled a lot. In those days AIDS was not there, 
because in Uganda I remember when it started in 86, in that year I was born. 
So theirs [their generation] was good…” (INT Denis, 16.04.2010).
The quote expresses very well the young man’s yearning for the past, which he 
imagines to have been a time of family solidarity and stability. Like other young 
people, who participated in the retraditionalization discourse, the interviewee felt 
overwhelmed by the rapid changes Acholi society was undergoing. This also be-
comes evident through his description of his generation as “floating”. Throughout 
the interview and in personal conversations afterwards, I learned that, although he 
came from an economically stable family, he had faced many struggles through-
out his life. When, as an introductory question to the interview, I asked him very 
unspecifically to tell me a little bit about himself, these were the first sentences he 
said:
“I come from a place called Amuru District. That is where my village is. Ac-
cording to me, this war has affected young people’s minds a lot, and it has 
not been easy for young people, especially because many people lost their 
parents in this war. Me, I have not been there [in the village, due to the war], 
the only times I go [went] there was maybe during our holiday times, we go 
[went] to our village there and we find [found] there is sort of war. It’s not 
been easy to stay there, so all of our relatives are living here in Gulu. (…) For 
me, there are difficult things: my father was working in Lacor hospital, he 
was a doctor there, and during Ebola outbreak here in 2000 I lost my dad, 
he went away through the Ebola virus. So from there we came from Lacor 
hospital to town where I am living now…” (INT Denis, 16.04.2010).
He went on to recall how after his father’s death he stayed with relatives in town 
and struggled through school. He never finished his A-level and instead started dif-
ferent job-trainings and courses, not all of which he completed. At the time of my 
research, he was working in a badly paid job at a local internet café. He was very 
frustrated with the job and his future perspectives. Although he sometimes talked 
of his dreams – to become a successful musician, to have a secure job and a family 
– he did not really seem to believe that they would ever come true and subsequently 
he did not seem to actively pursue them. At some point, he quit his job in town and 
I never saw him again. I later received an email from him saying that he had quit his 
job because he was not being paid properly. He further reported that he had been 
suffering from Malaria, that he was having a “financial crisis” and that his future 
plans had all failed because the people he relied on had disappointed him (email 
communication 30.05.2010).
Denis’ visions for the future of Acholi society seemed equally bleak. When he 
talked about urban youth he repeatedly mentioned alcoholism, suicide and prostitu-
tion as major problems which incapacitated many members of his generation. He 
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lamented how young urbanites were losing all the “beautiful things” of the past. 
One time, he told me that if he was to find a future wife it would have to be in the 
village, because girls in town were all “spoiled”.
Denis’ way of speaking about the past and the village typically represents the 
retraditionalization discourse. Like him, many of those who were in favor of retra-
ditionalization had experienced difficult times throughout their youth in town and 
currently felt stuck in life. Frustrated, with no educational or job perspectives and 
no prospects of getting married and starting a family they perceived their situation 
as hopeless and feared for their future. They were skeptical of the promises of mod-
ernization, which had remained largely unfulfilled for them, as their daily realities 
contrasted starkly with images of a ‘modern life’ presented in the media – of wealth, 
prosperity, consumer culture and individual freedom (cf. Ferguson 2006: Chap. 7). 
They did not believe they could change their situation for the better and thus had a 
very limited sense of their own agency – in the words of Durham (2008: 153ff.) they 
could be considered “apathetic youth”176. Instead of talking about their future plans 
and “projects” (Ortner, 1997, 2001, 2006), they idealized the past and claimed 
to see the only solution to contemporary problems in going back to an imagined 
“traditional culture”. In this sense, they lacked a “capacity to aspire” (Appadurai, 
2004).
However, despite their rhetoric, in practice not all youth who claimed to have 
given up on their future were lethargic or apathetic. Neither were all of those who 
claimed to support retraditionalization ‘traditionalists’. Denis, for instance, was part 
of the hip hop project and worked in an internet café, which for many Acholi signi-
fied quite a “modern” cultural style.
Thus, although their opinions on tradition and socio-cultural change were by no 
means arbitrary, what youth said and how they acted in practice not always neatly 
corresponded. Youth were more prone to ‘adopt’ the retraditionalization discourse 
in some situations, for instance, when they were specifically asked to reflect on their 
lives and their future prospects or when they were looking for support from older 
people (or from “Westerners” whom they believed to be nostalgic about “traditional 
African culture”) or in specific settings, for instance in the family home or in the 
village. In these sociopolitical contexts, specific power relations and ideologies (cf. 
Fairclough, 2001: 2) were at work, which were favorable to the retraditionalization 
discourse and excluded or impeded other ways of speaking about past and future. In 
other situations and settings, however, the same young people, who had claimed to 
support retraditionalization, would deny their affiliation with tradition and pretend 
to be “modern” or adopt the modernization discourse.
176 Deborah Durham or, more accurately, her ‘elite’ youth interlocutors in Botswana, have coined the 
term “apathetic youth”, describing those youth, usually from underprivileged backgrounds, who 
were politically uninterested and did not take their future in their own hands.
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The Modernization Discourse: Idealization of Life in the West5.5.2. 
On the surface, the modernization discourse represented the complete opposite of 
the retraditionalization discourse. It was commonly supported among members of 
the war generation, but also among some members of the adult generation. Mem-
bers of the elder generation rarely participated in the modernization discourse. 
The basic argument of the modernization discourse was that life today should be 
“modern”, “civilized” and “developed” and that African nations needed to “catch 
up” with the Western industrialized countries. Proponents of this discourse argued 
that “traditional Acholi culture” could not accommodate the changes which were 
necessary to become “modernized” and that “Western” ideas were replacing it. Just 
like in the retraditionalization discourse, tradition and modernity were perceived as 
irreconcilable binary oppositions and culture was understood as something static, 
bounded and coherent, which ‘belonged’ to a specific group of people. In this sense, 
the following statement by one of my interviewees, a 26-year old young man, is 
typical for the modernization discourse. When asked to comment on the biggest 
differences between the young generation and the parent’s or grandparent’s genera-
tion, he responded:
“If I can compare our generation, the now and the then generation, I can 
see there is some change we are getting, when I (compare it) to old stone 
age there… At least you can see some modern roads here, some machinery, 
you know those kind of things. In those days you couldn’t see these things, 
they were backward, they didn’t even know what education is. Right now 
an African child can do something cool, at least we are getting well versed 
with the world, in some few generations to come we are at the same level 
with those white people. Though some of us, we have coped up, but there are 
some people still living in those mountain areas, still having those kinds of 
mentalities. (…) What I can say in Africa, more especially in cities, town and 
centers, the Westerners, they are taking over, they are bringing their culture. 
(…) The culture of Africa, the way I am seeing it – I can’t force something – 
it is going to get lost. For sure, it is going to get lost. (…) People are compar-
ing the culture, the Western culture and the local culture, and when you are 
still doing local things… Nowadays they say the world is just growing, and 
for you are still backward, nobody wants to be called local, so people move 
away from their culture. And even when you know how to do something in 
this culture, you don’t do it, you just run away to the Western life, so that is 
it…” (INT Martin, 21.04.2010).
The quotation reveals the ambiguity of change and the feeling of being ‘seduced’ to 
give up one’s own culture in order to participate in ‘modernity’. Interestingly, the 
respondent does not blame the West for enforcing its culture. Rather, he describes 
the decision to move away from the “local culture” as a conscious and strategic 
choice. The way Martin attributes a deeper meaning to this development, which 
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occurs within a well-established (global) system of power, can be regarded as an 
expression of agency (of intentions) in Ortner’s sense. He seems to have internalized 
the widespread narrative of Africa as a place that is “backward” – economically, cul-
turally and socially. He does not believe that “the culture of Africa” can coexist with 
elements of a “modern”, “Western” society, but rather that all spheres of life need 
to be modernized and westernized in order to catch up and “grow” with the rest of 
the world. But, importantly, he sees himself and (some) members of his generation 
as drivers and ‘agents’ of this (necessary) change which is implied in the statement 
“some of us, we have coped up”.
A further quotation from another interviewee (20) also reflects this idea. The 
young man points out further benefits of modernization and Westernization: inde-
pendence, individual freedom, civic rights, and the possibility of overcoming patri-
archal and gerontocratic structures. According to him, there are three categories of 
youth with very different views on culture:
“First, the children of the rich, those ones, they are so westernized and that 
is so fine – for me I don’t see a problem there. Then, the middle ones, the 
ghetto dwellers, those who live in the ghetto [urban neighborhoods, slums]: 
those ones have both the local culture and the Western culture, and yeah – 
they are transforming and that is good. Then there is the other – the ones 
in the remote areas, the young people who are in the village. For them, they 
still have the culture thing in them, you can see them, the ladies are getting 
circumcised and they are not complaining; there are so many things happen-
ing to them, they are getting married young and they are not complaining. 
It is because their mind is still narrow, their thinking is still narrow, they are 
still focused on that thing… like ‘I want to be like my grandfather, he had 
12 wives’” (INT Joseph, 14.12.2010).
The respondent seems to embrace “Westernization” among Ugandan youth. For 
him, “local culture” is strongly related to the idea of being controlled, restricted 
and not being able to make independent decisions. He refers to young girls in the 
villages who are being circumcised or married off at a young age, probably partly 
against their will. He also refers to ideas which for him seem outdated, e.g. that a 
man has twelve wives, which was common in the past. He talks about young people 
living in rural areas in a very essentialist and also derogatory manner, which be-
comes obvious by his choice of expressions, especially the repeated use of the term 
“(culture) thing”.
Both of the respondents quoted above faced similar struggles like Denis, the 
interviewee quoted in the section on the retraditionalization discourse. Martin had 
lost his dad, who had been shot in the war, and was currently staying with his uncle. 
Joseph had grown up without his parents in the custody of his grandmother and was 
currently struggling to cope with life alone in Gulu. Although Martin and Joseph 
were originally from economically stable families and had attended part of their 
schooling in Kampala, both were currently in a situation of economic uncertainty 
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and were not very optimistic about their future perspectives. However, unlike Denis 
they did not idealize the past, but in fact blamed the past for the current state of 
Ugandan affairs. They also had more faith in their own agency. Although, when I 
spoke to them, they often expressed discouragement and despair at their current 
situation, they nonetheless always seemed driven by their dreams, i.e. to participate 
in what they understood as Western modernity. Martin dreamed of becoming a hip 
hop star. He was well-informed about the international hip hop scene and was one 
of the most active members of the hip hop group. He really believed the project 
would promote him as a hip hopper and was deeply disappointed and angry, when 
he realized that the hip hop project would not live up to its promises. Joseph de-
scribed himself as a poet and I often discussed his poetry with him. He loved read-
ing and writing, had read many internationally well-known novels and books, and 
dreamed of winning the Nobel Prize or a Pulitzer Prize one day. He tried to publish 
his poetry online and was very focused on his career as a writer despite the economic 
struggles he was facing. Even after I left Gulu, he sometimes sent me emails with 
his latest poetry.
When I asked the two interviewees how they imagined their future society to be 
both, Martin and Joseph, talked about the political situation in Uganda. They were 
both very critical of the current government and doubtful that its policies would 
bring about major improvements for their generation. Both stated that Ugandan 
politics needed substantial reforming in order to initiate a development process 
from which the whole country would profit. Thus, although they were skeptical re-
garding Uganda’s future perspective, their analysis of the situation was very different 
from that of the retraditionalization discourse. Instead of imaging a ‘local solution’ 
to contemporary problems and a return to ‘traditional life’, they referred to the na-
tional and even global level and saw the key to a successful future of their society in 
political reforms and development initiatives.
In conclusion, one can state that in some ways the analysis of the current state of 
Acholi culture found within the modernization discourse is similar to the discourse 
on retraditionalization. Both discourses claim that Acholi traditions are getting lost 
because they are not reconcilable with “modern life”. But the conclusions drawn 
from this argumentation greatly differ. While the retraditionalization discourse at-
tributes the current, negative state of affairs (poverty, high unemployment, limited 
access to quality education etc.) to the loss of Acholi culture, the modernization dis-
course in fact blames the current problems on the continuing interference of “local 
culture” with modern life177. It sees the solutions to contemporary (individual and 
177 Similar ways of reasoning, i.e. blaming the break with traditions for contemporary crisis, have 
been studied by anthropologists in other African contexts. Geissler and Prince (2010), for in-
stance, have ethnographically researched how a Luo community (JoUhero) in Western Kenya tries 
to cope with severe crisis sparked by poverty, unemployment and the AIDS epidemic. Conflict 
lines in Uhero were particularly pronounced between “Luo traditionalists” and “Saved Chris-
tians”. In order to cope with the crisis, “Luo traditionalists” had started to codify rules and tradi-
tions of the past, which should guide young people to reorient their lives and revive the stability 
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national) problems not in “tradition” and a return to the past, but in copying “the 
West”. Thus, instead of a glorification of the past, we find an idealization of life in 
the West and a deep-seated belief that the adoption of “Western” models can help 
Uganda to become “modern” and “progressive”.
When analyzing the perceptions of agency among the young people who pro-
moted the modernization discourse, we find that they are double-edged. On the 
one hand, they saw themselves as the drivers of change, who had a vision for the 
future. On an individual level, they not only imagined, but tried to plan and exert 
their “projects” and had an “active projection of the self toward some desired end” 
(Ortner, 1997: 146). Unlike the “apathetic youth” typically associated with the re-
traditionalization discourse, they had faith in the promises of modernization theory 
(cf. Ferguson 2006: Chap. 6, 7), namely that one day Uganda would reach the same 
level of development as the countries in the West. On the societal level, however, 
they did not believe that they could freely design the type and tempo of change they 
were pushing for. Rather, they felt that in order to overcome “backwardness” and 
the narrow confines of “traditional” society they needed to imitate the “Western” 
model and follow a predefined development path. Furthermore, many believed that 
substantial political reforms were needed in order to “modernize” and democratize 
Ugandan society, but few believed that in the current situation of Ugandan politics, 
they could contribute to instigating these necessary political changes.
Again, as stated above, speaker-discourse positions were by no means fixed and 
promoters of the modernization discourse sometimes switched to other discourse 
positions. Generally speaking, the modernization discourse was most commonly 
adopted in discussions about economic development and political liberalization. 
While many younger and older Acholi agreed that they would like to have the 
economic benefits and the political power associated with Western modernity (a 
common view among my interlocutors was that people in the West are rich and live 
‘easy lives’ due to their technical and economic advancement and political superior-
ity), they were more critical of adopting the ‘Western model’ in social terms. Thus, 
whenever the conversation turned to the subject of values and social relations, even 
stern supporters of modernization usually acknowledged that Western society was 
too materialistic, individualistic and “immoral” when compared with “traditional 
Acholi culture”. (I will further elaborate on this point in chapter 6). Generally, many 
Acholi had a very ambivalent attitude towards socio-cultural change and thus com-
monly adopted the ambivalent discourse.
and prosperity associated with the past, while “Saved Christians” rejected Luo traditions and in 
fact saw “traditional cultural practices” as the reason for the contemporary crisis. Similar to my 
analysis, Geissler and Prince show how social rules and imaginations of the ‘right society’ were 
heavily contested, even within the two ‘factions’, and how interpretations of what is “modern” or 
“traditional”, right or wrong varied according to speaker, context and situation (cf. Geissler & 
Prince, 2010: 79; 142ff.; Prince, 2009: 75ff.). 
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The Ambivalent Discourse: Uncertainty in the Face of Change5.5.3. 
The ambivalent discourse combined the two discourses outlined above and reflect-
ed the most widespread position among members of the war generation in Gulu. 
Proponents of this discourse were unclear on whether “modern” life in town today 
was better or worse than “traditional” village-life in the past. While they appreci-
ated many aspects of contemporary urban life and could not imagine going back 
to a rural lifestyle of former times, many still valued Acholi culture and expressed 
sadness that they had not practiced and learned more about Acholi traditions and 
cultural practices during their childhood. The ambivalent discourse, like the former 
two, relied on a number of binary opposition (tradition – modernity, past – future, 
urban – rural), but it supported a more dynamic view of culture than the two 
previous ones. It acknowledged that certain elements of culture could change over 
time, that culture could be incoherent and that there could be different cultural 
styles within one ethnic group. According to this understanding, certain elements 
of culture could get lost, but not Acholi culture as a whole. Therefore, while most 
believed that life in the past had been good and that “traditional Acholi culture” 
was something to be proud of and that should be preserved, they also acknowledged 
that times had changed and it was not possible to revive the past as it had been – 
which in some ways was good and in some ways was bad. The following quotation 
by a young man named Odong (19) typically reflects this position. When compar-
ing his generation to former generations he stated:
“This modernity and this technology has changed everything, most of the 
things. (…) The biggest difference nowadays is respect and morals. Those 
days, our parents, old people those days, they were so respectful, they were 
uprightly brought up, they were so disciplined, but nowadays (…). These 
children, they are used to these video things, they are used to what they see 
from screens, they will start imitating, and when you tell them you don’t 
know anything, your life… Just look at life those days where you used to live, 
this and your generation and modernity (…) so that is the biggest challenge, 
that is the biggest difference which I see between the people of those days – 
our parents – and the people nowadays of this generation.”
When I asked him whether he thought that “modernity” – as he called it – had 
brought only negative things, he replied:
“You see, everything has a bad part and a good part. But the way I see it, the 
bad part of it [modernity] is bigger, (…) there is so much indiscipline and 
no respect. You know in Africa those days, I mean in our culture, in Acholi 
culture, ladies were not allowed to put on miniskirts. If you put on some-
thing like that, oh – they will cane, they will chase you from home, they will 
call you prostitute, that you are trying to ruin and disgrace the name of the 
family, so those things were not allowed. (…) The worst thing was trousers, 
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when ladies put on trousers they will say you are competing with your father, 
they will chase you and no one will marry you because they will say you are a 
prostitute, so you are useless. [Laughs]. But nowadays everyone puts on trou-
sers. (…) Anyway, modernity and civilization have brought also good things, 
because it [modernity] has opened our eyes to the world. Like I told you, it 
has brought so many things we used not to know, but somehow somewhere it 
has also ruined our future and our culture, it has ruined our behavior… and 
our lifestyle – it has affected our lifestyle badly” (INT Odong, 04.05.2010).
The quotation well captures the ambivalence and uncertainty regarding the con-
temporary role of tradition I encountered among many youth. They had heard 
about formerly established norms and rules in Acholi society, for instance regarding 
gendered forms of behavior or certain rituals which used to be performed. On the 
one hand, they seemed proud of such traditions and regarded them as desirable 
and well-suited to establish social order. On the other hand, they also found many 
‘traditional practices’ strange and outdated and very much in conflict with their 
‘modern’ values.
Odong had grown up and gone to school in town. Throughout his youth he had 
participated in diverse youth activities ranging from break-dance and football to 
traditional dance. He was a stern supporter of English Premier League Football and 
a very active member of a cultural group. Although he dreamt of attending Gulu 
University, he had been compelled to start a course at a teacher’s college because 
he could not afford the university fees. When he spoke about his future, he always 
seemed torn between his dream of a “modern life” – with a house, a car and other 
luxury objects – and a more realistic vision of a life as a teacher, who might be sent to 
teach in a rural area, who would have to struggle to provide for a family, but whose 
lifestyle would be closer to the ‘original life’ of the Acholi people. He, like many oth-
er young people, felt that it was not so much his own choice how his personal future 
and the collective future of the Acholi people developed, but that it was determined 
by external circumstances. Thus, he accepted the changes Acholi society was under-
going without trying to actively influence them. In this sense, his perception of his 
agency was quite limited, but other than the “apathetic youth” who supported the 
retraditionalization discourse he did not resign but simply adapted to the changes.
Unlike the former two discourses, which were adopted in situations in which the 
speakers had a clear opinion on whether Acholi society should be retraditionalized 
or modernized with regard to the matter discussed, the ambivalent discourse was 
adopted in situations in which the speakers were truly torn between the advantages 
and detriments of either, retraditionalization or modernization. To me, this became 
especially evident in conversations I had with youth about gender norms. Both, 
my male and female interlocutors, regularly stressed that women and girls should 
show “culturally appropriate behavior”, which implied conforming to established 
Acholi gender norms. But whenever I asked the young men to describe how their 
future wives should be, they also mentioned that she should be “modern”, attractive, 
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educated, able to take decisions on her own and also share financial responsibilities 
in the family. This ambivalence concerning female gender norms, which I found 
among many of my interlocutors and which I will discuss in more detail in the next 
chapter, is clearly revealed in the following quotation by a male interviewee (20), 
whom I asked to describe his ideal future wife:
“Sure, I need to have a wife who is educated. But not quite – because some-
times when my wife is so much educated, and she works in the same situ-
ation like me, there is a tension in the family. Because, you know, men are 
different, women are different, and women when they are educated they start 
to see things in a different way. It is not worthy in Africa. So in Africa there 
is what we call… a man is the head of the family and he should decide. (…) 
But what I need in a woman: she should be someone caring, loving, and she 
should understand our culture, not to deviate from things when she gets 
exposed to your [Western] life (…) She should do things according to the 
tradition. I know other traditions nowadays they cannot work anymore. But 
what I mean is just to fulfill the role like a woman…”
When I asked him to explain which “traditions” exactly he was referring to, he went 
on to say:
“Those days, there were a lot of… Let me say – when it comes to family, 
mostly women were taken as properties and they were not having that free-
dom of speech. So that is what I don’t want to have. Those are the customs 
and traditions, which don’t work nowadays. She should feel free and express 
herself. It is better when you have a good woman, who can continue when 
you get stuck. It is not like I should put myself to be the principle. That is not 
good in a family” (INT Elima, 09.04.2010).
In this sense, the ambivalent discourse implied not just a switching between retra-
ditionalization in one situation, and modernization in another, but pertained to 
situations, in which the young people I encountered were really undecided about 
one specific matter (for instance marriage) with regard to which they felt that they 
could not really combine “traditional” and “modern” elements or decide which of 
both was more desirable. This ambivalence and indecisiveness posed a major differ-
ence to the position represented in the creative discourse.
The Creative Discourse: “Translating”5.5.4. 178 Acholi Culture
The attitude underlying the creative discourse is best captured by a statement from 
one of my interviewees. When I asked him whether he could imagine a future life in 
the rural areas, he answered: “If I go back to the village, I will go with a new style…” 
178 Hall (1996b: 628f.), following Robbins and Homi Bhabha, uses the term “translation” to describe 
those positions which “accept that identity is subject to the play of history, politics, representa-
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(INT Elima, 09.04.2010). Like him, supporters of the creative discourse believed 
that Acholi culture was currently undergoing many changes, but that this was a 
natural and desirable process. Rather than blaming certain groups within Acholi 
society of contributing to the erosion of “traditional culture”, they encouraged ev-
ery Acholi to contribute to transforming and actively shaping Acholi culture.
The creative discourse did not primarily assume a binary opposition between 
tradition and modernity, local and global, Africa and the West, and did not see 
globalization processes as a new, homogenizing threat to ‘local cultures’. Instead, it 
argued that globalization and, related to it, socio-cultural change and exchange were 
interconnected and historical processes which offered new chances and brought 
about new challenges. Thus, rather than being in favor of retraditionalization or 
modernization, or being torn between the two, proponents of the creative discourse 
contended that different facets of identity could coexist and be combined. This 
argumentation underlying the creative discourse is somewhat reminiscent of con-
temporary approaches in anthropological and Africanist theory (cf. Loimeier et al., 
2005a; Hall, 1996b). Hall, for instance, argues that
“[e]verywhere, cultural identities are emerging which are not fixed, but 
poised, in transition, between different positions; which draw on different 
cultural traditions at the same time; and which are the product of those 
complicated cross-overs and cultural mixes which are increasingly common 
in a globalized world” (1996b: 629, emphasis in original).
In a similar vein, the conception of culture underlying the creative discourse came 
close to recent anthropological convictions, namely that there is a need “to ex-
change a static, homogenizing concept of culture in favor of more open, fluid no-
tions which are able to contain the making and unmaking of localities and the 
shifting of boundaries which these processes entail” (Meyer & Geschiere, 1999: 3). 
Proponents of the creative discourse saw culture on a continuum between tradition 
and modernity, as being dynamic rather than static. Accordingly, changes in Acholi 
culture were acknowledged, but they were not interpreted as a sign of cultural loss 
but rather as necessary adaption to changed living circumstances and as a result of 
cultural transitions and transformations. The following quotation by Laurence (20) 
is a typical example. When I asked him why he thought Acholi culture was chang-
ing, he replied:
“When you are stuck to your tradition or when you are stuck to one thing, 
sometimes you don’t achieve much. Though I believe culture is wealth, that 
is true, but sometimes culture when you stick to it, it will not bring you the 
world. Sometimes you go and also try to copy up some other people’s cul-
ture, then you come back to yours. That is when you can lift up your culture 
and go ahead, when you know all or maybe both cultures (…). You have to 
tion, and difference, so that they are unlikely ever again to be unitary or ‘pure’”, i.e. identity 
formations which cut across and intersect seemingly “natural frontiers”. 
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change, in order also to cope up with others – as the world grows you grow 
together with the world. Because if you are to remain behind, you remain for 
good. That is why you see there are certain countries that are still backward. 
Uganda is among them, but I see they are now trying to improve… There 
is much improvement because of the culture changing… even the system 
of education has changed, that is why we are also able to speak English, we 
are able to communicate to other people… you have to change your culture 
at times, and you know, adjust to other cultures also…” (INT Laurence, 
28.04.2010).
The quotation is evocative of the idea formulated by Stuart Hall (see quotation 
above), namely that in the era of globalization, “as the world grows together”, peo-
ple can draw on different cultural elements in order to cope with the complicated 
challenges of contemporary life. The interviewee stresses that people of different 
cultural backgrounds should learn from one another and integrate the new insights 
they gain into their existing ‘cultural repertoire’ – without interpreting the ensuing 
changes of “their culture” as a sign of loss. Stagnation, the belief in cultural purity 
and the desperate latching onto one’s own traditions are interpreted as hindrances to 
a country’s or a people’s development. The respondent gives the pertinent example 
of language and communication. The latter can work only if people are willing to 
engage with one another, to learn new languages, and to adapt their own languages 
or dialects in order to facilitate mutual understanding.
Laurence came from an economically stable family background. His mother 
had died when he was still young and he had grown up with his grandmother in the 
village and later with his father in town. Currently, he was staying in Gulu with his 
father and his new wife. He told me that he had always been a successful student 
and that his father was planning to send him to a good school in Kampala for his 
A-level, or even abroad. Laurence was a dedicated member of the hip hop group, 
who felt inspired by US-American rappers such as Ice Cube, Dr. Dre and Snoop 
Doggy Dog and even female rappers like Lil’ Kim. But he also loved Acholi music, 
Ugandan dancehall and Congolese Lingala. He had many different plans for his 
future: he told me that his father was planning to open a big farm in the village and 
he would probably be involved in the management of the farm, but that he could 
also imagine becoming a musician because he really loved music. In the interview, 
he repeatedly emphasized that he was very proud of being an Acholi, and that he 
came from the Pakwa clan and that his great grandfather had been an important 
clan leader (“king”). In his words:
“It is always good to be proud of who you are, always be just proud. I am an 
African, I am black, I am proud of being an African and black, like you are 
a white lady, and you must be proud of your color, and you must be proud 
of your tribe you come from. I am proud of my tribe, I am proud of who I 
am, my culture all supports me, so being an Acholi is not something bad (…) 
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I am someone from the Pakwa clan. You know this Doloby? Doloby was a 
king, and I am glad to say that I am also a prince because he was my great 
grandfather…” (INT Laurence, 28.04.2010).
In some ways, Laurence was a typical representative of the creative discourse. He 
had a good level of education, his family was planning to set up a large-scale farm-
ing business in the rural areas and he was generally very optimistic about his future. 
He usually performed a modern cultural style, which, from an emic perspective, 
made him appear quite “westernized”. But unlike the proponents of the modern-
ization discourse he often proudly emphasized his Acholi identity and, unlike the 
representatives of the ambivalent discourse, he did not perceive his Acholi identity 
to contradict his ‘modern style’.
Alfred (in his early 20s), another one of my interlocutors who I met occasionally 
in the context of my work at Gulu University, was another typical representative of 
the creative discourse. After his A-level he had completed a nine-month diploma in 
law and was now studying public administration at Gulu University. Alfred was a 
very active student. He was part of the student guild, member of the debate club, 
had played football for the Gulu football club, and was involved in several political 
activities which aimed to strengthen the political voice of youth. In 2008, he had 
been part of a delegation of Ugandan youth who travelled to Nairobi and met youth 
from other African countries to discuss and revise the African Youth Charter. I al-
ways imagined him to be one of Northern Uganda’s future politicians or a successful 
business man in Kampala. But, to my big surprise, when I once asked him about his 
career plans he told me that he was planning to return to his village in Koch Goma, 
a rural area in Nwoya District179, although he also had a small business project in 
Kampala. He added that he was really a farmer and that his family land was there. 
Enthusiastically, he started to recount stories of his hunting adventures during his 
youth and about his old grandfather who had taught him many things about rural 
life (field notes 24.11.2012). Unlike many other Acholi I met, he did not seem to 
see a contradiction between his current lifestyle in town and his ‘real identity’ as an 
Acholi farmer. I gained the impression that he had found a way to combine two al-
legedly very different lifestyles – urban and rural – which many Acholi perceived as 
irreconcilable.
Like Laurence and Alfred, most proponents of the creative discourse had eco-
nomically stable backgrounds and thus had to worry less about their future than 
youths from more precarious backgrounds. Due to their relative economic security 
and, related, their higher social and spacial mobility, they could actually choose how 
and where they wanted their future to be and, even if they decided on a rural life as 
farmers, for them this usually did not mean a complete break with their urban lives. 
However, I also met youths from more precarious backgrounds, like Simon, who 
179 Nwoya District, formerly part of Amuru District, is part of the Acholi sub-region and is located 
southwest of Gulu Municipality (see appendix, figure 1). 
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quite successfully managed to combine urban and rural, ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ 
lifestyles and perceived their extensive ‘cultural repertoire’ primarily as a resource 
and not as a source of conflict.
In terms of agency, ‘creative youth’ saw themselves as self-conscious agents of 
change, not only regarding their individual lives but with regard to the future of 
Acholi society as a whole. They envisioned a society in which people could freely 
choose their style of living and in which elements from different cultures, including 
Acholi “traditional culture” could coexist or even be combined. While acknowledg-
ing socio-cultural change as a naturally occurring phenomenon, they also perceived 
it as a process which could be actively shaped by social actors by intentionally choos-
ing elements of culture which should be preserved and others which should be 
transformed.
This question of selecting suitable and unsuitable cultural elements often came 
up in conversations with my interlocutors and I also took it up in my questionnaire. 
Most of my respondents were very resolute about which Acholi cultural practices 
should be abandoned and which should be preserved. Regarding the former, i.e. 
abandonment, the most common answers were usually witchcraft/belief in witch-
craft (16.67 % of the questionnaire respondents)180, certain ritual practices like the 
twin ritual or the last funeral rite (14.1 %) and wife inheritance (11.54 %). With 
regard to the latter, preservation, the most common answer, by far, was traditional 
dance (51.61 %), followed by appropriate dressing styles (probably implying no 
miniskirts, baggy pants etc., 9.68 %), “traditional food” and “traditional marriage” 
(both 8.6 %). Overall, nearly half of the respondents to the questionnaire (47.68 %) 
disagreed or strongly disagreed that Acholi culture did not fit modern times and more 
than half (52.12 %) disagreed or strongly disagreed that young people should not stick 
to traditions of the past.
Thus, when asked to specifically reflect on the nature of socio-cultural change, 
many young people were able to differentiate between and select cultural elements 
which could easily be integrated into their “modern”, urban life and others which 
could or should not. However, as with all other discourses, the way young people 
spoke about ‘cultural mixing’ was heavily influenced by situational factors and power 
constellations. Furthermore, the ability for young people to mix cultural styles and 
participate in different cultural scenes was dependent, at least to some degree, on 
their material resources. As Hannerz (1996: 73f.) has pointed out, although people 
are free to choose and can adopt various discourses, they are influenced not only by 
the state and the market, but also by their capacities as cultural consumers.
180 The percentages given in brackets all refer to the respondents of the questionnaire. 
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Concluding Remarks:  5.6. 
The Positioning of Youth in Post-War Acholi Society
This chapter has shown how members of the war generation positioned themselves 
in ongoing discourses on socio-cultural change. Four sub-discourses were identified 
in which different perceptions and future implications of change were subsumed: 
the retraditionalization discourse, the modernization discourse, the ambivalent dis-
course and the creative discourse. Underlying each discourse were different con-
ceptualizations of culture and agency and different evaluations of the effects and, 
related, the desirability of change. In addition to analyzing the way young people 
spoke about change, the chapter also looked at social practices and the ways young 
people acted in the face of socio-cultural change with reference to Ferguson’s con-
cept of cultural styles.
The analysis revealed that individual members of the war generation engaged 
very differently with the subject of socio-cultural change. Some tended to dream of 
a return to the imagined stability of the past and felt inclined to revive “traditional 
cultural practices”, for instance traditional dance. Others were more prone to believe 
that they could overcome the conservativeness they saw as inherent in “Acholi tradi-
tions” by orienting their styles and behavior towards what they labeled “Western 
modernity”. As has been argued repeatedly, these different positionalities depended 
on individual characteristics (age, gender, social status, life experience), situational 
context and societal discourses. Few of the young people I met exclusively adopted 
only one cultural style or supported only one of the four sub-discourses. Rather, 
they switched between discourses and styles depending on the people they were in-
teracting with and the power relations involved and thereby exposed different facets 
of their identity as Acholi youth.
Despite the individual reactions to and interpretations of socio-cultural change, 
one can also make out a distinctive war-generational perspective on socio-cultural 
change, brought about by the specific experiences of this generation and reinforced 
by societal discourses on the war generation. This perspective was characterized, 
above all, by ambivalence and uncertainty. The young people I worked with in Gulu 
Municipality grew up in very turbulent circumstances and currently found them-
selves in a situation in which collective norms, rules and conceptions of life seemed 
to be in flux. Many of them could not or did not want to fulfill the roles and expec-
tations – in terms of lifestyle, occupation, marriage and family structures – which 
would have been required of them in ‘traditional’ Acholi society and which were still 
envisioned by some of their parents and community elders. Similar to many young 
people in other societies, they rebelled against the older generation and defined new 
ideals, which were more in line with their individual biographies and their hopes for 
the post-war future. At the same time, however, all members of the war generation 
were confronted with the societal discourse on retraditionalization which strongly 
idealized the past and which blamed the loss of Acholi culture not only on the war, 
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but also on the young generation of Acholi. This highly emotive discourse appealed 
to the young generation to participate in the revival and maintenance of Acholi 
traditions and by doing so to restore social stability and the reputation of the Acholi 
as a people. Some young people managed to integrate the latter exigency into their 
future plans, but most were caught in between the highly moralized societal expec-
tations and their individual dreams and “expectations of modernity” (cf. Ferguson, 
1999).
Thus, when looking from a macro perspective, societal conflict lines between 
different generations became obvious regarding the ways to deal with socio-cultural 
change. These were further manifested by local power struggles between the young 
and the old, but also by global discourses which categorized certain lifestyles as 
more desirable than others. These influences as well as the life experiences of the 
members of the war generation thoroughly affected their understanding of Acholi 
culture and values and their perceptions of changes in Acholi society. To conclude, 
one can retain that while there is a distinctive generational perspective on socio-
cultural change, there are also different sub-discourses and styles to be found within 
this generation. I will take up this point in the next chapter where I look at the ways 
Acholi and Ugandans, in different contexts, use references to the West to position 
themselves in discourses on socio-cultural change. 
Westernization versus Neocolonialism6. 
Representations of “Africa” & “The West” in Debates on 
Aid, Capitalism & Sexuality
In this chapter, I dissect perceptions of ‘Western-influenced’ socio-cultural change 
in Acholiland and Uganda at large181. I aim to understand why the West is such a 
frequent point of reference and comparison in contemporary discourses on socio-
cultural change and why and in which contexts local actors respectively establish 
positive or negative associations with it. I differentiate between discourses on West-
ernization and discourses on neocolonialism. Both are analyzed as forms of so-
cial critique – one internally and the other externally oriented. The largely elitist 
discourse on neocolonialism is explicitly critical of the West and its interventions 
in Uganda. But it is not representative of the more ambiguous perceptions of West-
181 Parts of this chapter have been published as a research article in the Journal of Modern African 
Studies (Vorhölter, 2012).
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ernization I encountered more frequently among my interlocturors who use refer-
ences to the West to comment on contemporary Ugandan society. My argument 
in this chapter is that the binary oppositions modern vs. traditional and Acholi vs. 
Western culture are used as benchmarks to interpret, criticize and imagine post-war 
Acholi society. Furthermore, I reveal the highly sexualized dimension of discourses 
on socio-cultural change in Acholiland and Uganda generally and analyze the way 
these discourses are closely interwoven with power dynamics at the local, national 
and international level.
Dissecting Acholi & Ugandan Notions of “The West”6.1. 
As the two previous chapters revealed, “the West” constitutes an important spa-
tial and symbolic reference point in discourses about socio-cultural change, which 
was commonly understood to denote the complete opposite of local, “traditional”, 
village-based Acholi culture and which, depending on the context and the speaker, 
could be both positively and negatively connoted. As I already mentioned in chap-
ter 4, “Westernization” was generally regarded as a major source of the ongoing 
changes in Acholiland, and its implication and desirability were strongly debated. 
Furthermore, in chapter 5, I analyzed how for some Acholi and/or in some contexts, 
“traditional culture” was seen as the ideal to be strived for in post-war society, while 
for others and/or in other contexts “the West” was taken as a point of orientation 
and inspiration.
In this chapter, I analyze the representations and perceptions of Westerniza-
tion and the West in Acholi and Ugandan182 discourses more thoroughly. I aim to 
understand what Ugandans mean when they speak of “the West”, and in which 
contexts and why they use it as a point of reference and comparison. In Ugandan 
discourses, as I will show throughout this chapter, the attribute “Western” is used in 
two, not clearly separable senses. It is used to refer to the actual interventions and 
political practices of Western, i.e. generally North-American and European, states 
and institutions (for instance in the context of development operations, structural 
adjustment and aid conditionality). And, it is used as a label to characterize specific 
cultural traits and practices. In the first sense, then, the West is seen and addressed as 
a political actor, in the second sense it is understood as a cultural complex. In both 
senses, the attribute “Western” can have positive or negative connotations.
Based on the analysis of my data from Northern Uganda and of statements in 
the Ugandan press, I claim that one can differentiate between two different types 
of discourses: on the one hand, discourses which mainly reflect negative percep-
tions of ‘Western-influenced’ change, focus mainly on the West as a political actor 
182 In addition to my field notes and interviews, I also analyze Ugandan media discourses in which 
references to the West are very common and reflect the pervasiveness of such references not only 
in Acholi discourses but in Uganda generally.
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and are used to blame the West for interference in Ugandan internal affairs. With 
reference to debates in postcolonial theory, I have labeled these “neocolonialism 
discourses”. And on the other hand, discourses which echo more ambiguous views 
of Western influences, both political and cultural, and are concerned with Ugandan 
society itself. Following emic conceptualizations among my interlocutors, I refer 
to these as “Westernization discourses”. I argue that both discourses are forms of 
social critique: one is more externally, the other more internally oriented, but they 
are not mutually exclusive and they sometimes overlap. Both discourses are strategic 
and follow different lines of argumentation (cf. Foucault, 1990: 36ff.). They serve 
certain purposes, reflect different positions within Acholi (and more broadly Ugan-
dan society), and are thus employed by different actors in different contexts and for 
different reasons.
I argue that the discourse on neocolonialism is highly politicized and address-
es, sometimes in a populist manner, historically grown, global power inequalities, 
Western aid politics and the processes of foreign-induced neoliberal change. To 
some extent, this is an elite discourse which is propagated by Ugandan leaders and 
intellectuals, and primarily targets Western politicians and development actors. Its 
main aim is to criticize the West and its continuing dominance in the world system, 
and to emphasize the sovereignty and autonomy of the Ugandan state despite its 
continuing aid dependence. A prominent example of a neocolonialism discourse 
is the current debate on the so-called “anti-homosexuality bill” in Uganda. I will 
briefly discuss this example in a later part of this chapter.
The discourse on Westernization, on the other hand, is more internally-oriented 
and comments on contemporary Ugandan society. It is less focused on the political 
processes of Western interventions, but is rather concerned with the cultural con-
tents and manifestations of values, norms and concepts, which are labled “Western”, 
and the consequences of establishing them in Ugandan society. In Northern Ugan-
da, particularly, the discourse is characterized by a common distinction between 
notions of traditional society on the one hand, and notions of Western modernity 
on the other (cf. Chap. 5). In using these benchmarks, Acholi contest dynamics 
within what they perceive as their rapidly changing society. The token “Western” is 
deployed, sometimes arbitrarily, as a crucial signifier which can have both positive 
and negative connotations. Among the ‘ordinary’ population, especially, to which 
most of my interlocutors in Gulu belonged (cf. Chap. 2 and Chap. 5), I found this 
discourse to be much more prevalent than the discourse on neocolonialism.
This more ambiguous discourse on ‘Western-influenced’ change is often de-
emphasized in the literature which deals with the ways in which Western-induced 
neoliberal reforms and discourses have affected norms and practices in Uganda (e.g. 
Cheney, 2007; Tamale, 2009; Wiegratz, 2010). It is also overlooked in some of the 
literature on post-colonial theory. This literature predominantly reflects the critical 
discourse on the role of the West, which undeniably is very present. But it places less 
emphasis on the ambivalence and complexity of local discourses on Westernization 
(Slemon, 1995: 45) and often represents an elite discourse which has lost its rele-
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vance for many ‘ordinary’ Africans (Magubane, 2003; Quayson & Goldberg, 2002; 
Ashcroft et al., 1998: 188ff.; Zeleza, 2003: 2ff.; Loomba et al., 2005: 3). For ex-
ample, one finds the frequently expressed claim that colonialism, and more recently 
human rights discourses, the aid industry and the global media have created global 
hegemonic norms which have been enforced on African and other ‘non-Western 
societies’ (e.g. Esteva & Prakash, 1998; Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997). Particularly in 
the field of gender, kinship and sexuality several debates, often in the context of aid 
interventions, have been fought over whether the vigorous promotion of concepts 
like gender equality, the fight for LGBTI (LesbianGayBisexualTransIntersex) rights, 
or the banning of practices such as female genital excision, to name just a few, rep-
resent forms of imperialism or neo-colonialism (Mohanty, 1988; Njambi, 2004; 
Bennett, 2010) and whether gender and feminism are not by themselves already 
“Western” or “colonized” concepts (Oyewumi, 1997, 2002, 2005).
These debates have often and too easily been framed in binary oppositions. A 
common claim, in public discourses as well as in some of the academic literature, 
is that there are two clear-cut and irreconcilable positions: on the one side, West-
ern politicians, activists and aid practitioners, who claim the universality of human 
rights and the necessity to enforce them if non-Western states are unable or unwill-
ing to implement them; on the other hand, critical scholars and African politi-
cians, who argue that human rights are just another excuse for Western state and 
development actors to interfere with the sovereignty of African states, and are thus a 
continuation of colonial politics. The perceptions and interpretations of the ‘target 
populations’ who, depending on the discourse, are to suffer or benefit from the im-
position of ‘Western’ norms and rights discourses, have often been ignored in these 
debates. Wiegratz (2010: 123), for example, argues that the neoliberal restructur-
ing of the Ugandan economy and society under the Museveni regime has led to “a 
spread of destructive norms and practices”, and is “mainly driven by the interests, 
norms, practices and projects of sections of the domestic power elite, as well as for-
eign donors, organizations, corporations and special interest groups” (ibid.: 133). 
This is a very important aspect, but it does not capture completely the complex 
processes of compliance and resistance within Ugandan society, particularly among 
the ‘ordinary’ population.
My aim in this chapter is to demonstrate that the Acholi population, which 
was highly exposed to the Western aid regime during and after the war, is by no 
means a passive recipient of ‘foreign imports’, but actively and very critically engages 
with what they label “Western” values, norms and practices. Local actors negotiate 
whether these are desirable or not. They do not generally portray themselves as ‘vic-
tims’ of the West, but base their arguments on their position within Acholi society, 
depending among other things on generation, social class and gender. By looking 
at different local discourses on neocolonialism and Westernization, I show how the 
blurred, multiple and contradictory ways in which Western-connoted concepts and 
ideas are rejected and embraced, enforced and enacted on the ground.
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In the upcoming extract from my field notes, emic conceptualization of differ-
ences between Western and Acholi gender norms and images become obvious. I 
then turn to analyze how Western influences on Acholi society are framed and 
evaluated in contemporary discourses on socio-cultural change. In the first part of 
the analysis, I examine general discourses on Westernization, related to aid depen-
dency, NGO intervention and generational change, all of which are much-debated 
topics in contemporary (Northern) Uganda. In the second part of the analysis, 
I place special emphasis on representations of the West in contemporary debates 
on gender, kinship and sexuality in which binary oppositions between local and 
global, modern and traditional and African and Western are particularly wide-
spread and contested. Finally, I give an example of a neocolonialism discourse – the 
current national debate on homosexuality – and show that the motives, arguments 
and strategies behind it are very different from the discourses on Westernization. I 
relate the example of the “anti-homosexuality bill” to other recent sexuality-related 
legal measures proposed by the Ugandan state in order to control and discipline its 
population and argue, following Foucault, that discourses on sexuality can provide 
important insight to power dynamics at the local, national and international level.
Simon’s Story – Extracts from my Field Notes6.2. 
August 10th, 2010. Simon and I sit at Franklin’s Inn, drinking soda, and catching up on 
what we have been doing lately. I ask him how his hip hop projects are coming along 
and Simon tells me that he has just finished shooting the video for his new song. He 
starts telling me about Peter, a young German, who helped him to produce the video 
clip. Soon, he digresses from talking about the video production. Instead, and rather 
excitedly, he starts to tell me of Peter’s relationship with an Acholi girl. The following is 
my summary of Simon’s story.
Peter came to Gulu to visit Julian, the German coordinator of the hip hop project 
for a few weeks. He was a good friend of Julian and stayed with Julian and his German 
girlfriend Anke183 in their flat in Gulu. Due to the work on the music video, Simon spent a 
lot of time with the three of them.
One day, Simon took Julian, Anke and Peter to a photo shop in Gulu to take some 
“snaps”184. A young girl, Ajok185, who Simon knew from previous visits, was working at 
183 All the names of the people mentioned in Simon’s story have been changed. 
184 “Taking snaps” is very popular among youth in Gulu. It involves going into a photo shop with 
a friend, often a girl- or boyfriend or a ‘muno friend’, and posing in front of fake photo-poster 
backgrounds, for instance a beach, a palace, a park etc. Six snaps in the size of passport photos 
cost around 1.500 UGX (approx. 0.5 Euro).
185 When Simon told the story, he just referred to her as “the girl”, but for readability purposes I have 
decided to give her a name, Ajok, which is a common Acholi name and usually given to girls “with 
a mark on the body that is believed to be of supernatural origin”, i.e. to girls who are somehow 
feared for their possible supernatural connections (Adong & Lakareber, 2009: 180).
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the front desk. She started to flirt heavily with Peter from the moment they entered 
the shop. (Simon explains to me that he felt very embarrassed by the girl’s behavior 
because she was “making very clear signs to Peter”). Even Julian, who had been living in 
Gulu for several months, asked Simon whether that was the way “Acholi girls normally 
behaved” – apparently he had never seen anything like it – and Simon told him that this 
was “definitely not the way Acholi girls should behave” and that it was “more like the 
way prostitutes acted”. Peter, however, did not seem to notice or to care about the girl’s 
“inappropriate” behavior and after this first encounter he and Ajok started to meet on a 
regular basis.
One night, when Simon went to perform his new hip hop song at Herm’s Club, Julian, 
Anke, Peter and Ajok came along. Simon recounts the evening and the many interesting 
details he observed. He tells me that “the whole time Ajok was trying to do with Peter 
what Julian and Anke were doing. When Julian and Anke stood arm in arm, she also put 
her arms around Peter, and when Julian and Anke were dancing very closely, grinding 
their bodies186, she would also dance the same way with Peter.” According to Simon, this 
made the other Acholi guests in the club look at them funnily and when I ask him why, 
he explains: “The way Western people behave should not be the same way for Acholi 
people. When Westerners kiss and hug in the streets, when they dance funnily (and 
dirtily), people here laugh at them, but they tolerate it, because it is the way Westerners 
behave. But when Acholi people, especially Acholi girls, behave in that way, people find 
it very embarrassing and think the girl might be a prostitute”.
Simon continues his narration of the evening with a critical undertone. He reports, 
somewhat disapprovingly, how he observed that Julian, Anke and Peter were drinking 
and even smoking the whole night. [A common cliché about Westerners is that they 
drink, smoke and behave immorally in public. Most Acholi have become accustomed 
to this behavior and while it is seen as tolerable for Westerners, at least in the official 
discourse, it is regarded disgraceful if Acholi people, especially women, do the same].
Later in the night, Simon walked home with Julian and Anke (Ajok and Peter had 
already left earlier). On the way, Julian pulled him aside and said he wanted to talk to him. 
He told Simon that he really did not like the way this Acholi girl was behaving, always 
being around Peter. She had even slept at their place for two nights, and this night would 
be the third night. Simon explained to me that Julian and Anke never invited anyone 
[probably implying anyone Acholi] to their place and therefore must have been very 
annoyed by Ajok’s nightly visits. Simon tells me that he apologized to Julian and tried 
to explain to him that “this girl was really like a prostitute” and that “the way she was 
behaving was not what people would expect from an Acholi girl”.
186 According to Wikipedia, “[g]rinding, (…) is a type of close partner dance where two or more 
dancers rub or bump their bodies against each other, especially a male dancer rubbing his 
crotch against a female dancer‘s buttocks, in imitation of rear-entry or ‘doggie-style’ inter-
course. Grinding gained its initial popularity in night clubs, and eventually moved on to high 
school and middle school dances especially in the US and Canada where there have been cases 
of administrators attempting to ban it due to its explicit nature” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Grinding_%28dance%29, accessed 21.09.2012).
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I interrupt Simon and ask him if he generally thinks that girls who go to night clubs are 
prostitutes, a claim I had often encountered among other of my Acholi interlocutors. He 
answers that many of the girls in the clubs are actually prostitutes, but not all. According 
to his ‘analysis’, there are some student girls (I think he refers mainly to university 
students) who just go there to have fun and dance. But there are also many girls who 
are working in unskilled jobs and who go to clubs to find a future husband because they 
think the guys there may have some money.
Simon continues with his story about Ajok. He tells me that even now that Peter 
has gone back to Germany she is still obsessed with him, telling everyone that she 
wants to marry Peter and that she had always wanted to marry a white guy. Simon just 
contemptuously comments that “she is aiming too high” (probably implying that a white 
man is of a higher economic and social class than Ajok and that Ajok should rather find 
a husband within her own ‘class’).
After we have finished our drinks, Simon says we should go and take a “snap” at the 
photo shop which is nearby, so that I can have a look at Ajok. We cross the road and 
enter the photo studio. Ajok is not there. Instead, a photographer welcomes us who 
seems very eager to see a white customer and tries to impress me by talking non-stop 
with a fake American accent, thereby completely ignoring Simon. We move to the back 
of the studio into a room with different wall papers. The motives include a beach setting, 
a palace, and a park. Before our pictures can be taken, Simon applies some white powder 
to his face and explains to me that he has seen people in the movies do it. Finally, we pose 
in front of the photo wall portraying a palm tree and a beach. The photographer keeps 
blabbing and when I turn to Simon to signal him that I want to leave, the photographer 
tells me that “this guy” (pointing to Simon) was his good friend and regular customer 
(later it turns out that he does not even know Simon’s name). When Simon goes to pay 
for the snaps, the photographer looks to me and apologizes that the photos will only 
be ready tomorrow because, unfortunately, they do not have digital cameras yet like “in 
the first world”.
We leave and I ask Simon what he thought about the guy’s behavior. He shrugs his 
shoulders and tells me that the guy acted similarly around Peter and that it was even 
a matter of conflict between Ajok and the photographer who were competing for the 
attention of the white guy (field notes 10.08.2010).
Simon’s story raises several interesting points. For one, it reveals how closely the 
behavior of “Westerners” and their interactions with Acholi are observed by the 
people living in Gulu (cf. Chap. 2) and how, based on these observations, moral 
judgments are pronounced. Hereby, the behavior of “Westerners” is judged very 
differently from the behavior of Acholi people and the behavior of women is judged 
very differently from the behavior of men. Simon’s interpretation of Ajok’s behavior 
as un-Acholi and disgraceful is especially interesting when contrasting it with the 
events at Herm’s club I described in the former chapter. While sexist behavior of 
Acholi men, including interactions with women which were on the verge of sexual 
harassment, were tacitly tolerated and in some instances even encouraged, ‘aggres-
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sive courting’ of Acholi women, like in the case of Ajok, seemed to be generally 
regarded as unacceptable, especially when it was directed towards a white man. In 
this regard, it is interesting to note that not only Simon, but also Julian used the 
discourse to express his disapproval of Ajok’s behavior as ‘un-Acholi’ and inappro-
priate.
The image of whites in connection with debates on gender and sexuality is a 
second aspect which Simon’s story reveals and which I will discuss throughout this 
chapter. Many young Acholi I spoke to, both men and women, told me that they 
dreamed of having a white girl- or boyfriend. When I asked them why, they usually 
mentioned one or more of the following reasons: whites are “financially stable”, 
they are more interesting and ‘exotic’, having a relationship with a white person 
enables the migration to a Western country, and having a relationship with a white 
person raises one’s status in Acholi society (personal conversations and observations, 
cf. field notes e.g. 02.09.2009; 12.08.2010; 02.11.2010; 31.12.2010; for similar 
debates among Madagascan youth, see Cole, 2011). The desirability of white peo-
ple as marriage or sexual partners was also reflected in dating adverts published in 
Ugandan newspapers where one could frequently find statements like “Man wants a 
white lady for love”; “African lady, 21, wants a white man, 25–35, from UK, USA, 
Canada and Australia for marriage” or “Chris, 28, is looking for a financially stable 
white lady, 19–30, for a serious relationship” (all published in Saturday Vision, Au-
gust 21st, 2010: 29). In the dating ad from which all these quotes are taken, 22 out 
of 92 advertisers were specifically looking for a white partner187.
However, representations of Western/white people in the Ugandan media are 
not all as admiring as these advertisements would suggest. With regard to gender 
and sexual issues one can often also find ridiculing remarks about white people’s 
perspectives and behaviors as the following two example show. In an article about 
how women can “lose that belly after giving birth”, for instance, readers are advised 
to eat their last meal three hours before they go to bed and assured that “[t]his is not 
all about acting like the whites” (Omurungi, 2010). Implied in this statement is a 
common conviction that white people make too much fuss about their appearance 
and (can afford to) consider it more important than many other, more mundane 
aspects of life which Ugandans have to struggle with. In another article entitled 
“G-spot is a myth?” a young Ugandan women is quoted saying: ”We see it [the 
G-spot] in the western magazines we read and see it being discussed in movies so 
that we definitely know about it”. “However”, the article continues, “most of them 
[the young women] don’t fuss about it like their western counterparts” (Kalumba, 
2010b). A Ugandan man in the same article is quoted as saying “This thing about 
women having a spot that I hear stimulates them so much called [G-spot] (sic) is a 
concoction from the west by the bazungu [whites].” These quotes again suggest that 
white people try too hard to be sophisticated and overly concerned about every-
thing, including very ordinary and ‘natural’ matters like sex.
187 For similar observations in other African contexts see Honwana, 2012: 96.
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Some articles also make fun of Ugandan’s ‘obsession’ with white people. One article 
I found in the Saturday Monitor, for instance, discussed the question why black 
women hated white women and “went livid, bananas, and all those things upset 
when they saw a black man with a white woman”. The columnists argued that one 
of the reasons might be that “while a white women has the mostly straight and soft 
hair, the black women has to endure hours of hours of work to her head, make sure 
she looks beautiful and also, hold down a proper job just so that she can leave her 
house and have to compete for the love, attention and affection of a black man…” 
(Matanda, 2010). This statement again reflects that white people are generally seen 
as privileged and that they are at the same time admired, envied and despised for 
their privileged status.
The three articles mentioned here are just random examples188 of the way gen-
der and sexual issues in the Ugandan media are often discussed with reference to 
the West. The ambivalent representations of white people one can infer from these 
articles are also reflected in Simon’s story. On the one hand, whites are admired and 
highly respected. This becomes evident in Ajok’s behavior towards Peter, but also 
in the photographer’s behavior towards me (trying to imitate an American accent, 
making reference to “first world” technology…). On the other hand, the comport-
ment of white people is also judged critically and even contemptuously, for instance 
with regard to alcohol and tobacco consumption.
In the following chapter, I will analyze in more detail how Western/white people 
and the West are represented in local and national discourses, and how valuations of 
the perceived “Westernization” of Ugandan society vary depending on the context, 
speaker and subject of debate. First, I will look at discourses on Westernization in 
the context of aid dependency, NGO intervention and generational change.
Discourses on Westernization in the Context of Aid, 6.3. 
Modernization & Generational Change
Over recent decades, Uganda has experienced wide-ranging changes in the po-
litical, economic, cultural and social spheres. Since President Museveni came to 
power in 1986, these changes have been heavily influenced by Western state and 
development actors. The Museveni government has willingly succumbed to foreign 
policy interventions and accepted structural adjustment measures in order to re-
ceive large amounts of international development aid (Ndikumana & Nannyonjo, 
2007). Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Uganda’s relationship with its Western 
donors remained quite favorable as the Museveni government continued to take up 
prominent development trends and discourses, e.g. on liberal economic reforms, 
188 Throughout my research stay I read and collected numerous newspaper articles on gender issues 
and particularly gender issues which were discussed with references to “Westerners”. 
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education, women’s and children’s rights (cf. Cheney, 2007; Vorhölter, 2010b). Un-
til today, development partners finance a large percentage (at least 25 percent) of the 
Ugandan national budget (Tabaire & Okao, 2010: 6; Branch, 2012: 85). Further-
more, the high presence of Western aid workers – in all parts of the country and in 
Northern Uganda in particular – and the expansion of the mass media have influ-
enced the dreams and expectations of Ugandans and led to a change in consumer 
trends and popular culture (cf. Chap. 5). Whereas the Ugandan elites profited from 
these developments, poverty remained widespread, especially in rural areas and in 
the North (Ndikumana & Nannyonjo, 2007: 21f.; Shaw & Mbabazi, 2008), and 
levels of social inequality rose.
The wide-ranging processes of socio-cultural change have created feelings of 
uncertainty and ambivalence among large sections of the population, not only in 
Northern Uganda (as discussed in the previous chapters) but in all parts of the 
country (cf. for instance Karlström, 2004, on Buganda; Whyte & Whyte, 2004, 
on Eastern Uganda; Wiegratz, 2010, on Uganda generally)189. There are frequent 
discussions whether the rate of change is too fast and whether it is actually for the 
better or the worse. Elderly people, in particular, fear that their “traditional culture” 
is “getting lost” and that the young generation is being confused and destabilized by 
the lures of “Western modernity” (cf. Chap. 4).
However, not all values and products which are perceived as Western are also 
perceived as negative. On the contrary, some are very much desired. Neither can the 
debates about positive and negative impacts of Western-induced change be framed 
purely in generational terms. Socio-cultural change is a very complex phenomenon, 
and positions regarding its desirability and extent depend on a number of factors: 
age, gender, educational background, class, setting (urban or rural), as well as chang-
ing circumstances and situations (cf. Chap. 5).
As the previous chapter has shown, many of my younger respondents in Gulu 
expressed a desire and a need for change. They felt unsatisfied with their current 
situation, and many believed that the adoption of “Western” models could help 
Uganda to become “modern” and “progressive”. Despite some improvements since 
the end of the war, the majority of the population still suffered from poverty, high 
unemployment rates and limited access to quality education (Branch, 2008; Whyte 
et al., 2012; Spitzer & Twikirize, 2013; Webster, 2013). Daily realities contrasted 
starkly with images of a modern, Western life presented in the media – of wealth, 
prosperity, consumer culture and individual freedom – which young people hoped 
to achieve.
However, despite the hopes of economic development and a liberalization of so-
ciety which Acholi youth, in particular, connected with the idea of Westernization, 
they also had doubts and fears of its potentially destructive effects (cf. Chap. 5). It 
189 This is also reflected, for instance, in advice or counseling sections on issues such as relationships, 
health, lifestyle etc. in the Ugandan daily newspapers Daily Monitor and New Vision, where read-
ers discuss issues and problems of concern to them.
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often seemed to me that my interlocutors wanted to have the economic benefits they 
associated with Western modernity. A common view was that people in the West 
are rich and live ‘easy lives’ due to their technical and economic advancement (cf. 
Ciaffa, 2008: 122 for a description of a similar perspective in “African philosophy”). 
However, most were very critical of adopting the ‘Western model’ in social terms. 
Many people I talked to and interacted with in Gulu seemed to believe that Western 
society was materialistic, individualistic and “immoral” – characteristics which are 
somehow linked to Western capitalism and economic success, although this was not 
always explicitly reflected by my interlocutors. One of my friends and regular inter-
locutors, Fred, for instance, often complained to me about the “Westerners” in Gulu 
who he saw as somehow representative for Western people as a whole. He used to 
tease me by claiming that “Western people”, especially those from the aid commu-
nity, all kept to themselves, only interacted with Ugandans when they needed them 
for their work or research, lived an excessive lifestyle, were arrogant and egoistic and 
so on. But he also remarked that many “westernized Ugandans”, primarily those 
from the upper class and many youths, had started to adopt similar attitudes (cf. e.g. 
field notes 14.03.2010; 27.03.2010; 04.04.2010; 18.06.2010).
Especially elderly people often expressed a feeling of despair at the socio-cultural 
changes which, according to them, were happening as a consequence of adopting 
“Western culture”, and many saw the only solution to contemporary problems in 
going back to their often idealized “traditional culture” (cf. Chap. 4). The ongo-
ing debates that I witnessed in Gulu between youth and elders about the extent to 
which Acholi society had become “westernized and modernized” reflect generation-
al conflicts about societal ideals and future expectations, including a fear by elders 
to lose the control they originally had in society, which was based on principles of 
seniority. The following quotations were typical expressions I encountered when 
talking to elderly people:
“Youths today are very lazy, idle and disorderly. They are confused, they 
don’t know what to do, they don’t know what is the right way anymore, they 
are so full of confusion. Maybe that is also because they don’t know how to 
combine human rights with their culture. Today, many children don’t listen 
to parents anymore; when they are given some advice, they say ‘I have my 
own rights, leave me alone’. That is making youths to be so unstable today 
because they don’t have proper guidance” (male elder, group interview Ka-
pedopong 28.06.2010, translated from the Acholi original by Kenneth Oyet 
Odong).
“Respect is the biggest problem. The young people today are following the 
Western culture, whereby boys are wearing earrings and pulling their pants 
down. When the elders talk to them, they say ‘ah, for you, you are local’” 
(male elder, group interview Paicho, 17.10.2010, translated from the Acholi 
original by John Omara).
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The derogatory use of the word “local”, referred to in the second quote, reflects an 
internalized view of a widespread hierarchization between global (equals modern) 
and local (equals traditional). Describing an elder as “local” could imply that he 
does not have formal education, cannot speak English, or does not know about 
recent consumer trends and developments. These aspects were frequently discussed 
in the interviews I conducted with mixed groups of elders and youth. However, as 
also discussed in the previous chapter, not only elders but also young people some-
times idealized the past and were desperate for more structure and elderly guidance 
in their lives.
Interestingly, while both groups – those who embraced ‘Western modernity’ and 
those who rejected it – felt somewhat determined by and experienced confusion as 
a result of the recent processes of socio-cultural change, most of the people I inter-
acted with did not explicitly blame the West for enforcing its concepts, norms and 
ways of life. Although this “neocolonialism discourse” was also present in Northern 
Uganda (I sometimes encountered it among university students and among local 
political and/or economically powerful ‘elites’, cf. Chap. 5), it rarely came up in my 
daily conversations about socio-cultural change.
Due to my own critical standpoint on the Western aid regime and due to the 
post-colonial discourses I knew from the literature, I had expected people to be 
explicitly critical of these interventions. What I found, however, was that most of 
my interlocutors actually appreciated the humanitarian intervention in Northern 
Uganda. In interviews, I often asked my respondents to evaluate the work of foreign 
aid organizations in Northern Uganda and typically received answers like the fol-
lowing:
“Quite a number of them did very credible work. Actually, minus [without] 
their intervention, there would be a big problem here, a catastrophe in the 
North” (INT Vincent Ochieng, 26.03.2010).
“They [the NGOs] have done their best, always, and they are still doing their 
best. There was a need for them to come! (…) We also see that, there are 
organizations that will still exist, because there is a need (…) I know that the 
long term goal is to have them [the people] sustain themselves, but I know 
there is a time for everything. So I know, eventually projects will be phased 
out, but when they are phased out people should be left standing on their 
feet, not in limbo, pull-out just like that” (INT Faith, 18.03.2010).
“I should say, many positive things came from the interventions that hu-
manitarian aid workers came with: human rights trainings, GBV trainings, 
all of this health and hygiene, water and sanitation. I can tell you that back 
then, in those villages 20 years ago, there existed no pit latrines, people just 
simply squatted somewhere and depended on nature to clean up the envi-
ronment. But today you go back and you’ll find there is a pit latrine for each 
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home. They are conscious about their health. (…) I think that demonstrates 
that people have learned things” (INT Rocki, 16.03.2010).
Like these interviewees, most of my interlocutors stressed that the aid intervention 
had been necessary to support the people in Northern Uganda during the war and 
that aid was still needed today because people were still recovering from the war 
and adapting to the post-war situation. Of course, debates on aid dependency, the 
non-sustainability of development projects, and the unequal distribution of ‘devel-
opment benefits’ were also widespread and my interlocutors often complained about 
the marginalized position of Uganda and the privileged position of the West190. All 
in all, however, and to my own surprise, the dominant discourse was not very criti-
cal towards the West. There could be different reasons for this: for one, the ‘inter-
viewer effect’, i.e. me being a “Westerner”. This, however, should have abated after 
some months of regular interactions, at least to some extent. A second reason could 
be that because of the war, the subsequent high levels of poverty, and the inability 
or unwillingness of the Ugandan government to help, most people in Northern 
Uganda felt dependent on interventions by the West. Most importantly, however, 
I argue that in the current post-war phase the dominant discourse revolved around 
‘rebuilding’ Acholi society and was thus internally-oriented. Obviously, Western ac-
tors were a part of this ‘rebuilding process’, therefore debates about the introduction 
of “Western” values, norms, consumer goods etc. often came up. But rather than 
criticizing the West, my interlocutors blamed fellow Ugandans for trying too hard 
to imitate the “Western” lifestyle and values which they considered not or not yet 
suitable for Acholi society.
When discussing the impact of humanitarian NGOs in Gulu, for example, my 
interlocutors often emphasized that the NGOs brought new concepts (like human 
190 The following quotation by one of my interviewees reflects these sentiments: “Too many or-
ganization and too many donors is not actually a good thing for the people in Gulu. What I 
think (…) and what I envision is to help people to have a sustainable program. Other than being 
behind them like a backbone all the time – so that if you pull out, the wall will collapse – the 
people who are here should actually be working on sustainable program that will make them 
develop their ability to reject funds. These organizations, I just have to mention it, most of them 
are money-minded, they are creating employment for the few who have studied. Corruption is 
another aspect, instead of targeting the very beneficiaries, when the money comes they have to 
think of themselves first (…). I feel there is too much being funded in Gulu, they need to reduce 
it and focus on sustainability, make a program that will make people learn that I have to work 
for something and get it, other than receiving it every time. (…) People want to eat and receive 
it [the food], but they don’t want to do the work. What I want to say, people don’t like work, 
they don’t want to work, but they want to be ok. A lot [of humanitarian work] has been done in 
Gulu and that is the thing that is misleading them. It can be reduced. If people will be told they 
have to work hard for this, there will be a lot of transformation” (INT Ojara, 17.03.2010). In this 
quotation, the respondent criticizes the aid organizations for creating dependency, being “money-
minded” and corrupt, but at the same time he also blames the people in Gulu, who “do not want 
to work” and do not take matters into their own hands. 
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rights) which in principle were very good. But then they went on to say, that because 
local people did not know how to use them properly, these new concepts were caus-
ing more harm than good, which is also expressed in one of the quotations above 
(“Maybe that is also because they don’t know how to combine human rights with 
their culture”). Westernization does therefore not necessarily mean a process which 
is initiated from the outside, as the term might suggest, but rather something which 
is actively enacted by Ugandans. This is also evident in the following quotation:
“There are some people that are too modern, they are too westernized. You 
know, we here just try to imitate the Western culture, but we could not really 
do it …. We call it half-baked: sometimes you pretend to be Western, but it 
will not fit you well” (INT Henry, 27.04.2010).
Statements like these, which I commonly encountered, suggest that the discourse 
on Westernization is not about blaming former colonial powers and other Western 
states for the current processes of change. Rather, it is a discourse directed at the 
Acholi/Ugandan population, and represents a debate about which norms, values 
and practices should prevail and whether it is desirable to imitate a “Western” life-
style. In using the term “Western” as a kind of benchmark, in both, a positive and 
negative sense, Acholi people are trying to come to terms with their own society. 
My interlocutors in Gulu seemed to have a stereotypical imagination of Western 
society, which was used as an external reference point. In discussing the desirability 
and undesirability of imitating this stereotypical Western society, they were nego-
tiating what they considered desirable for their own society. In this sense, debates 
about the Westernization of society represent a form of internal social critique. Im-
ages of an ideal society are debated by comparing (an imagined) Acholi society to 
an imagined other.
Some people also strategically used the label “Western” to ‘brand’ certain norms 
and practices as foreign and therefore unacceptable, which they felt interfered with 
their personal affairs. They claimed to reject these ‘foreign norms’ on the basis that 
they were “Western” and legitimated their own behavior by claiming it was a “cul-
tural practice”. I sometimes encountered this line of arguing in discussions on gen-
der roles and norms and the way they were currently changing. The following is a 
quotation from an interview with an Acholi man in his early 30s, who was working 
for an American organization as a “Capacity Building Manager” on issues related to 
Gender Based Violence (GBV). I asked him whether in his work he sometimes en-
countered people who blamed Western organizations for enforcing rights discourses 
and interfering with their lives, and he replied:
“GBV is a sensitive issue, not only here, I think in Germany, everywhere it 
is a sensitive issue, sensitive in a sense that people want to get the excuse to 
do the wrong things. It is also because of the power dynamics, people want 
to demonstrate their power and use it in some way or other. So when we 
question it – ‘why do you act like this?’ – then someone says: ‘culturally this 
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woman is supposed to be doing this…’. You know, so they demonstrate that 
they still have to be in charge. (…) There are many who say it [gender equal-
ity] is a Western thing, but again you can ask: ‘How many Western things 
are you using – from your dressing, to the phone, to your car, to English, 
everything’. I do not anymore know the boundaries between East and West, 
it just doesn’t exist, it is a global village, and this problem affects everyone. 
(…) The fact is that bad is bad, rape is rape, if Western or not Western: rape 
is rape, and so there is no Western-Eastern attribution to it. For me, it is a 
phenomenal problem that has to be dealt with” (INT Rocki, 16.03.2010).
The quotation reveals that at the centre of the debates about Westernization are 
power differences and conflicts within Acholi society: between men and women, 
young and old, rich and poor, urban and rural populations, who all have very dif-
ferent imaginations of the ideal society. The critical question then is not how far 
Western actors are enforcing certain concepts on Acholi/Ugandan society, although 
this remains an important issue, but how Acholi and other Ugandans are trying to 
negotiate critical issues such as norms, values and practical developments which 
affect their everyday lives. Although many of these are shaped and influenced by 
trends and actors from the West, the discourse is less about processes of interven-
tion as such, but about the contents of ‘Western models’ and the consequences of 
adopting them.
Furthermore, local discourses and negotiation processes on social norms can 
be regarded as expressions of agency, which reflect local appropriations of concepts 
that are labeled “Western”. Whether a “Western” concept is adopted and becomes 
a social norm is not, as is often suggested, something which can be steered from 
the outside, but rather something which reflects positionalities and power differ-
ences within Ugandan society, based on age, gender or class. But although older, 
wealthier, urban-based men probably have more impact than for instance young, 
poorer, rural-based girls in imposing new policies and related norms and practices, 
power relations are neither fixed nor all-encompassing, and agency can be exercised 
even by the least powerful (cf. Ortner, 1997)191. A good example are debates about 
children’s rights, also referred to in one of the quotations above. Elders and parents 
repeatedly complained to me that children were nowadays always talking about 
their rights, particularly their rights to education and leisure time. They complained 
that children rebelled if parents could not pay their school fees or when they were 
asked to work on the fields or in the household (cf. e.g. INT Okello, 26.09.2010). 
In contrast, children and youth I spoke to questioned former, more authoritarian 
educational methods and some scorned their parents for being “backward” due to 
191 As outlined in the introduction, Ortner’s concept of agency is concerned with the mediation 
between conscious intentions and actions of the individual and the structures he/she is embedded 
in and which influence the individual’s actions and intentions (Ortner, 2001: 77). Ortner argues 
that agency is a form of power which can be used by the powerful, but also by the seemingly 
powerless in order to keep up the status quo or to invoke changes. 
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their lack of knowledge of “modern” rights discourses (personal conversation cf. 
field notes 09.03./13.03.2010). These debates reveal that children, who are gener-
ally seen as the least powerful members of society, actively use the discourses on 
children’s rights to challenge established hierarchies and ideologies. Thus, although 
elites might have some influence in introducing certain measures such as neoliberal 
reforms, their influence is not as all-encompassing as authors like Wiegratz (2010, 
see above) suggest.
Here, it is helpful to employ a Foucauldian notion of power (cf. Chap. 1). Power 
produces social realities, but it is not ‘possessed’ only by dominant elites. Rather, it 
consists of a multiplicity of force relations and points of resistance, which together 
constitute an overall strategy or system of power, often with unintentional outcomes 
(Foucault, 1990: 93ff.). Different studies (e.g. Adogame et al., 2008a; Appadurai, 
1996; Ferguson, 1990; Loimeier et al., 2005a; Rottenburg, 2002) have shown that 
the outcomes of development interventions, globalization, modernization and 
Westernization processes are often unintentional, and neither homogenizing nor te-
leological (Adogame et al., 2008b: 4). On the contrary, through the encounter with 
the “new” – through both, active appropriation and passive alienation – boundaries 
can be redrawn and identities recreated (ibid.: 13). Thus, foreign influences as well 
as changing norms and practices are negotiated at all levels of society, and although 
policies adopted and promoted by elites have far-reaching consequences for the rest 
of Acholi and Ugandan society, as the example of neoliberal reforms shows, their 
influence is not all-encompassing.
The next section emphasizes some of these points by analyzing common nar-
ratives about Westernization in Acholi discourses on gender, kinship and sexuality. 
Here, social norms and practices are particularly contested. I discuss common points 
of debate among my interlocutors in Gulu, and show how the perceived Westerniza-
tion of gender, kinship and sexual relations manifests itself in a struggle between the 
older and younger generations, as well as between men and women.
Discourses on Westernization in Relation to  6.4. 
Gender, Kinship & Sexual Relations
In this section, I analyze Westernization discourses on matters related to gender, 
kinship and sexuality. The introductory extract from my field notes and the quota-
tions from newspaper articles already hinted at the fact that references to “West-
erners” and “the West” frequently come up in these discourses and constitute a 
significant point of comparison. Current popular discourses on gender, kinship 
and sexuality in Uganda and the reasons why the West figures so prominently in 
these discourses must be seen against the backdrop of historical developments and 
long-ranging popular and scholarly debates, which have discursively established the 
idea a) that there are significant differences between ‘African’ and ‘Western’ gen-
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der, kinship and sexual relations and b) that ‘African’ gender and kinship system 
have undergone drastic changes since colonial times, which have been significantly 
influenced by the West (cf. introduction). In order to contextualize contemporary 
Acholi/Ugandan discourses, I will briefly point out how the West is seen to have 
influenced gender, kinship and sexual relations and discourses in the colonial and 
postcolonial period in Uganda.
As already pointed out in chapter 4, Christian missionaries and the British colo-
nial administrators are believed to have influenced gender relations and gender dis-
courses among the Acholi and in Uganda more generally – through the introduction 
of Christianity and the moral discourses related to it, through the establishment of 
Western schools, through taxation and subsequent changes in the labour organiza-
tion, and by challenging established hierarchies and forms of organization within 
communities (Schäfer, 2008: 332; Girling, 1960: 174–195; Dolan, 2002: 63f. and 
El-Bushra & Sahl, 2005: 14ff.).
In the postcolonial period, specifically since Museveni came to power in 1986, 
Uganda has received exceptionally high levels of multilateral and bilateral develop-
ment aid and, subjected to aid conditionality, was among the countries worldwide 
which most readily accepted structural adjustment programs and also took on West-
ern rights discourses, especially regarding women’s and children’s rights (cf. Cheney, 
2007: 42ff.)192. Since the late 1980s, international, mainly Western NGOs and the 
Ugandan government have started campaigns and programs to promote women’s 
rights and gender equality which are seen to have ‘reshaped’ gender relations in 
Uganda (Wyrod, 2008). Furthermore, due to the high chance of gaining access 
to international funding, several Ugandan NGOs were founded, which claimed to 
support women’s rights and raise awareness of gender issues (Tripp, 2000: 117ff.), 
but which remained “in many ways beholden (…) to donors” (Tamale, 2009: 67).
Throughout the 1980s and 90s and up until today, Uganda has been hit, both 
by armed conflict193 and the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which not only affected gender 
and family relations, but again provoked large-scale interventions by Western hu-
manitarian and development actors along with their crisis-related gender discourses 
(see for instance the “Development – Gender” publications by BRIDGE194: Marcus, 
1993 & El Jack, 2003).
192 The supposed interlinkages between gender issues and economic growth, presumed by Western 
development institutions, become apparent in the following quotation from a World Bank report, 
which states that “Uganda is a leader in Sub-Saharan Africa in recognizing linkages between eco-
nomic growth and gender issues. These linkages are critical for achieving a variety of development 
goals” (Ellis et al., 2006: 1).
193 Two recent studies, Dolan (2002) and El-Bushra & Sahl (2005), document the impact of the 
armed conflict in Northern Uganda on Acholi gender relations. For a general overview of the 
linkages between gender, conflict and development see the influential volumes by Afshar & Eade 
(2004) and Manzurana et al. (2005). 
194 According to the information provided in the two reports cited above “BRIDGE was set up in 
1992 as a specialized gender and development research and information service within the In-
stitute of Development Studies (IDS), UK. BRIDGE supports gender mainstreaming efforts of 
246 Julia Vorhölter: Youth at the Crossroads
Recently, as has been repeatedly pointed out throughout this book, Ugandan youth, 
in particular, have become increasingly exposed to Western media and attentively 
watch (and sometimes copy) the attitudes and behaviors transmitted in films, TV 
shows and magazines (see e.g. Parikh, 2005).
In summary, one can state that for a long time gender discourses and debates in 
Uganda have been accompanied and influenced by Western discourses and the di-
chotomies they have created between Africa and the West. As the following analysis 
shows, this is reflected in the way Ugandan people talk about gender issues and in 
their frequent references to the West – as a major source of authority (for instance 
regarding topics such as gender equality) and as a point of comparison against which 
Acholi, Ugandan and African195 gender ideologies are discussed.
‘Western Models’ as Threats?6.4.1. 
As already discussed above, Ugandan people’s deliberations on ‘Western models’ 
are complex and contested. This is particularly noticeable in the field of gender, 
kinship and sexuality. When discussing these issues with my interlocutors in Gulu, 
they often claimed that gender roles and norms, dating and marriage customs and 
sexual practices had been “westernized”. They related this to a variety of causes, 
most prominently media influences, the promotion of women rights, and also the 
insurgency (cf. Chap. 4). Again, it was evident that references to Western influences 
were used to convey both positive and negative implications of these changes, the 
interpretation of which depended on the positionality of the speaker, as I will show 
below.
The positive aspects mentioned usually included: 1) more equality between the 
sexes and more chances for women (e.g. access to education and jobs and therefore 
greater economic and financial independence); 2) the decline of ‘harmful cultural 
practices’ (such as wife inheritance, which was most commonly mentioned, but also 
the reduction of polygyny, early or forced marriages); and 3) more personal freedom 
in relationships (e.g. to choose a partner, have more sexual liberties, and pursue the 
ideal of romantic love, cf. Cole & Thomas, 2009).
The positive aspects of changing gender roles are mentioned in the following 
interview extract (INT Ojara, 17.03.2010):
Ojara: “Culturally it [gender differences regarding jobs] used to exist, but 
we are trying to change that. For example in the fabrication section 
with all those difficult technical aspects, (…) traditionally those 
jobs were for men. But now, when they come [for career guidance], 
policy-makers and practitioners by bridging the gaps between theory, policy and practice with 
accessible and diverse gender information.”
195 Interestingly, I found that in these debates similarities between Africans are often emphasized, 
and related to an “African identity” in addition to ethnic and national identities. “African” as op-
posed to “Western” values are thus conceived in extremely essentialist terms.
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a lady might choose to go for tailoring. Then we counsel them, we 
say: ‘How many tailors do we need in Uganda? What will be the 
benefit? You are like a man, you are an ordinary human being, you 
can do what a man does’. So after talking to them, we saw a lot of 
the women diverting to other sections like building, welding and 
fabrication. At the moment there are about three welding work-
shops being run by ladies.”
J.V.: “Is there opposition by the community?”
Ojara: “No, they have not been opposing that. They used to think that it 
is not good, but poverty is streamlining people. When you don’t 
allow a girl to do that, you deny a lot of opportunity. A situation 
might come that you don’t have a boy, you may have only ladies, 
so if you don’t allow them to do those jobs you will remain in a 
desperate situation. (…) That’s why there are ladies going for driv-
ing, going for engineering… So equality and the gender thing is 
already being practiced to the maximum. (…) I believe they [the 
community] have understood the value of gender equality.”
In this extract, we find that gender equality is connected to the idea of economic 
development and, implicitly, the idea of being somehow progressive. The idea of 
modernity is linked to fulfilling ideals which have been promoted by the West. 
Although in this quotation the West is not explicitly mentioned, gender equality is 
generally understood and frequently referred to as a “Western” concept. An Acholi 
elder once mentioned to me in an interview that the notion of “gender balance” had 
existed and was practiced in pre-colonial Acholi society, but that gender equality 
as a political concept was recently introduced and is nowadays commonly referred 
to as a “Western” idea (INT Okello, 26.09.2010). In the above quotation, as in 
the other examples cited above, the West is not explicitly blamed for enforcing its 
concepts. Rather, economic arguments, i.e. gender equality is good for economic 
security and advancement and necessary in the context of post-war reconstruction 
in Gulu, seem to have convinced the Acholi population of the need to change ac-
cording to “Western” principles. The respondent states that “poverty is streamlining 
people”, implying that changes in gender roles have become a necessity, but were 
originally not desired (“they used to think that it is not good”). This implies skepti-
cism towards changes in gender norms and relations, which, however, have become 
reluctantly accepted due to the economic crisis.
Generally, more often than being completely accepted and supported, develop-
ments related to women’s emancipation and changes in gender roles were viewed 
quite ambiguously among my interlocutors. The following example is an extract 
from an interview with a Ugandan woman who was working in a project aimed at 
reducing sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in the Acholi sub-region. The 
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project was supported by the Acholi cultural institution Ker Kwaro Acholi and fo-
cused on the need “to modify or update some of the cultural practices that do not 
promote women’s human rights in Acholi land (sic)” (Ker Kwaro Acholi, 2010a: 2). 
In the interview, she explained the ambiguous effects of changing gender relations in 
Northern Uganda, which she attributed to “the conflict and Western culture”:
“In this generation now, there is gender equality, women can make their 
own decisions, things have generally changed. Formerly, there were cultural-
based-practices which were discriminating against girls and which are slowly 
changing today. But not all cultural-based-practices were bad; some were also 
good which have been destroyed. … There are definitely both – good and 
bad things [being imported from the West]. On the positive side: women’s 
empowerment, valuing of women, equal rights for the girl child, and educa-
tion. On the negative side: violence – in the movies, also the vulgar language 
which is taken up by some people (and it is worse if it is taken up by women); 
defilement; and also emancipation because it has gone out of proportion and 
has led to a loss of respect, especially in marriages, and thus also causes vio-
lence. The changes have come too fast and people couldn’t adapt properly” 
(INT SK, 23.03.2010).
The ambiguity expressed in this quotation is notable: changes in gender norms are 
not necessarily negative, but have “come too fast” and have “gone out of propor-
tion”. The respondent stresses that not all “cultural-based practices were bad”, as 
might be inferred from Western discourses on gender equality, but they were “de-
stroyed”. She does not say why or how. Overall, the most common negative aspects 
of ‘new’ concepts such as gender equality and women’s rights mentioned during 
my research were increased conflict and violence between men and women, a rise 
in ‘immoral’ or inappropriate behavior, a decline in social courtesy, and resultant 
instability in the community and society as a whole (cf. Chap. 4). I analyze these 
factors in more detail below.
My data reveal that debates about gender, kinship and sexuality are more emo-
tive and fought along more essentialist lines than other discourses on Westernization 
and socio-cultural change. One explanation may be that these are crucial factors in 
social reproduction and, in the long run, societal survival. According to my find-
ings, most of the concerns voiced in Ugandan discourses about changes in gender, 
kinship and sexuality matters can be related to three fundamental threats which are, 
implicitly or explicitly, feared by the speakers: 1) a threat to the family and kinship 
system; 2) a threat to the moral integrity of society; and 3) a threat to established 
gender orders. All three are closely interrelated and by no means specific to the 
Ugandan case, but have been analyzed with regard to other societies in the “late age 
of modernity” (cf. Giddens, 1991). In discussions about these threatening aspects 
of Westernization and modernity, my interlocutors often contrasted “traditional” 
Acholi/Ugandan/African society with an imagined “modern” and “Western” other. 
By looking at three typical narratives, I show how these binary oppositions are used 
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to negotiate generational and gender-based conflicts in Acholi society. I thus il-
lustrate my argument that discourses on Westernization, rather than providing an 
externally-oriented criticism of the West, are internally-oriented and reflect different 
evaluations and interpretations of socio-cultural change in which the West figures 
as a benchmark.
Narrative 1: Westernization as Threat to the African Family and Kinship Model
Changing family and kinship relations were a common topic among my interlocu-
tors, and were often discussed by using the above-noted binary oppositions. Accord-
ing to a widespread narrative (cf. Chap. 4), in “traditional African society”, marriage 
served to create bonds between different clans or lineages, and was not primarily 
seen as a relationship between two individuals. Nuclear families were incorporated, 
supported and controlled by a huge network of relatives. Extended families usu-
ally co-resided and/or collaborated to guarantee subsistence. Relationships between 
proximate generations were reciprocal, i.e. children took care of their parents in 
old age. Descent was clearly regulated by patrilineality. Most importantly, African 
society was seen to be based on solidarity and communality, as was repeatedly and 
emphatically conveyed to me (e.g. field notes 17.03./28.04./05.05.2010).
In contrast, “Western society” was described as being individualistic, material-
istic and unappreciative of communal values. My interlocutors claimed that these 
characteristics, which they saw as jeopardizing and undermining the stability of the 
“traditional” system of social relations, were now finding their way into Ugandan 
society through the “modern and westernized” young people. The latter were ac-
cused of finding their marriage/sexual partners without consulting their parents and 
kin, moving away from the villages and trying to distance themselves from the large 
kinship network and the obligations that come attached to it. As a consequence of 
individualization and selfishness, “these young people” were no longer committed to 
their marriages and families, and just left to do their own thing as soon as problems 
came up. Therefore, divorces, which had formerly been very rare, were increasing 
and early, extra-marital and/or multiple relationships were becoming more common 
Illustration 3: Posters at the registration desk, Gulu Youth Centre (photo by author)
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(e.g. field notes 04.09./10.09./02.12.2010). In an article entitled “Why marriages 
break up”, the author argues in a similar fashion to my interlocutors:
“[M]any young couples are facing (…) predicament. Either their marriages 
are slowly rotting such that they are literally living separate lives, or the di-
vorce papers are already signed. But why are young marriages faltering? (…) 
Moral decadence is part of the trouble. A man is being driven in one of those 
Benzes to his wedding and yet he is busy texting his many exes as to when 
they will meet when the honey moon is out of the way! A young married 
woman wanting to climb that corporate ladder will with no qualms lift her 
skirt to whoever matters in her quest to get that job. We are that immoral! 
The moral values in our society went bust a long time ago. Money is the oth-
er reason. (…) Personally I think the lack of sacrifice in many couples is the 
culprit for many of the break-ups. (…) Our parents’ marriages faced some 
serious hardships, right from their design, where women had zero rights to 
the structure that clearly had men as the sole bread winners. But despite 
the complications, which at the time required the intervention of the local 
church at the village to get the marriage on track, the marriage somehow 
survived. It could have been abusive and ugly but to this day after 50 years of 
such marriage, they are still together…” (Kalumba, 2010a).
Like the author, many of my interlocutors also related changes in African family 
and kinship systems and the rise in uncontrolled sexual behavior among youth to 
“moral decadence” and greed for individual (economic and social) benefits. Young 
women, in particular, were accused of being prostitutes (like Ajok in Simon’s story 
discussed above).
Prostitution is a very strong image, which stands for society’s loss of control 
over women’s sexuality and fertility (Arnfred, 2004a: 16), and which is evoked in 
many contexts, past and present, in Uganda and other (African) countries – also, for 
instance, to legitimate repressive laws (see below). Promiscuous sexual relationships 
of women are seen to pose a threat to patrilineal descent systems and societies that 
are closely interconnected through affinal ties. In present day Uganda, prostitution 
and similar phenomena such as “transactional sex” entail risks which are even more 
concrete and whose impacts are experienced on a day to day basis: HIV/AIDS, abor-
tion, and family break-up. From a women’s perspective, the decision to have more 
than one sexual partner or to abort might be regarded as expression of agency and in 
some contexts even as intentional strategy in the sense that women are consciously 
taking control of their own sexuality, fertility and economic situation (cf. Honwana, 
2012: 103f.; Sadgrove, 2007; Mills & Ssewakiryanga, 2004). In the dominant so-
cietal discourse, however, such practices are seen as posing a serious challenge to 
established gender orders (see below).
“Transactional sex” was a frequent topic of debate among the young people I 
worked with in Gulu. Although cases of young men sleeping with older women 
were sometimes mentioned, it was usually young girls, who were accused of sleep-
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ing with older men for money and material wealth (personal conversations, cf. field 
notes e.g. 02.01.2011; 10.01.2011). In the weekly ‘educational discussions’ with 
young people at Gulu Youth Centre, “something for something love”, “transac-
tional or cross-generational sex” and their consequences such as HIV/AIDS and 
unwanted pregnancies were common topics of debates (e.g. field notes 11.05.2010; 
26.08.2010; 14.09.2010). In one session, in which the question “Is poverty the 
main cause of unwanted pregnancy?” was debated, a university student argued that 
not poverty but the “materialism of girls” was the main reason for unwanted preg-
nancy. He continued by saying that pornography and the “influence of Western 
videos where girls wear miniskirts and do many immoral things which the girls here 
then want to imitate” encouraged Ugandan girls to behave like prostitutes (field 
notes 02.11.2010; my interpretation of exact wording).
In this sense, the perceived increase in women’s sexual freedom was also postulat-
ed as a sign of and a reason for the “moral degeneration” of Acholi society discussed 
in the following.
Narrative 2: Westernization as Threat to the Moral Integrity of African Society
According to this narrative, moral correctness and integrity were particular ‘cul-
tural strengths’ of “traditional African societies”. Respect (particularly of age and 
gender based hierarchies) was often mentioned by my interlocutors as the single 
most important principle regulating every aspect of social life. Other important 
rules they pointed out concerned proper conduct in public life, for example decent 
dressing, or no showing of (sexual) affections.
In contrast, “Western society” was seen as decadent and “morally degenerated”, 
as could apparently be ‘witnessed’ in Western movies, popular culture and the be-
havior of “Westerners” (expatriates and tourists) in Uganda. Many respondents crit-
icized the desire of Ugandan youth to imitate “Western culture”, and interpreted the 
changes in gendered and sexual behavior as a sign of insetting “moral degeneration” 
of Ugandan society. The often used image of indecency and moral decay was the 
miniskirt (which I already referred to in the introduction)196, as reflected in this quo-
tation by a male university student at a public debate (cf. field notes 24.11.2010):
“You see someone putting on a miniskirt in the village there and so disgrace 
our culture. Honestly, we have lost our conduct, our cultural behaviour has 
196 In the Ugandan daily newspaper Daily Monitor I often found articles which reinforced my inter-
pretation that the miniskirt was one of the emblems of indecency and Western-induced moral 
decay. One article (“Kitgum – Mini-skirts banned”, 23.03.2010 (N.N., 2010a)), for instance, 
discussed how miniskirts had been banned in a Kitgum village in order to counteract the increase 
in rape cases. In another (“Fort Portal NGO roots for dress code”, 01.01.2011 (N.N., 2011b)), 
I read about a local NGO in Fort Portal, which had started to train girls between the ages of 
five and 18 how to dress appropriately. Recently, in the context of the debate on the proposed 
“Anti-Pornography Bill” (see below), Ugandans were even discussing whether women who wear 
miniskirts in public should be punished by law. 
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really been lost. … When we leave this town and go to the village, we shall 
really be so much discriminated, because we differ so much from those peo-
ple in the village. … They will begin comparing us to people who come from 
outside… because of the way we conduct ourselves” (Audio record – Debate, 
24.11.2010).197
This statement reveals that ‘foreign’ dressing styles were taken to be particularly 
obvious indications of a ‘Western infestation’ of urban Ugandan society. Girls and 
young women were commonly accused of wearing or wanting to wear miniskirts. 
In a similar vein, boys and young men were blamed for wearing their pants low 
(‘baggy style’) and trying to look like US-American ‘gangsta rappers’. Other typi-
cal examples of “moral degeneration”, some of which I have already mentioned, 
included: children and youths have lost respect for their elders – they are rude, do 
not listen to advice anymore, do not help their parents and grandparents at home, 
and are too money-minded. Women have lost respect for their husbands and male 
relatives – they refuse to fulfill their roles in the household, quarrel all the time, 
and are also too much money-minded. The descriptions of such ‘misbehavior’ reveal 
that especially older people and men who felt (relatively) disempowered feared that 
fundamental social values were jeopardized which, according to them, had formerly 
served to create stability in the society.
The fear of a moral degeneration of society as well as the previously discussed 
fears of a “Westernization” of African kinship and family systems can be related to a 
third threat: the breakdown of gendered orders in Acholi society.
Narrative 3: Westernization as Threat to African Gender Orders
In Ugandan media discourses as well as in conversations among my interlocutors, 
normative expectations of how men and women should ideally behave in Acholi 
society were distinguished from “Western” gender images, particularly regarding 
women. According to the narrative, in “traditional” African society, gender rela-
tions were marked by clearly differentiated, complementary roles and related gender 
and age-based hierarchies, which were perceived as very different from “Western” 
notions of gender equality. However, in contrast to common Western (feminist and 
development) discourses on African gender relations, most elders, male and female, 
I talked to did not think that these former social structures were discriminatory or 
‘gender-unequal’. Okello once explained to me: “This gender balance necessity is 
just being brought like that [but] the original respect was there, it was just natural, 
197 The quotation is from a public debate at Gulu University which I already referred to in the previ-
ous chapter. In this debate, students from the debate club and the audience discussed the motion 
“This House resolves that Culture is being lost among the Youth”. Although the positions taken 
by the teams in the debate and the statements given by the speakers do not necessarily correspond 
to their personal opinions on the matter discussed and are often exaggerated, they nevertheless 
reflect popular discourses and common opinions.
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there was no question about it, you know this is for a woman, this is for a man” 
(INT 26.09.2010).
The typical “traditional” African woman was depicted as a caring, loving ‘mother’ 
who respects her husband and in-laws and behaves according to culturally-defined 
gender rules. This image was sometimes contrasted with the typical white woman 
who is not married to her sexual partner, does not have children, dresses and behaves 
inappropriately in public, and does not show respect for gender-based hierarchies. 
The ‘traditional African mother’ was also contrasted to the young generation of 
Ugandan girls who no longer stick to established norms, dress codes and behaviors 
expected of women (e.g. field notes 07.03./13.08./10.09./30.10./02.11./28.11./20.
&21.12.2010; cf. also Kalumba, 2010c).
The typical African man was commonly portrayed as a well-respected protector 
and provider of his, ideally polygamous, family. This image was contrasted with the 
irresponsible young generation of Ugandan men, who have multiple sexual relation-
ships and father many children without being able to properly marry the women 
and provide for their families198. This selfish and irresponsible behavior was seen 
as consequence of youth’s desire for a “Western”, urban, hedonistic lifestyle, and 
as a refusal to work hard on the fields as their parents had done. Most of my in-
terlocutors, however, also referred to underlying social dynamics such as poverty, 
unemployment and the subsequent inability of young men to acquire the brideprice 
necessary to get married properly or to provide for a family.
Despite wide-ranging changes in Acholi society, images of gender roles and hi-
erarchies have remained quite stable (Dolan, 2002). However, a growing number 
of men and women can no longer live up to these expected norms. In the literature 
on masculinities (e.g. Cleaver, 2002; Huisman, 2011; Silberschmidt, 2004), this has 
been attributed to complex processes that are linked, among many other things, to 
the introduction of capitalism during colonial times, subsequent neo-liberalization, 
related factors such as poverty and unemployment, and also the war. The break-
down of “hegemonic” models of masculinity (cf. Connell, 2005) is seen to pose a 
great challenge to established social orders and therefore to social stability, a concern 
which was also commonly expressed by my interlocutors:
“The behavior of women has changed these days and it is not easy to teach 
them anymore. They have started wearing trousers and always talk about 
women’s rights. They don’t respect and listen to their elders anymore, be-
cause of all these modern influences they are always rioting and referring 
to their rights and refuse to fulfill their traditional roles” (male elder, group 
interview Kapedopong 28.06.2010, translated from the Acholi original by 
Kenneth Oyet Odong).
198 The irresponsible and negligent young Ugandan man was a frequent point of discussion in Ugan-
dan newspapers supplements such as Full Woman (Saturday Monitor), Intimate and Total Man 
(both Saturday Vision ). Interestingly, white men were rarely mentioned directly as reference 
points in these discourses.
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“You know these women of nowadays – you find the one who is educated 
enough: she is now doing her own job. You find that she will not mind of you, 
because … she only has her job, everything is in her hand: her salary, month-
ly… So what are you? What does she want?” (INT Daniel, 30.04.2010).
“To a rural person, a woman remains a woman and she has to do all the do-
mestic chores, and a man remains the head of the family and the breadwin-
ner. And yet they are not now breadwinners, it is women who now struggle 
there at night to get something to eat for their children” (INT Zipparoh, 
23.03.2010).
The quotations express that the perceived breakdown of gender (and gerontocratic) 
orders, aggravated by the promotion of women’s rights and education, causes uncer-
tainty and instability as established hierarchies and power relations are being chal-
lenged. Men no longer feel valued, respected and needed. Women experience that 
men can no longer live up to the role as main provider, which in turn forces them to 
look for alternative sources of income and take over the man’s role themselves.
As discussed above, the failure of men to live up to societal expectations seems 
to be perceived as more serious (by men themselves but also by society) than that 
of women, who seem more flexible to choose and adapt to new gendered identities. 
In many ways women, who for instance gain access to the labor market, succeed in 
getting an education, and single-handedly manage their household are, relatively 
seen, empowered, while men who fail to attain these achievements are relatively 
disempowered. Those who are affected by unemployment and poverty, for instance, 
are denied many opportunities which are (still) needed in Acholi society to achieve 
the status of an adult man, such as the ability to marry, to provide for a family, and 
to be the representative and head of the family in public life.
Discourses on Westernization as Forms of Internal Social Critique6.4.2. 
As pointed out above, the debates about the values of tradition and modernity, 
and the disparities thus invoked between African and Western gender images and 
norms are hardly new. The famous Acholi poet and writer Okot P’Bitek took up 
very similar topics and images in his poem Song of Lawino (1989), first published 
in the 1960s shortly after Ugandan independence. In the poem, Lawino accuses 
her husband Ocol and her new co-wife Clementine of trying too hard to copy the 
lifestyle of “the whites”, and defends Acholi customs by contrasting them sharply to 
‘Western culture’199. Indecent behavior and dressing, sexual immorality, abortions, 
and even loss of masculinity (“My husband has become a woman”, ibid.: 119) are 
only some of the issues she criticizes as results of ‘Westernization’ in Acholiland. 
199 Rather than speaking of “Westerners” or the “Western culture” as is common in Uganda nowa-
days, Song of Lawino talks of the “white people” or the “white people’s way”. 
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Lawino uses the characteristics and behavior of white people as negative reference 
points in order to condemn unwanted dynamics in Acholi society. As in my ex-
amples above, positive “traditional” values (e.g. authenticity, morality, communal-
ity) are asserted as a means to emphasize the dignity and sovereignty of ‘African 
cultures’ in a time where Africa is commonly depicted as a dark, backward, poor 
and dangerous continent – even by Africans themselves.
In the poem, Lawino takes pride in ‘her’ Acholi culture and appeals to others to 
do the same. Interestingly, she does not criticize the whites, but the Africans who are 
trying so hard to imitate them: “She [Lawino] thinks the customs of white people 
probably suit white people. She doesn’t mind them following their own ways. … But 
those Africans who insist on following the ways of white people are foolish, because 
they misunderstand their own ways and do not know themselves” (Heron, 1989: 
19f.). This comment relates to my argument very well. It implies that complaints 
about ‘Westernization’ in Song of Lawino, like those in contemporary discourses, 
are not about or addressed to the West, but directed at Acholi society and aim to 
criticize those ‘westernized Acholi’ who are repudiating their own culture.
In the preceding pages, I have outlined the complex and contradictory ways in 
which Western influences (or what is labeled as such) and socio-cultural change 
were reflected among my Acholi interlocutors and in the Ugandan media. I have 
focused on discourses on Westernization and have argued that these are less about 
actions of Western actors, and more concerned with internal processes and dynam-
ics within Acholi/Ugandan society. Although these discourses acknowledge societal 
changes as a consequence of adopting ‘Western models’ such as capitalism and often 
expose strong distinctions between “Acholi/Ugandan/African” and “Western” values 
and concepts, they do not present the West as forcing Ugandans to comply with 
‘Western ways of life’. Rather, references to the West are used as a means to negoti-
ate contested norms in Ugandan society. Especially among the younger generation, 
the frequent references to the West also reflect a desire to be “Western” and “mod-
ern”, to engage in a lifestyle they know from the media, and to overcome some of 
the constraints they relate to “traditional” African society, such as being controlled 
by male elders in the family and clan, or to labor in the fields instead of going 
to school. In this sense, the given examples illustrate an extensive and conflictive 
inter-generational debate which is taking place within Acholi/Ugandan society. This 
debate is inspired by the changes people are witnessing in their everyday lives, some 
of which, like HIV, teenage pregnancies, abortions, and decline in marriages, have 
or are seen to have very serious consequences for their communities. Furthermore, 
these debates reflect internal power struggles about maintaining or challenging the 
status quo.
All in all, Westernization seems to have very different implications from the 
discourse on neocolonialism which I introduce in the following section. Judging 
from my own data on Northern Uganda, references to neocolonialism were rare 
in discussions of socio-cultural change among my interlocutors. But there was one 
prominent exception: the recent debate on homosexuality. Here, claims of neocolo-
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nialism and Western interference were explicit and brought forward by all segments 
of the population. In the following, I briefly examine this debate, and suggest why 
homosexuality is so explicitly framed as a form of neocolonialism.
Neocolonialism Discourses & the Debate about the 6.5. 
“Anti-Homosexuality Bill”
In October 2009, a Member of the Ugandan Parliament, David Baharti, proposed 
a legislative bill which would impose the death penalty on certain acts of homo-
sexuality200. In Uganda, homosexuality is widely perceived as a foreign threat which 
needs to be controlled so that it does not ‘infiltrate’ society.201 In Ugandan public 
discourse (i.e. in the media, in political statements, in ordinary conversations)202, 
the attempts by human rights actors and Western states to pressure Uganda into 
taking a more liberal stance on homosexuality are often interpreted as forms of 
“neocolonialism”203.
Ever since Bahati’s proposal of an “anti-homosexuality bill” became public, 
Uganda has been in the international headlines and on the agenda of human rights 
activists. The proposed law supposedly acknowledges the view of many Ugandans 
who state that homosexuality is something unnatural and fundamentally “un-Afri-
can” which is being introduced in Uganda by “Westerners” and poses a threat which 
needs to be contained. What is interesting in this debate is the way homosexuality is 
framed as something which is enforced by outsiders. A common claim is that young 
people are being corrupted into becoming homosexuals and will then ‘set upon’ 
200 The decision on the bill was postponed several times. In 2012 and early 2013, different media re-
ports announced that the Ugandan government was in the process of debating a new law against 
homosexuality which, however, no longer included the possibility of passing a death sentence 
for severe cases of aggravated homosexuality (Bhandari, 2012; Böhm & Kemper, 2013). The 
Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Act was finally passed in December 2013 and signed by President 
Museveni in February 2014. Although it no longer includes the death-penalty, it still broadens 
the criminalization of same-sex relations.
201 It is important to note that this radical opposition to homosexuality was strongly promoted and 
at least partly initiated by early Christian missionaries, and is still fuelled by fundamental Ameri-
can Evangelicals (cf. Böhm & Kemper, 2013; Epprecht, 2008; Kapya Kaoma, 2010). Thus, and 
somewhat paradoxically, homophobia is also a ‘Western import’. This aspect, however, is rarely 
touched upon in debates about the bill.
202 This discourse is well-depicted in the internationally acclaimed documentary “Call me Kuchu” 
(directed by Wright & Zouhali-Worrall, 2012).
203 In this sense, neocolonialism is an emic category used to describe undesirable foreign influences 
in Uganda. As an analytical concept, it was originally applied by African politicians and scholars 
in the immediate post-independence phase (e.g. Nkrumah, 1974) and in Marxist approaches (e.g. 
Amin, 1973). “Neocolonialism” is still regarded as a “key concept” in postcolonial studies and 
theory (cf. Ashcroft et al., 1998: 162f.).
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other Ugandans. The fact that people are agents who can make choices is strongly 
de-emphasized in this discourse. Homosexuality is seen as a ‘structural force’ which 
is highly contagious and ‘automatically’ turns people into homosexuals if it is not 
stopped at once. In contrast to other concepts (e.g. gender equality etc.) discussed 
above, which are perceived as Western and viewed with some skepticism, but nev-
ertheless debated and appropriated at the local level, homosexuality seems to be re-
jected completely and references to neocolonialism are frequent in public discourses 
(cf. Wright & Zouhali-Worrall, 2012). In an article entitled “Neo-colonialism fuels 
homosexuality in Africa” which was published in the New Vision, one of the two 
major daily newspapers in Uganda, Margaret Muhanga (2009), Member of Parlia-
ment for Kabarole District at the time of writing, claims:
“The dependency syndrome has increased to the extent that the elite who 
should direct the affairs of the country have betrayed the cause of our fore-
fathers and become spokespersons of Western ways. October 23 was one of 
the worst days of my life when I woke up to read, with disbelief a one-and-
a-half page press release in The New Vision titled ‘Anti-homosexuality or 
anti-human rights Bill’ by a coalition of civil society organizations on human 
rights and constitutional law. What a tragedy for Africans who depend on oth-
ers for a livelihood. The elite, including the women organizations, that sent 
this press release and paid handsomely for its publication, are slaves living 
under neo-colonialism. This is not their opinion or belief, it is their ‘sponsors’ who 
direct them what to do or say. What a disappointment we are to our society” 
(my emphasis).
The claim that Uganda is forced to accept homosexuality due to its aid and eco-
nomic dependency on the West is apparent in this statement. A further claim is 
that Ugandan civil society and elites are being co-opted by the West and incited to 
“betray the cause of their forefathers”. Here we find an explicit allegation that the 
West is forcing Ugandans to repudiate their established customs, norms, and ways 
of living. Generally, this press statement seems to reflect a relatively broad-based 
consensus that homosexuality is difficult to reconcile with a ‘Ugandan’ or ‘African 
identity’.
The reference to neocolonialism in this discourse constitutes a strategic differ-
ence from the discourse on Westernization. Unlike the latter, which is primarily an 
internally-oriented critique of Ugandan society, the discourse on neocolonialism is 
explicitly about the role of the West. It is a form of external critique, directed at West-
ern state and development actors who are trying to interfere with Uganda’s national 
politics. Under the label of neocolonialism, issues like international power imbal-
ances, inequalities in the world market and monetary system, and the ludicrousness 
of development aid are addressed. Judging from my own experience, the neocolo-
nialism discourse and its underlying argumentation are primarily brought forward 
by Ugandan ‘elites’. I encountered them in specific political and academic contexts, 
for example in university seminars or in political rallies (e.g. field notes 06.03.2010; 
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18.11.2010), but rarely in ‘normal’ conversations by ‘ordinary’ Ugandans, as I have 
outlined above. The current debate on homosexuality, however, which was initiated 
in elite circles (i.e. by religious leaders and politicians), was quickly taken up and 
discussed in all segments of Ugandan society and in various contexts under the label 
of neocolonialism. Obviously, the reasons for this are very complex and would need 
to be analyzed more thoroughly than I can do in the scope of this chapter. Neverthe-
less, I want to briefly suggest some potential explanations.
One reason could be that discourses on homosexuality reflect (or are used to ex-
press) ‘real’ anxieties by the Ugandan population in the sense that homosexuality, in 
a very fundamental way, is seen to pose a threat to all the three areas outlined above: 
a threat to family and kinship models, to moral integrity, to gender orders, and thus, 
very generally, to the constructed notions of ‘African identity’. This can be inferred 
from the article quoted above. The author provocatively asks: “If all of us were to 
become gay, where would the next generation come from? (…) These homosexuals 
cannot reproduce. They must recruit, and they want our children. (…) Ugandans 
must rise up and fight all sources of evil no matter how much money the West 
sends. Human dignity must be protected” (Muhanga, 2009). Here, homosexuality 
is perceived as a threat to the continuation of society as well as something immoral 
and against human dignity. The idea that homosexuality is something utterly ‘un-
African’ is also reflected in the following quotations by male university students at a 
public debate at Gulu University (see above):
“Homosexuality, do you want to tell me that in African traditions, in African 
nations we had homosexuality? No, homosexuality is just being brought…”
“We should consider it within this context of morality: now, when you talk 
of adopting homosexuality, my dear, you know it is quite wrong for a man to 
climb on the back of another man. In our tradition – that is wrong!” (Audio 
Record – Debate, 24.11.2010)
The debaters dealt with a provocatively formulated question: whether “traditional 
culture” was being lost among contemporary Ugandan youth. The majority of the 
participating speakers (five out of eight) referred to the issue of homosexuality and 
claimed that it was a sign of the bad “Western” influence on Uganda and an indica-
tor that young people (who engaged in or defended homosexual acts) were losing 
their “traditional culture”. During the debate I got the impression that homosexual-
ity had become an icon for all sorts of undesirable social developments and was used 
as a ‘teaser’ to discuss all sorts of issues (social values, cultural authenticity, national 
sovereignty, global power imbalance etc. to name but a few) which seemed to be of 
great concern to the debaters.
I noticed that the ‘dangers’ of homosexuality were evoked in all sorts of situa-
tions, and particularly in the context of youth educational and/or leisure activities, 
as the following example from my field notes (09.05.2010) reveals. I went to a three-
day workshop organized by the Catholic Church on the outskirts of Gulu, where 
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about 60–80 male and female students aged between 14 and 22 came together to 
discuss issues affecting their everyday lives. Towards the end of the third day, male 
and female youth were separated into groups for an ‘advisory talk’. When afterwards 
I asked the Ugandan priest who had invited me to the workshop what sort of advice 
had been given to the boys, the first thing he mentioned, to my surprise, was that 
they had been advised to stay away from homosexuality. This example illustrates 
that the current discourse on homosexuality seems to resonate with ‘real anxieties’ 
in the Ugandan population or, respectively, that the discourse creates and reinforces 
these anxieties.
A different explanation is based on the assumption that the discourse on neoco-
lonialism, like that on Westernization, is strategic and must be analyzed in the cur-
rent political context in Uganda. In recent years the relations between the Museveni 
government and Western donors have become increasingly strained – among other 
things due to corruption scandals, an increasingly authoritarian style of govern-
ing and the problematic involvement of the Ugandan army in the Congo wars. 
Furthermore, support for the Museveni government by the Ugandan population 
seems to be fading. Both facts must be taken into account when looking at the 
current debate on homosexuality. The critical stance the Ugandan government has 
taken towards and the way it has framed this issue seems to be supported by large 
parts of the Ugandan population – though this does not necessarily imply a com-
prehensive approval of the “anti-homosexuality bill”. At the same time it is an issue 
which provokes massive critique by the West. Thus, in ‘allying’ with the majority of 
the Ugandan population and taking up the prevailing negative sentiments towards 
homosexuality the Ugandan government is using the debate on homosexuality to 
demonstrate its strength and sovereignty against the West.
Despite Uganda’s continuing dependence on Western support, President Mu-
seveni has increasingly resorted to anti-Western rhetoric in his speeches, and has 
asserted that Uganda is no longer willing to let Western nations dictate its domes-
tic policy. He has used the neocolonialism allegation as a populist argument and 
portrayed his firm stance against Western intervention as a sign of his strength and 
autonomy as president, for instance with regard to election issues204, and to the 
proposed homosexuality law in relation to which the West exerted massive pressure 
in order to convince Museveni to withdraw it. In an interview on BBC “Hard Talk” 
in February 2012, he warned Western governments against making aid payments 
dependent on the respect of gay rights and said: “That would be their big mistake. 
They should be careful about black Africa”, and continued: “Black Africans are very 
humble people; we never impose our views on anybody else. We are not like Euro-
peans and Arabs who want to impose their views” (quoted in Butagira, 2012). Thus, 
it seems that the fierce debates about homosexuality are less about sexual practices 
and identities. Rather, the discourse is a strategic and political one which is used to 
204 Elections took place in February 2011. Some Western states had complained about irregularities 
and a biased electoral commission in the pre-election phase.
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stress the sovereignty and independence of the Ugandan government – also against 
critical voices within Ugandan civil society.
Nevertheless, the consequences of the discourses on homosexuality are very real. 
In October 2010, the Ugandan newspaper Rolling Stone published a list of 100 al-
leged homosexuals, including their photos and a banner that read “Hang them”. In 
January 2011, the Ugandan gay rights activist David Kato was murdered (Wright 
& Zouhali-Worrall, 2012). These and other cases show that the homosexuality dis-
course not only has consequences for Uganda’s external relations. The evocations 
of hatred and widespread anxieties also provoke extreme reactions and trigger ad-
versary dynamics within Ugandan society. Thus, one could further suggest that the 
Ugandan government is also using the debate on homosexuality (and other forms of 
sexuality) as a means to exercise power and control over the Ugandan population. I 
will take up this point in the last section of this chapter.
Discourses on Sexuality as Instruments of Power6.6. 
The debates I have outlined in this and the previous chapters reveal that discourses 
on socio-cultural change in Acholiland (and beyond) have a highly sexualized di-
mension. Based on Foucault’s reflections in The History of Sexuality, I suggest that 
one possible explanation for the frequent references to sexuality in these discourses 
is that matters of sexuality are closely interwoven with power dynamics at the local, 
national and international level. I will briefly elaborate my argument by referring 
to recent measures adopted by the Ugandan government on matters concerning the 
sexuality of Ugandan citizens.
Following Foucault’s argument that sexuality “appears (…) as an especially dense 
transfer point for relations of power” (1990: 103) I purport that discourses on sexu-
ality in Uganda, especially those on ‘abnormal’ or ‘dangerous’ forms of sexuality, are 
part of a larger disciplining project, not only by international state and development 
actors, but also by local authorities and the state205. The “anti-homosexuality bill” 
is only one of a number of recent attempts to set up new or sharpen existing laws 
which aim to regulate potentially dangerous forms of sexuality and which define and 
target specific ‘sexual subjects’ (cf. Foucault, 1990: 105). Further examples include 
legal measures, which are related to AIDS (and the sexuality of ‘ill’ persons), defile-
ment (and the sexuality of youth), prostitution (and the sexuality of women) and 
pornography (and the sexuality of ‘perverts’).
Regarding AIDS, Uganda is in the process of debating a new “HIV/AIDS Pre-
vention and Control Bill” which, if enacted, would legislate for mandatory testing 
205 The analysis of sexual discourses in Uganda with a Foucauldian approach presents an interesting 
topic for future study. Here, I only want to hint at the manifold ways power as well as disciplin-
ing and normalizing strategies by local authorities and the state are applied and become apparent 
through sexuality-related discourses and practices. 
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of HIV, mandatory disclosure of a person’s HIV status and the criminalization of 
intentional spread of the disease (cf. Basudde, 2012). The bill is a good example of 
a measure aimed at regulating the population by controlling the sexuality of indi-
viduals, specifically those of ‘ill persons’. The proposed obligation to ‘confess’ one’s 
HIV status, for instance, allows for a massive expansion of state control over matters 
related to the sexual life of individuals.
In order to protect (and control) youth sexuality and to ‘discipline’ intergenera-
tional sexual relations, Uganda has set up a “defilement law” which provides that 
“[a]ny person, who performs a sexual act with another person who is below the age 
of 18 years, commits a felony known as defilement and is, on conviction, liable to 
life imprisonment” (Section 129 of the penal code, quoted in Byamukama, 2010). 
The law not only serves to protect youth but, in actual practice, is also being misused 
to sanction youth sexuality. In Gulu, I was often told about parents, who had ac-
cused young men (often below the age of 18) of defiling their daughters as a means 
of making money. The ‘offenders’, in many cases the daughter’s secret boyfriends, 
were charged heavy fines and, if they were unable to pay, the case was reported and 
lead to the imprisonment of the ‘offenders’ (cf. Malinga, 2010). In this sense, the 
defilement law not only punishes adult’s sexual abuse of minors, but in fact enables 
the regulation of all forms of youth sexuality.
Women’s (promiscuous) sexuality is regulated, for instance, in Uganda’s law on 
prostitution which defines a prostitute as “a person who, in public or elsewhere, 
regularly or habitually holds himself or herself out as available for sexual intercourse 
or other sexual gratification for monetary or other material gain” (Section 138 of the 
penal code quoted in Tamale, 2011c: 146). As Tamale (ibid.) rightly remarks,
“[c]learly this definition limits culpability of the offence to the sellers of sex 
(the majority of whom being women) and not to the clients (mostly men). 
What this means is that if a woman is found guilty of ‘selling her sex’ she 
is liable to a sentence of up to seven years while the client that paid for her 
service walks away Scot-free.”
Following Tamale, one can argue that the law primarily seeks to control women’s 
promiscuity, while men’s promiscuous behavior is not sanctioned. The law must be 
seen in the context of gender and sexual discourses which, as previously outlined, 
generally associate promiscuous and/or extramarital sexual relations of women with 
prostitution, and which label girls and women who are known for such ‘offenses’ 
as prostitutes. A corresponding image of a male prostitute does not exist in these 
discourses.
Currently (in April 2013), Ugandan parliamentarians and citizens are heatedly 
debating an “Anti-Pornography Bill”, first proposed in 2011, which seeks to pun-
ish
“[a]ny cultural practice, form of behavior or form of communication (…) 
that depicts a person engaged in explicit sexual activities or conduct, sexual 
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parts of a person such as breasts, thighs, buttocks or genitalia, erotic behavior 
intended to cause sexual excitement or indecent act or behavior intended to 
corrupt morals” (cited in Walubiri, 2013, my emphasis).
Offenders face heavy fines or even up to ten years in prison. The bill has sparked big 
controversies, not only in Uganda but also internationally206. One frequently dis-
cussed point is whether the Bill also implies the prohibition of wearing miniskirts, 
and whether this would actually be desirable and “morally right” as one commenta-
tor (quoted in Tumusiime, 2013) put it207. This relates very well to my argument that 
the miniskirt is a crucial icon in Ugandan debates on social change. Furthermore, 
some observers have claimed that if the bill was to pass in its current form, it could 
also “prohibit the broadcasting of ‘risqué’ musical performances by Western singers 
such as Beyoncé and Madonna” (Guyson, 2013). In line with the general concerns 
about a “moral degeneration” of society, which I outlined above, proponents of the 
bill have argued that it could serve to prevent the young Ugandans from becoming 
a “generation brimming with immorality” (a Ugandan woman quoted in Tumusi-
ime, 2013: 18). The bill thus enables the Ugandan state not only to censor media 
contents but also to define far-reaching standards of behavior which regulate what 
was formerly considered the personal choices of individual citizens.
The above-mentioned laws, which attempt to control and sanction ‘dangerous’ 
or ‘abnormal’ forms of sexual behavior, reveal the contested nature of sexual rela-
tions and the ways they are becoming increasingly charged with power – on the 
local, national and international level. Sexuality, as shown in the examples above, 
offers new entry points for the operations of power which according to Foucault (cf. 
introduction) relates to sexuality being an intersecting point between the individual 
body and the population as a whole. The proliferation of discourses on sexuality 
must be seen in relation to the general socio-cultural changes Acholi and Ugandan 
society is currently facing. Presumably, these discourses are not primarily concerned 
with sexuality, but reveal important insights into the state of societal relations and 
power struggles on a more general level.
206 Again, we find that the issue is framed, by some, in terms of “African” vs. “Western” sexual norms 
and morals. Some commentators – applying the argumentation underlying the neocolonialism 
discourse – claim, for instance, that pornography is something “Western” and was introduced in 
Uganda through Western media (cf. e.g. Buturo, 2013).
207 See for instance the articles “Uganda: Anti-Pornography Bill not about Mini-Skirts – Minister” 
by Walubiri (2013), “To Ban or not to Ban?” by Tumusiime (2013) or “Women Face Arrest for 
Wearing Miniskirts in Uganda in New Laws that also Ban Beyonce from Television” by Frymann 
(2013). 
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C6.7. oncluding Remarks:  
Sexuality, “Africa” and “The West” as Strategic Fields  
& Figures in Discourses on Socio-Cultural Change
From the beginning of my research in Northern Uganda, I was struck by the fre-
quency of references to the West in conversations, media reports and other public 
discourses I encountered. I was particularly struck by the way the alleged differenc-
es between “Africa” and “the West” were discussed with reference to sexual matters. 
I decided to trace this phenomenon and to analyze the different ways these binary 
oppositions were used by individual speakers, not only in discourses on gender, kin-
ship and sexuality, but also in other contexts.
I soon noticed the multivocality in the references to the West. On the one hand, 
the attribute “Western” seemed to be very positively denoted and to stand for eco-
nomic development, power, wealth, prosperity, consumption, progress, beauty, edu-
cation as well as freedom. On the other hand, it could also be used in a very negative 
sense, symbolizing immorality, egoism, individuality, disrespectfulness, decadence 
and materialism. In many debates and virtually irrespective of the topic, the West 
was compared to an (imagined) African/Uganda/Acholi ‘other’, which could either 
signify morality, integrity, respect, authenticity, societal solidarity and stability, or, 
negatively, “backwardness”, poverty, gerontocracy, patriarchy and ‘harmful cultural 
practices’. I have listed the various attributes in the following table.
Table 2: The Multivocality of Representations of Africa and the West
The West Acholi/Uganda/Africa 
+ Economic Development -
(Political) Power -




















‘Harmful Cultural Practices’ -
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In this chapter, I have analyzed in great detail the ways these binary oppositions 
were used by my interlocutors and in the Ugandan media. I have argued that 
there are two different types of discourse which engage with ‘Western-influenced’ 
change: discourses on Westernization and discourses on neocolonialism. Both are 
strategic and represent different forms of social critique, one internally, the other 
externally oriented. They can be differentiated not only by looking at the terminol-
ogy, but because they have different underlying motives and follow different lines 
of argumentation.
The discourse on neocolonialism, in Uganda and beyond, is highly politicized 
and criticizes global inequalities, the continuing Western dominance in interna-
tional economic and fiscal politics and the hypocrisy of the development regime. 
It emphasizes that external, structural factors are responsible for the current prob-
lems of African states, and legitimizes practices by African governments, which defy 
Western understandings of democracy and human rights as signs of their autonomy 
and sovereignty. This discourse is also depicted in some parts of postcolonial litera-
ture, and reproduces the binary opposition between the “West and the Rest” (Hall, 
1992). Judging from my empirical findings in Northern Uganda, however, it is 
largely an academic and elite discourse.
Discourses on Westernization, on the other hand, are much more ambiguous. 
Here, references to the West are sometimes arbitrary and can be connoted both 
negatively and positively, depending on the context and speaker. Based on my ex-
periences, this discourse is much more common in everyday discussions of socio-
cultural change. In these discussions, the speakers engage with “Western” concepts, 
values and practices very pragmatically, and discuss whether these are desirable or 
not for their own society, irrespective of the ‘mechanisms’ which led to their in-
troduction such as structural adjustment measures or humanitarian interventions. 
This also shows that Acholi/Ugandan people by no means just passively receive, 
but actively negotiate, refuse and appropriate “Western” concepts, norms and prac-
tices, and by using “the West” as a benchmark also negotiate different positionalities 
within their society.
On another level, this chapter took a closer look at the highly sexualized dimen-
sion of discourses on socio-cultural change. I argued that the way sexuality has been 
established as a focal point for disciplinary action and regulation provides impor-
tant insights into power dynamics at the local, national and international level and 
reveals how these dynamics shape practices and discourses in the context of socio-
cultural change.
In summary, one could argue that Sexuality, “Africa” and “the West”, in different 
ways, represent strategic fields or figures which can be framed in a certain manner 
and used as benchmarks to powerfully articulate and enforce certain positions in 
discourses on socio-cultural change.
Conclusion:7.  Negotiating Socio-Cultural Change  
& the Future of Acholi Society
During the time of my fieldwork in 2010 and early 2011, Northern Uganda had 
been recovering from the 20-year war between the LRA and the Ugandan govern-
ment for four years. While war-related problems – access to basic needs, security, 
reconciliation and rehabilitation of former fighters – were still major concerns, espe-
cially for people who were in the process of resettling back to their original homes 
from the IDP camps, the focus of debates had shifted to a broader reflection of the 
socio-cultural changes that had occurred throughout the war years and their impli-
cations for the present and the future. At the center of these debates were various 
and often conflicting visions for and imaginations of post-war Acholi society, and 
implicated in these, conflicting notions of social order, norms and values.
These highly emotive and morally-charged debates constituted the starting point 
of my research. Based on observations and conversations during my fieldwork, I 
sought out to analyze how processes of socio-cultural change were perceived and 
how imaginations of post-war Acholi society were negotiated in different contexts 
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and between different (groups of ) social actors, for instance between youth and 
elders, men and women, local and international actors. As will become evident in 
the following conclusion, generational, gender and local-global relations proved to 
be of particular relevance to my analysis. Not only did the perceived changes in all 
three areas constitute a critical matter of debate. A speaker’s positioning within these 
different sets of relations also crucially affected his/her perspective on socio-cultural 
change.
My study specifically focused on the perspective of urban youth, particularly 
those who were born and grew up during the years of the war and whom I therefore 
labelled the “war generation”. My findings suggest that members of this war genera-
tion are currently faced with a particular situation of uncertainty and ambivalence. 
This is linked on the one hand to their experience of protracted war and their percep-
tion of the profound changes Acholi society has undergone as a result of the war and 
on the other hand to the expectations and hopes generally placed on Acholi youth as 
the ‘pillars of the future’ and the preservers of Acholi culture. I have argued that, in 
many ways, the war generation occupies a specific in-between position. Both in lo-
cal and international discourses, it is seen as the link between the war-torn past and 
a prospective peaceful future and also between tradition and modernity, Uganda 
and the West. Members of the war generation are often blamed for “losing” Acholi 
culture, for disrespecting long-established norms and orders and for “westernizing” 
Acholiland”. Implicit in these accusations, however, is also the hope that the young 
generation can re-establish social order and stability associated with the pre-war past 
and the realization that the fate of Acholi society is left in the hands of the young 
generation. Based on my observation that opinions on socio-cultural change are 
often voiced by using binary oppositions, I have claimed that members of the war 
generation are being discursively framed as standing at a crossroads: between past 
and future, tradition and modernity, Acholi culture and Western culture.
Placed in this pivotal position, most of my young interlocutors experienced feel-
ings of uncertainty and confusion. They felt that they had to choose whether they 
wanted to be ‘breakers with’ or ‘re-makers of ’ the past, modernizers or traditional-
ists, conformers or spoilers, and often deliberated whether these seemingly conflict-
ing notions could be reconciled. However, they not only perceived their in-between 
status as a cause of uncertainty, but also as a source of agency and a chance to shape 
the future of their society. This agency, as I have demonstrated, can be traced in the 
manifold ways that youth negotiate changes in generational, gender and local-global 
relations and thereby make use of different discourses and positionalities in order to 
establish, maintain and contest the social order.
My findings and the arguments I have put forth relate to broader debates on Af-
rican youth among anthropologists and Africanist scholars. As in Northern Uganda, 
youth in many other African contexts are seen as crucial actors in the future devel-
opment of their societies in the age of globalization. Paradoxically, enormous hopes 
are placed on the young generation as educated inventors, economic entrepreneurs, 
political reformers and cultural ambassadors, while at the same time young people 
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are being marginalized in the formal political and economic sector, and are being 
blamed for westernizing African societies due to their adoption and adaptation of 
global popular culture. My study reveals, in a very concrete case, how young people 
deal with this paradox position ascribed to them in societal discourses, i.e. being 
seen, at the same time, as leaders and subordinates, agents and victims, makers and 
breakers. Although youth in Gulu face a very specific situation of uncertainty due 
to their experience of 20 years of war, to some extent their aspirations and actions, 
predicaments and problems are representative of the “waithood generation” (Hon-
wana, 2012: 3ff.) of young people in Africa more generally.
In this concluding chapter, I aim to link my findings from Northern Uganda to 
broader debates on youth and youth agency in the context of intergenerational as 
well as gendered and global-local power dynamics, which represent central issues in 
many African societies today. I will introduce this chapter with a last extract from 
my field notes.
Two Conversations – Extracts from my Field Notes7.1. 
January 2nd, 2011. The day has come to say goodbye to Akello’s family. I have bought a 
chicken, which will be slaughtered for our farewell lunch, and while Akello and her mum 
are preparing the food in the kitchen hut, I sit outside with Akello’s dad Okello. We talk 
about the coming elections and the many problems Uganda is currently facing such 
as corruption, low world market prices for raw materials and unemployment. Okello 
says that apart from all these political and economic problems it is also the behavior 
of the young generation that contributes to the crisis in Uganda and in Acholiland in 
particular. In his words208: “The young generation now is refusing to dig, they are lazy. 
Soon, shortage of food crops will be a problem, even in the fertile lands of Northern 
Uganda. All these young people want to get wage employment – but where shall that 
come from, especially now that all the NGOs are pulling out?”
(…) We also talk about “cultural affairs” and I ask him what he thinks about the cultural 
institution Ker Kwaro Acholi. He replies that in principle he supports Ker Kwaro because 
it is a forum where the advice of elders is still respected and where young people can 
seek advice on matters concerning their lives. He sighs and then adds: “I wish young 
people would at least show some respect. When they come and ask for something or 
about something they should do it in a low voice. Then no elder would refuse to answer 
them. But young people today don’t have that respect anymore, they want everything 
right at once, and if you don’t give them, they start quarreling”. He returns to my 
question about the cultural institution and emphasizes again that he supports its work, 
208 For readability purposes, I occasionally use direct speech in this section. However, the quotations 
should not be mistaken as recorded statements, but are all based on my field notes which I wrote 
some hours after the described events had taken place. The exact wording is thus my interpreta-
tion.
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but that Ker Kwaro should also incorporate knowledge from “the West” and not only 
“traditional knowledge”: “Today it is necessary to combine different types of knowledge. 
It is important to have that local knowledge, but there is a lot the Acholi can learn from 
the West. Young people should grow up with both types of knowledge so that one day 
Uganda will prosper.”
We remain silent for a while. Okello is cracking groundnuts and giving them to his 
grandchildren who are running around in the compound. Suddenly, he says that he 
wants Akello to go back to school. I am surprised that Okello brings up this topic because 
I know from Akello that she had to leave school because he was unable to pay for her 
fees209. Nevertheless, I agree with Okello’s remark and tell him that I think that Akello is a 
very bright girl and would surely profit from further education. He nods and recalls that 
she always did very well in school. Then he makes an interesting statement: he explains 
to me that he took her out of school because she was associating with the wrong group 
of people, that she was doing wrong things and therefore had to be taken out of the 
school environment. I am puzzled about Okello’s interpretation of the reason for Akello’s 
dropout, but just when I want to question him about the details, Akello walks up to us 
and asks me to join her in the kitchen hut.
I follow her and we chat about this and that while I help her to prepare the food. All 
of a sudden, Akello starts speaking about her father. She says that he promised to buy 
her new clothes for Christmas but that he never did, and when she asked him about 
it he started quarreling. She says that these days he is often quarreling, even with her 
mum. Then she adds that he always kept them well when they were growing up but now 
that he is old there are many problems. She talks about her father’s co-wives: “For them 
and their children things were easier. Dad was still working when they were young and 
could send all of them to school. All of the children went to good schools and never 
had problems with school fees. But when my brothers and sisters and I were growing 
up, he stopped working and money problems started. We all had to struggle through 
school and most of us had to drop out eventually because dad couldn’t pay. When I was 
in primary school there were many times, especially during the last two years, when he 
didn’t pay regularly. I was often sent home but because I was so focused I always went 
back and asked to be taught. I was on the football and netball team so they sometimes 
allowed me to stay although the fees were not paid. I managed to finish my PLE (Primary 
Leaving Examination) very well. Actually, I was among the best from my school”. She tells 
me about this proudly and then adds: “My father promised to send me to a boarding 
secondary school so I stayed home for a year and waited for the money”. But the money 
never came so she then started secondary school at a cheaper public day school, but 
even there fees were always a problem. Eventually she had to drop out completely.
209 Maybe Okello brought up the subject because he hoped that I would support him in paying for 
Akello’s school fees. In fact, Akello and I had already talked several times about the idea of her 
going back to school and I had promised her to pay for her fees in the upcoming school year. It 
seemed, however, that Akello had not yet told Okello about our ‘plan’.
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Akello talks at length about poverty as the major problem Acholi society and particularly 
young people are facing today. According to her, poverty is the reason for many family-
conflicts and, even worse, also for the severe HIV/AIDS crisis in Northern Uganda: “It is 
really affecting everyone in Gulu so much. Young people are sleeping with older people 
just to get money. So many girls and boys these days want all these material things and 
the only way they see they can get them is by selling their bodies, also because there 
are no jobs. But they don’t think of the consequences, they think they can tell from the 
outside appearance whether someone has HIV. Then they get their short-term money 
but later find out that they are infected. Once you are infected everything changes: the 
way you think, the way you feel, even the way you walk – because for the rest of your 
life you will be bitter and suffering. This bitterness is also the reason why people then 
intentionally spread the disease. At school we even learned that some girls put petroleum 
jelly in their vagina before sleeping with a man so that, even when he wants to use a 
condom, the condom will break and he will get infected. You know, it is largely women, 
who are spreading the disease here. Some women not only get AIDS from sleeping with 
sugar daddies, but also fall pregnant so that they are even more desperate for money.”
I add that the high number of children might also be a problem for future Acholi 
society and Akello agrees: “My father’s generation used to produce so many children 
because they had land and feeding them was easy. But these days, people are struggling, 
especially with school fees, and all the people who have so many children make them 
suffer. But young people today are changing their perspectives, they want to have less 
children.” (…)
The food is ready and I move to Okello’s hut, where I usually eat with the men. Akello’s 
brother is also there. Today, Okello asks his wife to join us for the meal because it will be 
the last time we are eating together. As common for Acholi women of her generation she 
sits on the floor and not on chairs like the rest of us. Akello is not invited to eat with us 
and takes the meal in a separate hut with her young nieces and nephews. As I often do in 
situations like these I think about the complexity of gender, generational and intercultural 
relations and the power dynamics ingrained in them (field notes 02.01.2011).
The dialogues presented in this extract touch upon many issues which I have ana-
lyzed throughout this book, above all the conflictual relations between members 
of different generations, the gendered (and sexualized) dimensions of Acholi social 
life as well as the positioning and analysis of Acholi society in a globalized context. 
Both narratives, by Akello and her father, are concerned with current situations and 
perceptions of uncertainty and crisis: in the family, in Acholi and Ugandan society, 
and in international power relations. Both discuss these current crises in the context 
of generational and socio-cultural change.
Okello links problems on the local level such as unemployment and potential 
food insecurity to broader political and economic problems on the national and 
international level such as corruption, unfair trade conditions but also Uganda’s de-
pendency on NGOs. He blames the young generation for being lazy, having unreal-
istic economic expectations (seeking wage employment rather than working on the 
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fields) and, indirectly, of endangering Acholi society by not respecting the wisdom 
and knowledge of Acholi elders and cultural leaders. At the same time, however, 
Okello also acknowledges that the young generation is growing up in a highly com-
plex, globalized setting and should thus seek not only “traditional” knowledge but 
also “Western” education in order to cope with the challenges of today.
Akello, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the immediate prob-
lems she faces on a day to day basis in her family and social life: family conflicts, 
poverty, AIDS and lack of future perspectives for members of her generation. In 
contrast to Okello, she blames the members of the older generation for many of 
these problems. Their “traditional” family models, based on polygyny and intended 
to produce numerous children, no longer work today, but, on the contrary, are the 
cause of many contemporary problems. Fathers are no longer able to fulfill their 
changed roles as providers which, in ‘modern times’, not only entail the provision of 
food and shelter, but also the ability to send children to school and to (occasionally) 
endow them with material goods such as clothes. As a consequence of the inability 
of fathers to provide these ‘modern needs’, young people are compelled to find their 
own ways to gain access to education and material goods. Therefore, and due to the 
lack of economic opportunities, many resort to risky ‘income-generating activities’ 
such as “transactional sex”, which often cause a plethora of further problems such 
as HIV infections and unintended pregnancies. Akello’s analysis of contemporary 
problems also has an interesting gender dimension which alludes to gender images 
I commonly encountered in Acholi society. These gender images depict men as ir-
responsible fathers and incapable providers, while women, especially younger ones, 
are portrayed as being jealous and vindictive, engaging in immoral and risky sexual 
practices and thus being the main transmitters of HIV/AIDS.
The interplay between gender, age and intercultural dynamics is evident in the 
final scene of the extract, which also reflects a common spatialization of gender rela-
tions in Acholi society. In many local contexts, for instance during social gatherings 
or meals, men and women, often further distinguished by age, are assigned to dif-
ferent, sometimes hierarchically-structured spaces. In the example above, Akello eats 
her meal in a separate room with the younger children. Her mother, who is allowed 
into a sphere normally reserved for men, sits on the floor while the men and the 
foreign female visitor sit on chairs. Most older and younger Acholi I met during my 
fieldwork seemed to assume that gender relations and practices in “Western culture” 
were in some ways different from Acholi gender norms and practices. However, in 
many cases it seemed to be no problem to integrate these “Western” gender norms 
into the local context without dissolving “local” gender norms (for instance by let-
ting the Western, female visitor sit on a chair and eat with the men at the table, 
while the Acholi women adhered to “local” gender orders). In the context referred 
to above, the acknowledgement and application of these ‘foreign’ norms could be 
seen simply as a social courtesy, or it could be analyzed as a reflection of local-global 
hierarchies, in which Western women have a different status than Acholi women. 
In chapter 6, I have already discussed the complex attributions given to Acholi vs. 
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Western gender ideologies in Ugandan discourses and the power dynamics thereby 
reflected. I will refer back to these findings in my discussion of gendered and sexual-
ized power relations below.
All in all, the conversations and events described in the above extract hint at 
many important topics which constitute central concerns in post-war Acholi society 
and which are currently being negotiated among different groups of social actors 
in the context of changing generational, gender and local-global power relations. 
In the following, I recapitulate these debates and discourses in Northern Uganda, 
which I have presented throughout the chapters of this book, and situate my find-
ings in broader scientific debates on youth and socio-cultural change in postcolonial 
Africa.
Discourses on Socio-Cultural Change in the Context of 7.2. 
Generational, Gendered & Globalized Power Dynamics
As I have repeatedly argued throughout my analysis, discourses on socio-cultural 
change in post-war Acholi society are characterized by frequent references to gen-
erational, gendered and globalized (power) relations. One of the reasons for this 
must be seen in the particular historical context in which these discourses have 
appeared.
Between 1986 and 2006, Northern Uganda was heavily affected by the armed 
conflict between the LRA and the Ugandan government, which caused a sustain-
able disruption of Acholi cultural, social, political and economic life. Furthermore, 
it brought about the displacement and encampment of large parts of the Acholi 
population as well as a large-scale intervention by Western development and politi-
cal actors. I have shown how these events have shaped contemporary perspectives 
on Acholi culture and how they have affected the attempts to revive and ‘re-invent’ 
Acholi culture (cf. chapter 4).
On the national level, the period between 1986 and today has been marked by 
the presidency of Museveni and his political party, the NRM. The Museveni govern-
ment has not only been a major participant in the war, it has also managed to es-
tablish a specific pro-government narrative of Ugandan (recent) history through its 
national and international influence. This narrative has long dominated the outside 
perception of the war with very negative effects for the Acholi population. I have 
demonstrated that the establishment and consolidation of such selective narratives 
on the war and Ugandan history more generally have had a profound effect on his-
torical developments and their interpretations, and continue to influence contem-
porary discourses (cf. Chap. 3).
During his reign, Museveni also introduced several political reforms (see Tripp, 
2010), for instance with regard to women’s rights, educational policies and economic 
liberalization, many of which were initiated in the context of structural adjustment 
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programs dictated by Western states and development institutions. Throughout the 
period from 1986 until today, the presence of Western actors and concepts increas-
ingly expanded from the political and economic sphere into all spheres of Ugandan 
public life and this became increasingly reflected in local and national discourses. 
In chapter 6, I have analyzed how this circulation of “Western” ideas and images 
of the West, furthered by the expansion of the mass media and the globalization 
of popular culture, has instigated different types of discourses which engage with 
‘Western-influenced’ change in Uganda, namely discourses on Westernization and 
discourses on neocolonialism.
These and other events that occurred on the local, national and international 
level between 1986 and today are reflected in and shape contemporary discourses 
on socio-cultural change in Acholiland. Due to the war and related displacement, 
socio-cultural changes in Northern Uganda throughout the past three decades have 
been perceived as particularly radical and have involved fundamental changes in so-
cietal power structures and relations. Patriarchic and gerontocratic principles, which 
previously structured Acholi society, have been challenged by women and youth, 
who took over new roles during and after the war. Furthermore, and comparable 
to the situation in many other African countries, the increasing influence of ‘West-
ern’ concepts and ideas, circulated through the globalized media and development 
regimes, have called into question established local belief and value systems. Not 
only the changes as such but, more importantly, the way they have come to be 
represented in local and national discourses, have created the notion that post-war 
Acholi society is currently at a crossroads – between past and future, tradition and 
modernity, Africanization or Westernization. The constant reinforcement of this 
notion of dichotomy and the complex attributions connected to concepts like tradi-
tion and modernity implicate that imaginations of a future Acholi society are par-
ticularly contested. And due to the specific power constellations thereby involved, 
these contestations often revolve around generational relations, gender relations and 
relations between Uganda and the West. All three areas are especially dense fields 
and transfer points of power relations and thus particularly interesting and suitable 
to study by drawing on the theories of Foucault as I have done throughout my 
analysis. It is in these fields that different types of discourses – local, national and 
global, political, economic and moral, colonial and postcolonial – become closely 
intertwined and, due to their sometimes contradictory nature, cause a situation of 
uncertainty, especially for youth.
Generational Conflicts & Power Relations7.2.1. 
In chapter 5, I have argued with reference to Mannheim (1928) that one can dif-
ferentiate generation-based understandings and imaginations of Acholi culture and 
the role it is to play in the future, which are linked to the shared experiences mem-
bers of different generations underwent during their lives, and particularly during 
their youth. The existence of a distinct “consciousness” among members of different 
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“historical generations” in Gulu was reflected, among other things, in the conflict-
ual nature many of my interlocutors attributed to intergenerational relations in 
Acholi society today and which I often encountered in everyday conversations (as 
shown in the extract above).
Intergenerational conflicts were often related to or occurred in the context of 
discourses on the perceived crisis of contemporary Acholi society. This crisis was 
related to the processes of disarray and change Acholi society had undergone since 
the beginning of the war. Despite the disruptive nature of former historical periods 
(i.e. colonial times, the Obote and Idi Amin regimes), these were rarely mentioned 
by my interlocutors in relation to the current situation. In contrast, the pre-war 
period seemed to be idealized as a time of relative stability and social order, and set 
apart from the war- and post-war mayhem. Although members of all generations 
identified similar aspects and manifestations of the crisis (most commonly poverty, 
unemployment, HIV/AIDS, family and marriage break-ups, land conflicts as well 
as economic and political marginalization) and acknowledged the overall context of 
the crisis (i.e. the post-war situation, Ugandan national politics and international 
political and economic dynamics), there seemed to be distinct generational perspec-
tives regarding the reasons for the concrete, local manifestations of the current crisis, 
the societal groups who should be blamed for it and the solutions people espoused 
to overcome the crisis and to re-stabilize future Acholi society.
Members of the pre-war generation, i.e. those who had experienced the war as 
adults and elders, often blamed the crisis on Acholi youth. They claimed that today’s 
youth were lazy, disrespectful, no longer valued Acholi cultural and moral principles, 
and that they had thus contributed to the breakdown and “moral degeneration” of 
Acholi society. In conversations and interviews I conducted, young people’s lifestyle 
was often described as “westernized” and portrayed as revolving mainly around lei-
sure activities (hanging out in video halls and clubs, drinking and being involved in 
inappropriate sexual relations) and material wealth (especially phones and clothes, 
often inappropriate ones like miniskirts and baggy pants). This individualistic life-
style was seen to threaten established societal institutions like “traditional marriage”, 
kinship systems, property laws and family-based labor arrangements (for instance 
related to the cultivation of family land). Furthermore, it led members of the older 
generations to blame the young generation for no longer being committed to com-
munal relationships and being unwilling or unable to endure the hardships of mar-
riage and working life like their parents and grandparents had done. A common 
assertion by adults and elders was that today’s children and youth even refused to 
do their household chores and, when compelled to do so by their parents, cited 
discourses on children’s rights and accused parents of violating these rights. In sum, 
elders accused youth of lacking dedication to the communal values which they re-
garded as necessary to overcome the perceived crisis of Acholi society.
Members of the war generation, in turn, accused elders and adults of neglecting 
and disregarding youth and not properly fulfilling their roles as advisors, caregiv-
ers and guardians. Young people often recounted how during the war, especially in 
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the camps, parents had left their children to fend for themselves, while they drank 
or otherwise surrendered to the desperate situation. In the contemporary post-war 
situation, members of the older generations were often described by youth as being 
unwilling or unable to adapt to the changed circumstances and of still living in the 
past. Common expressions I encountered were that elders were “backward”, lacked 
“modern” education and knowledge and did not understand the changed require-
ments and complex challenges of life in a capitalist, globalized world. Young people 
felt that their parents did not respect “modern” rights discourses, for instance on 
children’s rights, which involved children’s and youth’s right to education and leisure 
time, freedom of expression and protection from ‘child labor’. Furthermore, they 
claimed that “traditional” family models, based on polygyny and a large number of 
children, were no longer viable today and, on the contrary, were the cause of many 
intra-family conflicts, in which especially the children and their mothers had to 
suffer.
However, despite young people’s skepticism with regard to some “traditional” 
practices and beliefs, which they saw as outdated and incompatible with “modern” 
life, most of them still valued Acholi culture and wanted to integrate some of its 
elements and principles into their everyday lives. In fact, many of my younger inter-
locutors complained that they did not really know enough about Acholi culture and 
accused their parents and grandparents of not passing on their cultural knowledge 
to the young generation.
For youth then, the essence of the crisis was the situation of uncertainty they 
currently found themselves in. They had grown up in a situation of great social up-
heavals in which collective norms, rules and conceptions of life were in flux. They 
were confronted with an equally unstable future in which they had to reconcile 
local and global demands in addition to the overall challenges of living in a society 
recovering from war. My interlocutors sometimes expressed that they felt unpre-
pared for these challenges. Many of them had experienced profound disruptions of 
their early-childhood socialization due to family break-ups and the disintegration 
of communal structures, which had prevented them from learning some of the cul-
tural practices and rules that for long had been and were still regarded as important 
social and cultural capital in Acholi society. Furthermore, due to the war-related 
disruption of their schooling and the lack of quality education generally associated 
with the introduction of UPE (Universal Primary Education) in Uganda from 1997 
onwards, they had not had the chance to obtain a proper ‘Western’ education. Thus, 
they felt that they lacked the necessary skills and qualifications to find one of the 
scarce, well-paying jobs in the formal employment sector.
The disordered experiences many of my young interlocutors underwent during 
their childhood and youth are a key factor in understanding their current sense of 
uncertainty and their feeling of being ‘stuck in between’ past, present and future, 
tradition and modernity. On a broader, theoretical level, my findings can be linked 
to sociological studies of “biographical uncertainty”, which I alluded to in the intro-
duction. According to Reiter (2010: 8),
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“[e]xperience and its status in biographical projecting is the key category for 
an assessment of the quality of the linkage of past, present and future. Expe-
riences are characterized by a dual temporal horizon: through experience we 
conserve and reinterpret the past in order to orient our (biographical) action 
towards the future (…). [A] sociological notion of biographical uncertainty is 
generally identified as the weakening of this linkage of experience, expecta-
tion and projecting due to an erosion of intersubjectively shared certainty in 
a special social situation” (emphasis in original).
The difficulty of establishing a coherent link between past experiences and future 
actions, which Reiter identifies as a major cause of uncertainty, seemed to be at the 
core of the ‘cultural crisis’ in Acholiland. This became evident from the common-
ly voiced assertion that the 20-year war had undermined the very foundations of 
Acholi society. Expectations and projections related to the future of Acholi society 
greatly differed among various social actors. The relevance of the past as a guide for 
the future was disparately assessed, especially between members of the older and 
members of the younger generation. Consequently, one can assume that this lack 
of a coherent past-future “horizon” led to an overall “erosion of intersubjectively 
shared certainty” among all members of Acholi society. This, in turn, caused feel-
ings of uncertainty not only on the individual, “biographical” level, but also evoked 
feelings of ‘cultural uncertainty’ at the societal level, indicated by a perceived lack 
of a shared value system and the disagreement about which lifestyles were to be re-
garded as desirable, morally acceptable and sustainable. As argued above, members 
of different generations experienced the manifestations of this cultural uncertainty 
differently and subsequently drew different conclusions and options for action from 
it.
Elders essentially feared that “Acholi culture was getting lost”, an expression I 
frequently encountered, and were at the forefront of the efforts to retraditionalize 
Acholi society. Connected to their fear of cultural loss was also a fear of losing the 
influential position given to elders in societies based on gerontocratic principles – 
within the family, but also in the political sphere. In this sense, generational conflicts 
in Acholi society were not only about different values, beliefs and life conceptions, 
but essentially also about power.
Youth’s reaction to the situation of cultural uncertainty involved very complex 
considerations. On the one hand, they resisted (in very diverse and sometimes subtle 
ways) elders’ attempts to re-establish gerontocratic principles, and instead lobbied 
for the “modernization” of Acholi society based on the ideas of individual freedoms 
and ‘democracy’ (including notions of citizen rights, children’s rights, women’s rights 
etc.). They rebelled against the roles and expectations – in terms of lifestyle, occupa-
tion, marriage and family structures – which would have been required of them in 
“traditional” Acholi society and which were still envisioned by some of their parents 
and community elders.
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On the other hand, however, many youth were also drawn to the idea of reviving 
Acholi culture – for different reasons. Some felt obliged to preserve Acholi  culture 
and to re-establish the reputation of the Acholi people in the Ugandan national 
context. Some felt nostalgic about Acholi culture and sad that they knew so little 
about their cultural heritage and had never really experienced “traditional life”. And 
some believed that the revival of certain cultural practices and principles would 
help them to deal with current problems and crises. Youth’s perspectives on Acholi 
culture seemed to be strongly influenced by the highly emotive societal discourse 
(promoted especially by elders and international actors), which ‘burdened’ the 
young generation with the task of ‘saving’ Acholi culture and suggested that only 
the revival and maintenance of Acholi traditions would lead to a restoration of so-
cial stability.
In chapter 5, I identified a great range of perspectives on and reactions to socio-
cultural change within the war generation, which can be seen as a result of these 
complex considerations and confusing influences. My analysis revealed that mem-
bers of the war generation adopted different discourses which encompassed different 
sentiments (e.g. ambivalence, creativity) and entailed different projections (e.g. re-
traditionalization or modernization) for the future of Acholi society. Their decision 
to position themselves in a certain way depended on individual characteristics (age, 
gender, social status, life experience) and the situational context. Most of the young 
people I met switched between different positions depending on the people they 
were interacting with and the power constellations thereby involved.
This also relativizes the extent to which one can speak of clearly separable gen-
erational perspectives on Acholi culture and socio-cultural change. Although, as 
I elaborated above, there are many aspects which are debated along generational 
lines, there are also crosscutting positions as well as intra-generational disparities. 
More important than the actual similarities or differences, however, is the general 
perception, (re-)produced in local discourses, that generational relations in Acholi 
society have become strained and conflictual. In some ways, this discursive creation 
of clearly distinguishable ‘conflict groups’, which are associated with dichotomous 
notions of tradition and modernity and which mutually blame each other for the 
crisis, might reflect an attempt to make sense of and explain the current state of 
affairs. Similar processes of dichotomization have been observed in other African 
contexts of severe crisis. Geissler and Prince (2010), for instance, analyze the ways a 
Luo community (JoUhero) in Western Kenya tries to cope with the disarray sparked 
by poverty, unemployment and the AIDS epidemic. They state:
“We, as much as JoUhero, need at times the convenient fictions that dichoto-
mies (…) provide, in order to choose what to do in a given situation, to tell 
stories or to frame our analysis. An important reason for the prominence of 
such dualist patterns in contemporary Uhero, and consequently in this book, 
is the sense of crisis that we noted above: in a present that is experienced as 
a breakdown, tropes of rupture acquire acute significance. Whether one at-
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tributes this crisis to a breach with the past or to a failure to break through 
into the future, this radicalizes the modern dichotomies and brings concerns 
with alterity and identity to the fore” (Geissler & Prince, 2010: 79).
In many ways, the debates within the Luo community described by Geissler and 
Prince make an interesting comparison to the situation I encountered among my 
Acholi interlocutors. As in Gulu, gender and generational relations within the Luo 
community in Kenya were perceived as being severely strained due to the pressure 
of illness and death, economic hardship and land scarcity and a widespread feeling 
that “the land was dying” and people’s expectations of modernity had remained un-
fulfilled, especially for young Luo (Geissler & Prince, 2010: 2ff.). Similar to my ob-
servations in Gulu, discourses about modernity, tradition and the West centered on 
normative behavior – Geissler and Prince (2010: 91) speak of a “moral battlefield” 
– and were based on a desire to understand and overcome the current crisis. One 
aspect, which was at the core of these debates, both in Uhero (cf. Geissler & Prince, 
2010: 89ff.) and in Acholiland, concerned gender orders and norms. Rules, which 
prescribed the ‘right ways’ of behaving often involved clearly defined gender roles, 
norms and practices, and men and women who violated these rules were accused of 
aggravating the crisis. I will summarize in the following how the perceived changes 
in gender relations in Acholi society constituted a central aspect in discourses on 
socio-cultural change and, in a very fundamental way, reflected power struggles 
about gender orders and hierarchies.
Gendered & Sexualized Power Relations7.2.2. 
As I have shown in chapters 4, 5 and 6, gender was an important and highly con-
tested category in Acholi society, especially in discourses on socio-cultural change. 
Reflected in these discourses was a general conviction among all members of Acholi 
society that gender relations had radically changed throughout the past decades. 
This change was attributed to the displacement situation during the war and the 
introduction of “Western” practices and discourses (for instance on women’s rights 
and gender equality) through development organizations and the media. The im-
plications and practical manifestations of changing gender roles, orders, ideologies 
and norms were a matter of much debate and evoked wide-ranging conflicts and 
power struggles.
As in the case of generational conflicts discussed above, ‘gender conflicts’ seemed 
to be fought between outwardly homogenous ‘groups’, i.e. men and women, which 
mutually blamed each other for the current state of ‘disorder’. In local discourses, I 
often found that women blamed men for being lazy, irresponsible, unable to provide 
for their families and of being unfaithful to their wife or wives. Men, on the other 
hand, accused women of being materialistic, promiscuous, disrespectful towards 
male authorities, and of refusing to fulfill their roles as wives and mothers. The 
actual situation, however, was much more complex than these mutual accusations 
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between seemingly ‘binary-opposed groups’ would suggest. Conflict constellations 
were much more blurred and also involved generational power differences, for in-
stance between young men and old men or young women and old women.
It appeared that both men and women struggled with the perceived breakdown 
of long-established hegemonic models of masculinity (and femininity), which chal-
lenged the established social orders and therefore social stability. Especially young 
men struggled with the fact that they could no longer live up to the roles as family 
heads and providers expected of them in Acholi society. Many of my male interlocu-
tors insinuated that they no longer felt valued, respected and needed. My female 
interlocutors, on the other hand, reported that for various reasons men were no 
longer able to fulfill the increasingly challenging role as provider, which in turn 
forced them to look for alternative sources of income and take over the man’s role 
themselves.
On the practical level, men’s frustration about their perceived relative disempow-
erment and women’s new assertiveness on account of their perceived relative em-
powerment led to sometimes violent conflicts. Incidences of Gender Based Violence 
(GBV) and aggressive sexual behavior of men towards women were seen, by my 
interlocutors, to have increased as a result of men trying to regain their former social 
position. This claim can also be found in the literature. Whyte et al. (2012: 12ff.), 
for instance, who analyze the way Acholi men are using “arguments of culture” in 
the resettlement process to deny unmarried women access to land and belonging, 
describe an increase in “patrilineal fundamamentalism”. Similarly Branch (2008: 
16), speculating on the nature of post-war relations and conflicts in Acholi society, 
has presumed that
“there is a significant possibility that post-war Acholi society may be char-
acterized by an intensive disciplinary project carried out by men, especially 
men with family or clan authority, designed to eliminate what they see as 
the corruption that had infected Acholi society during the war and displace-
ment. (…) Indeed, among men, the re-establishment of ‘traditional author-
ity’ was often framed explicitly in terms of undoing the power gained by 
women and youth in the camps and imposing the power of men and elders 
over these putatively formerly subservient groups”.
This quotation points to the combined effects of the perceived breakdown of gender 
and gerontocratic orders and the complex conflict lines between different gender 
and age groups of Acholi society connected to it. One particularly controversial 
aspect, which played a big role in everyday discourses and in inter-gender, intergen-
erational interactions, concerned sexual relations.
The commonly discussed practice of “transactional sex” is a case in point. Trans-
actional sexual relations exemplify the complex intertwinement of age and econom-
ic status, agency and power as well as changes in values and desires. Young women 
usually ‘choose’ to get involved with a “sugar daddy” and profit from the exchange. 
In this sense, transactional sexual relations reflect new forms of women’s agency and 
Conclusion: Negotiating Socio-Cultural Change & the Future of Acholi Society  279
sexual liberty (cf. Groes-Green, 2013). Young men, on the other hand, often told 
me that because they could not provide the material assets today’s women desired, 
women of their age group preferred to go out with older men. Economically pow-
erful, older men thus reinforced their dominant position in society by preventing 
younger men from getting a girlfriend and, in the long run, from being able to get 
married210.
I have explicated that, in addition to their gendered dimension, discourses on 
socio-cultural change and power dynamics in Acholiland also have a highly sexual-
ized dimension, which I discussed in relationship to Foucault’s theories (cf. Chap. 6). 
During my fieldwork, I observed numerous incidents, which may well be analyzed 
with reference to his argument that a) sexuality can be instrumentalized in various 
(for instance social, political, cultural and economic) power struggles, that b) dis-
courses on sexuality infiltrate all spheres of social life, and that c) the sexual conduct 
of the population is often taken as a target for intervention by local authorities, state 
officials and international actors (see Foucault, 1990: 26). The interconnection be-
tween sexuality and power, individual and population, became especially evident in 
societal discourses on HIV/AIDS, youth sexuality, women’s sexuality, homosexual-
ity and pornography. All of these discourses linked various local and national crises 
to the changed and ‘uncontrolled’ sexual behavior of the Acholi or, respectively, the 
Ugandan population and thus implied that a tighter control of these ‘threatening’ 
forms of sexuality was necessary to re-establish social order and stability. Poignant 
examples were the discourses on youth sexuality and HIV/AIDS which I frequently 
encountered at Gulu Youth Centre.
In fact, the youth centre was essentially a drop-in centre for VCT (Voluntary 
Counseling and Testing for HIV/AIDS) and its main function, besides testing, was 
to inform and counsel young people about risky sexual behavior, HIV and other 
sexually transmitted diseases. Most of the weekly debates, in which the young wom-
en and men who had come for testing had to participate and which were chaired by 
a counselor, revolved around sexual issues: teenage pregnancies, “transactional sex”, 
sexual networks (i.e. the ways sexually transmitted diseases could spread if one was 
involved with multiple sexual partners), abusive (sexual) relationships, but also love 
and sex, family planning, safer sex practices, or living with HIV. In these “girl and 
boy talks”, the young participants were usually asked about their experiences (related 
to the topic of debate) and then discussed how risky sexual behavior among youth 
210 Even young men with girlfriends who had agreed to marry them could often not afford the ex-
orbitant bride prices currently demanded in Gulu. Therefore, girls were sometimes pressured by 
their parents to choose a more prosperous partner. Whyte et al. (2012) describe that during the 
war, when people were living in the camps and few had the resources to pay brideprice, marriages 
were often celebrated without the brideprice payments otherwise seen as necessary to formalize a 
marriage and to integrate the wife and her children into the lineage of the husband. In the post-
war phase, this lack of formalization has caused several problems, especially concerning women’s 
right to patrilineal land and men’s right to their children. Whyte et al. (2012: 10) tellingly state 
that even “[m]arriage had become a matter of uncertainty”. 
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had become a major cause of societal crisis. At the end of each session, the counsel-
ors advised the participants on how to lead a safe and responsible life and avoid the 
detrimental consequences of sex. In many ways, the counseling techniques exhibited 
in these sessions are reminiscent of Foucault’s discussion of the modern discourses 
on sex – which according to him evolved in Europe from the 18th century onwards – 
in which confessions on sex are seen to generate certain general “truths”.
In applying Foucault’s argument about the “interplay between sex and truth” 
(1990: 57) – i.e. the idea that confessing about sex is needed to reveal certain truths 
– to the situation in the youth center (and potentially other situations), I propose 
that confessions and debates regarding the dangers of youth sexuality were not pri-
marily concerned with sexuality as such. Rather, they were used to enter into a 
discussion about a whole range of problematic societal developments seen to be the 
cause of the current crisis. In chapter 6, I already discussed how in similar ways other 
‘threatening’ forms of sexuality were debated in local and national discourses, and 
discursively established as ‘threats’ to social stability and survival. The pending “anti-
homosexuality bill” is only one, albeit very prominent, example of such debates.
The preceding section has shown the convoluted interconnections of genera-
tional, gender, economic, social and sexual relations in contexts of changing societal 
power structures, precarious livelihoods, declining marriage rates and kinship ties in 
Acholi society. The insights drawn from these discussions can be applied to other 
African contexts in which rapid changes (related to HIV/AIDS, war, globalization 
etc.) necessitate a re-organization of society that fundamentally challenges estab-
lished gerontocratic and patriarchic principles and thus evokes bitter struggles for 
power, influence and social order. A further, much debated aspect of socio-cultural 
change in Acholi discourses and beyond relates to local-global power relations, and 
particularly the colonial and postcolonial role of the West in Africa. I will summa-
rize my insights on this matter in the following section.
Local-Global Power Relations7.2.3. 
Throughout this book, I have outlined the complex ways local-global power re-
lations, more concretely relations between Acholiland (respectively Uganda and 
Africa) and the West, played a role in local discourses on socio-cultural change. 
Generally, it was inferred that Western influences were a fundamental driver of 
socio-cultural change in Uganda, and particularly in Acholiland, due to the large-
scale humanitarian and political intervention by Western state and development 
actors. I noted that my interlocutors frequently used binary oppositions to elabo-
rate and evaluate ‘Western-influenced’ change in Uganda. On the one hand, they 
glorified the West as the embodiment of progress and ‘role model’ for Uganda. On 
the other hand they condemned the West as the epitome of evil and criticized its 
neocolonial tendencies to impose its political agendas and belief systems on African 
people.
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Discourses on Westernization and neocolonialism must be seen in the context of 
Uganda’s high level of dependence on foreign, primarily Western aid interventions. 
These have targeted and influenced discourses, policies and practices in a broad 
range of fields, including the economic, political, judicial, military, cultural, social, 
and even religious sector. The impact of the ‘humanitarian regime’ in Northern 
Uganda has been repeatedly stressed throughout this book. Apart from the ‘prac-
tical interventions’ (i.e. support for the provision of food, shelter, health services, 
education facilities, infrastructure etc. in the war and post-war phase), Western 
development actors introduced new discourses and influenced existing ones on a 
broad range of subjects: the war, the camps, the LRA, post-war reconstruction, 
human rights, culture, ‘child soldiers’, lifestyles, morals and many others. I have 
pointed out (especially in chapters 3, 4 and 6) how these discourses came to pervade 
local perceptions and narratives. But I have also demonstrated that local actors by 
no means just passively received and adapted to these discourses, but also refused, 
appropriated and strategically used them to negotiate and take on different posi-
tions in different social contexts.
I have demonstrated that Western discourses, for example regarding gender 
equality or children’s rights, which imply certain morals, norms and regulations, 
are often cited in local power struggles, for instance between youth and elders or 
men and women. Depending on the speaker and the situation, they can be used 
to emphasize the discriminatory and outdated nature of “traditional” Acholi social 
norms or, on the contrary, the corruption and decadence of “modern” Acholi society 
brought about by “Western” imports. I often witnessed how some of my interlocu-
tors switched between seemingly contradictory discourses and positions depending 
on the context and its power constellations. In one situation, they would describe 
themselves and the Acholi people as helpless victims of war and in dire need of 
Western aid, and use this argument to convince me or other “Westerners” to provide 
financial support for them personally or for one of their projects (common examples 
included recording a song, making a film, setting up a CBO). In other contexts, the 
same people would condemn the submissiveness and passivity of the Acholi people, 
who were always begging “Westerners” for money instead of relying on their own re-
sources. Sometimes, they would add that this kind of behavior only led the arrogant 
“Westerners” to feel and act even more superior towards the local population.
However, while ambivalence and situational switching were common, positions 
regarding the desirability of Western interventions and the introduction of ‘Western 
concepts’ were not completely arbitrary, but also depended on individual character-
istics (age, gender, social status, life experience, level of education etc.). Not surpris-
ingly, young people generally supported a more pro-Western stance, while older 
people were often more skeptical about “Westernization”. One reason could be that 
young people were more exposed to international media (via TV, films, internet 
etc.), which transmits glossy images of ‘Western modernity’ and advertizes Western 
popular culture. Another reason could be related to young people’s more extensive 
access to ‘Western’ forms of education, which privilege certain (i.e. science-based) 
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perspectives and ways of knowing as more ‘truthful’ than ‘traditional’ knowledge, 
and which imply that people who do not possess and believe in these ‘modern’ forms 
of knowledge will not be able to excel in a globalized, capitalist world.
This latter aspect is especially relevant when looking at generational conflicts 
and power struggles because, as Foucault has emphasized in Discipline and Punish 
(2002b [1975]), power is essentially dependent on the control of knowledge and, 
vice versa, the establishment of what is considered knowledge is based on power. In 
Acholi society, it has long been elders’ control of knowledge that legitimated their 
privileged position in society. This power-knowledge base is now being challenged 
through the introduction of new forms of knowledge that are passed to the young 
generation through ‘Western’ models of mass education in schools. Not only is el-
ders’ knowledge no longer considered useful. In addition, they also lose their status 
as definers and providers of knowledge, who can control which morals, worldviews 
and epistemologies are passed on to the younger generation. The latter function has 
been largely taken over by modern institutions like schools and the media.
Intergenerational struggles about power and knowledge are by no means specific 
to the Acholi context, although the particular dynamics of change, especially the 
simultaneous breakdown of social ties during the war, the sudden influx of West-
ern development actors and the expansion of ‘Western’ schooling and media, may 
have led to an intensification of these struggles in Acholi society. Worldwide, local 
power-knowledge struggles along generational lines have become closely interlinked 
with globalized, capitalist power relations and modern power-knowledge regimes, 
which purport specific views on what is needed and what can be gained in a global-
ized world. In Africa, as various recent studies have shown, youth are attracted by 
and believe in the idea of ‘capitalist modernity’ transmitted to them in schools and 
the media. At the same time, however, they realize that they can neither fulfill the 
criteria (for example a high level of quality education) necessary to succeed in this 
system, nor do they profit from its promised benefits. Paradoxically, through their 
better access to education and global media (when compared to former generations), 
youth’s desire for ‘capitalist modernity’ has been enflamed, but at the same time they 
have been ‘enlightened’ about the global power imbalances inherent in this system. 
They can see – on television, in films, on the internet – on a day to day basis what 
is ‘out there’, but what remains inaccessible for most of them. Mbembe (2002: 271) 
has analyzed this phenomenon and pointed to the “problem of the object of desire 
in an economy of scarcity as one more transformative force in contemporary African 
practices of self formation.” Analyzing the material dimension of this “desire”, he 
suggests that
“the sites and the vectors of this imaginaire of consumption are to a large 
extent the same as those found elsewhere in the world. But one development 
in particular deserves special recognition here. This is the phenomenon, in 
all its manifold aspects, of an economy of desired goods that are known, that 
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may sometimes be seen, that one wants to enjoy, but to which one will never 
have material access” (ibid.).
The findings from my study relate very well to this statement. For the majority of 
my young Acholi interlocutors, the realization that they were in many ways ex-
cluded from the imagined benefits of ‘Western modernity’ was not only a source 
of great frustration, but also contributed to their feeling of uncertainty and being 
‘stuck in between’. In their quest for a future vision of Acholi society, so it often 
seemed to me, they were torn between idealized narratives about the ‘traditional 
past’ promoted by their elders and idealized images of a spatially distant and seem-
ingly unattainable ‘Western present’. However, as I have pointed out in chapter 5, 
there were also those young people, who could make creative use of their state of 
being ‘in between’, and who could use their imaginations of past and present, tradi-
tion and modernity to build a vision for the future.
Youth at the Crossroads –  7.3. 
In Post-War Acholiland & Beyond
In recent years, African youths’ perspectives on the state of their societies have 
become a subject of increased relevance in both basic and applied research. All cur-
rent debates, popular and scientific, on the wide-ranging changes African societies 
have undergone in the past decades take into account the role young people have 
played in bringing about these changes and, more importantly, the role they are to 
play in the future of African societies. The ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions in Northern 
Africa and the Gulf Region, which were spearheaded by young people who were 
dissatisfied with their political leaders and the economic, political and social sys-
tems in their respective countries, have put the precarious and volatile situation of 
marginalized youth on the global news and political agendas. One of the pressing 
questions after the fall of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, brought about 
by youth-led popular protests, was whether these events would spark ‘youth revo-
lutions’ in Sub-Saharan Africa, where life conditions for young people seem to be 
even more precarious and where large numbers of unemployed youth face bleak 
future perspectives due to the political mismanagement, corruption and nepotism 
of their aged political leaders. Uganda was one of the countries where a repeat of 
the revolts in Egypt and Tunisia seemed possible. After the disputed re-election of 
President Museveni in February 2011 and sparked by rising fuel and food prizes, 
the Ugandan opposition initiated a series of popular protests and demonstrations, 
which reminded of the revolutions during the Arab Spring. However, the Museveni 
regime did not topple and through its violent repressions of the protests managed to 
maintain the political status quo. Similarly, popular uprisings in other Sub-Saharan 
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states, most notably Malawi and Equatorial Guinea, were quashed (Akidi, 2012; 
Kainja, 2011; Brune, 2011).
Nevertheless, these recent developments have made African leaders aware that 
youth are a force to reckon with and no longer tolerate the marginalization and 
repression they long had to face by the old generations of political and economic 
elites. Through the global media, new communication technologies and mass edu-
cation young people in Africa have become increasingly (and more than ever) aware 
of the inequalities they face, not only in their local communities and nation states, 
but also within the international system. Conversely, local and national authorities 
are slowly coming to realize the dangers inherent in neglecting the concerns and 
ambitions of the young generation. In her recently published book on the Time of 
Youth, Honwana (2012: 3) declaims that
“[y]oung people (…) are beginning to assert their rights as citizens. They are 
rising up against unemployment, socioeconomic marginalization, unsound 
economic policies, corrupt governments, political exclusion, and lack of re-
spect for their rights. These are cries for freedom by a generation yearning to 
make a place for itself in the world.”
She goes on to emphasize the importance which has come to be attributed to youth 
as “critical indicator of the state of the nation, of its politics, economy, and social 
and cultural life” (ibid.) in contemporary societal developments and, consequently, 
also in academic research.
Like Honwana, numerous scholars have stressed that the rapid changes in gen-
erational relations across Africa, caused among other things by globalization and the 
AIDS epidemic, necessitate a ‘re-making’ of African societies, which fundamentally 
challenges established societal principles and thus evokes bitter struggles for power, 
influence and social order. In my research, I have analyzed one particular case of so-
cietal ‘re-making’ and the conflicts and discourses which accompany such processes 
of socio-cultural change.
The young people in my case study faced many of the challenges seen as charac-
teristic for the contemporary generation of African youth: lack of quality education, 
unemployment, HIV/AIDS, political and economic marginalization. In addition 
to these ‘general’ problems, however, they had grown up in a context of protracted 
war and were now confronted with the very specific challenges of living in a slowly 
recovering post-war society and with particular vulnerabilities related among other 
things to traumas resulting from abduction, displacement and violence experienced 
during the war, loss of parents and relatives as well as broken kinship ties and uncer-
tain (social and spatial) belonging211. One particular challenge, which I have focused 
on in my study, concerns the ‘burden’ placed on youth – at least discursively – of ‘re-
building’ society and ‘saving’ Acholi culture. Youth are framed as “primary vehicles 
211 Some of these particular vulnerabilities are described in the recent studies by Spitzer & Twikirize 
(2012), Verma (2012), Webster (2013) and Whyte et al. (2012).
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for social change” (Cheney, 2007: 3), who, through their actions and choices, decide 
over the fate of Acholi society.
As I have discussed throughout this concluding chapter, the combination of the 
above-noted challenges has placed Acholi youth in a specific situation of uncertain-
ty. On their “uneasy path to normality” (Spitzer & Twikirize, 2012), they seem to be 
at a crossroads – between war and peace, past and future, tradition and modernity, 
Africanization and Westernization. As Whyte et al. (2012: 15) have noted: “Now 
that they are returning to some kind of normality, it is evident that those exceptional 
circumstances [of the war] are not exactly past; it is not clear what the norms of 
normal are or should be.”
Youth’s in-between status, however, is not only a source of uncertainty, but also 
places them in a unique position to shape the future of their society. As I have shown, 
Acholi youth are not only victims but important agents who can strategically use 
their in-between position by drawing on different discourses and switching between 
societal roles and positions. Throughout this book, I have given numerous examples 
of the multiple and complex ways my young interlocutors made use of various so-
cietal discourses on “culture”, “tradition” and “modernity” in their negotiations of 
generational, gender, family and peer-to-peer relations. Their shifting between roles 
and positions enabled them to introduce new practices and perspectives in some 
contexts, while adhering to established rules and social orders in others, for instance 
in the family or when elders were present. While many youths experienced their 
situation as ambivalent and saw their actions as a mere adaption to circumstances 
rather than an active expression of agency, the way they dealt with socio-cultural 
changes and conflicting societal demands was in many ways very creative and inno-
vative. Especially in the fields of art, music and dance, young people gained inspira-
tion from a variety of sources including ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ popular culture, 
and sometimes combined them in quite thought-provoking ways.
My study takes up a recent trend in research on African youth, which has shifted 
from a predominant focus on youth “in crisis” or “as crisis” to more complex con-
siderations of youth as social actors in situations of wide-ranging change, confusion 
and uncertainty. While various studies have discussed how young people cope with 
physical, economic and political uncertainty, my research has pointed to an often 
neglected aspect which may be termed cultural or even epistemological uncertainty. 
I have shown how young people not only strive for physical and economic well-
being and political recognition but aspire for something much more comprehensive. 
In fact, their quest is one for certainty, for meaning and, in a larger sense maybe, for 
truth212. While many studies have revealed African youth’s impressive abilities for 
improvisation and short term strategies to deal with instable and often precarious 
212 I have borrowed this expression from David Pratten, who used it in his commentary on my 
(Vorhölter, 2013) and three other papers in the panel “Novel Spaces for African Youth: Creativity, 
Entrepreneurship and Political Action” during the European Conference on African Studies in 
Lisbon. 
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social environments, less attention has been paid to their long-term aspirations, i.e. 
their desires to build stable societies which enable individual freedoms while being 
guided by collective moral principles, and their hopes of contributing to and be-
coming part of a global community. In these long-term quests for future certainties, 
young people and old people become mutually entangled rather than diametrically 
opposed. As my findings show, members of the young generation not only chal-
lenge, but also conform to and reproduce some of the discourses and power relations 
established by members of the older generation. And while they need the old gen-
eration as an ‘imagined other’ against which they can ‘rebel’, they also want and ac-
tively call on members of the old generation to fulfill their role as knowledge-sharers 
and patrons. On a theoretical level, the complexity and contradictions inherent in 
these dynamics can be well-captured by applying a Foucauldian approach to power. 
The strength of such an approach lies in its ability address – with a non-ideological 
gaze – how the various power relations at the mirco-level produce often unforeseen 
outcomes on the marco-level and how all forms of resistance inevitably take place 
within already existing systems of power.
A central challenge I faced in my study – and presumably one which poses a 
challenge for any anthropological study of youth – is the great diversity in the way 
young people imagine and try to create certainty and the question whether one can 
speak of youth as a distinct social category at all. In my analysis, I tried to overcome 
the latter difficulty by using Mannheim’s concept of “historical generation” to speak 
about a clearly demarcated ‘subgroup’ of youth. However, this ‘solution’ only partly 
addresses the problem of diversity. Van Dijk et al. (2011) have recently pointed out 
that “youth” in Africa has in many ways become an ideology rather than a phenom-
enon or a concept, which people irrespective of their age make use of – for instance 
to position themselves in international development discourses or, as I have alluded 
to in my study, in local power structures. Youth, in this sense then, is a historically 
established discourse rather than a fixed category. Thus, one could argue, it becomes 
less important to define youth ‘as such’ and rather more important to ask who adopts 
the label youth and why and, respectively, who speaks about youth and in which 
context. As I have shown in my study with regard to other problematic terms such 
as “culture” or “the West”, a Foucauldian discourse-analytical approach can help to 
identify emic or situational usages and relate them to analytical conceptualizations 
of such terms. I suggest that a similar approach may also be applied to deconstruct 
and reconfigure contemporary notions of youth.
On a theoretical level, questions related to generational power struggles, the 
relevance of age and experience, and the problem of diversity will remain central 
challenges for the anthropology of youth. With regard to my case study and the cur-
rent situation in (Northern) Uganda, it remains to be seen how the war generation 
of Acholi ages and whether, after the uncertainties which shaped their childhood 
and youth, their futures will be more certain. How will this generation raise their 
own children and which values, norms and social orders will be the subject of future 
generational conflicts? Will peace, and not just the absence of war, return to Acho-
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liland and prevail? Or will existing grievances linger and new forms of violence and 
political conflict erupt? Is there a prospect for a ‘youth revolution’ in Uganda after 
all? Or will the old elites, stirred by the lures of economic power through recently 
discovered oil, maintain the status quo?
These and other questions might be taken up in future studies. And in some 
years to come we shall know which pathways the ‘leaders of tomorrow’ have chosen 
and which new crossroads they face in their quest for certainty.
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Acronyms9.1. 
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
A-Level Advanced Level
ARLPI Acholi Religious Leaders‘ Peace Initiative
CBO Community-based Organization
CCCS Centre of Contemporary Cultural Studies (Birmingham)
DEO District Education Officer
DJ Disk Jockey
DP Democratic Party
DRC Democratic Republic Congo
FDC Forum for Democratic Change
FEDEMU Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda
GBV Gender-based Violence
GUTA Gulu Theatre Artists
GYC Gulu Youth Centre
H.E.A.L.S Health, Education, Arts, Literacy and Sports
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HSMF Holy Spirit Mobile Forces
HURIFO Human Rights Focus
HURIWA Human Rights Watch
ICC International Criminal Court
ICG International Crisis Group
IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IMF International Monetary Fund
INAMO Informationsprojekt Naher und Mittlerer Osten
INT Interview
IPSS Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies
IRIN Integrated Regional Information Network
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KKA Ker Kwaro Acholi
KM Kacoke Madit
LCs Local Councils
LDU Local Defense Unit
LGBTI  LesbianGayBisexualTransIntersex
LRA/M Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement
LTC Luo Talent Centre
MC Master of Ceremony
NGO Non-governmental Organization
NRM/A National Resistance Movement/Army  
(NRA renamed to UPDF in 1995)
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
O-Level Ordinary Level
RDC Resident District Commissioner
RLP Refugee Law Project
UGX Ugandan Shilling
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNLA Uganda National Liberation Army
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UPC Uganda People’s Congress
UPDA/M Uganda People’s Democratic Army/Movement
UPDF Ugandan People’s Defense Forces
UPE Universal Primary Education
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VCT Voluntary Testing and Counseling
WFP World Food Program
ZFD Ziviler Friedensdienst




awak Working party for communal field work
boda boda Motorbike taxi
bulu Youth
cen Spirit of people who died violently
jok ( pl. jogi ) Spirit(s)
kaka Clan; extended family unit whose members 
can trace their genealogical links to a known 
common male ancestor
kacoke madit Big meeting
lawi rwodi Head chief
mato oput Drinking of the bitter root (lit.); term for a 
reconciliation ritual
muno ( pl. munu ) Colloquial Acholi term for white person, often 
used interchangeably with the Swahili term 
mzungu (pl. bazungu )
ot House or household
paco dogola (Extended) family
rwot ( pl. rwodi ) Chief, king
rwodi kalam Appointed Chiefs
rwodi moo “Traditional” Chiefs
rwot okoro / rwot mon Female “Chief” for women affairs




Figure 1: Map of Uganda, including Acholi Sub-Region9.3.1. 
Map of Uganda (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Uganda_districts_2010.png, 
cited 18.02.2013; modified by Martin Morlock); black-rimmed: Acholi sub-region 
with its seven districts Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Amuru, Nwoya, Lamwo and Agago 
(status as of 2011).
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Figure 2: Map of Uganda, including major towns & neighboring countries9.3.2. 
Map of Uganda including major towns and neighboring countries [Busia and Pal-
abek added by J.V.] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Uganda_Regions_map.png, 
cited 16.05.2014); circled: Gulu Municipality.
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Figure 3: Socio-Demographic Characteristics, Acholi Districts,  9.3.3. 
 2010 Survey
Gulu Amuru Kitgum Pader Total
Sex (% women) 50.3 51.7 49.6 49.7 50.3
Age (average) 39.1 37.9 39.0 38.6 38.6
Education Level (%)
None 23.8 34.9 39.1 37.0 35
Primary incomplete 44 39.6 33.9 42.4 40
Primary complete 12.3 11.1 11.7 6.4 10
Vocational Training 3.1 0.9 3.2 4.6 3.1
Secondary incomplete 11.3 7.2 9.5 7.4 8.6
Secondary complete or above 5.5 6.2 2.5 2.2 3.9
Literacy
Read/write (% yes) 59.4 48.7 51.8 52.8 52.8
Poverty
Average income last 7 days (UGX*) 13,105 9,642 6,503 4,043 7,716
Average income per week (UGX) 23,157 16,935 10,976 6,442 13,259
Poorest asset quintile (%) 14 27 22 17 20
Average number of assests 3.9 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1
* At the time of the survey, 1 US dollar was traded for approximately 2,000 UGX.
Source: Pham & Vinck, 2010: 16, adapted from original by J.V.
The above-cited socio-demographic characteristics are based on a statistical survey 
conducted by Phoung Pham & Patrick Vinck in the four Acholi districts Gulu, 
Amuru, Kitgum and Pader (the recent divisions of these districts, cf. figure 1, were 
not taken into account) in April and May 2010. A total of 2,498 individuals in 154 
villages were interviewed. Presumably, the average income, level of education and 
literacy rate in Gulu Municipality were slightly higher than the above averages sug-
gest as the survey has a rural bias. Unfortunately, I did not find any reliable income 
statistics for Gulu Municipality. 
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Figure 4: Urban Population Development in Uganda – Selected Towns9.3.4. 
Name Region 1969 1980 1991 2002 2011
Arua North 10,837 ... 22,217 43,929 59,400
Entebbe Central 21,096 21,289 42,763 55,086 79,700
Fort Portal West 7,947 26,806 32,789 40,993 47,100
Gulu North 18,170 14,958 38,297 119,430 154,300
Jinja East 47,872 45,060 65,169 71,213 89,700
Kabale West 8,234 21,469 29,246 41,344 44,600
Kampala Central 330,700 458,503 774,241 1,189,142 1,659,600
Kasese West 7,213 9,917 18,750 53,907 74,300
Kira213 Central ... ... ... 124,067 179,800
Kitgum North 3,242 4,961 12,978 41,821 59,700
Lira North 7,340 9,122 27,568 80,879 108,600
Masaka Central 12,987 29,123 49,585 67,768 74,100
Masindi West 5,226 4,958 10,839 28,300 45,400
Mbale East 23,544 28,039 53,987 71,130 91,800
Mbarara West 16,078 23,255 41,031 69,363 83,700
Nansana Central ... ... ... 62,044 89,900
Soroti East 12,398 15,048 40,970 41,711 66,000












Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2012)213
213 The comparatively high population of Kira is explained by the fact that the town lies very close 
(approximately 17 kilometers) to the central business district of Kampala.
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List of Interviews9.4. 214215
Interview with Acholi Elder9.4.1. 





26.09.2010 Family home Okello: born 1937, retired school teacher, 
married with 5 co-wives [Samuel: born 
1984, O-Level (Junior Secondary School), 
boda boda driver, married with 2 children]
Interviews with Acholi Youth9.4.2. 
Name Date Location214 Details (Year and place of birth, Level 
of Education, Profession…)215
Simon 31.03.2010 Gulu Youth Centre Born 1992 in Pader (village), enrolled in 
A-Level (Senior Secondary School)
Ojok 31.03.2010 Gulu Youth Centre born in Pader (village), enrolled at Gulu 
University,
Cyclo 09.04.2010 Gulu Youth Centre born 1988 in Gulu (town), finished A-
Level
Elima 09.04.2010 Gulu Youth Centre born 1990 in Pader (village), enrolled in 
A-Level
Denis 16.04.2010 Gulu Youth Centre born 1986 in Amuru (village), started but 
did not finish A-Level
A.B. 16.04.2010 Gulu Youth Centre born 1975, lived in Canada from 1991-
2009
Nura 21.04.2010 Gulu Youth Centre born 1990 in the village, enrolled in 
O-level
Martin 21.04.2010 Gulu Youth Centre Born 1984 in Gulu (town), completed 
O-Level (Junior Secondary School)
Laurence 28.04.2010 Gulu Youth Centre born in 1991 in Gulu (town), has finished 
his O-level and is waiting to go for his 
A-level
214 All interviews were conducted in Gulu Municipality unless otherwise stated.
215 The information concerning the level of education and profession was obtained during the time 
of my research, i.e. in 2010/early 2011, and may no longer be accurate.
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Daniel 30.04.2010 Gulu Youth Centre born in 1990 in Gulu (village); enrolled 
in O-Level
Odong 04.05.2010 Luo Talent Centre Born in 1991 in Kitgum (village), has 
finished A-level; enrolled in teacher’s 
college
Innocent LTC 04.05.2010 Luo Talent Centre Born in 1989 in Gulu (village); has 
finished A-Level; working at local gas 
station
Omony 08.05.2010 Luo Talent Centre Born in 1994 in Gulu (town), enrolled in 
O-Level
Atim 08.05.2010 Luo Talent Centre Born in 1995 in Gulu (town), enrolled in 
Primary School
Ajoka 08.05.2010 Luo Talent Centre Born in 1991 in Gulu (town), enrolled in 
O-Level
Helen 08.05.2010 Luo Talent Centre Born in 1995 in Pader (village), enrolled 
in Primary School
Lagen 08.05.2010 Luo Talent Centre born in 1993 in Kitgum (village), enrolled 
in O-Level
Alice 06.10.2010 Bobbi, Gulu District Born in 1984 in Pader (village), police 
officer
Akello 26.11.2010 My place, Pece Born in 1991 in Gulu (town), finished Pri-
mary School, had to drop out of O-Level
Joseph 14.12.2010 Gulu Youth Centre Born 1990 in Masindi, finished A-Level, 




Interviews with NGO-Representatives9.4.3. 216217
Name Date Location216 Details (Year and place of birth, Level 
of Education, Profession…)217
EM 16.03.2010 American Refugee 
Council, Office
American, female, in her 30s, GBV Coor-
dinator for American Refugee Council
Rocki 16.03.2010 American Refugee 
Council, Office
Acholi, male, in his early 30s, GBV-Ca-
pacity-Building-Manager for American 
Refugee Council
Ojara 17.03.2010 Gulu Youth Develop-
ment Association, 
Office 
Acholi, male, born in 1984, General 
Secretary for Gulu Youth Development 
Association
Faith 18.03.2010 Gulu Youth centre, 
office
Alur, female, born in 1970, Manager of 
Gulu Youth Centre
Zipporah 23.03.2010 NGO Forum, Office Acholi, born in 1987, Gulu Youth Leader-
ship Programme Officer
SK 23.03.2010 Ker Kwaro Acholi 
Headquarters
Acholi, female, in her late twenties, Ker 






Acholi, male, in his 40s, District Educa-
tion Officer
Mike 29.03.2010 Ker Kwaro Acholi 
Headquarters
Acholi, male, in his 40s, Ker Kwaro Acholi 
Coordinator of the SPRING Project
Odong and 
Bangi
27.04.2010 Gulu Youth Coalition 
for Peace, office
Acholi, male, both in their 20s, leaders of 
the Gulu Youth Coalition for Peace 
216 All interviews were conducted in Gulu Municipality unless otherwise stated.
217 The information concerning the level of education and profession was obtained during the time 
of my research, i.e. in 2010/early 2011, and may no longer be accurate.
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Group Interviews in Rural Areas 9.4.4. 218







Bobbi 06.10.2010 19 11 male, 8 female 3 elders, 16 youth
Bungutera 03.10.2010 27 17 male, 10 female 3 elders, 24 youth
Kapedopong 28.06.2010 17 8 male, 9 female 7 elders, 10 youth 
Pabbo,  
Amuru District
23.10.2010 15 9 male, 6 female 2 elders, 13 youth
Paicho 17.10.2010 23 17 male, 6 female 4 elders, 19 youth 
Wii Aweng 26.09.2010 39 12 male, 27 female 20 elders, 19 youth 
219220
218 All in Gulu District unless otherwise stated.
219 It proved to be impossible to limit the number of interview participants in the group interviews 
my research assistants and I carried out in the rural areas. Usually, as soon as my research assis-
tants had announced our arrival and arranged the interview setting, the majority of the villagers 
came over to observe and/or participate in the interview. In the end, this often turned out to be 
an advantage, because big discussions emerged between the participants which reflected quite a 
number of different voices and perspectives.
220 The ages of the people considered youth and elders respectively greatly varied in the different 
interview contexts. The youth-elder ratios given here are rough estimates based on the self-defini-
tions given by the interview participants. 
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Short Biography of Most Important Interlocutors9.5. 
Name No. of Meetings/
Conversations
Details
Akello 50 Akello, 19 at the time of my research, was one of my most 
important interlocutors during my stay in Gulu. I first met 
her in the weekly sessions of the “Gulu Taling Straight” 
hip hop project, where I also met Simon. Akello had to 
drop out of school in Senior 3 because her parents could 
no longer afford to pay her school fees. During the time 
of research, she was working in different unskilled jobs in 
order to earn money to sustain herself and her one-year 
old daughter, but in her free time she sometimes partici-
pated in hip hop contests and was well-known in the lo-
cal scene. Over the course of my stay in Gulu, we became 
close friends and usually met at least once a week. She 
often took me to see and talk with her family, introduced 
me to the hip hop scene and the life of young people in 
Gulu, and accompanied me to different events.
GYC staff 41 Gulu Youth Centre was one of my central research ven-
ues and the people who worked and volunteered there 
were very important interlocutors throughout my stay. 
They accepted me as a volunteer and I often joined the 
youth talk sessions, helped out at the reception desk or 
accompanied the outreach to VCT-sessions in the rural 
areas and at public events in Gulu. I learned many as-
pects about youth and youth life from the different staff 
members and by speaking to the young people who 
came to GYC for youth services. 
Hip Hop 
Group
26 The “Gulu Talking Straight” hip hop project consisted of 
approximately 20 young people (in their late teens and 
early twenties) and two “trainers”. The aim of the project 
was to train the participants in creative writing and 
other basic music skills and then give each participant 
the chance to record a song in a record studio after their 
training. I found out about the project by coincidence 
from one of the staff members at Gulu Youth Centre. 
From the beginning, I joined nearly all of the bi-weekly 
training sessions and thus established close contact to
334 Julia Vorhölter: Youth at the Crossroads
the group. I conducted interviews with some of the par-
ticipants and spent a lot of time at the project, especially 
in the first phase of my research. Even after the project 
had officially ended I maintained sporadic contact with 
some of the young hip hoppers. 
Fred 24 Fred, 25 at the time of my research, was another very 
important interlocutor and close friend. He was the 
chairperson of the GUTA traditional dance group and 
I met during one of my first visits to the group. After 
a while, we also started to meet outside of the dance 
practice sessions and he introduced me to many places 
and events in Gulu. We often had very long conversa-
tions and debates about culture and cultural changes, 
life of young people in Gulu, gender relations, Western 
influences on Uganda, politics and other topics pertain-
ing to my research. Fred had finished university and after 
some months of unemployment started to work for a 
government agency. 
GUTA 21 The “Gulu Theatre Artists” (GUTA) were a “cultural 
group”, consisting of male and female children and 
youth between the ages of roughly ten to thirty who 
met regularly to practice and perform traditional Acholi 
dances. Throughout my stay in Gulu, I visited their dance 
practices and their performances in public venues and at 
dance competitions on a regular basis. I also conducted 
interviews with a number of the GUTA members and 
some became regular and important interlocutors. 
Williams 20 I already met Williams, in his mid-20s, during my first stay 
in Gulu. He was working in one of the local internet cafes 
and I often had lengthy conversations with him when 
I went there to check my emails. He had just finished 
university and many of his friends, who had also finished 
university and were not yet working and/or were not 
yet married, came to hang out at the internet place. All 
of them were big fans of English Premier League soccer 
and I sometimes joined them to watch a game. I also 
often accompanied Williams and his friend to the weekly 
pub quiz at one of the bars in Gulu. Thus, I gained some 
insights into the lives of ‘elite youth’ in Gulu. 
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Julie 19 Julie, in her late 20s, was my flat mate and colleague at 
IPSS. She came from a middle-class, highly educated 
family and had grown up in Kampala. We often had 
lengthy conversations about life in Gulu and ‘ordinary 
Acholi society’, which Julie, although she was half-Acholi 




15 I was introduced to Florence, in her 30s, and her four chil-
dren, by Lioba, a fellow German anthropologist, whom I 
met and became close friends with in Gulu (see below). 
Florence lived alone with her children in a little village 
setting at the outskirts of Gulu. She had a basic level of 
education and throughout her life had been working 
in a number of different unskilled jobs with in-between 
periods of being unemployed. Florence had experienced 
life in Gulu before and during the war and often told us 
about these times. She was also a great proverb- and 
story-teller and had a big repertoire of cultural knowl-
edge. I usually met with Florence, her children and Lioba 
to have dinner; sometimes I also visited her at her place 




14 Akello often took me to visit her family home and I 
developed a close relationship especially with her father 
Okello and her brother Samuel. Since her mother could 
only speak Acholi our conversations remained fairly 
limited. I also met some of Akello’s other brothers and 
sisters as well their children. The regular visits to Akello’s 
family enabled me to get a good insight into Acholi fam-
ily relations.
Joel 13 Joel, in his late 20s, was one of the “trainers” of the 
hip hop project. He called himself a music artist and 
producer and had recently landed a relatively success-
ful song, which was played on the local radio stations. 
Joel introduced me to the Gulu hip hop scene and I even 
recorded a song with him and one of his friends in one of 
the local record studios. 
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Ruth 12 Ruth, in her late 20s, worked at Gulu Youth Centre and 
over time became an important interlocutor and friend. 
I sometimes visited her at her place in the outskirts of 
Gulu, where she lived with her 9-year-old son. Ruth often 
talked to me about gender and family relations and 
the difficult situation of women in Acholi society. She 
once took me to visit her father and his family in Lamwo 
district, which was a very inspiring and insightful trip for 
me. 
Simon 10 Simon, 18 at the time of my research, was a participant 
in the hip hop project, where I first met him and often 
chatted with him during and after the training sessions. 
We remained in touch even after the project was finished 
and I met him on a fairly regular basis in town, at hip hop 
events or when I visited his youth cultural group. Simon 
was a very open converser and I was often amazed and 
amused by the stories he told me about the Gulu youth 
scene. Simon dropped out of A-Level and tried to pursue 
a hip hop career but in a recent telephone conversation 
(December 2012) I learned that he had taken up his stud-
ies again. 
Opio 10 Opio, also in his mid-20s, was a friend of Williams and 
I usually met him on Thursday night for the pub quiz. 
He had also finished university and was looking for a 
job. Opio was one of the most politically-interested and 
critical people I met and we often had interesting discus-
sions about Ugandan politics, elite corruption, but also 
cultural affairs and social relations in Acholi society. 
Christopher 4 Christopher, in his 40s, was another person who was 
introduced to me by Lioba. Christopher was a real 
‘self-made man’ and entrepreneur, involved in all sorts 
of businesses. He was also a stern supporter of ‘Acholi 
traditions’ and often ‘lectured’ Lioba and me on Acholi 
customs and conventions. Christopher had two wives 
and a number of children and had recently started to 
partly settle back to the rural areas. Like Florence, he was 
also a great story-teller and ‘cultural expert’. 
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Joseph 4 I met Joseph, 20 at the time, at Gulu Youth Centre, where 
he later came to work as a volunteer. He wrote a lot of 
poetry in which he talked about his life experiences as a 
young man in Uganda. He often showed me his poetry 
and sometimes we had lengthy debates about some of 
the topics he talked about, especially Ugandan politics. 
Towards the end of my stay, I had some very long and 
thought-provoking conversations with Joseph and even 
after I left he continued to send me some of his poetry. 
Lioba I did not count 
the times I met 
Lioba, but as we 
became close 
friends, were col-
leagues at IPSS, 
and lived in close 
proximity, we saw 
each other nearly 
every day of my 
fieldwork.
Lioba is a fellow German anthropologist, whom I met 
and became close friends with in Gulu. Lioba has been 
living in Gulu for several years and is working as a re-
searcher and senior lecturer at the Institute of Peace and 
Strategic Studies. Lioba was a very important interlocu-
tor during my fieldwork, not only as a friend, but also in 
her function as an anthropologist and resource person. 
She often gave me valuable advice on my research and 






















Based on eleven months of field work (2009-2011), this book analyzes the situation of youth in urban Gulu, Northern Uganda, in the a ermath of the war between the Lord’s Resistance 
Army and the Ugandan Government (1986-2006). Specifically, it focuses on the generation that 
was born and grew up during the 20-year war: How do members of this generation perceive and 
evaluate socio-cultural changes which occurred in Acholi society throughout the war years? 
How do they imagine their future society? And how do they react to the expectations directed at 
them by their elders? In order to answer these questions, the book draws on rich ethnographic 
material. It provides an in-depth analysis of how imaginations of the post-war society are 
contested and negotiated between di erent groups of social actors – youth and elders, men 
and women as well as local, national and international actors. While some try to re-establish 
former cultural practices and conventions and call for a ‘retraditionalization’ of Acholi society, 
others lobby for ‘modernization’ and attempt to establish ‘new’ social structures, values and 
norms which are strongly influenced by local understandings of ‘the Western culture’. The book 
presents numerous examples of the multiple and complex ways young people strategically 
position themselves in these debates and make use of the various discourses on culture, 
tradition and modernity in their negotiations of generational, gender, family, and peer-to-peer 
relations. 
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